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	THE	PINBOARD	AND	THE	PARADOX	OF	PAIN:	AN	EXPERIMENT	OF	
POST-EPISTEMOLOGICAL	METHOD	IN	REPRESENTING	THE	LIVED	
EXPERIENCE	OF	PERSISTENT	PAIN		LEIGH	ROONEY		
ABSTRACT	This	thesis	is	about	the	crisis	in	representation	that	accompanies	the	attempt	to	account	for	lived	experience,	with	particular	reference	to	bodily	pain	in	social	science.	The	diagnosis	of	this	problem	of	experience	identifies	epistemology	as	an	inappropriate	means	of	knowing	that	initiates	a	translational	paradox	unable	to	satisfy	the	simultaneous	demands	of	making	lived	experience	familiar	in	representational	form	yet	retaining	the	foreignness	of	the	original	experience	at	the	same	time.	This	problem	of	simultaneity	is	not	a	problem,	however,	if	it	is	built	into	a	way	of	knowing,	something	that	escapes	epistemological	conditions	of	possibility	with	its	either/or	of	singularities.	To	know	in	such	‘double	vision’,	or	fractionally,	characterises	post-epistemological	thinking.	This	thesis	draws	on	a	relatively	underdeveloped	method	for	practicing	a	fractional	means	of	knowing	from	post-	actor-network	theory,	that	of	the	pinboard,	and	explores	how	it	might	be	usefully	applied	to	the	problem	of	experience.	The	thesis	constitutes	an	experiment	in	producing	a	social	science	account	of	the	lived	experience	of	chronic	pain	using	this	method	as	an	alternative	to	conventional	epistemological	techniques	that	initiate	the	problem	of	experience.	Through	initial	theoretical	discussion,	followed	by	reflection	on	its	practical	application	involving	the	construction	of	fractional	accounts	of	lived	experience	for	five	participants	experiencing	chronic	pain	(interviewed	individually	over	several	sessions),	the	pinboard	is	developed	as	a	technique	that	seeks	to	maintain	‘double	vision’	whilst	inherently	resisting	attempts	to	resolve	the	juxtaposition	it	makes	visible,	enacting	and	engaging	in	an	
ontological	politics	with	conventional	methods	of	social	analysis.	This	includes	discussion	of	how	the	method	might	be	transported	from	methodological	knowledge	spaces	to	effectively	intervene	on	such	conventional	methods.
							
THE 	P INBOARD 	AND 	THE 	PARADOX 	OF 	PA IN 	
AN	EXPERIMENT	OF	POST-EPISTEMOLOGICAL	METHOD	IN	REPRESENTING	
THE	LIVED	EXPERIENCE	OF	PERSISTENT	PAIN	
			 Leigh	Rooney		Submitted	in	fulfilment	of	the	requirements	for	the	degree	of		Doctor	of	Philosophy			Department	of	Sociology	Durham	University	2019
	 ii	
Table	of	Contents	
LIST	OF	ABBREVIATIONS	..................................................................................................................................	VIII	ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	..........................................................................................................................................	X	INTRODUCTION	..........................................................................................................................................................	1		PART	I : 	THEORY	CHAPTER	1:	A	NARRATIVE	OF	SUCCESSION	–	BIOMEDICAL	AND	INTEGRATIVE	PARADIGMS	INTRODUCTION	...........................................................................................................................................................	5	BIOMEDICAL	PAIN:	ENLIGHTENMENT	AND	DESPAIR	IN	BIOMEDICINE	..............................................................	5	The	narrowness	of	biomedical	definition	(part	1)	...............................................................................................	6	The	narrowness	of	biomedical	definition	(part	2)	...............................................................................................	9	Biomedical	ineffectiveness	..........................................................................................................................................	11	CORRECTING	BIOMEDICAL	FAILURE:	THE	INTEGRATIVE	PARADIGM	...............................................................	12	Providing	an	embodiment	account:	narrative	....................................................................................................	14	CHAPTER	CONCLUSION	............................................................................................................................................	17	CHAPTER	2:	THE	PARADOX	OF	PAIN	EXPERIENCE	INTRODUCTION	.........................................................................................................................................................	19	ONTOLOGISING	THE	OBJECTIFICATION	OF	PAIN	..................................................................................................	20	THE	PARADOX	OF	PAIN:	ABSENT	PRESENCE	........................................................................................................	21	PAIN	AS	‘ONTOLOGICALLY	NEGATIVE’	...................................................................................................................	23	
THE	CHRONIC	PAIN	PATIENT:	ON	PAIN’S	CAUSE	AND	EXPERIENCE	....................................................................	25	CHAPTER	CONCLUSION	............................................................................................................................................	27	CHAPTER	3:	REPRESENTATION	AND	THE	RHETORICAL	TURN	INTRODUCTION	.........................................................................................................................................................	29	THE	RHETORICAL	NATURE	OF	ACCOUNTS	OF	PAIN	.............................................................................................	30	RHETORIC	AND	THE	TRANSPARENCY	OF	TRANSLATION	....................................................................................	31	A	SECOND	READING	OF	RHETORIC:	ON	THE	IMPOSSIBILITY	OF	TRANSLATION	..............................................	33	The	problem	of	foreignness	........................................................................................................................................	33	The	signifier-signified	relationship	and	the	production	of	authoritative	knowledge	.......................	35	
						TRANSLATION	AND	EPISTEMOLOGY	..............................................................................................................................	36	‘A	new	authority	of	the	same	conventions’:	reflexivity	as	rhetorical	device	.........................................	37	
						UNPICKING	READINGS	OF	RHETORIC:	THE	EXPERIENCE	OF	A	NARRATIVE	RESEARCHER	..............................	39	CHAPTER	CONCLUSION	............................................................................................................................................	40	
ACCOUNTING	FOR	PAIN	EXPERIENCE:	BEYOND	TRANSLATION	............................................................................	41	
	 iii	
CHAPTER	4:	AFTER	TRANSLATION	INTRODUCTION	.........................................................................................................................................................	43	PAIN	AS	NON-OBJECT	...............................................................................................................................................	44	RE-READING	PAIN	AS	NON-OBJECT:	TWO	RESPONSES	........................................................................................	47	AFTER	TRANSLATION:	A	FIRST	RESPONSE	...........................................................................................................	47	An	unbridgeable	dualism	.............................................................................................................................................	47	Defining	the	indefinable:	the	return	of	the	problem	of	simultaneity	........................................................	49	AFTER	TRANSLATION:	A	SECOND	RESPONSE	(OR,	ACCEPTING	RHETORIC	IN	FULL)	.....................................	51	On	closure:	the	definitive	attitude	of	translational	representation	...........................................................	52	
						CLOSURE	AND	‘THE	EVENT’	.............................................................................................................................................	54	‘Double	vision’:	on	allegory	.........................................................................................................................................	55	CHAPTER	CONCLUSION	............................................................................................................................................	58	CHAPTER	5:	THE	PRACTICE	OF	(CENTRING	AND)	DECENTRING	INTRODUCTION	.........................................................................................................................................................	59	DECENTRING	AND	ATTENDING	TO	PRACTICE	......................................................................................................	59	
WIDER	LITERATURE	ON	PRACTICE:	NON-REPRESENTATIONAL	THEORY	...........................................................	62	TYPES	OF	PRACTICE:	DISTRIBUTION	AND	COORDINATION	................................................................................	63	
ON	THE	IMPORTANCE	OF	FRACTIONAL	PRACTICE	.................................................................................................	65	CHAPTER	CONCLUSION	............................................................................................................................................	66	CHAPTER	6:	INTERVIEW	RESEARCH	AND	THE	LIVED	EXPERIENCE	OF	PAIN	INTRODUCTION	.........................................................................................................................................................	67	CONTEMPORARY	METHODOLOGICAL	UNDERSTANDINGS	OF	INTERVIEWS	.....................................................	68	Pain	and	the	interview	..................................................................................................................................................	68	The	interview	in	context	...............................................................................................................................................	69	
						A	FIRST	READING	OF	RHETORIC	IN	INTERVIEW	RESEARCH	....................................................................................	71	THE	PROCESS	OF	PRODUCING	THE	OBJECT	OF	PAIN	EXPERIENCE	....................................................................	76	Social	analysis:	centring	the	object	..........................................................................................................................	76	Decentring	through	attending	to	interview	practice	.......................................................................................	78	Multiplicity	and	its	space-time	distribution	.........................................................................................................	79							TELOS	AND	THE	‘TEMPORALITY	OF	THWARTED	CONNECTION’	............................................................................	81	Multiplicity	and	controversy	in	the	interview	....................................................................................................	82	Epistemological	appropriation	of	the	controversy	...........................................................................................	83							CLARIFYING	CONTROVERSIES	..........................................................................................................................................	86	CHAPTER	CONCLUSION	............................................................................................................................................	88	
FIRE	STARTERS:	TWO	READINGS	OF	CRITICAL	INTERLOPING	..............................................................................	89			
	 iv	
CHAPTER	7:	PINBOARDS	......................................................................................................................................	92	INTRODUCTION	.........................................................................................................................................................	92	ONTOLOGICAL	POLITICS:	TWO	READINGS	OF	FRACTIONAL	INTERVENTIONS	................................................	93	
THE	FRACTIONAL	NATURE	OF	FRACTIONALITY:	ENCOUNTERING	FRACTIONALITY’S	NON-RELATIONAL	.......	95	
ON	THE	GOOD	OF	CHOOSING	TO	BE	FRACTIONAL	...................................................................................................	96	AFFIRMING	THE	NON-RELATIONAL	.......................................................................................................................	97	Pinboards	as	interference	............................................................................................................................................	97	Method	assemblages:	pinboard	processes	...........................................................................................................	99							METHOD	ASSEMBLAGES	AND	THE	INTERVIEW	........................................................................................................	101	Empiricism	(i):	constructing	naivety	....................................................................................................................	102	Empiricism	(ii):	the	(im)perfections	of	small	miracles	.................................................................................	104	Empiricism	(iii):	resistance	to	cosmology	..........................................................................................................	106							PINBOARDS	AND	LIVED	EXPERIENCE	..........................................................................................................................	107	CHAPTER	CONCLUSION	.........................................................................................................................................	108	
TWO	READINGS	OF	ABDUCTION	AND	THE	CONTROVERSY	.................................................................................	109	CHAPTER	8:	METHOD	INTRODUCTION	......................................................................................................................................................	113	(1)	CHOOSING	A	METHOD	ASSEMBLAGE	TO	INTERFERE	UPON	.....................................................................	113	Interviewing	a	single	case:	on	the	authentic	individual	...............................................................................	114	Open-ended	interview	protocol:	achieving	depth	...........................................................................................	117	Repeat	interviews	..........................................................................................................................................................	119	Interview	length	.............................................................................................................................................................	119	Thematic	analysis	..........................................................................................................................................................	119	(2)	DEMONSTRATING	ROBUSTNESS	OF	THE	INTERVENTION	........................................................................	120	(3)	DETAILS	OF	METHOD	.....................................................................................................................................	121	Study	design	.....................................................................................................................................................................	121							ON	THE	FRACTIONALITY	OF	FRACTIONAL	PRACTICE	..............................................................................................	121	Participants	......................................................................................................................................................................	122	Data	collection	.................................................................................................................................................................	122	Analysis	..............................................................................................................................................................................	122	Ethics	...................................................................................................................................................................................	125		PART	II : 	PRACTICE	INTRODUCTION	TO	PART	II	.............................................................................................................................	127	CHAPTER	9:	STEPHANIE	FIRST	MOVEMENT:	A	NARRATIVE	OF	ADJUSTING	TO	PAIN	.............................................................................	128	(1)	‘The	accident’	and	the	problems	of	pain	......................................................................................................	128	(2)	Stoicism	and	the	rejection	of	‘weakness’	.....................................................................................................	132	
	 v	
(3)	Conflict	between	the	need	for	help	and	the	stoic	attitude	...................................................................	135	(4)	A	compromise	to	come	........................................................................................................................................	137	SECOND	MOVEMENT:	THE	UNRAVELLING	OF	STOICISM	..................................................................................	139	An	extended	field	of	vision	........................................................................................................................................	139	From	intermediaries	to	mediators	.........................................................................................................................	141							THE	GOOD,	THE	BAD,	AND	THE	FRACTIONAL	............................................................................................................	146	INTERVIEW	REFERENCES	.....................................................................................................................................	150	CHAPTER	10:	ERIC	FIRST	MOVEMENT:	THE	AVOIDANCE	OF	DECLINE	............................................................................................	153	(1)	Pain,	painkillers,	and	exercise	..........................................................................................................................	153	(2)	Motivational	crisis	and	Eric	as	the	‘younger	man’	...................................................................................	154	(3)	Uncertain	resolution	.............................................................................................................................................	157	SECOND	MOVEMENT:	FAILURE	AND	THE	ABJECT	.............................................................................................	161	The	threat	of	the	Other	................................................................................................................................................	161	Making	failure	present	................................................................................................................................................	163	Polluting	success	............................................................................................................................................................	164	Failure	as	necessary	and	impossible	.....................................................................................................................	166							THESIS	AS	PINBOARD,	INTERVIEW	AS	FIRE	OBJECT	................................................................................................	166	INTERVIEW	REFERENCES	.....................................................................................................................................	167	CHAPTER	11:	ALICE	FIRST	MOVEMENT:	THE	(UN)MAKING	OF	ILLNESS	..........................................................................................	170	(1)	Functional	neurological	symptoms	................................................................................................................	170	(2)	Living	an	unreality	of	illness	.............................................................................................................................	172	(3)	Making	FNS	real	......................................................................................................................................................	175	SECOND	MOVEMENT:	MULTIPLE	MULTIPLICITIES	...........................................................................................	179	Part	I:	Finding	humanity	.............................................................................................................................................	180							TWO	READINGS	OF	(IN)HUMANITY	.............................................................................................................................	183	Part	II:	The	void	as	reclusion	....................................................................................................................................	185	Part	III:	On	the	ontology	of	pain	..............................................................................................................................	189							POTENTIALITY,	ACTUALITY,	AND	BEETLE	BOXES	....................................................................................................	191	INTERVIEW	REFERENCES	.....................................................................................................................................	192	CHAPTER	12:	JUDITH	FIRST	MOVEMENT	NARRATIVE	(SUMMARISED)	...............................................................................................	195	‘SECOND	MOVEMENT’	NARRATIVE	(SUMMARISED)	.........................................................................................	196	SEARCHING	FOR	SECOND	READINGS	...................................................................................................................	198	
EVALUATING	THE	EXECUTION	OF	THE	PINBOARD	METHOD	......................................................................................	200	INTERVIEW	REFERENCES	.....................................................................................................................................	201		
	 vi	
CHAPTER	13:	MARY	FIRST	MOVEMENT:	COORDINATING	CONFIDENCE	AND	ANXIETY	..................................................................	202	Intermediate	narrative	I:	salvation	and	strength	............................................................................................	203	(1)	Illness	suffering	and	medical	salvation	...................................................................................................	203	(2)	Growth	through	suffering	.............................................................................................................................	205	Intermediate	narrative	II:	negative	judgement	from	others	......................................................................	208	(1)	Disbelief	from	others	.......................................................................................................................................	208	(2)	Reactions	to	disbelief	......................................................................................................................................	209	Coordinating	a	new	narrative	..................................................................................................................................	213	(1)	Distribution	and	rejection	.............................................................................................................................	213	(2)	Transformation	into	a	coordinated	narrative	......................................................................................	214	SECOND	MOVEMENT:	LOVE	AND	HATE	..............................................................................................................	216	Mother	as	abuser	...........................................................................................................................................................	216	The	necessity	of	love	....................................................................................................................................................	220							TRANSITORY	VERSUS	OBDURATE	MEDIATORS	.........................................................................................................	223	INTERVIEW	REFERENCES	.....................................................................................................................................	224	CHAPTER	14:	DISCUSSION	INTRODUCTION	......................................................................................................................................................	227	PINBOARDS	AND	TIME	..........................................................................................................................................	227	Pinboards	and	space	.....................................................................................................................................................	227	Space	as	time	...................................................................................................................................................................	228	Obdurate	interferences	and	the	neutralisation	of	space-as-time	.............................................................	231							EXPOSING	THE	VIRTUAL:	TWO	READINGS	OF	HESITATION	...................................................................................	232	How	to	enact	obdurate	interferences	...................................................................................................................	234	FROM	METHODOLOGICAL	TO	INSTITUTIONAL	PRACTICE	...............................................................................	235	Methodological	laboratories	.....................................................................................................................................	235							‘WAYS	OF	THINKING	UNUSUAL’	IN	SOCIAL	SCIENCE	......................................................................................	236	Knowledge	spaces	.........................................................................................................................................................	237	Negotiating	between	knowledge	spaces	.............................................................................................................	238							THE	STICKINESS	OF	KNOWING	......................................................................................................................................	240							HELPING	PEOPLE	IN	PAIN:	TWO	READINGS	OF	THE	EXPERIENCE	OF	CHRONIC	PAIN	....................................	242	CHAPTER	CONCLUSION	.........................................................................................................................................	244	CHAPTER	15:	CONCLUSION	.............................................................................................................................	246	
TWO	WAYS	OF	ENACTING	A	FLAT	ONTOLOGY	......................................................................................................	250	
DEVELOPING	THE	PINBOARD	................................................................................................................................	251	
TWO	READINGS	OF	AN	INTERVENTION	ON	EPISTEMOLOGY	..............................................................................	252	
THE	FINAL	WORD:	ON	DISCONCERTMENT	...........................................................................................................	253		
	 vii	
APPENDICES	APPENDIX	1:	REFLECTION	ON	INTERVIEW	PRACTICE	....................................................................................	256	APPENDIX	2:	PARTICIPANT	INFORMATION	SHEET	..........................................................................................	260	APPENDIX	3A:	CONTACT	FORM	(PPI	VARIANT)	................................................................................................	267	APPENDIX	3B:	CONTACT	FORM	(NON-PPI	VARIANT)	......................................................................................	269	APPENDIX	4:	RECRUITMENT	LETTER	(PPI	PATIENTS)	....................................................................................	271	APPENDIX	5:	PARTICIPANT	INFORMED	CONSENT	FORM	................................................................................	273	APPENDIX	6:	JUDITH	(FULL	ANALYSIS)	.............................................................................................................	275	First	movement:	a	narrative	of	restitution	.........................................................................................................	275	(1)	Conflict	between	demands	to	function	and	caution	in	functioning	............................................	275	(2)	The	negotiated	return	to	normality	..........................................................................................................	278	(3)	‘Unknown	quantities’:	empirical	uncertainty	in	decision-making	..............................................	280	(4)	Normality	out	of	reach	....................................................................................................................................	282	Second	movement:	an	interest	story	on	loneliness	........................................................................................	285	(1)	Loneliness	and	being	a	‘loner’	.....................................................................................................................	285	(2)	Defending	against	loneliness	.......................................................................................................................	289	Interview	references	....................................................................................................................................................	292	REFERENCES	...........................................................................................................................................................	295			
	 	
	viii	
LIST	OF	ABBREVIATIONS	
	ANT:	actor-network	theory	CBT:	cognitive	behavioural	therapy	ESRC:	Economic	and	Social	Research	Council	FNS:	functional	neurological	symptoms	GP:	general	practitioner	IPA:	interpretative	phenomenological	analysis	MPQ:	McGill	Pain	Questionnaire	MS:	multiple	sclerosis	NEDTC:	North	East	Doctoral	Training	Centre	NHS:	National	Health	Service	NRS:	numerical	rating	scale	OPP:	obligatory	passage	point	PPI:	patient-public	involvement	RA:	rheumatoid	arthritis	STS:	science	and	technology	studies	TNF:	tumour	necrosis	factor	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 ix	
	
	
‘The	copyright	of	this	thesis	rests	with	the	author.	No	quotation	from	it	should	be	published	
without	the	author's	prior	written	consent	and	information	derived	from	it	should	be	
acknowledged.”														
	 x	
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	
First	and	foremost,	I	am	indebted	to	Tiago	Moreira	for	his	assistance	throughout	the	process	of	producing	this	thesis.	He	has	provided	insight,	reassurance,	and	patience	in	the	highest	measure,	and	I	am	sincerely	thankful	for	his	supervision.	Second,	I	thank	Roy	Sturgess	for	many	years	of	ongoing	philosophical	discussion	and	friendship	starting	well	before	the	start	of	this	project.	I	have	been	inspired	and	guided	by	his	wisdom	in	applying	the	kinds	of	ideas	discussed	in	this	thesis	to	the	living	of	life.	I	am	also	grateful	to	the	discussions	and	friendships	of	the	many	others	I	have	met	through	the	Newcastle	Philosophy	Society,	of	which	I	have	similar	sentiments.	Third,	I	thank	‘Physiotherapist	A’	(who	must,	unfortunately,	remain	anonymous	to	prevent	deductive	disclosure	of	participant	identities)	for	his	unending	kindness	and	effort	in	facilitating	the	recruitment	of	participants.	He	quite	literally	saved	the	project	when	an	existing	recruitment	strategy	fell	through	at	the	eleventh	hour,	and	was	committed	to	both	helping	me	get	the	study	through	the	exacting	National	Health	Service	(NHS)	research	ethics	process	and	ensuring	I	then	obtained	the	participants	required.	It	was	sincerely	heartening	that	someone	would	be	so	plentiful	with	their	time,	effort,	and	goodwill.		Fourth,	I	am	very	grateful	to	the	five	participants	who	took	part	in	the	study.	They	invited	me	into	their	lives,	spent	many	hours	in	diligent	discussion	with	me	whilst	experiencing	persistent	pain,	and	without	their	involvement	there	could	be	no	thesis.	I	felt	close	to	them	all,	and	I	am	thankful	for	their	warmth	and	openness.	Fifth,	thank	you	to	Fiona	Jackson	for	assisting	on	everything	and	anything	related	to	administration,	which	was	always	offered	with	a	much-appreciated	personal	touch.	Thanks	also	to	those	at	the	Wolfson	Institute	for	Health	and	Wellbeing	for	being	so	accommodating	in	offering	a	venue	for	many	of	the	interviews,	in	particular	Jennifer	Cook.	I	am	also	grateful	to	Teresa	Henley	for	providing	assistance	in	formatting	the	thesis	document.	Sixth,	warmest	thanks	to	Kim	Jamie	for	her	guidance	and	feedback	on	developing	the	NHS	research	ethics	submission,	and	to	Paul	Harrison	for	offering	his	time	to	usefully	discuss	the	central	issues	of	this	thesis	with	me.	Thanks	also	to	Peter	Grundy	for	providing	clarification	on	some	technical	terminology	from	pragmatics.		Seventh,	I	am	grateful	to	Steve	Brown	and	Brian	Castellani	for	thoroughly	reading	and	engaging	with	the	thesis,	and	offering	helpful	suggestions	for	its	improvement.	Eighth,	I	thank	Denis	Martin	for	giving	me	a	large	degree	of	freedom	to	pursue	my	own	research	agenda	whilst	working	as	his	research	assistant	in	the	years	prior	to	the	start	of	
	 xi	
this	study,	and	for	having	the	confidence	in	me	to	follow	through	with	that	agenda.	It	was	through	this	work	that	the	basis	of	the	thesis	was	developed.	Ninth,	I	am	grateful	to	the	Economic	and	Social	Research	Council	(ESRC),	via	the	North	East	Doctoral	Training	Centre	(NEDTC),1	for	providing	the	studentship	that	has	made	the	production	of	this	thesis	financially	possible	(grant	reference	ES/J500082/1),	and	to	the	NEDTC	for	affording	a	wonderful	space	in	which	to	work	during	my	unsocial	writing	and	reading	hours.	Thank	you	to	Fadhila	Mazanderani	for	working	with	me	to	produce	the	proposal	for	this	studentship,	Magdalena	Ietswaart	and	Denis	Martin	for	kindly	providing	references	for	my	application	(and	for	their	general	support	in	the	years	beforehand),	and	to	Angela	Woods	for	offering	lots	of	initial	direction	in	finding	supervisors.	Thanks	too	to	fellow	PhD	students	and	staff	in	the	Department	of	Sociology	(formerly	School	of	Applied	Social	Sciences)	at	Durham	University	who	I	have	met	over	the	years	for	their	support	and	company,	particularly	those	who	have	been,	at	one	stage	or	another,	cloistered	away	in	the	eaves	of	room	201.	Tenth,	I	thank	friends	near	and	far	for	their	friendships	over	the	years,	despite	me	being	more	antisocial	than	ever.		Finally,	I	would	like	to	offer	loving	gratitude	to	my	mother,	father,	aunty,	uncle,	nanna,	and	granddad	for	sustaining	me	in	all	ways	throughout	this	enterprise.	These	constitute	that	which	could	hardly	be	included	in	the	content	of	the	thesis,	but	on	whose	presence	its	production	was	entirely	dependent.
																																								 																					
1	Which	has	now	been	succeeded	by	the	Northern	Ireland	and	North	East	Doctoral	Training	
Partnership.	
	 xii	
								 Dedicated	to	Vienna	and	Jim.		If	there	was	ever	a	clearer	expression	of	the	‘wicked	problems’	of	the	world	and	our	forlorn	attempts	at	making	them	benign,	it	is	in	the	death	of	those	we	would	wish	to	live	forever.		
	 1	
INTRODUCTION	
What	does	it	mean	to	know	or	be	a	‘self’?	For	Moreira	and	Palladino	(2005)	the	self	is	the	
effect	of	the	interaction	between	multiple	contradictory	“organizational	logics”	that	structure	the	material	and	semiotic	world	(p.	57).	Indeed,	it	might	be	seen	as	a	necessary	space	that	permits	negotiations	between	these	different	regimes,	a	common	reference	point	“to	which	it	is	possible	to	return	or	from	which	it	is	possible	to	depart	and	differ”	(p.	74).	However,	for	one	of	the	authors	(Moreira)	there	is	the	potential	that	the	intersection	of	contradictory	logics	does	not	have	to	rely	on	effecting	a	self.	This	can	be	found,	for	example,	in	the	interview	participant	who	refuses	to	participate	in	methods	that	enact	them	as	a	definable	subject,	which	in	turn	serves	to	highlight	the	work	such	methods	do	to	achieve	the	interview	subject	and	the	possibility	that	it	might	be	otherwise	(Callon	&	Rabeharisoa,	2004).	This	raises	the	possibility	of	a	“move	towards	obscurity	and	indeterminate	ways	of	being”,	where	“the	ability	to	position	and	recognize	oneself	in	action	is	progressively	lost”	(Moreira	&	Palladino,	2005,	p.	75).	Yet	the	enactment	of	this	self-less	state	very	much	involves	the	constitution	of	the	self,	since	it	involves	moving	from	a	self,	to	“	‘slip	through’	the	tightly	fitted	links	between	our	environments	and	ourselves	and	not	find	ourselves	any	more”	(p.	76,	emphasis	in	original).	Most	significantly,	we	might	say	that	“this	erasure	is	[…]	never	complete”,	and	that	what	Moreira	and	Palladino	describe	is	subjectivity	as	loss	(Wylie,	2010,	p.	108).	Indeed,	across	human	thinking	there	remains	a	“persistence	of	an	undisturbed	humanism”,	that	is,	a	“persistence	of	beliefs	in	the	inviolate,	coherent	and	given	existence	of	a	free-standing	‘creative’	subject	–	an	undisturbed	‘I’	who	feels,	speaks,	expresses”	(p.	102).	We	may	even	be	aware,	following	Julia	Kristeva,	of	a	horror	involved	at	the	loss	of	the	self	(Felluga,	2011a).	If	the	message	that	a	material-semiotic	conception	of	the	self	offers	is	that	“we	are	not	always,	already”,	then	it	is	a	message	that	has	not	been	well	received	(Moreira	&	Palladino,	2005,	p.	76,	emphasis	in	original).		But	more	precisely,	subjectivity	as	loss	captures	the	tension	that	is	involved	in	giving	definition	(such	as	in	a	‘self’)	to	lived	experience,	a	“tension	between	making	the	experience	visible	and	the	obscurities	it	produces	in	the	very	process	of	representation”	(p.	76).1	Indeed,	to	know	or	be	a	self	means	to	somehow	apprehend	the	relationship	involved	in	this	tension.	To	explore	this	problem	of	experience	is	to	perhaps	explore	the	history	of	philosophy	itself,	which	might	be	regarded	as	a	collective	attempt	to	come	to	terms	with	such	tension.	This	thesis	does	not	add	anything	novel	to	such	wisdom,	but	is	rather																																									 																					
1	Kristeva’s	concept	of	the	abject	captures	an	associated	tension	between	horror	and	fascination	with	the	points	at	which	the	(incomplete)	breakdown	of	the	self	is	made	visible.	See	Chapters	7	and	10.	
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concerned	about	its	influence.	For	it	contends	that	contemporary	methods	of	knowing,	constituted	as	they	are	with	epistemological	conditions	of	possibility,	are	unable	to	deal	with	the	problem	of	experience,	enacting	it,	instead,	as	a	paradox	that	is	barely	yet	relentlessly	papered	over.	This	thesis	can	be	understood	as	engaging	in	a	sort	of	political	activism	that	seeks	to	find	an	alternative	method	better	equipped	to	deal	with	knowing	lived	experience.	It	experiments	with	one	particular	method,	that	of	the	pinboard,	in	the	specific	context	of	how	social	science	might	come	to	account	for	the	lived	experience	of	pain.	Part	I	of	the	thesis	constitutes	a	theoretical	exploration	of	the	problem	of	experience	in	this	specific	context	and	how	it	might	be	approached	methodologically.	Chapters	1	to	3	outline	the	nature	of	the	problem,	including	the	representation	of	the	lived	experience	of	pain	by	medical	sociology	and	related	fields	(Chapter	1),	a	common	paradoxical	ontology	of	pain	experience	(Chapter	2),	and	a	wider	crisis	in	representing	lived	experience	in	social	science	(Chapter	3).	Chapter	4	considers	how	the	problem	of	experience	might	be	addressed.	Starting	from	techniques	that	have	tried	to	represent	pain	as	a	non-object,	the	thesis	settles	on	a	theoretical	approach	that	claims	to	be	able	to	hold	both	sides	of	the	tension	in	the	problem	of	experience	(presence	and	absence)	in	a	‘knowing	in	tension’	described	as	
fractionality.	Chapters	5	to	7	discuss	how	fractionality	might	be	practiced.	This	is	regarded	as	making	visible	a	‘decentring’	movement	arising	from	an	attention	to	the	practices	of	social	analysis	(Chapter	5),	something	that	is	examined	in	the	particular	context	of	interview	research	(Chapter	6).	This	practice	is	formalised	into	the	more	technical	instrument	of	the	
pinboard,	a	relatively	underdeveloped	concept	that	is	significantly	elaborated	upon	in	Chapter	7.	Chapter	8	completes	Part	I	by	operationalising	the	pinboard	into	a	method	that	was	then	carried	out	to	test	its	viability	in	producing	fractional	accounts	of	the	lived	experience	of	pain.	This	consisted	of	repeat	one-on-one	interviews	with	5	participants	experiencing	chronic	pain.	Part	II	concerns	the	practice	of	the	method	developed	in	Part	I.	Chapters	9	to	13	each	present	a	pinboard	of	an	individual	participant	and	their	narrative	of	chronic	pain	experience	(though	in	Chapter	12	it	is	suggested	that	a	pinboard	cannot	be	readily	produced).	Following	the	elaboration	of	the	pinboard	method	in	Part	I,	these	each	consist	of	two	‘movements’	where	juxtaposition	is	captured	as	part	of	a	process	of	a	narrative	encountering	that	which	does	not	fit.	This	is	an	approach	to	the	pinboard	that	combines	its	use	as	a	surface	of	juxtaposition	with	the	ongoing	nature	of	the	processes	of	analysis,	as	well	as	a	committed	empiricism	from	a	‘naive’	observer.	Throughout	Chapters	9	to	13,	and	more	extensively	in	Chapter	14,	there	is	a	reflection	on	the	execution	of	this	method.	In	particular,	Chapter	14	focuses	on	how	the	pinboard	manages	time,	suggesting	that	fractionality	can	only	be	enacted	when	the	resolution	to	the	juxtaposition	cannot	be	readily	projected	as	a	possibility.	Having	used	this	reflection	to	suggest	how	the	method	might	be	refined,	the	
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second	half	of	Chapter	14	considers	what	would	be	involved	in	transporting	it	from	the	methodological	space	of	the	thesis	to	the	institutional	spaces	that	this	thesis	wishes	to	intervene	on.	Finally,	Chapter	15	draws	together	the	main	themes	of	the	thesis	into	a	conclusion.	It	does	so	through	introducing	a	particular	way	of	considering	the	functioning	of	fractionality,	that	of	syncretism,	and	suggesting	that	conventional	syncretic	accounts	are	politically	inert	insofar	as	their	enactment	of	fractional	subjectivity	does	not	have	any	effect	on	the	epistemological	methods	they	observe.	By	contrast,	the	pinboard	method	developed	in	this	thesis	permits	the	shift	from	perspectives	necessary	for	effective	intervention.	Whilst	this	method	is	offered	as	a	means	to	address	a	methodological	problem	of	representation	in	accounting	for	the	lived	experience	of	pain	within	a	particular	section	of	social	science,	it	is	relevant	to	the	same	problem	in	wider	research	into	lived	experience,	and	as	part	of	an	even	wider	post-epistemological	project.	But	perhaps	most	fundamentally	it	offers	a	very	modest	contribution	towards	highlighting,	and	tentatively	coming	to	terms	with,	an	existential	problem	of	what	it	means	to	be.
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CHAPTER	1:	A	NARRATIVE	OF	SUCCESSION	–	BIOMEDICAL	AND	INTEGRATIVE	PARADIGMS	
INTRODUCTION	
This	opening	chapter	outlines	two	ways	that	pain	has	been	conventionally	represented	in	academic	literature	in	social	science:	the	‘biomedical’	and	‘integrative’	paradigms.	Social	science	has	tended	to	promote	a	narrative	of	succession	between	these,	where	a	failed	biomedical	project	is	replaced	with	an	integrative	one.	As	part	of	this	narrative,	a	picture	of	biomedicine	is	constructed	where	its	perceived	flaws	come	to	represent	the	centrality	of	what	a	biomedical	representation	of	pain	is.	Even	biomedicine’s	historical	development	becomes	constructed	from	the	perspective	of	this	narrative	of	succession,	with	its	(integratively-perceived)	maladies	charted	from	their	historically	distant	origins	to	become	central	tenets	in	its	oppressively	modern	present.	From	these	flaws	arise	the	structure	of	the	integrative	paradigm,	which	might	be	broadly	characterised	as	a	post-modern	reaction	to	the	biomedical	‘exclusion’	of	patient	experience,	or	more	simply	‘mind’,	due	to	the	latter’s	mechanistic	focus	on	‘body’.	However,	the	chapter	argues	that	the	inclusive	goals	of	the	integrative	paradigm	instigate	a	representational	paradox	that	the	biomedical	model	had	actually	avoided.	In	trying	to	represent	experience,	it	paradoxically	makes	the	attempt	to	represent	what	it	simultaneously	defines	as	un-representable.	The	chapter	thus	ends	by	flipping	the	narrative	of	succession	on	its	head,	and	sets	the	scene	for	a	more	detailed	examination	of	this	paradox	of	representation.	
BIOMEDICAL	PAIN:	ENLIGHTENMENT	AND	DESPAIR	IN	BIOMEDICINE	
The	biomedical	paradigm	has	probably	been	the	most	influential	means	of	representing	pain	in	both	this	century	and	the	last,	reflecting	a	wider	dominance	in	defining	health	and	illness.	Nevertheless,	what	has	increasingly	given	the	biomedical	model	its	definition	in	contemporary	thought	is	criticism	of	the	way	it	functions.	Indeed,	Nettleton	(2013)	notes	how	the	field	of	sociology	of	health	and	illness	is	largely	constituted	as	a	reaction	against	the	biomedical	model.	Here	the	model	is	understood	as	an	insensitive,	mechanistic,	and	often	oppressive	way	of	doing	health	and	illness,	at	odds	with	later	20th	century	notions	of	social	justice	and	inclusion.	This	framing	contrasts	with	the	way	in	which	medical	science	was	imbued	with	hope	in	18th	Century	Europe,	containing	as	it	did	the	Enlightenment	promise	of	progress	through	reason	(Porter,	1999).	Notably,	this	was	itself	a	reaction	to	the	“ogres	of	error	and	blind	authority”	that	had	(in	this	view)	theretofore	constituted	man’s	approach	to	medicine	(p.	246).	
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But	even	histories	of	medicine	must	necessarily	be	informed	by	contemporary	interpretations	of	health	and	illness.	Thus,	Joanna	Bourke’s	(2014)	history	of	pain	charts	how	increasingly	since	the	18th	Century	the	patient’s	personal	account	was	“stripped	of	any	significance	beyond	the	rudimentary	information	imparted	by	the	cry	‘It	hurts	here!’	”	(p.	132,	emphasis	in	original).	This	is	a	gradual	muting	(or	by-passing)	of	the	unreliable	patient	voice,	making	way	for	increasing	methodological	rigour	and	technological	advancement	in	diagnosing	a	specific	source	of	pain.	This	reflects	the	contemporary	concern	with	biomedicine’s	traditional	subjugation	of	the	patient	voice,	where	the	patient	surrenders	their	body	to	physicians	and	other	medical	experts	(Frank,	2013).	Emerging	from	the	social	science	critique	of	biomedical	approaches	to	pain	is	a	defining	set	of	assumptions	of	what	biomedicine	is,	re-constructed	in	histories	of	their	emergence	that	also	define	what	it	was.	Nettleton	(2013)	defines	five	of	these	assumptions:	mind-body	dualism,	a	mechanical	metaphor,	the	“merits	of	technological	interventions”,	biological	reductionism,	and	the	“doctrine	of	specific	aetiology”	(the	idea	that	disease	can	be	causally	attributed	to	an	identifiable	object)	(p.	2,	emphasis	in	original).	The	centrality	of	these	assumptions	in	the	narrative	of	succession	derives	from	their	contextualisation	within	three	major	criticisms	of	biomedicine,	which	are	now	discussed	in	turn.	
THE	NARROWNESS	OF	BIOMEDICAL	DEFINITION	(PART	1)	
Insofar	as	we	can	outline	the	contours	of	a	‘biomedical	model	of	pain’,	Bendelow	(2006)	suggests	that	its	central	feature	can	be	traced	back	to	Descartes,	who	considered	pain	in	terms	of	pain	receptors	that	transmit	signals	to	the	brain	–	akin	to	a	bell	that	rings	when	a	chord	is	pulled	(Williams	&	Bendelow,	1998).	This	has	provided	a	template	that	has	persisted	as	the	skeleton	of	a	biomedical	approach	to	representing	pain,	and	forms	the	basis	of	specificity	theory,	the	most	popular	biomedical	conception	of	pain	taught	to	medical	students	today	(Bendelow,	2006).	In	an	updated	version	of	Descartes’	bell-pull,	specificity	theory	posits	that	pain	is	detected	by	pain	receptors	(nociception),	triggering	electrochemical	impulses	that	are	propagated	to	a	pain	centre.	For	Bendelow	(2006,	2010;	Williams	&	Bendelow,	1998),	what	is	inherent	in	this	model	of	pain	is	a	mind-body	dualism	(echoing	Descartes)	that	focuses	exclusively	on	the	‘body’,	which	is	understood	as	a	purely	physical	entity	separate	from	the	‘mind’	(understood	to	incorporate	the	psychological,	social,	and	cultural).	This	“naturalistic”	understanding	of	the	body	assumes	it	“is	a	real	biological	entity,	which	exists	as	a	universal	phenomenon	
irrespective	of	the	social	context	in	which	it	resides”	(Nettleton,	2013,	p.	97,	my	emphasis).	Put	differently,	that	‘nature’	has	a	privilege	or	autonomy	over	culture	is	a	fundamental	assumption	of	Western	Medicine	(Gordon,	1988).	Bendelow	(2006)	suggests	that	even	Melzack	and	Wall’s	(1967)	influential	Gate	Control	Theory,	which	introduced	a	psychological	
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element	through	positing	that	the	strength	of	the	impulse	travelling	from	a	pain	receptor	can	be	reduced	before	reaching	the	central	nervous	system	through	the	action	of	cognitive	inputs,1	has	failed	to	change	“the	traditional	biomedical	paradigm	which	divorces	mental	from	physical	states”	(Bendelow,	2006,	p.	61).	This	ignorance	of	the	psycho-socio-cultural	in	the	biomedical	definition	constitutes	the	first	criticism	of	biomedicine	highlighted	here.	The	biomedical	attempt	to	account	for	pain	is	given	meaning	through	this	sociological	critique	of	the	absence	of	‘mind’	in	these	accounts.	In	other	words,	the	biomedical	model	becomes	to	be	understood	as	much	by	what	is	absent	as	what	is	present.	Thus,	Nettleton’s	(2013)	five	assumptions	of	biomedicine	(noted	above)	all	derive	at	least	part	of	their	meaning	from	the	absence	of	the	psychological,	social,	and/or	cultural.		The	mechanical	metaphor	is	critical	to	the	way	in	which	biomedicine	is	understood:	the	human	body	is	a	machine	to	be	repaired.	In	this	metaphor,	pain	is	an	expression	of	a	fault	with	the	machine,	to	be	repaired	via	technological	interventions,	which	might	be	pharmacological	(such	as	injections	of	steroids	and/or	local	anaesthetics)	or	non-pharmacological	(such	as	using	heat	or	radio	waves	to	destroy	nerves)	(Hegarty	&	Murphy,	2012).	Lorimer	Moseley’s	(2007)	book	Painful	Yarns	provides	explicit	illustration	of	the	mechanical	metaphor.	A	collection	of	short	stories	that	provide	metaphors	to	“explain	to	[pain	patients]	what	we	now	know	about	the	biology	of	pain”	(p.	4),	in	three	of	these	stories	the	painful	body	is	presented	as	a	broken	vehicle.	As	Painful	Yarns	suggests	via	the	complex	metaphors	with	which	it	uses	to	‘explain’	pain,	identification	of	the	fault	of	the	body-as-machine	requires	the	seeking	of	specific	biological	entities	as	the	cause	of	pain	(specific	aetiology).	These	are	to	be	“located	within	the	anatomical	frame”	(Nettleton,	2013,	p.	75)	–	locating	pain	within	“the	interior	space	of	the	body”	(p.	76).	The	soul,	the	spirit,	the	mind,	the	consciousness	of	the	patient	plays	no	role	in	this	technical	exercise,	and	simply	acts	as	spectator	as	the	clinician	works	on	charting	and	then	fixing	the	lifeless	machine	(and	who	may	then	explain	the	mechanics	to	the	spectator).	‘Mechanical’	is	read	through	an	understanding	of	its	absent	opposites:	‘consciousness’	and	‘feelings’,	a	lack	that	nevertheless	yearns	to	be	fulfilled	in	a	restoration	of	humanity.2	Notably,	the	charting	of	the	(mechanical)	body	has	largely	privileged	the	visual.	For	pain,	there	is	a	search	for	“an	object	with	an	interior	space	knowable	through	[primarily]	visual	means”	(Rhodes,	McPhillips-Tangum,	Markham	&	Klenk,	1999,	p.	1192,	square	brackets	in	original),	with	its	ultimate	contemporary	expression	in	x-rays	and	brain	scanning.	Even	as	
																																								 																					
1	This	proposes	that	cognitive	inputs	can	excite	cells	that	inhibit	neurons	transmitting	impulses	from	pain	receptors,	reducing	the	intensity	of	pain.	The	‘gate’	is	thus	closed.	2	As	the	Tin	Man	noted:	“Just	because	I’m	presumin’	/	That	I	could	be	kind	of	human	/	If	I	only	had	a	heart”	(Arlen	&	Harburg,	1939/1995).	
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the	patient-as-spectator	devolves	responsibility	for	their	body	to	the	expert	clinician	to	chart,	their	role	in	simply	helping	to	define	the	clinician’s	mechanics	has	been	gradually	degraded	throughout	the	evolution	of	modern	medicine.	Bourke	(2014)	suggests	that	technological	interventions	like	x-rays	that	can	visually	show	some	pain	aetiology	have	emerged	as	ways	to	by-pass	the	‘mind’	of	the	patient	altogether,	which	biomedicine	regards	as	an	unreliable	way	of	charting	the	mechanics	of	the	body.	The	‘mind’	of	the	patient	becomes	increasingly	separate	from	its	‘body’,	ignored	and	isolated	even	in	the	process	of	helping	to	chart	its	own	alienated	mechanical	body.	This	is	evident	in	Keefe	and	Smith’s	(2002)	review	of	pain	behaviour	observation	protocols,	which	are	designed	to	diagnose	pain	pathology	based	upon	the	observation	of	patient	behaviours.	The	authors	thus	highlight	how	some	studies	“have	found	that	chronic	pain	patients	are	inaccurate	in	reporting	on	their	own	behavior”	(p.	123,	my	emphasis).	This	notion	of	the	unreliable	mind	is	even	given	a	technical	term:	“reactivity”	(p.	123).	Reactivity	is	the	tendency	of	a	patient	to	change	their	behaviour	in	the	presence	of	an	observer,	and	is	something	that	the	Keefe	and	Smith	posit	as	a	problem	to	be	avoided.	Indeed,	they	recommend	“providing	the	patient	with	little	information	about	the	specific	pain	behaviors	being	coded”	(p.	123).	Implicit	in	the	narrative	of	succession	is	that	privileging	body	over	mind	is	bad:	it	is	unethical	to	understand	(and	thus	treat)	people	as	heartless	machines.	Yet	this	has	also	been	made	explicit.	Such	literature	can	be	placed	into	two	categories:	moral	and	epistemological.	Arthur	Frank’s	(2013)	Wounded	Storyteller	epitomises	the	former	category.	Frank	discusses	the	switch	from	a	premodern	to	modern	experience	of	illness	where	the	technical	expertise	of	modern	medicine	comes	to	subjugate	the	patient’s	experience.	Following	the	argument	made	thus	far	about	the	bypassing	of	the	(unreliable)	mind	of	the	patient	in	favour	of	a	technical	mapping	of	the	patient	body,	Frank	suggests	that	the	narrative	of	a	patient’s	illness	becomes	devolved	to	the	physician.	This	“narrative	surrender”	of	the	construction	of	a	patient’s	illness	is	a	“central	moment	in	modernist	illness	experience”	(p.	6,	emphasis	in	original).	Frank	identifies	this	as	an	oppression	of	the	patient,	albeit	deriving	from	a	drive	towards	helping	patients	through	scientific	and	technical	progress.	Indeed,	Western	modern	medicine	has	thus	developed	as	a	“benevolent	form	of	colonialism”	(p.	11),	where	the	cost	of	scientific	progress	is	only	later	shown	in	the	moral	despair	of	the	social	systems	that	this	progress	has	established	(see	also	Kleinman,	1988).	And	just	like	post-colonialism,	Frank	(2013)	argues	that	the	colonised	have	finally	begun	to	assert	their	right	to	their	assets:	a	right	for	the	patient	to	have	a	say	in	the	construction	of	their	illness	experience.	
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Health	care	practitioners	working	within	a	biomedical	paradigm	are	framed	as	“insensitive	to	the	patient’s	needs	and	disaffirming	of	the	illness	experience”	(Kleinman,	Brodwin,	Good	&	DelVecchio	Good,	1992,	p.	6).	Hydén	and	Peolsson	(2002)	highlight	how	the	patient’s	expressions	are	valued	only	insofar	as	they	are	“reports	of	objective	physical	conditions”	(p.	327).	The	meaning	of	the	illness	to	the	patient	is	“diagnostically	irrelevant”	(Steen	&	Haugli,	2000,	p.	583).	Leone	et	al.’s	(2012)	exploration	of	the	experience	of	physicians	treating	pain	in	cancer	patients	suggests	they	experienced	patients’	pain	as	“a	wall	that	moves	away	the	patient”,	constructing	pain	as	“a	non-human	subject	to	care	[for]	or	even	to	cure”	(p.	104).	Whilst	this	argument	shoots	the	scientific	rationalism	of	biomedicine	through	with	an	unforeseen	moral	failure,	the	narrative	of	succession	also	suggests	that	biomedicine	is	simply	not	good	science:	that	it	fails	on	its	own	terms.	This	position	is	set	out	most	prominently	in	a	paper	by	George	Engel	(1977).	Similar	to	the	argument	thus	far,	Engel	characterises	biomedicine	as	preoccupied	with	a	biological	reductionism	constructed	in	terms	of	a	mind-body	dualism	where	‘mind’	is	entirely	absent.	Indeed,	for	Engel,	a	psychiatrist,	the	dominance	of	biomedicine	within	his	discipline	had	created	a	crisis	over	what	to	do	about	mind	given	psychiatry’s	historical	preoccupation	with	it.	Engel	agrees	with	the	principle	that	models	of	illness	inherently	(naturally)	arise	to	designate	the	sick,	understand	them,	and	attempt	to	help	them.	This	a	kind	of	scientific	rationalist	approach	to	illness	that	is	sometimes	positioned	as	central	to	the	subjugation	of	the	patient	voice:	a	rationalism	that	has	no	room	for	humanity.	Yet	Engel	argues	that	the	issue	with	the	biomedical	model	is	that	it	does	not	go	far	enough	in	the	rationalism	that	is	applied.	In	focussing	exclusively	on	the	body,	shorn	of	mind,	the	biomedical	model	fails	to	take	into	account	the	“behavioral	and	psychosocial	data”	required	to	properly	understand	and	react	to	disease	(p.	132).	The	“social,	psychological,	and	behavioral	dimensions	of	illness”	(p.	129)	are	compliments	to	the	biological.	All	require	consideration	in	order	to	“account	for	the	reality”	of	a	particular	disease	(p.	131).	In	this	sense,	biomedicine	provides	an	inadequate	model	of	illness	because	the	reality	of	illness	encompasses	more	than	just	the	biological.	Engel’s	article	is	best	known	for	proposing	an	alternative	medical	model:	the	biopsychosocial	
model.	Deriving	from	both	moral	and	scientific	critiques	of	biomedicine,	the	biopsychosocial	model	was	proposed	as	the	next	stage	in	the	evolution	of	medicine.	But	it	did	not	quite	provide	the	restitution	of	mind	that	was	desired.	
THE	NARROWNESS	OF	BIOMEDICAL	DEFINITION	(PART	2)	
Bendelow	(2010)	points	out	that	whilst	the	naturalistic	body	shorn	of	‘mind’	is	a	defining	characteristic	of	biomedicine,	it	is	not	simply	that	biomedicine	excludes	the	psychological,	social,	and	cultural	aspects	of	pain	that	is	problematic.	For	Bendelow,	the	more	fundamental	issue	is	that	the	mind-body	dualism	that	biomedicine	expresses	fractures	the	experience	of	
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illness	into	distinct	realms,	when	it	is	actually	lived	as	a	single	whole.	Even	a	physician	working	within	a	biopsychosocial	framework	may	refer	the	biomedically	unexplained	chronic	pain	patient	to	a	psychologist	or	psychiatrist	whilst	simultaneously	maintaining	the	purity	of	a	biological	‘domain’	where	mind	is	just	as	separate	from	the	body	as	it	is	in	a	biomedical	model.	In	so	allowing	pain	to	become	compartmentalised	in	this	way,	the	fracturing	of	lived	experience	along	the	mind-body	dualism	continues	to	be	propagated	within	medicine.	Indeed,	Kleinman	et	al.	(1992)	suggest	that	whilst	psychology	challenges	biomedical	reductionism,	it	continues	to	partition	pain	through	“focusing	exclusively	on	the	psychological	sources	of	pain”	(p.	10),	on	only	‘mind’	rather	than	mind	and	body	together.	Moreover,	Harding,	Campbell,	Parsons,	Rahman,	and	Underwood	(2010)	highlight	how	clinicians	using	a	biopsychosocial	framework	often	ended	up	focussing	on	a	psychological	explanation,	and	Dansie	and	Turk	(2013)	point	to	the	continuing	duality	within	pain	assessment	where	“the	report	of	symptoms	is	attributed	to	either	somatic	or	psychogenic	mechanisms”	(p.	19,	emphasis	in	original).		Instead,	the	notion	of	the	lived	experience	of	pain	becomes	an	important	term	in	the	narrative	of	succession.	This	is	because	“the	patient’s	experience	of	pain	is	lived	as	a	whole”	rather	than	the	“fragmented	[…]	series	of	dichotomies	that	represent	the	deep	cultural	logic	of	biomedicine”	(Kleinman	et	al.,	1992	p.	8,	my	emphasis).1	In	short,	the	biomedical	model,	and	even	a	‘biopsychosocial’	model	premised	on	compartmentalisation,	is	identified	as	problematic	because	it	lacks	the	holism	inherent	in	lived	experience.2	Reflecting	this,	a	common	narrative	of	qualitative	health	research	on	pain	has	been	to	explore	patient	perceptions	of	a	biomedical	diagnostic	procedure	and	find	that	the	procedure	fails	to	appreciate	the	way	that	pain	is	a	‘lived	experience’.	Thus,	one	study	into	the	perceptions	of	a	numerical	rating	scale	(NRS)	for	pain	in	postoperative	pain	assessment	found	that	patients	“described	that	a	number	did	not	tell	enough	about	how	they	experienced	their	pain”	(Eriksson,	Wikström,	Årestedt,	Fridlund	&	Broström,	2014,	p.	44).	In	another	study	the	“general	view	expressed	by	the	majority”	of	its	participants	(patients	with	chronic	back	pain)	was	that	the	NRS	“did	not	adequately	capture	the	complexity	of	their	personal	experience	of	pain”	(Hush,	Refshauge,	Sullivan,	De	Souza	&	McAuley,	2010,	p.	650).	Ong,	Hooper,	Jinks,	Dunn,	and	Croft	(2006)	found	that	back	and	knee	pain	participants	who	filled	out	structured	questionnaires	standardly	used	to	clinically	assess	pain	experience	faced	a	“restricted	format”	(p.	86)	that	resulted	in	the	spontaneous	inclusion	of	annotations																																									 																					
1	Kleinman	et	al.	(1992)	explicitly	note	these	dichotomies,	all	of	which	can	be	observed	as	some	variation	of	mind-body	dualism:	“[p]hysiological,	psychological;	body,	soul;	mind,	body;	subjective,	objective;	real,	unreal;	natural,	artificial”	(p.	8).	2	Note	that	Engel	(1977)	used	the	words	‘holistic’	and	‘integrated’	in	reference	to	his	biopsychosocial	model,	but	less	in	the	sense	of	creating	a	seamless	whole	than	proposing	the	addition	of	social,	psychological,	and	behavioural	determinants	of	the	construction	of	illness	alongside	the	biological.	
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on	the	questionnaire	as	well	as	supplementary	letters.	This	spontaneity	is	presented	as	a	spilling	over	of	lived	experience	into	a	medical	model	that	is	not	designed	to	recognise	it.	For	Ong	et	al.,	their	study	reveals	the	need	to	establish	“assessment	tools	more	relevant	to	the	experience	of	people	suffering	from	musculoskeletal	pain”,	as	part	of	developing	“patient-centred”	health	care	(p.	87).	These	understandings	are	more	than	Engel’s	(1977)	demand	for	the	incorporation	of	“behavioral	and	psychosocial	data”	(p.	132)	as	compliments	to	biological	data	in	a	scientifically	rational	medical	model.	They	are	calls	for	the	appreciation	of	illness,	and	of	pain	specifically,	to	be	understood	as	a	holistic	lived	experience.	
BIOMEDICAL	INEFFECTIVENESS	
Despite	Engel’s	(1977)	call	for	a	new	medical	model,	he	was	careful	to	highlight	the	positive	impact	of	biomedicine.	Indeed,	his	proposed	biopsychosocial	model	can	be	seen	not	so	much	as	a	replacement	to	a	biomedical	model,	but	as	an	extension	through	the	addition	of	social,	psychological,	behavioural,	and	cultural	dimensions.	Thus,	Engel	writes	of	biomedicine’s	“record	of	astonishing	achievement	in	elucidating	mechanisms	of	disease	and	devising	new	treatments”	(p.	129)	despite	his	fervent	criticism	of	it.	Yet	just	as	his	biopsychosocial	critique	later	morphed	into	a	deeper	issue	about	the	fracturing	of	lived	experience,	this	triumphant	view	of	biomedicine	has	also	come	to	be	viewed	increasingly	critically.	Nettleton	(2013)	discusses	how	the	positive	advances	of	biomedicine	have	been	associated	with	negative	consequences	that	were	either	not	realised	or	were	underplayed	within	the	biomedical	narrative.	A	common	example	cited	is	the	development	of	antibiotics	in	the	mid-20th	Century.	Against	the	biomedical	triumphalist	narrative	of	an	antibiotic	‘revolution’	is	set	the	increasingly	limited	nature	of	their	effectiveness	following	the	development	of	bacterial	resistance.	Moreover,	Nettleton	also	argues	that	advances	in	health	have	come	more	from	social	changes	rather	than	medical	interventions.	These	critiques	challenge	the	traditional	narrative	of	the	effectiveness	of	biomedicine	as	an	organised	response	to	illness.	In	particular,	the	persistent	pain	patient	has	become	expressive	of	biomedical	ineffectiveness.	‘Chronic	pain’	is	medically	defined	as	pain	that	persists	for	a	minimum	period	of	time,	such	as	3	to	6	months	(Merskey	&	Bogduk,	1994).	In	terms	of	prevalence,	a	survey	by	Breivik,	Collett,	Ventafridda,	Cohen,	and	Gallacher	(2006)	of	over	46,000	adults	from	15	European	countries	and	Israel	suggested	19%	had	experienced	persistent	pain	for	at	least	6	months.	The	ineffectiveness	of	the	biomedical	model	in	chronic	pain	is	twofold.	First,	chronic	pain	in	patients	can	remain	“medically	unexplained”	(Ciaramella	et	al.,	2004,	p.	13).	Quite	simply,	biomedical	models	of	pain	cannot	account	for	why	pain	exists	in	such	patients.	Second	(and	often	reflecting	the	first	failure),	attempts	at	repairing	the	chronically	pained	body-as-machine	often	fail,	or	are	only	temporarily	effective.	Thus,	Turk	(2002)	
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found	that	none	of	the	medical	interventions	for	chronic	pain	that	he	examined	eliminated	pain	for	the	majority	of	patients,	and	Breivik	et	al.	(2006)	found	that	40%	of	a	sample	of	adults	experiencing	chronic	pain	were	dissatisfied	with	their	treatment.		Even	amongst	the	remaining	60%	in	the	Breivik	sample,	pain	is	not	cured,	but	“adequately	controlled”	(p.	305).	The	fact	that	chronic	pain	is	‘managed’	is	insufficient	for	a	biomedical	narrative:	the	desire	to	fix	the	body	remains.	Corrigan,	Desnick,	Marshall,	Bentov,	and	Rosenblatt’s	(2011)	exploration	of	first-year	medical	students’	encounters	with	chronic	pain	patients	stressed	that	in	addition	to	a	difficulty	students	felt	in	dealing	with	the	uncertainty	of	the	cause	of	the	pain,	they	experienced	similar	discomfort	in	realising	that	“they	could	not	cure”	(p.	1218).	Similarly,	Patel,	Peacock,	McKinley,	Carter,	and	Watson	(2008)	found	that	general	practitioners’	(GPs’)	inability	to	treat	and	manage	a	patient’s	chronic	pain	became	“progressively	more	frustrating”	for	them,	causing	some	to	“question	their	medical	training	and	value	to	the	community”	(p.	74).	The	inability	to	provide	a	cure	has	been	suggested	to	produce	stress,	lack	of	satisfaction,	and	guilt	in	health	care	professionals	(Matthias	et	al.,	2010),	and	might	develop	into	a	sense	of	failure	(Kristiansson,	Brorsson,	Wachtler	&	Troein,	2011;	Lindberg	&	Engström,	2011).	Here	biomedical	ineffectiveness	leads	to	fundamental	doubt	in	the	value	of	the	biomedical	model	by	those	most	invested	in	it.	
CORRECTING	BIOMEDICAL	FAILURE:	THE	INTEGRATIVE	PARADIGM	
It	is	from	these	criticisms	that	the	contemporary	biomedical	model	has	become	re-constructed	in	sociology,	wrested	from	a	triumphalist	biomedical	narrative	of	modernist	medicine.	And	as	part	of	this	re-construction,	a	new	model	of	illness	has	taken	shape	in	its	place,	one	based	upon	Engel’s	embryonic	biopsychosocial	model.	Reflecting	the	shift	from	the	critique	of	biomedicine	as	the	exclusion	of	‘mind’	to	its	fracturing	of	lived	experience,	Engel’s	(1977)	‘biopsychosocial	model’	has	increasingly	been	defined	as	promoting	a	‘holistic’	approach	to	the	lived	experience	of	illness	rather	than	simply	the	inclusion	of	the	social,	behavioural,	psychological,	and	cultural	elements	of	disease	alongside	the	biological.	In	this	vein,	Bendelow	(2010)	suggests	an	“integrative	model”	as	a	more	appropriate	medical	model	of	pain	to	replace	the	flawed	biomedical	one	(p.	23).	Bendelow	defines	the	basic	assumptions	of	the	integrative	model	as	the	corrective	opposites	of	the	flawed	assumptions	that	have	come	to	define	the	failed	(or	failing)	biomedical	model	in	the	narrative	of	succession.	Thus	“Mechanistic”	becomes	“Holistic”,	“Body-mind	dualism/reductionism”	becomes	“Interaction	between	body/mind”,	“Single	fundamental	cause	of	illness”	becomes	“Multicausality”,	and	so	on	(p.	23).	Just	as	each	of	Nettleton’s	(2013)	assumptions	of	the	biomedical	model	can	be	characterised	as	lacking	the	lived	
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experience	of	the	pain	sufferer,	a	unifying	principle	of	the	assumptions	of	the	integrative	model	is	that	they	are	integrated	into	the	lived	experience	of	pain.		In	this	regard,	the	concept	of	embodiment	has	come	to	form	the	central	feature	of	the	integrative	model	(Williams	&	Bendelow,	1998).	A	phenomenological	term	deriving	from	Merleau-Ponty,	embodiment	is	a	state	where	the	“self	and	the	body	are	not	separate”	(Nettleton,	2013,	p.	102).	For	Williams	and	Bendelow	(1998)	embodiment	provides	a	way	of	“unifying”	the	divisions	of	mind-body	dualism,	which	they	regard	as	abstract	reifications	(alien	from	lived	experience)	that	“sets	in	train	a	series	of	[…]	unfortunate	consequences,	including	the	ideological	separation	of	nature	from	culture,	reason	from	emotion,	public	from	private,	and	so	on”	(p.	208).	Nevertheless,	they	suggest	that	there	is	an	inevitability	of	having	to	engage	with	the	categories	thrown	up	by	dualism,	which	(following	the	traditional	phenomenological	argument)	are	proposed	to	arise	once	conscious	reflection	on	a	phenomenon	occurs.	Embodiment,	on	the	other	hand,	represents	“the	transcendence	of	duality	at	the	pre-objective	level	of	lived	ongoing	experience”	(p.	209)	(note	the	explicit	link	to	‘lived	experience’,	which	becomes	synonymous	with	‘embodiment’1).	Williams	and	Bendelow	thus	discuss	embodiment	as	an	idealised	end	state.	The	“analytical	potential”	of	the	categories	of	dualism	“must	be	acknowledged	and	engaged	with”	so	that	the	alienating	power	of	the	dualistic	categories	is	reduced	and	(finally)	eliminated	(p.	3).	Indeed,	the	authors	talk	in	terms	of	a	development	trajectory	towards	embodiment:	
Rather	than	dispense	with	these	analytical	categories	[of	dualism]	altogether,	however,	they	must	be	engaged	with	in	order	to	move	‘forward’,	so	to	speak,	to	a	‘third’	stage	of	development;	one	‘prepared	for’,	as	it	were,	by	these	previous	stages	of	conceptual	distinction	and	analytical	elaboration.	(p.	208)	Williams	and	Bendelow	write	of	‘duality’	as	distinct	from	‘dualism’.	Duality	is	an	intermediate	stage	between	dualism	and	embodiment.	It	has	the	same	linguistic	divisions	of	dualism	but	without	more	fundamental	ontological	divisions.	In	this	regard,	it	is	considered	an	“analytically	important”	stage	in	“the	‘development’	of	human	consciousness”	(p.	208).	Duality	is	where	the	“	‘inflection’	of	mind	into	body	and	body	into	mind	can	be	grasped	and	the	binary	divide	effectively	overcome	(without	abandoning	it	altogether)”	(p.	3).	The	concept	of	what	the	higher	stage	of	human	consciousness	(embodiment)	might	properly	look	like	without	dualistic	divisions	is	not	entirely	made	clear,	but	Williams	and	Bendelow	seem	to	express	a	form	of	pragmatism	in	arguing	that	a	“negotiated	settlement”	occurs																																									 																					
1	Many	of	the	‘embodied’	studies	that	Williams	and	Bendelow	(1998)	called	for	at	the	end	of	their	book,	The	Lived	Body,	have	included	representations	of	the	physical	body	as	an	implicit	definition	of	what	embodiment	is	(see,	for	example,	Tarr	&	Thomas,	2011).	I	here	use	embodiment	in	the	sense	that	I	suggest	Williams	and	Bendelow	(1998)	meant	it,	which	is	as	a	lived	experience.	As	they	noted:	theory	should	not	be	“about	bodies”	but	“from	bodies	as	lived	entities”	(p.	209,	emphasis	in	original).	
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between	embodiment	and	the	dualistic	categories	of	conscious	reflection	(p.	162).	This	is	a	settlement	that	is	“never	quite	able	to	return	the	individual	to	their	former	embodied	state	[of	pre-reflective	experience],	[but]	none	the	less	attempts	an	approximation	to	it”	(p.	162).	Considering	that	the	integrative	model	suggests	that	pain	is	best	accounted	for	through	the	concept	of	embodiment	(or	a	‘negotiated	settlement’	approximating	it),	we	might	then	ask	what	an	embodied	account	of	pain	might	look	like.	This	has	been	one	of	the	major	questions	that	the	integrative	paradigm	has	had	to	answer,	particularly	in	terms	of	how	in	practical	terms	an	integrative	model	of	illness	differs	from	a	biomedical	model	or	a	biopsychosocial	model	defined	in	the	spirit	of	Engel	(1977).	The	answer	has	been	provided	from	a	turn	in	the	social	sciences	in	the	later	20th	Century:	the	turn	to	narrative.	
PROVIDING	AN	EMBODIMENT	ACCOUNT:	NARRATIVE	
‘Narrative’	is	a	term	that	social	science	has	been	opening	up	since	the	late	20th	Century.	Narrative,	put	in	the	vague	sense,	is	“someone	telling	something	to	someone	about	something”	(Kearney,	2002,	cited	in	Morris,	2012,	p.	734).	It	has	become	synonymous	with	‘story’:	something	with	a	beginning,	middle,	and	an	end.	A	patient’s	story	has	become	particularly	important	in	the	integrative	reaction	to	biomedicine	because	of	the	relationship	that	narratives	are	purported	to	have	with	lived	experience:	that	the	lives	of	patients	are	
performed	through	the	stories	they	tell.	From	this	perspective,	the	question	of	interest	is	not	simply	“[h]ow	do	people	talk	about	their	lives?”,	but	“[h]ow	do	people	perform	their	lives	in	storied	form?”	(Ochberg,	1994,	p.	117).	An	important	assumption	arises	from	this	position:	that	“the	performative	activity	of	storytelling	constitutes	the	self.	We	are	stories,	stories	are	us”	(Morris,	2012,	p.	734,	emphasis	in	original).	Williams	and	Bendelow	(1998)	suggest	that	an	embodied	account	of	pain	can	be	provided	in	a	patient’s	narrative,	arguing	that	narrative	creates	what	Kleinman	(1988)	describes	as	a	“felt	world	[that]	combines	feeling,	thought,	and	bodily	process	into	a	single	vital	structure	underlying	continuity	and	change	in	illness”	(p.	55).	Indeed,	for	Williams	and	Bendelow	(1998),	narrative	“combines	the	physical,	affective	and	cultural	dimensions	of	human	suffering	in	a	seamless	web	of	lived	experience”	(p.	168).	Put	more	succinctly,	“narratives	are	fundamentally	embodied”	(p.	164),	providing	a	“more	holistic	understanding	of	pain”	(p.	169).	Within	sociology,	narrative	accounts	have	become	a	way	of	accessing	the	holism	of	the	lived	experience	of	illness	as	a	panacea	against	a	fracturing	and	dehumanising	biomedicine.	As	Woods	(2011a)	writes:	
Narrative	is	seen	as	salvation	from	the	biomedical	reductionism;	it	is	a	humanizing	force,	a	vehicle	through	which	to	recover	those	qualities	(empathy,	care,	attentiveness	to	the	whole	person)	deemed	to	be	most	sorely	lacking	from	contemporary	healthcare	[…].	(p.	4)	
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Reflecting	this	understanding	of	narrative,	there	has	been	an	increasing	emphasis	on	the	importance	of	patient	narratives	in	the	response	to	illness.	This	is	reflected,	for	example,	in	Rita	Charon’s	(2001)	concept	of	narrative	medicine,	which	attempts	to	train	doctors	to	listen,	interpret,	and	respond	to	patient	stories	in	order	to	enhance	the	health	care	of	the	patient	within	an	integrative	framework.	The	act	of	listening,	of	“authentic	engagement”	(p.	1899),	becomes	important	in	the	response	to	the	illness	through	recognising	the	particularity	of	the	patient’s	embodied	position	in	the	world	as	opposed	to	their	generic	mechanical	structure.	Similarly,	Arthur	Frank	(2013)	urges	a	thoroughly	embodied	form	of	medical	knowledge	through	his	emphasis	on	listening	to	a	patient’s	story	in	his	“ethics	of	listening”	(p.	25).	Frank,	like	other	theorists	discussed	in	this	section,	equates	the	performance	of	a	narrative	about	experience	with	experience	itself:	the	“truth	of	stories	is	not	only	what	was	experienced,	but	equally	what	becomes	experience	in	the	telling	and	its	reception”	(p.	22,	emphasis	in	original).	Indeed,	the	stories	“become	our	experience	of	those	lives”	(p.	22).	Frank’s	ideas	take	on	a	moral	dimension	through	his	assertion	that	without	being	able	to	perform	a	narrative	of	one’s	experience	there	is	a	diminishing	of	the	self.	Illness	disrupts	narratives	that	a	sufferer	needs	to	experience	the	world,	and	therefore	the	act	of	listening	to	a	patient’s	narrative	takes	on	particular	significance	as	a	necessary	act	for	the	(re-)constitution	of	the	self	in	light	of	an	illness	that	threatens	to	eliminate	it.1	Narrative	representation	of	illness	is	generally	proposed	as	a	way	to	overcome	the	fearful	chaos	imposed	on	a	person’s	life	by	illness	(Biro,	2011;	Charmaz,	1991;	Charon,	2001,	2005;	Frank,	2013;	Kleinman,	1988).	To	represent	in	narrative	means	“to	find	the	words	to	contain	the	disorder	and	its	attendant	worries”,	something	that	“gives	shape	to	and	control	over	the	chaos	of	illness”	(Charon,	2001,	p.	1898).	For	Frank	(2013)	this	involves	drawing	upon	a	socially	shared	repertoire	of	storytelling.	In	particular,	he	contends	that	narrating	illness	draws	from	three	generic	narrative	structures:	restitution,	quest,	and	chaos.	The	first	two	of	these	involve	the	construction	of	a	coherent	narrative	in	time.	A	restitution	narrative	involves	the	storyline:	“Yesterday	I	was	healthy,	today	I’m	sick,	but	tomorrow	I’ll	be	healthy	again”	(p.	77).	The	quest	narrative	“is	defined	by	the	ill	person’s	belief	that	something	is	to	be	gained	through	the	experience”	of	illness,	of	illness	as	“the	occasion	of	a	journey	that	becomes	a	quest”	(p.	115).	By	contrast,	the	chaos	narrative	involves	the	“lack	of	any	coherent	sequence”,	summed	up	as	a	plot	that	“imagines	life	never	getting	better”	(p.	97).	It	is	a	narrative	that	is,	in	its	lack	of	a	coherent	temporal	sequence,	“anti-narrative”	(p.	98,	emphasis	in	original).	Indeed,	it	can	only	be	told	as	a	narrative	when	distance	is	obtained	from	the	noncoherence	of	its	subject	matter,	such	as	retrospectively	or	by	an	external	observer.	“Lived	chaos	makes	reflection,	and	consequently	storytelling,	impossible”	(p.	98).																																									 																					
1	Frank	(2013)	describes	this	fear	of	the	diminishing	of	self	because	of	the	threat	illness	poses	on	the	ability	to	perform	narratives	as	“the	core	issue	of	[his	book,]	The	Wounded	Storyteller”	(xvi).	
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But	whilst	the	plot	of	a	chaos	narrative	involves	the	“voice	of	the	teller	[…being]	lost	as	a	result	of	the	chaos”	(p.	115),	the	act	of	its	telling	constitutes	the	sufferer’s	entry	into	a	system	of	storytelling	in	which	the	promise	of	a	coherent	self	is	offered:	“[c]haos	is	never	transcended	but	must	be	accepted	before	new	lives	can	be	built	and	new	stories	told”	(p.	110).	Like	Frank,	Charmaz	(1991)	discusses	how	people	experiencing	chronic	illness	actively	work	to	maintain	the	coherence	of	a	narrative	of	the	self	in	face	of	an	illness	that	threatens	to	undo	such	coherence.	For	Charmaz,	illness	threatens	to	interrupt	the	narrative	self-concept	developed	by	the	sufferer,	and	may	progress	through	to	intrusion	and	finally	an	
immersion	in	illness	where,	at	its	most	extreme,	attempts	to	find	any	coherent	self-concept	are	limited	to	a	moment-by-moment	struggle	for	coherent	self-definition.	Each	of	these	three	stages	of	self-concept	disruption	is	negotiated	by	the	sufferer	in	an	attempt	to	produce	a	new	coherence	of	self-concept,	which	is	either	achieved	or	else	the	sufferer	struggles	in	an	existence	defined	by	its	lack.	Indeed,	such	is	the	coterminous	nature	of	the	act	of	constructing	a	narrative	self-concept	with	embodied	experience	that	for	Charmaz	illness	experience	is	defined	by	this	struggle	for	coherence.	Yet	the	representational	act	in	producing	such	narratives	constitutes	a	moment	where	the	division	between	lived	experience	and	the	narrative	account	of	that	lived	experience	has	threatened	to	challenge	the	synonymous	relationship	between	‘narrative’	and	‘embodiment’	that	proponents	of	the	integrative	model	have	suggested.	As	qualitative	health	research	has	gradually	collected	and	represented	patient	‘narratives’,	the	distinction	between	the	narrative	account	held	on	a	library	journal	shelf	and	the	lived	experience	it	represents	becomes	obviously	marked.	But	even	when	the	distinction	between	account	and	experience	is	made	explicit,	the	narrative	account	is	typically	positioned	as	a	conduit	for	understanding	lived	experience.	Thus,	Woods	(2011b)	suggests	that	the	“foremost”	role	of	narrative	accounts	across	medical	academic	and	clinical	disciplines	that	employ	it	is	“to	provide	privileged	access	to	the	subjective	experience	of	illness”	(p.	73).		Similarly,	Bendelow	(2010)	suggests	that	phenomenological	accounts	of	illness	act	in	a	similar	way	in	accessing	embodied	experience.	Within	anthropology,	Kleinman	et	al.	(1992)	also	argue	for	“an	ethnography	of	experience	of	persons	afflicted	by	chronic	pain”	(p.	14,	emphasis	in	original)	as	a	means	to	counter	the	fracturing	of	lived	experience	brought	about	by	mind-body	dualism.	This	involves	attempting	“to	provide	an	authentic	representation	of	the	experiences”	of	sufferers	through	ethnographic	accounts	(p.	16).	However,	in	making	salient	the	process	of	producing	narrative	accounts	about	lived	experience,	a	traditional	representational	problem	is	raised.	Merleau-Ponty’s	understanding	of	embodiment	reminds	us	that	“while	we	can	observe	and	experience	empathy	for	another,	
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ultimately	we	can	never	share	entirely	the	other’s	experience,	because	their	experience	belongs	to	their	own	embodied	position	in	the	world”	(Smith,	Flowers	&	Larkin,	2009,	p.	19).	For	phenomenologists	like	Merleau-Ponty,	narrative	accounts	are	what	happen	when	we	begin	to	reflect	on	experience,	to	make	meaning	of	it,	to	objectify	it.	Here	experience	has	a	“pre-objective”	form	that	“has	yet	to	be	reflected	upon,	thought	about,	analyzed	or	conceptualized”	(Throop,	2009,	p.	538).	Objects	such	as	narrative	accounts	about	that	experience	“are	secondary	products	of	reflective	thought	and	conceptualization”	(p.	538).	They	are	distinct	from	lived	experience,	and	cannot	be	used	to	‘access’	that	pre-objective	experience.	Yet	in	regarding	these	concepts	as	the	lived	experience,	or	as	the	conduit	to	attaining	them,	these	secondary	products	threaten	to	become	the	very	alienating	dualistic	concepts	that	the	appeal	to	narrative	attempted	to	avoid.	Each	narrative	account	provided	of	lived	experience	thus	necessarily	means	“betraying	it”	(Jackson,	1994,	p.	221)	because	“representation	is	not	coterminous	with	experience	itself”	(p.	222).	There	is	thus	a	paradox	–	to	be	able	to	begin	to	understand	lived	experience	means	to	represent	it,	yet	this	representation	is	inherently	alien	from	the	lived	experience	itself.	The	integrative	paradigm	faces	the	challenge	of	how	it	can	define	embodied	experiences	without	creating	the	very	same	alienating	concepts	that	it	tries	to	overcome.	
CHAPTER	CONCLUSION	
The	cultural	constructionist’s	icon	can	be	as	inhumanely	artifactual	a	characterization	of	experience,	then,	as	is	the	pathologist’s	histological	slide.	(Kleinman,	1992,	p.	190)	This	chapter	has	outlined	two	conventional	ways	of	accounting	for	pain:	in	biomedical	and	integrative	models.	It	has	suggested	that	sociology	understands	these	medical	models	within	a	narrative	of	succession,	which	firstly	involves	constructing	biomedicine	as	a	failed	health	care	paradigm.	Here	flawed	assumptions	are	understood	as	central	to	defining	biomedicine,	and	histories	created	of	the	rise	of	these	assumptions	like	slowly-growing	malignant	tumours.	The	chapter	categorises	these	flaws	into	three	historically-specific	criticisms.	First,	Engel	(1977)	highlighted	that	the	biomedical	obsession	with	body	over	mind	has	resulted	in	the	exclusion	of	the	behavioural,	cultural,	social,	and	psychological	aspects	of	illness.	This	has	posed	both	ethical	problems	in	the	perceived	‘coldness’	of	biomedicine,	as	well	as	epistemological	ones	because	of	the	exclusion	of	a	whole	host	of	additional	variables	that	can	be	used	to	designate,	understand,	and	respond	to	illness.	With	time,	however,	this	criticism	has	evolved	to	be	about	the	fracturing	of	the	lived	experience	of	illness	into	distinct	domains	along	a	mind-body	dualism.	These	domains	are	removed	from	the	wholeness,	the	“single	vital	structure”	(Kleinman,	1988,	p.	55)	of	lived	experienced,	and	are	alienating	in	their	necessary	disconnect	from	this	holism.	The	dualistic	concept	of	‘body’	
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cannot	simply	be	absolved	by	an	inclusion	of	‘mind’	within	healthcare	as	a	distinct	domain,	since	this	conceptual	category	is	just	as	alien	from	lived	experience	as	the	biomedical	preoccupation	with	the	mechanics	of	‘body’.	Finally,	more	recently	biomedicine’s	effectiveness	at	producing	technological	solutions	to	disease	has	been	challenged,	with	the	technological	‘revolutions’	of	a	triumphalist	biomedical	narrative	becoming	re-defined	as	containing	unforeseen	negative	consequences.	This	is	particularly	the	case	in	the	context	of	pain,	with	‘chronic	pain’	being	constructed	an	often-irresolvable	condition	serving	as	a	personal	and	paradigmatic	expression	of	the	failure	of	biomedicine.	As	biomedicine	fails,	the	narrative	of	succession	proposes	an	alternative	model	of	illness.	This	is	a	model	in	which	its	central	assumptions	are	defined	according	to	a	corrective	contrast	to	the	flaws	characterising	biomedicine.	Originally	a	‘biopsychosocial’	model	based	upon	the	inclusion	of	the	psychosocial	into	biomedicine,	this	new	model	has	increasingly	become	defined	by	its	holistic	integration	of	the	lived	(embodied)	experience	of	illness	into	a	single	whole,	without	splitting	that	lived	experience	into	a	set	of	alienating	dualistic	concepts.	Proponents	of	such	an	‘integrative’	model	suggest	that	whilst	the	dualistic	categories	of	reflective	meaning-making	are	inevitable,	they	are	part	of	an	analytically	important	stage	in	the	gradual	development	of	thinking	towards	a	holistic,	embodied	understanding	of	illness.	As	a	practical	means	to	accessing	these	embodied	experiences,	proponents	of	an	integrative	model	have	suggested	that	narrative	accounts	of	lived	experience	provide	this.	Narratives	of	illness	are	characterised	as	holistic	and	embodied	examples	of,	or	conduits	to	accessing,	the	lived	experience	of	illness.		This	is	the	standard	story	of	the	narrative	of	succession	that	has	become	the	staple	of	sociology,	the	medical	humanities,	and	much	‘alternative’	medicine.	However,	what	has	been	less	visible	in	this	story	is	the	representational	problem	initiated	in	seeking	patient	narratives:	the	act	of	representing	lived	experience	as	a	narrative	account	involves	creating	an	entity	(the	account)	that	is	necessarily	removed	from	that	experience.	The	narrative	account	threatens	to	become	yet	another	alienating	concept,	as	alien	as	the	dualistic	categories	of	biomedicine	that	it	tried	to	replace.	A	paradox	is	initiated	where	the	start	of	understanding	illness	requires	the	objectification	of	the	pre-objective,	the	representation	of	that	which	is	un-representable.	Ironically,	this	is	a	problem	that	biomedicine’s	mechanistic	focus	on	the	body	avoided:	it	never	claimed	to	capture	‘lived	experience’.	This	representational	paradox	is	not	new.	but	one	that	is	by-passed	in	the	narrative	of	succession.	Yet	it	becomes	uniquely	exposed	in	knowing	pain	experience.	As	a	‘thing’	that	escapes	definition,	as	‘beyond	words’,	pain	experience	poses	a	problem	for	an	integrative	account	seeking	to	find	words	for	its	narratives	of	embodied	experience.	It	is	to	this	philosophical	consideration	of	the	ontology	of	pain	experience	that	the	next	chapter	turns.
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CHAPTER	2:	THE	PARADOX	OF	PAIN	EXPERIENCE	
INTRODUCTION	
The	representational	problem	of	accounting	for	experience	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter	is	most	starkly	revealed	when	we	consider	the	nature	of	what	it	means	to	be	in	pain,	of	the	ontology	of	its	experience.	This	account	of	pain	is	more	foundational	than	the	narrative	of	succession	discussed	in	the	last	chapter,	existing	more	in	the	realm	of	metaphysics	than	the	transitory	narratives	of	history.	This	chapter	outlines	three	assumptions	that	underpin	contemporary	understandings	of	pain	experience	and	how	they	are	ontologised:	made	fundamental,	natural,	and	universal	to	the	experience	of	pain.	The	first	is	that	pain	is	experienced	as	a	‘something’	that	can	be	represented,	an	object	that	can	be	accounted	for.	Yet	this	assumption	is	peculiar	because	a	second	key	ontological	assumption	about	the	experience	of	pain	is	that	it	cannot	be	represented,	that	it	is	pre-objective.	Accounts	of	the	experience	of	pain	paradoxically	contain	both	assumptions	despite	their	contradictory	nature:	pain	is	both	present	as	an	object	to	be	contemplated	and	absent	as	pre-objective	experience.	This	paradox	becomes	masked,	however,	through	characterising	pain	as	a	something	that	eludes	definition.	When	pain	is	elusive	it	seems	to	reconcile	the	two	disparate	aspects	of	pain	because	pain	is	present	in	the	form	of	a	promise	of	a	something-to-come,	an	entity	yet-to-be-defined,	but	always	currently	absent.	Embodied	experiences	of	pain	thus	transform	from	an	impossible	concept	(an	objectless	object)	to	a	promise	of	a	present-to-come.	Crucially,	characterising	pain	as	elusive	provides	the	possibility	for	an	embodied	experience	of	pain	to	be	captured	in	a	narrative	account.	It	thus	offers	the	hope	to	the	integrative	paradigm	that	narrative	accounts	of	pain	can	and	will	be	successfully	represent	its	experience.		The	third	and	final	ontological	assumption	of	the	experience	of	pain	is	the	most	important:	its	inherent	negativity.	It	is	this	negativity	–	pain’s	sheer	‘againstness’	–	that	is	simultaneously	pre-objectively	experienced	and	where	the	pain	object	is	born.	Moreover,	it	is	pain’s	negativity	that	works	most	to	ontologise	the	structure	of	the	absent-present	pain	object	because	of	the	undeniability	of	pain’s	againstness.	The	chapter	closes	by	suggesting	that	integrative	accounts	of	pain	cannot	rely	on	narrative	accounts	of	pain	experience	to	generate	an	embodied	understanding	of	it	because	of	the	paradox	inherent	in	the	ontology	of	pain	experience.	Instead,	more	fundamental	questions	regarding	the	contradictory	ontological	nature	of	pain	experience	need	to	be	made	visible	before	an	integrative	model	can	adequately	respond	to	biomedicine.	
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ONTOLOGISING	THE	OBJECTIFICATION	OF	PAIN	
Let	me	introduce	myself	to	you,	I	am	pain.	Not	just	pain,	but	Chronic	Pain.	Sometimes	I	am	a	hot	searing	pain,	other	times	I	am	a	sharp	shooting	pain,	cutting	through	you	like	a	knife.	And	yet	at	other	times	I	am	like	a	root	canal	or	toothache,	that	never	goes	away.	If	left	uncontrolled,	I	will	rob	you	of	your	humor,	I	will	rob	you	of	your	friends	and	rob	you	of	your	dignity.	I	will	rob	you	of	your	job	and	make	your	family	miserable.	I	will	take	away	from	you	everything	that	is	dear	to	you	including	your	very	soul.		You	can	not	see	me,	As	I	am	invisible	to	the	human	eye.	[…]	No	one	wants	me	as	a	friend;	Because	I	Am	The	Enemy!	Many	doctors	fear	me	for	they	don't	or	won't	treat	me!	[…]	I	hide	and	I	lurk	in	somebody’s	body.	(Paula	Baier,	n.d.,	lines	1-14,	27-30,	33)	The	above	poem	about	the	experience	of	pain	personifies	pain.	It	is	a	conscious	entity,	a	‘thing’	that	has	taken	on	sentience	(it	is	a	monster,	even).	The	personification	is	an	extension	of	a	more	fundamental	tenet:	that	pain	as	it	is	experienced	is	an	object,	an	entity,	a	‘thing’.	The	reason	why	this	tendency	to	objectify	stands	out	so	prominently	is	because,	as	is	argued	later	in	the	chapter,	it	exists	hand-in-hand	with	another	definition	of	pain	experience	as	
unable	to	take	objectifiable	form.	This	is	not	novel	to	regard	the	objectification	of	pain	as	such	a	curiosity.	Joanna	Bourke’s	(2014)	history	of	pain	makes	reference	to	Peter	Mere	Latham,	a	physician	writing	on	pain	in	the	19th	Century,	who	asserted	(with	some	degree	of	puzzlement)	that	“I	have	known	many	a	philosopher	[…]	take	to	rating	and	chiding	his	Pain,	as	if	it	were	an	entity	or	quiddity	of	itself”	(cited	in	Bourke,	2014,	p.	4,	emphasis	in	original).	Yet	it	would	seem	that	the	process	of	pain	objectification	has	become	so	naturalised	that	it	has	become	an	ontological	given.	Indeed,	Bourke	argues	that	if	a	history	of	pain	involves	describing	how	pain	has	been	‘done’	by	people,	then	“the	most	dominant	‘doing’	of	pain	is	to	objectify	it	as	an	entity”	(p.	8).	The	tendency	towards	making	pain	objectification	an	ontological	fact	is	perhaps	most	apparent	in	modern	medicine,	with	its	focus	on	a	(particularly	visible)	specific	aetiology	(see	previous	chapter).	Even	Engel’s	(1977)	biopsychosocial	model	involves	reducing	pain	to	a	number	of	distinct	realms,	each	with	its	own	set	of	objects	constituting	the	biopsychosocial	‘data’	of	pain	(and	illness	more	widely).	However,	pain	objectification	is	not	some	peculiarity	of	a	biomedical	(or	biopsychosocial)	paradigm	that	can	be	historically	situated	and	where	alternatives	can	be	thought	and	practiced.	It	is	far	more	ontologised	than	that	in	the	universality	of	its	personal	experience.	
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In	this	regard,	Leder	(1990)	claims	that	pain	exerts	a	“telic	demand	upon	us”	(p.	77,	emphasis	in	original),	something	consisting	of	a	“hermeneutical”	moment	where	the	suffering	of	pain	“gives	rise	to	a	search	for	interpretation	and	understanding”	(p.	78,	emphasis	in	original).	In	this	search	“the	body	becomes	the	object	of	an	ongoing	interpretive	quest”	(p.	78).	For	Leder,	objectifying	the	“body”	as	an	attempt	to	interpret	pain	is	a	fundamental	reality,	an	ontological	given:	“our	very	effort	to	understand	the	nature	of	pain	is	natural”	(Bakan,	1971,	cited	in	Leder,	1990,	p.	78).	
THE	PARADOX	OF	PAIN:	ABSENT	PRESENCE	
In	her	influential	book,	The	Body	in	Pain,	Elaine	Scarry	(1985)	draws	on	Husserl’s	concept	of	
intentionality	to	explain	the	process	of	pain	objectification,	suggesting	that	states	of	mind	are	always	about	some	object.	She	argues	that	bodily	sensation	becomes	objectified,	first	in	symbolisation,	and	ultimately	in	physical	objects.	In	this	understanding,	pain	is	unobjectified	bodily	sensation,	and	intentional	acts	produce	objects	that	serve	to	disembody	us	from	that	pain.	Scarry	considers	this	to	be	“a	framing	identity	of	man-as-creator	within	which	all	other	intimate	perceptual,	psychological,	emotional,	and	somatic	events	occur”	(p.	169).	But	here,	whilst	pain	is	integral	to	the	process	of	objectification,	pain	itself	is	defined	as	the	antithesis	of	objectified	content.	Indeed,	Scarry	defines	pain	as	“an	intentional	state	without	an	intentional	object”	(p.	164).	Here	pain	is	a	state	where	the	symbolic	structures	constituting	the	personal	world	of	lived	experience	become	destroyed,	where	it	is	unmade.	When	we	are	left	with	pure	pain	there	is	only	the	“mute	facts	of	sentience”	(p.	256).	Scarry	here	identifies	a	second	crucial	ontological	assumption	of	pain	as	experienced:	that	it	is	pre-objective,	and	is	defined	only	by	the	absence	of	objects	with	which	to	characterise	it.	In	this	understanding	pain	presents	itself	as	“inaccessible”	to	linguistic	categorisation	(p.	6).		This	second	ontological	assumption	of	pain	experience	contradicts	the	first	(that	this	pain	can	be	named).	But	what	are	two	opposing	assumptions	regarding	the	nature	of	pain	experience	are	actually	intimately	entwined	with	one	another.	Thus,	although	The	Body	in	
Pain	defines	pain	as	the	absence	of	objectified	content,	Scarry	(1985)	goes	on	to	characterise	pain	as	an	object	in	and	of	itself,	an	object	the	sufferer	seeks	definition	for	in	the	attempt	to	rid	it.	This	sets	up	an	impossible	situation:	there	is	an	attempt	to	define	pain	as	an	object,	even	though	its	very	definition	is	the	lack	of	objectified	content.	To	attempt	to	define	what	the	pain	object	is	inevitably	leads	to	a	distinct	lack	of	objects	with	which	to	define	it.	Somehow	pain	is	a	‘something’	that	we	experience	where	the	contours	of	that	something	escape	definition,	a	presence	that	is	at	the	same	time	absent.	Yet	in	the	accounts	that	enact	the	ontology	of	pain	being	outlined	here,	an	interesting	manoeuvre	is	made	that	transforms	the	assumptions	from	incompatible	opposite	to	a	single,	resolvable	problem.	This	occurs	
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through	a	subtle	morphing	of	pain	from	being	defined	as	the	lack	of	objectified	content,	to	being	an	object	that	is	simply	resistant	to	objectification.	Pain	becomes	an	elusive	object	in	experience,	a	“blur”	(Biro,	2011,	p.	38),	whose	presence	as	a	thing	that	we	experience	is	undoubted,	but	with	the	charting	of	its	contours	resisted,	thrown	off,	and	even	actively	destroyed.	The	morphing	of	absent-presence	into	such	elusivity	sets	up	the	possibility	that	definition	is	possible:	it	offers	the	promise	of	definition,	the	promise	of	future	presence	in	the	face	of	current	absence.	Yet	because	the	elusive	nature	of	pain	is	underpinned	by	its	necessary	absence,	this	is	promise	that	is	never	fulfilled.	Elusivity	remains	a	mask	hiding	the	epistemological	gap	between	presence	and	absence	in	the	ontology	of	pain	experience.1	David	Biro’s	(2011)	book,	Listening	to	Pain,	contains	the	same	basic	blueprint	of	an	absent-present	ontology	that	becomes	subtly	masked	by	the	concept	of	elusivity.	Listening	to	Pain	is	a	book	designed	to	provide	a	theoretical	justification	for	seeking	the	‘right	words’	to	capture	the	experience	of	pain	for	the	sufferer.	It	first	sets	out	its	ontological	foundation	and,	like	Scarry’s	work,	it	too	recognises	both	sides	of	the	paradox	of	pain.	On	the	one	hand	Biro	acknowledges	the	feeling	that	pain	is	an	‘inner	experience’	that	lies	outside	of	language	(it	is	defined	by	its	lack	of	objectified	content),	but	on	the	other	points	to	the	fact	that	there	is	already	a	“working	language	of	pain”,	something	that	“implies	some	degree	of	mutual	understanding”	(p.	50)	(it	can	be	expressed	as	an	object,	in	language).	The	contradiction	is	expressive	of	the	wider	philosophical	problem	of	relating	personal	experience	to	public	language,	and	in	this	light	Biro	invokes	Wittgenstein	as	a	solution.	For	Wittgenstein,	language	is	constituted	by	pre-linguistic	behaviours	accompanying	subjective	experience	rather	than	the	subjective	experience	itself.	Language	comes	to	replace	these	behaviours	but	does	not	capture	the	experience.	Indeed,	using	an	example	of	a	beetle	in	a	box	that	cannot	be	observed	from	the	outside,	Wittgenstein	emphasises	the	pre-objective	nature	of	subjective	experience	by	asserting	that	the	“thing	in	the	box	has	no	place	in	the	language	game	at	all;	not	even	as	a	something:	for	the	box	might	even	be	empty”	(Wittgenstein,	1958	cited	in	Biro,	2011,	p.	74,	emphasis	in	original).	There	is	a	fundamental	separation	of	experience	from	objectification	(from	making	experience	even	into	a	something).	As	Wittgenstein	sums	up	in	a	quote	identified	by	Bourke	(2014):	“mental	language	is	rendered	significant	not	by	virtue	of	its	capacity	to	reveal,	mark,	or	describe	mental	states,	but	by	its	function	in	social	interaction”	(Wittgenstein,	n.d.,	cited	in	Bourke,	2014,	p.	7).	However,	despite	invoking	Wittgenstein’s	notion	of	the	beetle	in	the	box	as	being	indefinable,	even	as	a	‘something’,	Biro	(2011)	then	goes	on	to	suggest	pain	(the	beetle)	is																																									 																					
1	In	philosophy	of	mind,	this	‘epistemological	gap’	also	takes	the	form	of	the	‘mind-body	gap’	or	the	‘hard	problem	of	consciousness’,	which	centres	on	the	problem	of	how	the	present	body	(defined	according	to	biology)	can	be	theoretically	reconciled	with	the	absent	mind	(of	whose	qualia,	or	lived	experience,	escape	definition)	assuming	that	both	are	integral	parts	of	being	human.	
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indeed	a	‘something’	by	defining	the	pain	as	a	“void”	(p.	73).	A	void	might	not	seem	like	a	
something	(a	crucial	subtlety),	but	even	a	‘void’	is	an	object	with	definition.	It	is	an	empty	object,	a	“world	that	is	barren	and	wordless”	(p.	213).	It	is	an	empty	canvass	that	is	waiting	for	definition,	offering	the	promise	of	future	definition	in	the	face	of	current	absence.	Here	again	we	observe	the	absent	presence	of	pain	transformed	into	the	promise	of	definition.	Biro’s	void	is	waiting	to	be	filled	with	words:	“to	find	external	objects	that	can	stand	in	for	and	refer	to	how	we	feel	inside”	(p.	217).	As	with	Scarry’s	use	of	intentionality,	and	Leder’s	concept	of	the	telic	demand,	the	process	of	filling	the	void	with	words	is	presented	as	an	ontological	process:	one	that	happens	naturally.	Indeed,	according	to	Biro	(2011),	for	people	in	pain	their	“primary	motivation”	is	to	fill	the	void	with	language	(p.	73).		Continuing	to	parallel	Scarry,	Biro’s	void	of	pain	also	fundamentally	resists	objectification,	as	he	makes	clear	in	opening	his	first	chapter:	
Pain	is	difficult	to	express.	Language	and	pain	seem	as	far	apart	as	the	opposite	poles	of	an	electric	current.	While	language	can	capture	much	of	the	diverse	range	of	human	experience,	it	fails	us	in	the	case	of	pain.	(p.	11)	In	framing	pain	as	a	void	that	lacks	but	simultaneously	invites	(as	a	‘primary	motivation’)	language	into	the	void	through	a	difficult	(resisted)	process	of	objective	definition,	Biro	forms	the	basis	of	Part	I	of	his	book	(“THE	CRISIS”).	As	with	Scarry,	the	crisis	emerges	from	the	absent-present	paradox	but	morphs	into	a	promise	of	definition	when	the	absent-present	ontology	becomes	masked	by	the	concept	of	elusivity.	This	provides	the	platform	for	an	exploration	of	the	content	and	process	involved	in	the	provision	of	the	right	words	to	give	definition,	forming	the	basis	of	Part	II	(“THE	SOLUTION”).	This	structure,	it	is	suggested,	captures	the	essential	thinking	that	has	framed,	and	continues	to	frame,	much	of	the	ontology	present	in	accounts	of	the	experience	of	pain.	Indeed,	the	works	of	Leder,	Scarry,	and	Biro	might	be	seen	as	reflective	of	a	wider	cultural	narrative	that	forms	the	ontological	basis	for	accounting	for	pain	experience.	One	final	ingredient	in	the	ontological	construction	of	pain	is	what	constitutes	the	essential	nature	of	intentionality,	the	telic	demand,	and	the	filling	of	voids,	as	well	as	the	motivation	driving	the	promise	of	definition:	the	inherent	negativity	of	pain	experience.	
PAIN	AS	‘ONTOLOGICALLY	NEGATIVE’	
It	goes	without	saying	that,	standardly,	pain	is	something	we	would	rather	be	without.	(van	Hooft,	2003,	p.	255)	The	third	and	final	ontological	assumption	of	the	experience	of	pain	is	the	intrinsically	aversive	nature	of	pain.	Deborah	Padfield’s	photo	exhibitions	Perceptions	of	Pain	and	
face2face	typify	this	aversiveness.	Both	exhibitions	were	intended	to	enhance	the	
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communication	about	pain	between	chronic	pain	patient	and	doctor,	and	consisted	of	photographs	patients	co-created	with	an	artist	that	aimed	to	express	their	pain	(Padfield,	2011).	There	are	images	of	rotting	food,	knives	piercing	objects,	rocks	that	have	been	knawed	at,	ants	crawling	over	the	skin,	swords	and	knives	lying	upon	flesh,	constriction	devices,	rotten	wastelands	filled	with	drugs,	cages,	smashed	glass,	and	dark	hallways	(amongst	others)	(2003,	2011).	Much	of	these	mirror	what	Scarry	(1985)	considered	as	one	of	the	most	basic	and	universal	languages	for	pain:	the	metaphor	of	a	weapon	inflicting	a	wound	(e.g.	a	‘stabbing	pain’),	what	she	termed	the	language	of	agency.	The	negativity	of	the	pain	object	can	also	emerge	in	its	personification	as	a	malevolent	being,	as	is	evident	in	the	poem	presented	at	the	start	of	the	chapter	(see	also	Rooney,	2015).	Social	science	researchers	have	observed	similar	personifications	in	pain	participants,	with	descriptions	of	pain	such	as	a	“little	man	jumping	on	my	lower	abdomen”	(Berna	et	al.,	2011,	p.	1090).	However,	the	negativity	of	pain	goes	far	deeper	(is	more	ontological)	than	the	language	used	to	describe	it.	We	recognise	a	photo	of	a	knife	piercing	a	piece	of	fruit	as	a	constructed	entity,	and	Scarry	(1985)	points	out	how	the	language	of	agency	is	in	fact	metaphorical	(and	thereby	seems	somehow	detached	from	what	pain	really	‘is’).	However,	Scarry	makes	it	clear	that	the	“first”,	and	“most	essential”	aspect	of	pain	is	“its	sheer	aversiveness”:	
Pain	is	a	pure	physical	experience	of	negation,	an	immediate	sensory	rendering	of	“against,”	of	something	being	against	one,	and	of	something	one	must	be	against.	Even	though	it	occurs	within	oneself,	it	is	at	once	identified	as	“not	oneself,”	“not	me,”	as	something	so	alien	that	it	must	right	now	be	gotten	rid	of.	(p.	52)	For	Scarry,	the	againstness	of	pain	occurs	before	objectified	content	such	as	the	language	of	agency	can	attempt	to	define	what	pain	is.	But	it	is	at	the	same	time	crucial	to	the	process	of	objectification	that	creates	pain	as	an	object	(intentionality)	because,	in	being	against	in	the	first	instance,	‘pain’	instantaneously	positions	itself	as	an	object	separate	from	(and	against)	the	self.	The	first	moment	of	the	objectifying	process	is	the	againstness,	and	it	is	here	where	the	(absent-present)	pain	object	is	born,	even	whilst	the	experience	of	againstness	is	characterised	by	pure	pre-objective	sensation.	One	could	argue	that	the	againstness	of	pain	is	the	most	ontologised	aspect	of	the	process	of	pain	objectification.	Thus,	Newmahr	(2010)	makes	the	distinction	between	what	are	considered	“socially	constructed”	(p.	391)	ideas	of	pain	(such	as	athletes’	romanticised	notions	of	pain	representing	the	sacrifice	required	for	success,	or	even	the	types	of	historically-specific	constructions	such	as	those	in	Bourke’s,	2014,	history	of	pain	or	in	the	
narrative	of	succession	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter),	and	what	is	considered	“the	reality	of	pain”	(Newmahr,	2010,	p.	391).	This	‘reality’	of	pain	is	the	“hurt	and	the	aversion	to	it”	(p.	391).	It	is	this	undeniable	isness	of	pain’s	negativity	that	she	defines	as	“the	understanding	of	pain	as	ontologically	negative”	(p.	408).	As	the	absent-present	ontology	of	
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pain	is	born	in	againstness,	in	negativity,	it	too	shares	this	undeniable	quality	that	cements	it	as	an	ontological	given.1	Additionally,	the	negativity	of	pain	adds	a	dynamic	to	the	absent-present	structure	when	it	is	expressed	in	the	form	of	elusivity.	If	the	elusive	twist	serves	to	give	the	possibility	that	(future)	presence	can	be	made	to	fill	(current)	absence,	the	sheer	negativity	of	pain	gives	the	
existential	drive	to	achieve	this.	After	all,	pain	“must	right	now	be	gotten	rid	of”	(Scarry,	1985,	p.	52),	and	through	the	schema	of	man-as-creator	this	drive	to	remove	pain	through	giving	it	explanation	is	fuelled	by	its	sheer	aversive	nature.	Such	is	the	urgency	of	pain’s	againstness	that	the	telic	demand	produces	an	incessant	energy	to	define	it.	As	Biro	(2011)	poetically	puts	it:	
[…]	no	matter	how	extreme	the	ordeal,	it’s	almost	impossible	to	extinguish	the	desire	to	break	down	the	pain	wall.	Inexhaustible,	our	voice,	no	matter	how	puny	it	may	seem	to	us,	will	continue	to	sound	as	long	as	we	live.	(p.	61)	
THE	CHRONIC	PAIN	PATIENT:	ON	PAIN’S	CAUSE	AND	EXPERIENCE	
The	previous	chapter	argued	that	the	biomedical	model	was	able	to	avoid	the	paradox	of	representing	the	experience	of	pain	because	of	its	narrow	focus	on	seeking	to	establish	the	cause	of	pain	(so	that	it	might	be	cured).	In	this	sense	a	distinction	is	made	between	the	cause	of	pain	and	its	experience.	However,	Jackson	(1994)	notes	how	this	distinction	between	the	“presumed	origin”	of	pain	and	its	experience	are	frequently	conflated	“for	both	professionals	and	sufferers”	alike	(p.	207).	More	than	this,	the	“mind-body”	dualism	constituting	this	distinction	“break[s]	down	in	accounts	of	lived	painful	pain	experience”	(p.	208).	Indeed,	Leder’s	(1990)	telic	demand,	Biro’s	(2011)	
void,	and	Scarry’s	(1985)	againstness	all	constitute	an	ontology	of	pain	experience	where	the	search	for	its	presumed	origin	and	its	lived	experience	are	conflated	at	the	most	ontological	level.	To	experience	pain	is	to	experience	the	need	to	find	“an	image	with	the	power	to	heal”	(Good,	1992,	p.	47).	Unpicking	cause	from	experience	means	challenging	the	intractably	negative	status	of	pain	(Newmahr,	2010).	
																																								 																					
1	Newmahr	(2010)	argues	that	her	ethnography	of	a	sadomasochistic	(SM)	community	identified	a	minority	viewpoint	that	disrupted	the	ontological	status	of	pain	as	‘negative’,	highlighting	what	is	a	taken-for-granted	aspect	of	pain	ontology.	She	argues	that	most	SM	play	accepts	pain	as	ontologically	negative,	but	which	may	then	be	acted	upon	to	achieve	a	certain	goal	(using	it	to	generate	desirable	power	relations,	as	an	act	of	endurance,	or	simply	transform	the	negativity	into	a	pleasurable	feeling).	However,	she	identified	one	form	of	play	that	valued	the	hurting	of	pain	as	a	goal	in-and-of-itself,	where	pain	is	never	negative	even	in	the	first	instance.	She	argues	this	is	a	horrifying	position	for	most	within	the	SM	community,	and	is	tabooed.	Whether	or	not	such	‘autotelic’	pain	actually	diverges	from	Scarry’s	(1985)	ontology	of	againstness	is	debatable,	but	for	the	present	argument	it	at	least	serves	to	highlight	how	integral	(how	ontologised)	the	negativity	of	pain	is	conventionally	conceived.	
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Whilst	it	is	important	to	note	that	this	thesis	is	concerned	with	the	paradox	initiated	by	the	integrative	paradigm’s	attempt	to	represent	lived	experience	rather	than	directly	examine	what	this	means	for	people	experiencing	pain,	Jackson	(1994)	discusses	the	curious	implications	of	this	conflation	of	cause	and	experience	for	patients	in	a	society	where	a	biomedical	model	of	illness	continues	to	exert	dominance	in	the	practice	of	disease	and	illness.	Because	of	the	“legacy	of	Cartesian	dualism”	(p.	208)	and	the	hegemony	of	body	over	mind	in	biomedicine,	the	conflation	of	pain’s	cause	and	experience	means	that	biomedical	explanations	of	pain’s	cause	have	come	to	define	the	range	of	possibilities	within	which	pain	is	experienced	by	patients.1	Thus,	Jackson	argues	that	chronic	pain	sufferers	“have	been	socialized	to	see	pain	as	a	sensation,	as	basically	a	physical	feeling”	(p.	211).	Even	when	mind	as	the	necessary	‘other’	to	body	is	inferred,	“any	mention	of	emotional	or	cognitive	solutions	threatens	the	legitimacy	of	a	given	pain	by	diminishing	its	physical	quality”	(p.	215).	Sufferers	are	‘reluctant	to	see	pain	as	something	complex	because	this	diminishes	its	“real	pain”	quality’	in	physical	sensation	(p.	212).	And	where	a	biomedical	explanation	cannot	offer	the	cure	it	desperately	seeks,	such	chronic	pain	patients	experience	not	simply	the	frustration	felt	by	clinicians	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter,	but	a	desperate	search	for	a	biomedical	pain	object	that	could	be	regarded	as	a	form	of	suffering	in	itself.	Good	(1992)	captures	a	sense	of	this	urgency	in	a	chronic	pain	patient	he	interviewed	who	was	seeking	a	medical	cure:	
Perhaps	more	fundamental	is	the	general	representational	paradox	that	both	chronic	pain	sufferer	and	integrative	paradigm	must	deal	with	when	enacting	the	ontology	of	pain	experience	outlined	in	this	chapter.	But	for	the	chronic	pain	sufferer	there	is	more	at	stake	than	simply	a	methodological	problem.	Each	time	pain	sufferers	“speak,	or	groan,	or	remain	silent,	and	are	disappointed	(at	times	a	disappointment	
																																								 																					
1	For	example,	Crawford	(2009)	contends	that	the	creation	of	the	McGill	Pain	Questionnaire	(MPQ)	(Melzack,	1975),	a	popular	quantitative	rating	scale	for	pain	used	in	medical	settings	and	based	on	common	single-word	descriptors	(e.g.	‘burning’)	divided	into	three	categories	(sensory,	affective,	and	evaluative),	served	to	significantly	influence	the	“discursive	practices	available	to	people	in	pain”	to	define	“the	properties	of	pain,	the	pained	subject,	and	pain	relations”	(Crawford,	2009,	p.	655).	With	specific	reference	to	phantom	limb	pain,	the	descriptions	of	the	condition	became	“overwhelmingly	consonant	with	the	set	of	descriptors	advanced	by	the	MPQ”	after	it	was	introduced	(p.	659).	Moreover,	she	argues	that	the	MPQ	“accentuated	pain”	because	of	the	increase	in	painful	phantoms	associated	with	its	introduction,	as	well	as	its	re-categorisation	of	‘pleasant’	phantom	sensation	as	“pre-pain	sensation”	(p.	659).	
To	name	the	origin	of	the	pain	is	to	seize	power	to	alleviate	it,	and	the	intensity	of	the	pain	demands	urgency.	To	name	the	origin	of	the	pain	is	also	a	critical	step	in	the	remaking	of	the	world.	[…]	And	because	of	this	hope,	he	keeps	looking	for	answers.	There	is	a	surgeon	recommended	by	a	member	of	the	support	group.	There	is	someone	involved	in	a	study	at	a	pain	centre.	[…]	The	hope	remains.	(pp.	45-46)	
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approximating	despair)	at	the	results	of	their	choice	of	action,	they	compellingly	illustrate	the	incommensurability	between	embodiment-as-lived	and	embodiment-as-represented”	(Jackson,	1994,	p.	222).	They	enact	an	ontology	of	pain	experience	that	involves	a	fundamental	separation	of	experience	into	distinct	entities	that	simultaneously	betrays	the	very	nature	of	that	experience	as	a	holistic,	pre-objective	form	in	the	very	process	that	tries	to	offer	it.1	An	unavoidable	“trap”	of	representation,	complete	with	“bait,	trigger,	and	a	loop	of	wire	attached	to	a	kill	pole”,	it	is	a	way	of	
being	rigged	to	lose	from	the	outset	(Harrison,	2015,	p.	293).	
CHAPTER	CONCLUSION	
The	chapter	closes	by	returning	to	the	poem	(Baier,	n.d.)	with	which	it	opened,	for	it	captures	all	of	the	elements	constituting	the	ontology	of	pain	experience	outlined	in	this	chapter.	In	it	pain	is	a	‘thing’,	an	object.	More	than	this,	it	is	a	personified	entity.	It	is	also	clearly	an	entity	that	is	very	much	present	as	it	“never	goes	away”	(line	7)	and	is	“in	somebody’s	body”	(line	33),	but	is	simultaneously	absent	since	it	is	“invisible”	(line	14)	and	“you	can	not	see	[it]”	(line	13).	Defining	pain	is	frustrated	by	its	elusivity	as	it	“hide[s]”	and	“lurk[s]”	(line	33),	its	form	constantly	transmogrifying:	“I	am	[…]	other	times	I	am	[…]	yet	at	other	times	I	am”	(lines	4,	5,	7).	And	finally,	it	is	ontologically	negative	in	its	againstness:	“I	Am	The	Enemy”	(line	28).	This	chapter	has	argued	that	accounts	of	the	experience	of	pain	contain	a	paradoxical	ontology	consisting	of	three	key	assumptions.	First,	pain	is	experienced	as	an	object	that	can	be	represented.	This	simultaneously	clashes	with	the	second	assumption	that	pain	is	experienced	as	a	state	of	anti-objective	sensation,	making	pain	both	present	(as	a	definable	object)	and	absent	(as	pre-objective	sensation).	Crucially,	there	is	then	a	subtle	morphing	of	this	absent-present	ontology	into	one	of	elusivity,	a	move	positing	the	possibility	of	definition,	but	(due	to	its	absent	nature)	is	a	promise	that	never	reaches	closure.	Third,	the	
againstness	of	pain	is	the	most	fundamental	aspect	of	this	ontology,	for	in	simultaneously	producing	the	pain	object	that	is	so	against	the	self,	it	also	demands	its	eradication	through	objective	definition.	It	is	within	this	moment	that	the	dual	nature	of	absent-presence	is	birthed,	and	bathed	with	an	undeniable	isness	in	what	it	means	to	experience	pain.	The	conversion	of	an	absent-present	ontology	to	one	of	elusiveness	poses	a	problem	for	addressing	the	paradox	in	the	representation	of	the	lived	experience	of	pain,	for	what																																									 																					
1	Or	even	ontologically	demands	such	a	separation.	Echoing	Scarry’s	(1985)	againstness,	Jackson	(1994)	argues	that	pain	sufferers	“long	for	an	adequate	everyday-world	explanation,	provided	in	a	language	that	promises	distance,	control,	abstraction	precisely	because	representation	is	not	coterminous	with	experience	itself”	(p.	222,	emphasis	in	original).	
28	
elusiveness	offers	is	little	more	than	an	opaque	mask,	one	that	falls	off	in	the	process	of	representing	or	when	the	ontology	is	examined	more	closely,	where	the	incompatibility	between	representation	and	lived	experience	is	revealed.	If	the	problem	of	experience	is	to	be	properly	addressed	then	this	absent-present	ontology	must	be	made	fully	visible	rather	than	passing	by	in	opacity.	But	this	is	testament	to	the	persistence	of	the	subtle	conversion.	Indeed,	the	process	of	masking	of	an	absent-present	ontology	can	be	detected	in	a	crisis	of	representation	that	extends	far	more	widely	than	its	relevance	to	the	experience	of	pain,	revealed	in	instances	that	have	emerged	at	various	points	throughout	human	thinking,	perhaps	most	notably	for	the	social	sciences	in	the	‘rhetorical	turn’	of	the	later	20th	Century,	persisting	in	the	concept	of	epistemology	that	has	been	extensively	problematised	but	which	has	nevertheless	endured.	To	better	understand	how	to	unpick	this	mask	and	make	visible	the	absent-present	nature	of	accounting	for	experience,	the	wider	crisis	of	representation	in	the	social	sciences	requires	exploration.	The	following	chapter	starts	from	here.
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CHAPTER	3:	REPRESENTATION	AND	THE	RHETORICAL	TURN	
INTRODUCTION	
The	previous	two	chapters	highlighted	the	problem	involved	in	representing	the	lived	experience	of	pain.	The	current	chapter	clarifies	this	problem	through	an	exploration	of	the	wider	theoretical	debates	regarding	the	representation	of	lived	experience	that	arose	most	prominently	in	the	1980s’	‘rhetorical	turn’	in	the	social	sciences.	In	re-focussing	attention	on	the	author	of	knowledge,	it	raises	fundamental	questions	about	the	relationship	between	representation	and	lived	experience,	or	between	presence	and	absence.	Specifically,	Chapter	2	argued	that	an	absent-present	ontology	of	pain	experience	becomes	opaquely	masked	in	the	concept	of	elusivity,	preventing	a	proper	accounting	of	experience.	In	this	regard,	the	current	chapter	seeks	to	explicitly	differentiate	these	two	closely-intertwined	ontologies	(absent-presence	and	elusivity),	arguing	that	the	insight	of	the	rhetorical	turn	(a	renewed	focus	on	the	role	of	the	author	in	producing	representations	of	experience)	has	been	‘read’	in	two	main	ways.	The	first	suggests	that	the	insight	complicates	the	process	of	translation1	of	lived	experience	into	its	representation.	Whilst	translation	has	traditionally	been	regarded	as	occurring	transparently,	now	we	must	appreciate	that	those	involved	in	the	translational	process	exert	their	own	influence	on	the	resulting	representation.	In	this	reading	the	insight	of	rhetoric	allows	for	a	more	accurate	(but	infinitely	more	contextualised)	means	of	translating	lived	experience	into	representation,	generating	a	new	paradigm	for	doing	research	based	upon	reflexivity	and	positionality.		However,	a	second	and	more	radical	reading	suggests	the	insight	of	rhetoric	reveals	representations	as	entirely	produced,	and	that	translation	(from	experience	to	an	account	of	that	experience)	is	impossible.	It	rejects	the	translational	link	between	experience	and	representation,	just	as	the	previous	chapter	rejected	the	possibility	of	resolution	to	the	
elusive	promise	that	what	is	absent	in	pain	experience	might	be	brought	into	presence	in	the	future.	Having	explicitly	unpicked	the	two	readings	from	an	intimate	intertwining	that	permits	a	subtle	conversion	of	an	absent-present	ontology	to	one	of	an	(elusive)	translation,	the	chapter	sets	the	scene	for	a	consideration	of	what	an	account	of	the	absence	and	presence	of	lived	experience	beyond	a	translational	understanding	might	involve.	
																																								 																					
1	‘Translation’	is	an	important	concept	for	this	thesis	and	is	introduced	in	this	chapter	as	the	conversion	of	lived	experience	into	representation,	deriving	from	the	linguistic	concept.	It	should	not	be	confused	with	the	term	as	it	is	specifically	used	in	science	and	technology	studies	(STS).	To	avoid	confusion,	throughout	the	thesis	the	term	‘translation’	is	used	in	the	former	sense	until	Chapter	14,	where	its	STS	usage	is	specifically	highlighted.	
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THE	RHETORICAL	NATURE	OF	ACCOUNTS	OF	PAIN	
The	problematising	of	representations	of	lived	experience	emerged	prominently	in	the	‘rhetorical	turn’	in	the	social	sciences,	a	trend	that	began	to	find	its	fullest	expression	in	the	1980s	through	texts	such	as	Writing	Culture	(Clifford	&	Marcus,	1986).	This	turn	has	focussed	on	the	idea	that	any	account	must	be	produced	by	an	author	for	others.	Thus,	specifically	with	regard	to	accounting	for	pain	in	an	interview,	Buchbinder	(2010)	draws	upon	Judith	Butler’s	concept	of	performance,	suggesting	that	interviewees	“not	only	represent	events	in	the	world	(a	referential	function),	but	also	perform	a	set	of	social	relations	and	persuade	people	to	view	the	world	from	a	particular	moral	stance”	(p.	115,	emphasis	in	original).	Buchbinder	applies	this	understanding	to	an	interview	of	a	mother	in	relation	to	her	son,	discussing	the	“moral	accounting	practices”	that	serve	to	constitute	the	account	provided	to	the	interviewer	(p.	119).	The	referential	function	is	‘pulled’	at	by	a	rhetorical	function,	something	Butler	refers	to	as	an	‘interruption’.	Buchbinder	suggests	that	“many	different	social	forces	may	tug	and	pull	at	narratives”	in	this	way,	but	suggests	the	“the	structural	dynamics	of	the	interview	encounter	invoke	a	more	explicit	form	of	interruption”	(p.	125).	In	a	similar	way,	Werner	and	Malterud	(2003)	found	that	women	with	chronic	muscular	pain	“invested	much	work,	time,	and	energy	before	or	during”	medical	encounters	“in	order	to	be	perceived	as	a	credible	patient”	(p.	1412).	Indeed,	by	‘trying	out	various	strategies	such	as	appropriate	assertiveness,	surrendering,	and	appearance,	they	attempted	to	fit	in	with	normative,	biomedical	expectations	of	what	was	“just	right”	’	(p.	1412).	These	types	of	studies	are	expressive	of	a	renewed	recognition	of	rhetorical	processes	involved	in	producing	social	scientific	knowledge.	They	draw	attention	to	how	accounts	of	lived	experience	are	(at	least	in	part)	rhetorical	rather	than	(entirely)	referential.	As	Radley	and	Billig	(1996)	suggest,	“accounts	that	are	given	of	health	and	illness	are	more	than	a	disclosing	of	a	supposed	internal	attitude”,	they	“are	also	making	claims	about	themselves	as	worthy	individuals,	as	more	or	less	‘fit’	participants	in	the	activities	of	the	social	world”	(p.	221).	The	account	is	not	some	(transparent)	translation	of	embodiment-as-lived	to	embodiment-as-represented,	but	is	constructed	on	the	basis	of	conforming	to	the	moral	demands	of	the	encounter	with	the	other.	Since	all	stories	are	necessarily	social	–	all	stories	are	told	to	someone,	even	a	message	in	a	bottle	(Frank,	2013)	–	all	stories	must	therefore	have	this	rhetorical	aspect.	The	wording	of	the	above	paragraph	has	been	carefully	constructed,	as	it	is	suggested	that	the	insight	of	the	rhetorical	turn	(that	accounts	are	constructed)	has	been	interpreted	in	two	main	ways.	Reading	the	above	paragraph	with	the	bracketed	words	included,	the	first	(and	more	hegemonic)	reading	suggests	that	lived	experience	can	be	translated	into	an	account,	
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but	not	transparently.	According	to	this	reading,	if	we	are	to	properly	understand	how	lived	experience	is	translated	into	an	account,	we	must	also	understand	an	additional	complication	of	what	happens	during	the	process	of	accounting	for	that	experience,	including	the	moral	demands	placed	on	both	participants	and	researchers.	However,	reading	the	above	paragraph	without	brackets	provides	a	more	radical	second	reading,	one	which	suggests	translation	is	simply	an	illusion.	In	this	reading	there	can	be	no	translation	from	lived	experience	to	an	account	of	it	because	the	account	is	entirely	produced.	Here	the	rhetorical	processes	do	not	simply	complicate	the	referential	function	of	representation,	but	entirely	constitute	its	nature.	The	following	sections	draw	upon	the	wider	discussions	associated	with	the	rhetorical	turn	to	explore	this	further.	
RHETORIC	AND	THE	TRANSPARENCY	OF	TRANSLATION	
Both	the	first	(translational)	and	second	(non-translational)	readings	of	rhetoric	emerge	from	a	critique	of	“an	ideology	claiming	transparency	of	representation	and	immediacy	of	experience”	(Clifford,	1986,	p.	2).	Put	simply,	it	criticised	the	idea	that	experience	can	be	unproblematically	translated	into	an	account.	This	critique	came	to	the	fore	in	the	edited	collection	of	essays,	Writing	Culture	(Clifford	&	Marcus,	1986),	and	its	simple	insight	that	ethnographies	(and	other	social	scientific	texts)	are	constructed	by	an	author.	An	apparently	obvious	concept,	it	is	its	taken-for-granted	nature	that	makes	it	so	insightful:	when	the	author	is	forgotten	so	are	the	rhetorical	processes	involved	in	the	creation	of	an	account.	Thus,	within	Writing	Culture,	Renato	Rosaldo	(1986)	examines	both	Evans-Pritchard’s	(1940)	ethnography,	The	Nuer,	and	Le	Roy	Ladurie’s	(1975)	study	of	a	fourteenth	century	French	village	via	an	Inquisitor’s	register	(Montaillou).	In	both	of	these,	Rosaldo	suggests	that	the	authors	position	themselves	within	the	texts	in	such	a	way	as	to	establish	an	authority	that	what	is	being	presented	is	an	objective	account.	In	The	Nuer,	this	involves	Evans-Pritchard	(funded	by	the	colonial	government)	constructing	himself	as	“lone	heroic	victim”,	something	that	“establishes	his	innocence	from	colonial	domination	and	validates	his	credentials	as	a	disinterested	scientist”	(p.	93).	This	is	a	“narrative	logic	that	fixes	the	ethnographer	as	the	heroic	scientist	and	authorized	bearer	of	objective	knowledge”	(Clough,	1998,	p.	5).	Indeed,	through	the	establishment	of	such	ethnographic	authority	(Clifford,	1983)	Le	Roy	Ladurie	and	Evans-Prichard	are	presented	to	the	reader	as	having	managed	to	bracket	“the	purity	of	their	data	[…]	from	the	contaminating	contexts	through	which	they	were	extracted”	(Rosaldo,	1986,	p.	88).	Yet	in	highlighting	such	rhetorical	techniques,	Rosaldo	attempts	to	undermine	this	bracketing	process,	suggesting	that	structural	forces	do	indeed	‘tug	and	pull’	at	their	accounts:	‘contamination’	or	‘interruption’	necessarily	occur,	and	are	only	masked	by	ethnographic	authority.	
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A	clarifying	metaphor	for	this	criticism,	one	which	epitomises	what	I	have	called	the	‘first	reading’	of	the	insight	of	rhetoric,	is	outlined	by	James	Clifford	(1986)	in	the	introduction	to	
Writing	Culture.	Using	an	optical	analogy,	he	argues	that	we	can	no	longer	assume	that	the	lens	through	which	we	view	original	experience	is	transparent.	Instead,	the	lens	distorts	the	light	of	original	experience	and	the	distortion	can	no	longer	be	masked	through	ethnographic	authority.	The	specific	nature	of	the	lens	is	the	specific	nature	of	the	rhetorical	process	that	has	the	distorting	effect.	Knowledge	becomes	situated	within	the	particular	perspective	(the	particular	lens)	that	the	author	is	viewing	through.	This	metaphor	expresses	the	way	that	accounts	of	lived	experience	are	translated,	passing	from	source	(embodiment-as-lived)	to	destination	(embodiment-as-represented).	As	Law	(2004)	notes,	this	model	“hopes	to	act	as	a	set	of	short-circuits	that	link	us	in	the	best	possible	way	with	reality”	(p.	10).	This	first	reading	of	rhetoric	introduces	the	idea	that	the	nature	of	those	short-circuits	(the	rhetorical	processes	involved	in	the	translation)	have	an	effect	on	the	signal	as	it	passes	from	reality	to	the	representations	that	constitute	our	knowledge	about	that	reality.		Whilst	critiquing	transparent	modes	of	representing	experience,	what	remains	the	same	is	that	the	light	of	original	experience	(in	Clifford’s	metaphor)	or	the	electrical	signal	(in	Law’s)	still	passes	from	source	to	destination:	translation	remains.	That	is,	there	is	still	a	link	with	original	experience,	but	now	this	experience	is	distorted	by	the	lens	through	which	it	passes.	An	account	still	has	a	‘truth’	to	tell	about	the	original	lived	experience	because	of	this	link,	but	it	now	must	be	understood	within	the	context	of	rhetorical	processes	of	the	particular	contextual	lens.	Whilst	we	can	no	longer	claim	an	account	can	produce	a	universal	truth	about	the	experience	it	represents,	it	can	nevertheless	reveal	a	context-dependent	truth,	which	is	what	Clifford	(1986)	refers	to	as	“partial	truths”	(p.	1).	Clifford	suggests	that	we	understand	the	nature	of	the	rhetorical	processes	by	understanding	the	context	in	which	the	account	was	produced,	allowing	the	production	of	a	
more	perfect	version	of	translation	than	one	assuming	a	transparent	lens	because	now	we	can	understand	the	role	of	subtle	refractive	nuances	producing	the	resulting	representation.	Unlike	the	seemingly	inevitable	consequence	of	a	second	reading	of	rhetoric	(discussed	in	the	next	section),	we	need	not	abandon	the	translational	project.	Indeed,	we	can	actually	refine	our	translational	abilities	in	representing	lived	experience.	As	Clifford	asks	(rhetorically,	of	course),	“may	not	the	vision	of	a	complex,	problematic,	partial	ethnography	lead,	not	to	its	abandonment,	but	to	more	subtle,	concrete	ways	of	writing	and	reading?”	(p.	25).	Thus,	the	first	reading	of	rhetoric	maintains	the	assumption	that	lived	experience	can	be	translated	to	representation	through	converting	it	into	the	search	for	the	contextually	
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produced	experience.	In	this	understanding	pain	experience	can	still	be	translated,	but	only	if	the	potentially	infinite	number	of	permutations	generated	by	the	rhetorical	circumstances	of	its	production	are	recognised.	However,	the	following	section	shows	that	a	second	reading	of	rhetoric	necessarily	precludes	the	possibility	of	translation	entirely,	let	alone	allowing	for	a	more	nuanced	version	of	it.	Indeed,	echoing	the	previous	chapter	it	argues	that	the	first	reading	provides	a	subtle	(but	erroneous)	ontological	shift	where	an	absent-present	ontology	of	experience	instead	simply	becomes	elusive.	Central	to	this	argument	is	the	unacknowledged	re-cycling	of	the	very	processes	for	generating	authority	that	it	so	prominently	criticises.	
A	SECOND	READING	OF	RHETORIC:	ON	THE	IMPOSSIBILITY	OF	TRANSLATION	
To	represent	means	to	have	a	kind	of	magical	power	over	appearances,	to	be	able	to	bring	into	presence	what	is	absent.	(Tyler,	1986,	p.	131)	THE	PROBLEM	OF	FOREIGNNESS	
Vincent	Crapanzano	(1986)	explicitly	considers	what	the	metaphor	of	translation	entails	for	providing	accounts	of	lived	experience.	As	with	a	first	reading	of	rhetoric,	for	Crapanzano	the	insight	of	rhetoric	draws	attention	to	the	translator	and	their	role	in	translating.	A	translator,	he	surmises,	is	faced	with	a	paradox	relating	to	the	feeling	of	“foreignness”	of	one	person’s	experience	to	another.	On	the	one	hand,	the	translator	“aims	at	a	solution	to	the	problem	of	foreignness”	(p.	52),	of	putting	experience	into	terms	comprehendible	to	the	reader	receiving	the	translation.	On	the	other,	the	translator	“must	also	communicate	the	very	foreignness	that	his	interpretations	(the	translator’s	translations)	deny”	(p.	52),	for	it	is	that	very	foreignness	that	makes	it	another’s	experience	and	not	simply	their	own.	Thus,	the	translator	“must	render	the	foreign	familiar	and	preserve	its	foreignness	at	one	and	the	same	time”	(p.	52).		This	is,	of	course,	a	version	of	the	absent-present	ontology	outlined	in	the	previous	chapter.	The	translator’s	translations	deny	the	essential	foreignness	of	the	lived	experience	it	tries	to	capture	just	as	the	objectification	of	pain	experience	denies	its	essential	non-objective	nature.	For	Crapanzano	the	paradox	reveals	the	fallacy	of	trying	to	understand	the	representation	of	experience	through	a	translational	metaphor.	Instead,	the	insight	of	rhetoric	shows	that	the	“ethnographer	does	not	[…]	translate	texts	the	way	the	translator	does.	He	must	first	produce	them”	(p.	51).	As	Tyler	(1986)	notes	in	his	discussion	of	ethnography,	there	can	be	no	translation	from	a	source	of	lived	experience	to	a	destination	
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in	concepts,	since	all	aspects	of	the	ethnography	are	concepts	produced	by	the	author.	Indeed,	ethnography	“begins	and	ends	in	concepts”	(p.	137).	In	clarifying	this	assertion,	Crapanzano	(1986)	criticises	ethnographies	attempting	to	capture	the	experience	of	others.	In	his	discussion	of	Clifford	Geertz’s	(1973/1975)	essay	
Deep	Play:	Notes	on	a	Balinese	Cockfight,	he	suggests	that	Geertz’s	description	of	a	cockfight	on	the	Indonesian	island	of	Bali	(constructed	from	a	first	person	perspective	of	his	own	fieldwork	experience)	is	erroneously	accepted	as	the	experience	of	a	cockfight	for	the	Balinese	attending.	For	Crapanzano	(1986)	there	is	in	fact	“no	understanding	of	the	native	from	the	native’s	point	of	view	[…but]	only	the	constructed	understanding	of	the	constructed	native’s	constructed	point	of	view”	(p.	74).	“Cockfights	are	surely	cockfights	for	the	Balinese”,	he	asserts,	“and	not	images,	fictions,	models,	and	metaphors”	(p.	73)	that	make	up	Geertz’s	account.	Indeed,	what	Geertz	produced	is	neither	a	native’s	experience	of	the	fight	nor	even	his	own	experience.	It	is	instead	a	collection	of	organised	conceptualisations	produced	entirely	by	Geertz	independently	of	the	experience	itself.	Yet	this	was	not	lost	on	Geertz.	He	grappled	with	the	issue	of	the	necessary	absence	(or	foreignness)	of	experience	in	the	(present)	accounts	of	that	experience,	asserting	elsewhere	within	The	Interpretation	of	Cultures	(the	collection	of	essays	containing	Deep	Play)	that	‘[d]oing	ethnography	is	like	trying	to	read	(in	the	sense	of	“construct	a	reading	of”)	a	manuscript’	(1973/1975,	p.	10).	For	Geertz,	there	is	recognition	that	the	first	movement	is	not	to	read	(in	a	translational	manner)	experience,	but	to	construct	the	reading	itself.	Whilst	it	is	notable	that	Geertz	quite	literally	brackets	knowledge	about	the	constructed	nature	of	the	reading	(reflecting	the	inherent	tendency	for	this	knowledge	to	disappear	from	awareness	–	what	the	rhetorical	turn	was	a	reaction	against),	it	is	nevertheless	clear	that	he	agrees	exactly	with	Crapanzano	that	the	ethnographer	does	not	translate	texts,	but	produces	them.	For	both,	translation	is	not	what	happens	when	experience	is	represented.	For	both,	the	insight	of	rhetoric	draws	attention	to	the	inherent	contradiction	of	a	translational	model,	and	thus	to	its	central	flaw.	This	viewpoint	is	what	I	refer	to	as	the	‘second	reading’	of	rhetoric.	However,	this	reading	is	more	complex.	Specifically,	much	work	has	been	done	exploring	how	a	translational	understanding	emerges	in	the	process	of	producing	knowledge.	Central	to	this	is	the	generation	of	authority	and	how	this	reconstitutes	the	relationship	between	absence	and	presence.	Indeed,	the	act	of	comprehending	the	dynamics	of	this	process	unravels	the	foundation	upon	which	a	translational	understanding	of	knowledge	is	premised,	pointing	to	the	generation	of	translation	from	a	subtle	but	erroneous	reconstitution	of	the	absent-present	relationship.		
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THE	SIGNIFIER-SIGNIFIED	RELATIONSHIP	AND	THE	PRODUCTION	OF	AUTHORITATIVE	KNOWLEDGE	
The	critique	of	translation	provided	in	the	previous	section	suggested	that	contrary	to	the	claims	of	a	translational	understanding,	the	translator	does	not	translate	texts,	but	entirely	produces	them.	Thus,	if	knowledge	is	conceived	in	terms	of	a	representation	that	is	a	translation	of	some	fundamental	reality	(such	as	lived	experience)	then	a	second	reading	contends	that	both	aspects	of	a	representational	sign	(the	signifier	and	signified)	are	the	product	of	rhetoric	and	not	just	the	signifier	–	both	the	representation	(presence)	and	what	that	representation	refers	to	(which	is	absent)	(Law,	2004).	However,	Law	notes	how	the	generation	of	authority	of	knowledge	leads	to	the	bracketing	or	hiding	of	its	entirely	constructed	nature.	He	argues	that	once	this	becomes	hidden,	this	allows	its	reconceptualisation	from	an	entirely	constructed	entity	to	one	where	an	‘in-here’	representation	is	caused	by	(is	translated	from)	an	‘out-there’	reality.	Law	highlights	this	process	through	drawing	on	Latour	and	Woolgar’s	(1986,	in	Law,	2004)	ethnography	of	the	production	of	scientific	knowledge	in	a	laboratory.	Specifically,	this	demonstrates	how	the	drive	to	create	authoritative	knowledge	leads	to	the	deletion	of	markers	that	reveal	the	“inscription	devices	and	practices”	that	created	such	knowledge,	and	thus	of	the	constructed	nature	of	the	knowledge	(Law,	2004,	p.	32).1	Latour	and	Woolgar	note	how	the	production	of	scientific	statements	(expressed	in	forms	such	as	academic	journal	articles)	involves	the	attempt	to	produce	statements	that	are	as	authoritative	as	possible.	Many	statements	are	accepted	as	‘fact’,	whilst	others	might	be	disputed	and	require	qualification	to	enhance	their	claim	to	acceptability,	much	as	Clifford	(1983)	describes	of	the	techniques	that	establish	ethnographic	authority.	Such	qualifications	might	involve	referencing	the	statement	with	respected	work	by	other	researchers,	and	are	referred	to	as	“modalities”	(Latour	&	Woolgar,	1986,	cited	in	Law,	2004,	p.	28).	The	aim	of	scientists	is	to	“create	unqualified	statements”	(Law,	2004,	p.	28),	this	constituting	the	highest	form	of	authority	of	knowledge.	Thus,	if	“all	goes	well”	for	the	scientist	“it	may	become	possible	to	make	statements	that	assert	unqualified	claims	about	substances	and	realities,	pin	these	down,	fix	them,	and	make	them	definite”	(p.	28).	In	this	sense,	the	conferring	of	authority	can	be	observed	to	be	a	gradual	shedding	of	qualifications	that	results	in	increasing	solidification	of	knowledge	as	a	definite	(representation	of)	reality.	This	“process	of	artful	deletion”	(p.	88)	has	an	interesting	effect	on	the	relationship	between	presence	and	manifest	absence.	Whilst	inscription	practices	“simultaneously	produce																																									 																					
1	In	Law’s	terminology	the	constructed	nature	of	knowledge	in	this	situation	is	neither	manifestly	present	or	manifestly	absent,	but	in	the	realm	of	“absence	as	Otherness”	(2004,	p.	84,	emphasis	in	original).	
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statements	about	realities	and	the	realities	they	describe”,	when	“the	modalities	disappear	the	realities	are	suddenly	turned	into	the	causes	of	those	statements”	(p.	59,	my	emphasis).	Thus,	the	manifest	absence	of	a	participant’s	embodied	experience	is	constructed	as	the	cause	of	a	narrative	account	about	that	experience.	This	invites	an	understanding	where	there	is	a	translation	from	absence	to	presence	that	belies	the	constructed	nature	of	both	elements	of	knowledge.	
TRANSLATION	AND	EPISTEMOLOGY	
The	notion	that	an	‘out-there’	reality	can	be	translated	into	an	‘in-here’	representation	expresses	the	functioning	of	epistemology,	which	can	be	regarded	as	the	preeminent	expression	of	a	translational	model	(and	the	terms	are	used	essentially	interchangeably	throughout	the	rest	of	this	thesis).	It	is	a	“powerful	tradition”	of	“ordering,	of	consistent	explanation,	of	foundations,	of	origins”	(Law,	2002,	p.	188)	that	informs	“many,	perhaps	most,	parts	of	Euro-American	culture”	(p.	189).	Drawing	upon	Richard	Rorty,	Paul	Rabinow	(1986)	traces	the	development	of	epistemology	to	17th	Century	Europe.	More	specifically,	he	draws	attention	to	a	Cartesian	division	between	internal	representations	of	the	mind	and	the	external	reality	that	they	represent,	which	is	striking	when	contrasted	to	ancient	Greece	where	“there	was	no	sharp	division	between	external	reality	and	internal	representations”	(p.	235).	The	“modern	notion	of	epistemology”	(p.	235)	became	defined	as	making	an	assessment	of	how	accurately	‘reality’	is	translated	into	knowledge	of	that	reality,	based	upon	an	assumption	that	“[t]o	know	is	to	represent	accurately	what	is	outside	the	mind”	(Rorty,	1979,	cited	in	Rabinow,	1986,	p.	235).	Epistemology	thus	embodies	a	translational	understanding	of	knowledge,	a	project	forever	tasked	with	“the	problem	of	correct	representations”	(Rabinow,	1986,	p.	239).	
In	(re-)establishing	the	role	of	the	author	in	the	production	of	knowledge,	a	second	reading	of	rhetoric	unravels	the	authority	of	knowledge,	revealing	the	entirely	constructed	nature	of	both	signifier	and	signified.	Whilst	both	readings	serve	to	highlight	rhetorical	practices,	this	chapter	has	sought	to	pick	them	apart	from	one	another	and	reveal	the	fundamental	ontological	differences	between	each	reading	in	terms	of	the	relationship	between	presence	and	absence	in	knowing	lived	experience.	As	a	final	act	of	making	this	distinction	visible	and	of	revealing	the	flawed	nature	of	a	first	reading	of	rhetoric,	the	following	section	argues	that	the	founding	of	a	new	form	of	(reflexive)	authority	in	a	first	reading	permits	the	very	same	bracketing	of	inscription	processes	that	it	purports	to	be	a	reaction	against.			
37	
‘A	NEW	AUTHORITY	OF	THE	SAME	CONVENTIONS’:	REFLEXIVITY	AS	RHETORICAL	DEVICE	
A	first	reading	of	rhetoric	criticises	the	authority	with	which	rhetorical	processes	become	masked	in	transparently	translational	accounts	by	techniques	that	generate	the	authority	of	knowledge.	However,	this	authority	is	replaced	by	a	new	authority	based	on	an	author’s	ability	to	recognise	and	disclose	the	role	of	rhetorical	processes	in	the	production	of	their	account.	An	authoritative	translation	now	depends	upon	the	ability	to	explicitly	recognise	the	rhetorical	practices	governing	an	account	rather	than	its	ability	to	show	detachment	from	them.	Despite	the	difference,	we	are	left	with	the	curiosity	that	a	critique	of	transparency	that	revealed	how	authority	masks	the	role	of	the	author	(leading	to	unwarranted	conclusions	about	the	nature	of	that	knowledge)	has	itself	given	birth	to	a	reliance	on	a	new	form	of	authority.	As	George	Marcus,	writing	about	a	decade	after	publishing	Writing	Culture,	noted:		
Even	as	the	traditional	conventions	for	asserting	ethnographic	authority	in	texts	have	been	powerfully	critiqued,	a	new	authority	for	a	more	critical	version	of	the	same	conventions	–	concerned	with	the	politics	of	fieldwork,	the	nature	of	identity,	subjectivity,	reflexivity,	and	difference	in	the	fieldwork	encounter	–	has	been	instantiated.	(Marcus,	1998,	p.	10)	Following	Clifford’s	(1986)	optical	analogy,	this	might	be	described	as	a	new	ethnographic	authority	based	upon	full	disclosure	of	the	optics	of	the	contextual	lens	through	which	an	account	is	produced.	However,	like	the	traditional	forms	of	authority,	this	new	authority	serves	to	mask	rhetorical	processes,	leading	to	unwarranted	claims	regarding	the	status	of	knowledge	it	produces.	In	particular,	it	is	suggested	that	this	new	authority	has	been	associated	with	the	rise	of	what	has	been	termed	‘reflexivity’	in	social	research.	Whilst	the	term	has	been	regarded	as	lacking	precision	over	both	its	definition	and	practical	application	(Bryman,	2004;	Corbin	&	Strauss,	2008;	Lynch,	2000),	it	is	here	meant	in	the	broad	sense	of	an	awareness	of	the	impact	of	rhetorical	processes	of	agents	(particularly	the	researcher)	in	producing	social	scientific	knowledge.	In	particular,	it	is	often	used	to	mean	that	“social	researchers	should	be	reflective	about	the	implications	of	their	methods,	values,	biases,	and	decisions	for	the	knowledge	of	the	social	world	they	generate”	(Bryman,	2004,	p.	500).	Whilst	Bryman	suggests	the	trend	towards	reflexivity	in	social	science	began	before	the	“postmodernism”	that	the	rhetorical	turn	can	be	regarded	as	a	constituent	of,1	he	also	argues	that	reflexivity	has	taken	on	a	particular	significance	in	light	of	the	types	of	arguments	concerning	representation	that	arose	during	this	period	(p.	500).	Indeed,	there	has	been	a	“growing																																									 																					
1	‘Postmodernism’	is	a	notoriously	nebulous	term	that	Bryman	(2004)	characterises	as	being	“sensitive	to	the	different	ways	social	reality	can	be	constructed”	(p.	267).	As	the	emphasis	is	on	the	process	of	constructing	of	social	reality,	the	link	to	the	rhetorical	turn	is	particularly	apparent.	
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reflexivity	in	social	research”	(p.	500)	such	that	reflexivity	is	“now	considered	essential	to	the	research	process”	(Corbin	&	Strauss,	2008,	p.	31).	This	has	also	been	reflected	in	the	kinds	of	rhetorical	accounts	of	pain	experience	highlighted	at	the	start	of	this	chapter.	Going	further,	it	might	be	argued	that	this	‘reflexive	paradigm’	embodies	a	first	reading	of	rhetoric	insofar	as	it	uses	reflexivity	to	perfect	translation	according	to	the	means	discussed	earlier	in	the	chapter.	Echoing	Clifford’s	(1986)	introduction	to	Writing	Culture,	reflexivity	is	regarded	as	a	tool	that	enables	the	production	of	more	accurate	(partial)	truths.	Reflexivity	confers	authority	on	these	partial	truths:	they	have	power	to	recount	a	contextually-specific	account	of	lived	experience.	And	just	as	the	ethnographic	authority	in	transparently	translational	texts	arose	through	the	elimination	of	the	rhetorical	processes	from	those	texts,	the	same	process	occurs	in	reflexive	accounts.	The	researcher	must	
produce	their	account	of	the	rhetorical	processes,	and	this	is	something	that	gets	lost	in	the	generation	of	reflexive	authority.	The	researcher	(as	author)	must	create	the	subject	positions	that	constitute	the	reflexive	account	of	lived	experience.	The	author	and	the	author-as-subject-position	(in	the	account)	are	two	entirely	different	things.	However,	the	greater	the	attentional	detail	to	the	subject	positions	involved	in	the	account,	the	more	the	author	of	that	rhetorical	account	actually	disappears	from	view.	The	reader	is	instead	satisfied	with	the	author-as-subject-position,	granting	authority	to	the	account	as	an	accurate	translation	of	the	reality	of	the	rhetorical	landscape	this	account	of	lived	experience	is	situated	within,	whilst	its	actual	author	vanishes	from	sight.	The	account	thus	takes	on	an	authority	at	the	expense	of	the	elimination	of	the	author.	Reflexivity	acts	as	a	rhetorical	device	allowing	the	researcher	to	be	positioned	as	a	genuine	and	authentic	social	scientist	and	authorised	bearer	of	(partially)	objective	knowledge	(to	paraphrase	Clough’s,	1998,	description	of	transparently	translational	ethnographic	accounts	cited	earlier	in	the	chapter).	Reflexive	authors	manage	to	convince	their	postmodern	readers	(conscious	of	the	tension	between	rhetoric	and	authority)	of	their	attentiveness	to	rhetoric	so	well	that	they	themselves	as	authors	disappear.	It	seems	an	absurd	proposition	that	a	reader	sensitive	to	rhetoric	might	be	so	uncritical	as	to	allow	the	author	to	be	eliminated	in	this	way.	However,	this	elimination	is	relatively	subtle.	The	constructed	nature	of	the	rhetorical	account	is	in	fact	acknowledged,	but	only	in	a	
conventional	sense	that	renders	it	insignificant.	Hence	in	the	quote	from	Geertz	(1973/1975)	highlighted	earlier	in	the	chapter,	the	constructed	nature	of	a	reading	of	lived	experience	is	acknowledged	but	is	quite	literally	bracketed	in	that	very	acknowledgement.1	A	conventional	acknowledgement	that	the	author	produced	the	reading	sufficiently	brackets																																									 																					
1	The	quote	again:	‘Doing	ethnography	is	like	trying	to	read	(in	the	sense	of	“construct	a	reading	of”)	a	manuscript’	(Geertz,	1973/1975,	p.	10).	
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its	constructed	nature	so	as	to	render	an	authoritative	definitiveness.	Crapanzano	(1986)	highlights	this	within	ethnography,	noting	that	while	the	“ethnographer	conventionally	acknowledges	the	provisional	nature	of	his	interpretations	[…]	he	assumes	a	final	interpretation	–	a	definitive	reading”	(p.	51).	
UNPICKING	READINGS	OF	RHETORIC:	THE	EXPERIENCE	OF	A	
NARRATIVE	RESEARCHER	
There	are	moments	of	realisation	where	the	authoritative	definitiveness	of	a	reflexive	account	contradicts	its	(conventionally	acknowledged)	constructed	nature,	where	rhetoric	is	fully	unbracketed	rather	than	re-bracketed	under	a	new	authority	of	the	same	conventions.	Recounting	her	career	in	narrative	research,	Hendry	(2007)	discusses	a	realisation	of	the	fallacy	of	“an	ontological	position	that	maintains	a	view	of	narrative	as	having	explanatory	power	to	recount	original	experience”	(p.	489).	Whilst	a	narrative	is	conventionally	acknowledged	as	a	constructed	account	of	lived	experience,	it	is	nevertheless	practically	regarded	as	translation	of	a	situation-specific	lived	experience.	The	ontological	position	she	problemetises	is	readily	visible	in	the	early	“positivist”	phase	of	her	career,	which	was	concerned	with	capturing	experiences	through	a	range	of	personal	narratives	of	her	participants	(p.	490).	This	was	designed	to	“add”	to	a	stock	of	knowledge	about	the	experience	of	women	in	education,	serving	to	counter	a	more	generic	(and	possibly	oppressive)	‘	“grand”	narrative’	(p.	490).		However,	it	became	apparent	that	she	could	not	simply	expect	to	“capture”	a	person’s	experience	within	the	narrative	account	(p.	490).	Indeed,	reflecting	the	rhetorical	turn,	she	became	“increasingly	informed	by	a	post-structuralist	perspective	in	which	I	become	less	concerned	with	what	stories	are	told,	but	why	we	tell	a	particular	story	at	a	particular	time”	(p.	490).	In	other	words,	the	referential	function	of	her	narrative	accounts	gave	way	to	an	attention	to	the	moral	demands	of	storytelling.	However,	she	came	to	feel	that	this	‘post-structuralist’	perspective	repeated	the	very	problem	it	was	supposed	to	be	a	response	to.	Thus,	she	found	that:	
The	post-structuralist	narrative	accounts	that	she	produced	still	claimed	an	authority	to	recount	(to	translate)	in	a	partial	way	some	truth	about	lived	experience,	defying	the	fact	that	they	are	entirely	her	construction.	The	knowledge	that	the	researcher	instead	actually	constructs	these	narratives	(entirely	removed	from	‘original	experience’)	is	bracketed,	reifying	them	with	a	power	to	recount	original	experience	that	they	do	not	
[…]	even	my	poststructural	understandings	of	narratives	as	discursive	practices	produced	in	relations	of	power	embedded	my	analysis	in	methods	of	interpretation	that	reified	narrative	as	having	a	distinct	agency	or	power	that	it	does	not	inherently	have	but	that	I	as	an	inte[r]preter	subscribe	to	[…].	(p.	490)	
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have.	This	applies	as	much	to	the	‘positivist’	narrative	accounts	she	collected	in	her	youth	as	to	her	later	rhetorically-focussed	narratives.	Both	attempt	to	assert	an	impossible	authority	to	recount	lived	experience,	and	(for	Hendry)	constitute	an	artificial	imposition	on	lived	experience.1	Indeed,	“[t]he	common	denominator	of	a	positivist	and	poststructural	view	of	narrative	is	that	narrative	is	still	at	work,	still	imposing	itself	on	our	lives”	(p.	490).	The	bracketing	of	the	fact	that	her	‘post-structuralist’	narrative	accounts	were	constructed	by	her	allowed	a	reconstitution	of	the	relationship	between	absence	and	presence	where	an	out-there	reality	of	lived	experience	can	now	be	translated	into	an	in-here	contextualised	(partial)	narrative	about	it,	of	the	maintenance	of	the	‘illusion	that	“a”	story	was	out	there	to	be	captured’	(p.	490).	
CHAPTER	CONCLUSION	
What	happens	to	narrative	when	we	relieve	it	of	the	impossible	burden	of	explaining	lives?	(Hendry,	2007,	p.	489)	Building	on	Chapter	2,	the	current	chapter	has	sought	to	make	visible	the	absent-present	ontology	of	the	lived	experience	of	pain,	unpicking	the	subtleties	that	transform	it	into	an	ontology	of	elusiveness.	It	has	done	this	through	engaging	with	a	wider	crisis	in	the	representation	of	lived	experience	within	social	science:	the	rhetorical	turn.	This	turn	involved	the	insight	that	texts	are	constructed,	by	an	author	for	others.	This	chapter	has	provided	two	readings	of	this	insight.	The	first	arose	from	a	criticism	of	the	transparency	with	which	experience	has	traditionally	been	represented.	In	seeming	to	recognise	the	rhetorical	processes	(the	inscription	devices)	that	are	involved	in	the	production	of	an	account	of	experience,	a	first	reading	of	rhetoric	discredits	a	transparently	translational	model	(where	the	light	of	original	experience	passes	unproblematically	straight	into	the	representational	account)	and	offers	the	possibility	of	a	more	perfect	translation.	Indeed,	this	reflexivity	effectively	allows	a	precise	understanding	of	the	optics	governing	the	(inevitable)	distorting	effect	of	the	lens,	resulting	in	the	production	of	‘partial	truths’	that	constitute	a	more	accurate	(but	infinitely	more	nuanced)	accounting	of	lived	experience.2	It	allows	a	reconstituting	of	the	integrative	paradigm	as	the	search	for	contextually	situated	accounts	of	the	lived	experience	of	pain.	However,	this	reading	fails	to	properly	appreciate	the	implications	of	the	insight	of	rhetoric.	A	second	reading	accepts	that	the	translation	of	experience	into	an	account,	even	one																																									 																					
1	Whether	or	not	representational	forms	act	as	‘imposters’	to	some	authentic	reality	outside	of	representation	is	an	important	line	of	thought	that	forms	the	basis	of	the	next	chapter.	However,	it	is	not	relevant	to	the	current	argument	and	so	such	discussion	is	left	until	then.	2	Mol	(2002)	refers	to	this	as	perspectivalism.	
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defining	the	rhetorical	processes	influencing	the	capturing	of	that	experience,	cannot	occur	because	to	bring	what	is	absent	into	presence	takes	away	the	essential	absence	in	that	experience.	What	is	presented	as	the	referent	of	the	account,	which	is	the	original	experience	that	the	account	is	about	(and	which	is	absent),	is	as	much	a	construct	of	the	author	as	is	the	account	itself.	Both	are	the	product	of	rhetoric.	There	is	no	‘out-there’	reality	
causing	an	‘in-here’	representation:	both	are	constructed,	and	there	can	thus	be	no	translation	of	experience	into	an	account.	A	second	reading	suggests	rhetoric	reveals	a	problem	of	simultaneity	of	absence	and	presence	when	accounting	for	the	lived	experience	of	pain,	something	more	fundamental	than	the	problem	of	transparency	of	translation	that	concerns	a	first	reading.	Nevertheless,	a	first	reading	of	rhetoric	has	spawned	a	new	methodological	paradigm	within	the	social	sciences	based	upon	reflexivity	and	positionality,	yet	one	that	reinforces	(tries	to	perfect)	translation	rather	than	rejecting	it.	However,	whilst	a	well-defined	and	popular	paradigm	for	accounting	for	lived	experience	has	arisen	based	upon	a	first	reading	of	rhetoric,	the	same	cannot	be	said	of	the	second.	Instead,	those	advocating	a	second	reading	seem	defined	by	the	problem	of	the	failure	of	translation,	of	the	simultaneity	of	absence	and	presence,	rather	than	offering	a	response	to	managing	it.	Yet	if	we	are	to	reject	the	reflexive	paradigm	as	repeating	the	sins	that	the	insight	of	rhetoric	attempted	to	highlight	in	transparently	translational	accounts,	we	might	ask	what	a	possible	replacement	would	look	like.	Turning	explicitly	back	to	the	paradox	of	pain	inherent	in	an	integrative	model	we	can	ask:	what	would	an	account	of	pain	experience	look	like	that	didn’t	rely	on	a	translational	model	of	knowledge?	How	can	the	simultaneity	of	absence	and	presence	in	lived	experience	be	accounted	for	once	it	is	made	fully	visible?	
ACCOUNTING	FOR	PAIN	EXPERIENCE:	BEYOND	TRANSLATION	
Arthur	Kleinman	edited	and	contributed	to	Pain	as	Human	Experience	(DelVecchio	Good,	Brodwin,	Good	&	Kleinman,	1992),	which	might	be	regarded	as	one	of	the	most	influential	texts	in	the	development	of	an	integrative	model	of	pain	experience	(and	indeed,	the	accounting	of	experience	more	generally).	A	book	that	was	reacting	to	the	anatomisation	of	lived	experience	into	distinct	realms	associated	with	both	a	biomedical	and	a	biopsychosocial	conception	of	medicine	(see	Chapter	1),	it	was	also	inevitably	influenced	by	the	rhetorical	turn.	In	many	ways	the	contributions	of	the	book	can	be	positioned	as	enacting	a	translational	model.	Kleinman	and	his	fellow	editors	note	in	the	opening	chapter	(Kleinman	et	al.,	1992)	of	their	hope	for	the	“authentic	representation	of	the	experiences	[of	]	sufferers”	(p.	16),	of	“faithful	attention	to	the	lived	experience	of	those	with	whom	we	work”	(p.	18).	Here	the	roots	of	some	‘out	there’	reality	of	embodied	experience	are	hoped	to	be	captured	within	accounts,	if	only	
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the	researcher	can	pay	faithful	enough	attention	to	patients’	stories,	including	the	moral	demands	associated	with	the	performance	of	the	story.1	Yet	in	the	final	chapter	of	the	book	(before	the	epilogue),	Kleinman	(1992)	seems	to	break	somewhat	with	this	interpretation,	and	to	question	whether	there	really	can	be	a	link	between	embodied	experience	and	the	(‘faithful’)	accounts	of	it.	Whilst	the	volume	criticises	biomedical	accounts	that	substitute	lived	experience	with	an	‘artificial’	set	of	constructions	along	a	mind-body	dualism,	the	danger	is	that	these	new	accounts	provide	similar	artificial	substitutions.	Thus,	the	suffering	generated	by	a	failure	of	these	substitutions	to	capture/embody/be	a	portal	for	the	holism	of	embodied	experience	threatens	to	result	in	“a	type	of	social	scientific	transmogrification	of	suffering”	where	the	new	ethnography	of	experience	repeats	the	mistakes	of	the	biomedical	(and	biopsychosocial)	paradigm	that	it	intends	to	replace	(p.	189).	Indeed,	the	“cultural	constructionist’s	icon	can	be	as	inhumanely	artifactual	a	characterization	of	experience	[…]	as	is	the	pathologist’s	histological	slide”	(p.	190).	Commenting	on	this	pessimistic	conception	of	an	inherent	problem	in	trying	to	create	representations	of	experience,	Kleinman	ends	his	chapter	by	suggesting	that	there	“probably	can	never	be	[an]	entirely	satisfying	[…]	explanatory	account	of	human	suffering”	(p.	190).	Seeming	to	recognise	the	volume’s	attempt	to	bridge	the	unbridgeable,	a	second	reading	emerges	where	Kleinman	appears	to	reject	the	hope	(the	promise)	that	representation	can	ever	capture	something	of	the	experience	it	represents.	Seeming	to	recognise	the	fundamental	separation	between	an	extra-representational	reality	of	original	experience	and	the	accounts	produced	about	experience,	Kleinman	suggests	that	“there	may	come	a	time”	(p.	191)	when	we	need	to	admit	that	“There	are	no	words!”	(Mintz,	1984,	cited	in	Kleinman,	1992,	p.	191).	This	end	to	the	final	chapter	of	Pain	as	Human	Experience	is	in	stark	contrast	to	the	‘faithful	attention’	of	an	ethnography	of	experience	discussed	in	the	book’s	introductory	chapter,	and	testament	to	the	intimacy	of	first	and	second	readings	and	the	subtlety	of	interpretation	between	the	two.	In	his	closing	remarks	we	are	implicitly	invited	by	Kleinman	to	take	the	next	logical	step	to	a	second	reading	of	rhetoric,	to	consider	an	alternative	to	translation	that	asks	not	“how	to	make	a	better	representation,	but	how	to	avoid	representation”	(Tyler,	1986,	p.	128,	my	emphasis):	the	creation	of	an	anti-representational	account	of	pain.	It	is	from	here	the	next	chapter	begins.
																																								 																					
1	Brodwin’s	(1992)	chapter	is	particularly	notable	in	this	sense	for	his	emphasis	on	“metaphor,	rhetoric,	and	performance”	(p.	77).	
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CHAPTER	4:	AFTER	TRANSLATION	
INTRODUCTION	
Having	deconstructed	a	translational	model	and	made	visible	the	absent-present	ontology	of	what	it	means	to	know	the	lived	experience	of	pain,	the	current	chapter	explores	what	an	alternative	account	of	lived	experience	could	look	like	that	maintains	this	visibility.	The	chapter	begins	by	exploring	different	ways	in	which	pain	experience	has	been	constructed	as	non-object	within	social	science,	as	beyond	words.	It	suggests	that	pain	as	non-object	can	be	read	in	two	ways,	constituting	two	different	responses	to	the	failure	of	translation.	The	specific	reading	is	important	because	just	as	a	first	reading	of	rhetoric	(see	previous	chapter)	repeated	a	flawed	translational	logic,	so	too	does	one	type	of	‘non-translational’	response.	A	‘first	response’	maintains	the	division	between	‘out-there’	reality	and	‘in-here’	representation	characteristic	of	translation.	Whilst	acknowledging	the	critique	from	a	second	reading	of	rhetoric	that	translational	accounts	could	never	hope	to	capture	the	out-there	reality,	it	nevertheless	maintains	that	there	is	some	extra-representational	domain,	but	one	that	is	completely	unknowable	to	the	realm	of	representation.	Any	attempts	to	represent	this	domain	are	actively	resisted	by	those	positing	this	response	since	to	represent	means	the	colonisation	by	alien	entities	that	betray	the	absent	nature	of	the	extra-representational	domain.	However,	the	very	attempt	to	define	the	boundary	that	maintains	the	purity	of	absence	and	presence	unwittingly	produces	a	definition	of	the	extra-representational	in	the	process	of	trying	to	avoid	it.	A	‘second	response’	suggests	that	the	problem	of	translational	accounts	(including	a	‘first-response’)	is	that	they	posit	an	‘out-there’	reality	that	is	absolute	and	beyond	the	reach	of	rhetoric.	When	this	absolutism	becomes	translated	into	presence,	presence	takes	on	a	
presumption	of	closure,	an	absolutism	that	assumes	that	reality	really	has	(once	and	for	all)	been	captured	in	this	privileged	moment	of	presence,	bestowing	the	enormous	(and	impossible)	burden	on	the	representational	form	to	make	present	that	which	is	absent.	By	contrast,	a	second-response	posits	that	both	the	out-there	reality	and	in-here	representation	are	the	product	of	rhetoric,	disarming	the	notion	that	anything	like	absolutism	is	possible	in	the	ongoing	processes	of	rhetorical	practice.	In	this	understanding	the	closure	offered	by	presence	always	makes	visible	a	‘second	movement’	of	something	more	than	can	be	offered	by	that	presence	alone,	an	absence	that	is	made	manifest	rather	than	bracketed.	This	
fractional	understanding	of	what	it	means	to	know	is	presented	as	an	adequate	theoretical	position	to	know	the	lived	experience	of	pain	where	the	visibility	of	its	absent-present	ontology	is	maintained	rather	than	masked	as	elusivity.	
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PAIN	AS	NON-OBJECT	
Faced	with	the	failure	of	the	translational	project	of	accounting	for	lived	experience,	social	scientists	embracing	a	second	reading	of	rhetoric	in	the	rhetorical	turn	were	required	to	confront	the	representational	processes	that	defined	what	they	did	as	producers	of	knowledge.	For	these	theorists,	the	process	of	providing	a	representation	of	experience	was	so	ingrained	with	translation	that	the	only	proper	response	seemed	to	be,	to	paraphrase	the	quote	from	Tyler	(1986)	used	at	the	end	of	the	last	chapter,	to	avoid	representation	entirely.	As	noted	in	Chapter	2,	pain	as	experienced	has	traditionally	been	objectified	as	a	representational	entity,	as	a	thing.	To	ask	how	we	might	account	for	pain	as	something	other	than	a	representational	entity	seems	counter-intuitive	when	viewed	through	the	familiar	lens	of	translation,	where	the	point	is	to	try	to	give	it	accurate	representational	form.	Yet	many	social	scientists	have	attempted	to	do	exactly	this	with	pain	as	it	is	experienced:	to	make	it	a	non-object.	This	re-imagining	of	pain	experience	extends	to	its	underlying	ontology.	Chapter	2	outlines	an	ontology	of	pain	experience	where	the	sheer	againstness	of	pain	constitutes	a	first	movement	in	an	objectification	process	(as	a	something	to	be	against)	(Scarry,	1985),	a	telic	
demand	for	representational	definition	(Leder,	1990).	Specifically,	Scarry’s	(1985)	schema	of	‘man-as-creator’	is	based	upon	an	interpretation	of	the	Husserlian	concept	of	
intentionality,	and	it	is	in	a	re-interpretation	of	intentionality	that	a	non-translational	re-imagining	of	the	ontology	of	pain	experience	has	occurred.	Scarry	understood	intentionality	to	mean	that	states	of	mind	such	as	anger	and	love	are	about	some	object,	such	that	‘pain’	is	understood	as	a	pain	object	(albeit	perhaps	an	elusive	one).	Indeed,	in	this	understanding	intentional	acts	“shape	the	amorphous	pre-objective	experience,	the	flow	of	sensations	or	perceptions	into	objectified	experiences,	into	an	experience	of	something”	(Honkasalo,	2000,	p.	200,	emphasis	in	original).	By	contrast,	Honkasalo	argues	that	intentionality	should	be	understood	as	a	human	act,	as	“the	ground	for	human	action”	(p.	201)	rather	than	as	the	production	of	representational	forms	that	apprehend	an	intentional	state.	Here	intentionality	has	is	“I	can”,	not	“I	think	that”	(Merleau-Ponty,	1962,	cited	in	Honkasalo,	2000,	p.	200):	on	action	rather	than	representational	objects.	Explaining	this	further	with	reference	to	chronic	pain,	Honkasalo	(2000)	asks	us	to	consider	chronic	pain	as	an	emotion.	Deriving	from	the	Latin	emovere,	which	means	“to	move	outward	toward	the	world,	away	from	oneself”	(p.	200),	in	emotion	the	“movement	is	its	essential	trait”	(p.	200,	emphasis	in	original).	In	reflecting	on	her	interviews	with	participants	experiencing	chronic	pain,	she	suggests	that	pain	constitutes	“an	intensive	passionate	movement”	between	a	current	(pained)	world	and	a	lost	(non-pained)	world	(p.	
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203).	Within	these	interviews,	the	intentional	act	forms	past	and	present	worlds	as	intentional	objects,	but	it	is	the	movement	between	them	that	is	the	important	feature	of	Honkasalo’s	understanding	of	pain	experience.	It	is	the	yearning	for	the	lost	world,	the	frustration,	the	disappointment,	the	depression,	that	point	towards	(but	never	‘capture’	as	a	
something)	the	movement	connecting	pre-	and	post-	pain	worlds.	In	this	sense,	Honkasalo	suggests,	drawing	on	Merleau-Ponty,	that	pain	as	experienced	should	be	understood	as	a	
hinge,	a	“somatic	reference	point	that	makes	our	passage	possible	between	different	modes	of	experience”(Honkasalo,	2000,	p.	205).	Ralph	(2013)	makes	a	similar	argument	in	suggesting	that	the	“qualitative	experience”	(p.	104)	of	pain	inflicted	by	a	Chicago	police	department	on	black	residents	as	part	of	an	oppressive	campaign	of	torture	“offers	a	way	for	black	urban	residents	to	conjure	the	past	while	seeking	to	understand	the	present”	(p.	115).	To	see	pain	as	an	object	formed	from	intentionality	misses	the	point.	For	Honkasalo	(2000),	the	phenomenological	body	(embodiment)	“is	never	an	object	between	other	objects”	(p.	199).	Indeed,	“a	phenomenological	level	of	analysis	demands	[an]	understanding	of	one’s	own	body	as	a	genuine	source	of	experience,	not	as	an	object”	(p.	204,	emphasis	in	original).	Thus	reconceptualised,	pain	becomes	a	non-object	of	emotionally-driven	movement,	an	intangibility	that	escapes	the	perils	of	translational	representation.1	Kugelmann	(2003)	applies	Peirce’s	(1960)	understanding	of	the	sign	to	consider	pain	in	a	similar	sense.	He	asks	us	to	consider	a	sign	in	three	ways:	as	an	object	(“a	sign	is	a	something”),	a	meaning	attached	to	the	sign	(representamen),	and	the	interpretation	of	the	sign	(interpretant)	(Kugelman,	2003,	p.	33).	Kugelmann	suggests	pain	can	be	understood	in	these	three	ways:	as	an	object	(e.g.	“I	feel	pain	there”),	as	representamen	(e.g.	“pain	means	danger”),	and	as	interpretant	(p.	38,	emphasis	in	original).	Pain	as	interpretant	is	where	pain	itself	is	the	interpretation.	Thus,	Kugelmann	suggests	an	example	in	which	a	woman’s	stomach	pain	recedes	after	receiving	a	negative	pregnancy	test	result.	“The	change	in	pain,	its	lessening,	interprets	the	test	result”	(p.	39).	Honkasalo	(2000)	might	suggest	that	pain	as	interpretant	is	the	‘somatic	hinge’	that	connects	the	different	modes	of	experience,	namely	between	the	woman’s	world	with	and	without	children.	Both	sets	of	analysis	are	a	way	of	accounting	for	the	experience	of	pain	without	making	pain	into	an	object	of	representation,	albeit	one	“less	familiar	because	pain	is	usually	taken	as	what	we	feel”	(Kugelmann,	2003,	p.	39,	emphasis	in	original),	where	the	imperative	is	to	translate	pain	experience	into	a	representational	object.																																									 																					
1	Bissell	(2010)	makes	a	similar	argument	to	Honkasalo	in	suggesting	how	pain	experience	can	be	understood	in	terms	of	affect	as	a	movement	connecting	intentional	objects.	Specifically,	Bissell	writes	of	the	“different	movements	of	affect”	(p.	81),	which	are	understood	to	be	“generated	and	quiesced	through	entanglements	with	people,	physical	locations,	material	objects,	at	different	times	and	in	different	spaces”	(p.	83).	Like	Honkasalo,	the	emphasis	“is	not	about	what	the	body	in	pain	is,	but	about	what	the	body	in	pain	has	the	capacity	to	do”	(Bissell,	2010,	p.	83,	emphasis	in	original).	
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This	understanding	of	pain	experience	as	a	non-objectified	interpretation	echoes	psychotherapeutic	work	exploring	the	role	of	pain	within	social	relationships.	Shapiro	(2006)	discusses	how	pain	can	be	understood	as	a	“physical	language”	(p.	115,	after	Bucci,	1997)	within	the	context	of	two	mother-daughter	relationships	she	examined	(where	at	least	one	in	each	pair	experienced	chronic	pain).	She	suggests	that	in	these	relationships	there	is	an	unbounded	connection	between	mother	and	daughter,	something	that	in	normal	development	would	have	resulted	in	separation	once	the	daughter	grew	older.	In	this	context	pain	mediates	between	the	contradictory	demands	of	separation	and	closeness.	Thus,	in	one	of	the	relationships,	the	daughter	(who	experienced	chronic	pain)	“hated	and	envied	her	mother	while	longing	for	her	approval”	(p.	114).	Pain	as	illness	created	a	dependency	of	care	between	mother	and	daughter	(the	former	whom	did	not	experience	chronic	pain),	and	was	“the	glue	for	the	dyad”	(p.	114).	On	the	other	hand,	the	diagnosis	of	a	chronic	pain	illness	managed	the	hate	and	envy	because	it	served	as	“a	vehicle	throughout	[the	daughter’s]	life	for	[daughter]-and-her-mother,	as	a	merged	unit,	to	displace	and	project	inner,	undefined	badness	into	a	less-threatening,	external,	medicalized	entity”	(p.	105).	Pain	“kept	mother	and	daughter	close	but	not	merged”	(p.	114).	In	a	similar	sense,	Smith	and	Friedemann	(1999)	suggest	that	chronic	pain	can	act	as	a	“stabilizer”	mediating	between	the	contradictory	desires	for	connectedness	and	personal	autonomy	within	a	family	context	(p.	548).	However,	there	is	a	danger	that	reading	pain	experience	as	non-object	in	a	somatic	hinge,	physical	language,	or	interpretation	results	in	its	objectification	as	part	of	a	narrative	account	of	patient	suffering.	Thus,	whilst	the	emphasis	is	placed	by	Honkasalo	(2000)	on	pain	as	human	action	mediating	between	different	forms	of	experience	(something	avoiding	representation),	emphasising	this	action	as	encapsulated	within	the	representational	confines	of	a	narrative	account	of	a	patient’s	experience	is	to	objectify	it,	and	thus	re-initiate	the	problem	of	trying	to	make	absence	present.	This	arises	because	of	a	shift	in	emphasis	back	to	the	representational	forms	of	these	accounts	of	pain	rather	than	pain	as	a	human	act.	Emad’s	(2006)	study	of	an	internet	forum	for	women	with	endometriosis	stresses	the	need	to	maintain	the	emphasis	on	pain-as-human-action	(as	opposed	to	narrative	objects	of	experience)	when	decolonising	lived	experiences	from	those	constituted	by	biomedical	representation.	Emad	suggests	that	within	the	forum	pain	is	transformed	from	the	conventional	biomedical	objects	of	pain	that	the	women	had	acquired	from	medical	encounters	“not	into	something	else,	but	translated	as	engagement”	(p.	198,	emphasis	in	original).	She	suggests	the	forum	provides	an	alternative	(and	non-objectified)	way	of	conceiving	of	pain	to	the	“frustrating	[biomedical]	reifications	of	pain	experience	that	move	to	contain	and	essentialize	pain	rather	than	accounting	for	patients’	real	pain	experiences”	(p.	202).	In	this	sense,	pain	is	released	from	its	representational	container,	coming	(in	its	
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engagement	form)	to	establish	a	“communal	body”	(p.	198).	As	Emad	notes,	the	biomedical	object	is	not	replaced	with	another	something:	‘engagement’	(like	emovere)	is	not	meant	to	be	regarded	as	an	object.	The	breaking	of	the	(biomedical)	representational	objects	is	part	of	pain-as-engagement,	since	it	is	“[t]hrough	storytelling	as	an	exchange	of	information”	that	“the	respondents	begin	to	formulate	critiques	of	biomedical	authority	that	they	experience	as	empowering”	(p.	203).	In	“translating	pain	as	communal	engagement”	there	is	the	breakdown	of	(biomedical)	object	into	non-object	(‘engagement’)	(p.	198).	
RE-READING	PAIN	AS	NON-OBJECT:	TWO	RESPONSES	
Thus	far	the	chapter	has	highlighted	means	by	which	the	lived	experience	of	pain	has	been	accounted	for	in	ways	that	seem	to	avoid	that	lived	experience	entering	representational	definition.1	It	will	now	explicitly	frame	the	ideas	presented	in	the	previous	section	(pain	as	
non-object)	in	two	slightly	different	ways,	reflecting	two	ways	in	which	theorists	have	responded	to	the	failure	of	translation.	Just	as	the	previous	chapter	argued	that	the	rhetorical	turn	has	been	read	in	two	similar	but	crucially	different	ways,	it	is	argued	that	the	non-translational	response	can	be	characterised	by	two	similar	readings	of	pain	as	non-object	that	contain	a	crucial	difference.	The	first,	whilst	more	intuitive,	actually	repeats	the	very	flaws	of	the	translational	model	it	critiques,	whilst	only	the	second	response	offers	the	possibility	of	a	non-translational	account	of	pain	experience.	
AFTER	TRANSLATION:	A	FIRST	RESPONSE	
AN	UNBRIDGEABLE	DUALISM	
What	might	be	termed	a	‘first	response’	to	the	problem	of	simultaneity	of	absence	and	presence	takes	as	its	starting	point	what	remains	of	the	collapse	of	the	translational	bridge	between	‘out-there’	reality	and	‘in-here’	representation	of	lived	experience.	Here	both	aspects	of	the	dualism	remain,	but	they	are	now	necessarily	cut-off	from	one	another.	The	problem	of	simultaneity	is	resolved	by	means	of	a	respect	for	the	necessary	partition	between	both	aspects	of	the	dualism:	presence	and	absence	remain	strictly	separated	into	representational	and	extra-representational	domains.	
																																								 																					
1	As	noted	in	Chapter	2,	much	of	the	literature	makes	no	explicit	distinction	between	pain’s	lived	experience	and	its	cause,	often	simply	referring	to	‘pain’.	Even	though	this	distinction	is	important	(only	making	lived	experience	present	instigates	an	absent-present	paradox),	it	is	often	conflated	(Jackson,	1994).	For	the	purposes	of	the	current	argument,	I	refer	specifically	to	the	lived	experience	of	pain	even	if	this	is	actually	conflated	with	the	cause	of	pain	in	the	literature	discussed.	
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Within	the	influential	book	on	rhetoric,	Writing	Culture	(discussed	in	Chapter	3),	Stephen	Tyler’s	(1986)	contribution	might	be	most	easily	read	as	expressing	a	first-response.1	He	provides	a	vision	for	re-structuring	the	way	that	ethnographic	knowledge	is	understood:	what	he	terms	“post-modern	ethnography”	(p.	125).	In	this,	he	makes	a	division	between	representational	forms	and	“objective	reality”	(p.	135),	and	suggests	that	the	former	cannot	be	used	as	a	route	to	access	the	latter.	Rather,	this	objective	reality	“is	already	established	by	common	sense”	(p.	135).	What	is	left	for	the	representational	form	(presence)	once	it	is	freed	from	the	burden	of	(translationally)	representing	objective	reality	is,	for	Tyler,	in	what	it	can	evoke.	Post-modern	ethnography	is	“intended	to	evoke	in	the	minds	of	both	reader	and	writer	an	emergent	fantasy	of	a	possible	world	of	commonsense	reality”	(p.	125).	That	is,	whilst	the	representational	form	could	never	hope	to	represent	(translate)	an	objective	reality	established	by	‘common	sense’,	it	can	nevertheless	evoke	an	experience	constituting	objective	reality	(but	one	that	could	never	be	represented).	An	ethnography	“evokes	what	can	never	be	put	into	a	text	by	any	writer,	and	that	is	the	commonsense	understanding	of	the	reader”	(p.	138).	Tyler’s	chapter	is	very	similar	to	the	argument	outlined	by	Bourdieu	(1972/1977)	in	Outline	
of	a	Theory	of	Practice.	Bourdieu	makes	the	distinction	between	theory	and	practice.	Theory	might	be	understood	as	representation,	and	practice	as	“a	mode	of	practical	knowledge	not	comprising	knowledge	of	its	own	principles”	(p.	19),	something	outside	of	representation.	For	Bourdieu,	anthropologists	attempt	to	create	theory	about	practice	yet,	because	of	the	bracketing	of	the	rhetorical	nature	of	theory	(see	Chapter	3),	the	(theory	of)	practice	comes	to	constitute	the	practice	itself.	Practice	thus	comes	to	be	understood	“as	mere	execution	of	the	model”	of	that	practice	(p.	29,	emphasis	in	original),	creating	an	“imaginary	anthropology”	(pp.	29-30).	Tyler	(1986)	agrees	that	these	are	“only	imitations	of	reality”	that	can	be	contrasted	with	the	“realism	of	the	commonsense	world”	(p.	137).	For	Bourdieu	(1972/1977)	this	problem	arises	because	the	theorist	“constitutes	practical	activity	as	an	
object	of	observation	and	analysis,	a	representation”	(p.	2,	emphasis	in	original),	meaning	they	are	“condemned	to	adopt	unwittingly	for	[their]	own	use	the	representation	of	action	which	is	[then]	forced	on	agents	or	groups”	(p.	2).	Somewhat	ironically,	understanding	practice	in	this	way	“takes	away	understanding	of	the	logic	of	practice	in	the	very	movement	in	which	it	tries	to	offer	it”	(p.	19).	Like	Tyler	(1986),	the	problem	is	identified	as	the	attempt	to	represent	the	extra-representational.	This	is	the	mistaken	notion	that	one	can	refer	to	an	out-there	reality	via	a	representational	domain,	enacting	a	distorting	representational	colonisation	that	leads	to	the	execution	of	the	model	as	reality	itself,	or	
																																								 																					
1	Or	at	least	part	of	it,	since	his	chapter	is	a	deliberate	exploration	of	the	problems	raised	by	the	rejection	of	translation	as	opposed	to	providing	a	coherent	‘solution’	to	them.	
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(put	differently)	the	instigation	of	the	artificial	constructions	of	biomedicine	or	medical	anthropology	in	the	experience	of	illness	(Kleinman,	1992).	It	is	important	to	note	that	proponents	of	a	first-response	would	seem	to	suggest	that	there	is	no	conflict	between,	on	the	one	hand,	the	belief	in	distinct	representational	and	extra-representational	domains,	and	on	the	other,	a	second-reading	of	rhetoric	that	posits	that	
both	representation	and	the	represented	experience	(as	referred	to	in	the	account)	are	produced	by	an	author.1	Indeed,	the	experience	referred	to	in	an	account	might	be	regarded	as	an	imposter	to	a	genuine	(authentic)	extra-representational	domain	(i.e.	an	execution	of	the	model	as	reality),	as	masquerading	as	some	extra-representational	‘out-there’	reality	through	the	bracketing	of	rhetorical	processes	in	the	establishment	of	authority	(see	previous	chapter).	This	approach	might	be	understood	as	the	decolonisation	of	representational	objects	from	an	extra-representational	domain.	It	is	suspicious	of	the	reach	of	representational	knowledge,	and	concerned	with	maintaining	the	purity	of	an	extra-representational	realm,	which	comes	to	be	regarded	as	“a	desert	island	circled	by	hungry	sharks”	(Latour,	2005,	p.	215).	Certainly,	we	can	see	this	suspicion	in	Honkasalo’s	(2000)	assertion	that	lived	experience	should	never	be	treated	as	an	object,	and	in	Emad’s	(2006)	belief	that	the	decolonisation	of	biomedical	signifiers	should	not	simply	be	replaced	with	more	colonising	representational	objects.	
DEFINING	THE	INDEFINABLE:	THE	RETURN	OF	THE	PROBLEM	OF	SIMULTANEITY	
This	preoccupation	with	defining	the	nature	of	a	pure	extra-representational	realm,	be	it	as	‘common	sense’	(Tyler,	1986),	‘practical	knowledge’	(Bourdieu,	1972/1977)	or	‘genuine	source	of	experience’	(Honkasalo,	2000),	ironically	threatens	to	give	it	representational	objectification.	In	defining	the	boundary	between	representational	and	extra-representational	domains	(to	guard	against	the	colonisation	of	the	latter	by	the	former),	this	boundary	demarcation	actually	gives	the	extra-representational	the	very	definition	that	it	is	proposed	to	circumvent.	It	means	saying	something	about	that	which	is	beyond	words,	of	representing	the	extra-representational.2	
																																								 																					
1	Thus,	whilst	Tyler	(1986)	argues	that	all	parts	of	an	ethnography	(the	account	of	experience	as	well	as	the	original	experience	that	is	referred	to	by	the	account)	are	constructed,	he	still	nevertheless	posits	the	existence	of	some	extra-representational	reality	beyond	the	realm	of	representation	that	is	evoked	by	the	account.	2	Law	(2004)	makes	the	same	point	when	he	argues	that	there	is	no	need	to	make	a	judgment	about	whether	coherence	or	noncoherence	is	a	good	or	bad	thing	since	such	a	judgment	already	presupposes	the	nature	of	what	is	not	known,	and	thus	“limits	the	realities	that	can	be	known,	and	forms	by	which	we	can	know	them”	(p.	103).	
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By	contrast,	Throop’s	(2008,	2009)	ethnography	of	pain	can	be	seen	as	an	attitudinal	shift	away	from	a	preoccupation	with	the	boundaries	of	an	extra-representational	domain	towards	an	exclusive	interest	in	the	representational.	Instead	of	focussing	on	a	domain	that	we	cannot	make	meaning	about	in	our	accounts	(the	extra-representational	domain	of	lived	experience)	his	ethnography	accounts	for	what	we	can	make	meaning	of:	the	representational	objects	that	come	to	pattern	the	experience	of	pain.	Throop	notes	how	William	James	drew	attention	“to	fringe	or	vague	[…]	experiences	in	which	meaningful	articulations	of	objects	of	experience	are	yet	to	crystallize”	(Throop,	2009,	p.	536),	making	an	explicit	link	to	Merleau-Ponty’s	notion	of	experience	as	existing	in	a	“pre-objective	form”	that	has	“yet	to	be	reflected	upon,	thought	about,	analyzed	or	conceptualized”	(Throop,	2009,	p.	538).	Throop	suggests	that	the	intentional	objects	of	experience	–	the	“more	clearly	defined	thoughts,	ideas,	images,	feelings,	and	sensations”	–	are	connected	by	the	ineffable	moments	of	experience	–	the	“transitions,	margins,	and	fringes”,	the	“barely	graspable”	(p.	536).	Indeed,	these	latter	moments	of	experience	constitute	the	“connective	tissue”	between	the	intentional	objects	of	experience	(p.	536).	Throop	calls	these	‘barely	graspable’	moments	“intermediary	varieties	of	experience”	(p.	536),	and	recognises	that	they	become	objectified	when	we	begin	to	reflect	on	them.	This	process	occurs	through	“culturally	and	historically	informed	practices	of	perceiving,	imagining,	feeling,	and	judging”	(p.	540),	which	serve	to	“parse	an	otherwise	yet	to	be	differentiated	field	into	a	differentiated	one”	(p.	541).	For	Throop,	the	ethnographer	can	only	ever	be	concerned	with	this	parsed	field	of	representations,	since	reflection	inevitably	results	in	parsing	the	extra-representational	with	the	representational.	The	researcher	only	ever	has	the	representational	to	hand,	and	so	should	be	concerned	with	it	exclusively.	As	a	consequence,	with	regard	to	the	experience	of	pain	he	focuses	on	how	“the	moral	and	cultural	frameworks	serving	as	the	semiotic,	existential,	and	practical	materials”	serve	as	“the	background	against	which	individual	sufferers	tend	to	interpret	their	dysphoric	sensory	experiences”	(2008,	p.	255).	Drawing	on	Thomas	Csordas	(2009),	Throop	calls	for	a	“cultural	phenomenology”	interested	in	how	the	extra-representational	domain	of	intermediary	varieties	of	experience	become	(upon	reflection)	incorporated	as	representations	constituting	experience	(Throop,	2009,	p.	553).	Unlike	Bourdieu	(1972/1977),	Tyler	(1986),	and	Kleinman	(1992),	Throop’s	(2008,	2009)	analysis	does	not	suggest	that	the	representational	forms	that	come	to	constitute	the	experience	of	pain	are	imposters	to	some	authentic	extra-representational	reality.	To	do	so	presupposes	an	ability	to	represent	the	nature	of	the	extra-representational	domain,	when	of	course	its	very	nature	means	this	is	impossible.	Throop’s	analysis	thus	highlights	an	inherent	flaw	in	a	first	response	distinction	between	a	representational	and	extra-
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representational	domain:	a	boundary	is	defined,	and	in	doing	so	the	extra-representational	must	enter	representational	form.	Throop’s	exclusive	focus	on	the	representational	might	be	regarded	as	coming	closest	to	respecting	the	unbridgeable	gap	between	representational	and	extra-representational	domains.	Yet	whilst	he	seems	to	escape	the	need	to	define	the	border	between	them,	he	nevertheless	does	exactly	this	in	distinguishing	between	a	reflected	(representational)	and	unreflected	(extra-representational)	realm.	He	is	forced	to	define	the	indefinable	as	a	“yet	to	be	differentiated	field”	(2009,	p.	541),	“dysphoric	sensory	experiences”	(2008,	p.	255),	and	the	“connective	tissue”	between	the	representational	objects	of	conscious	reflection	(2009,	p.	536).	Whilst	these	may	seem	to	be	a	nothing,	to	be	a	void	outside	of	representation,	they	still	must	take	representational	form.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	2,	Biro’s	(2011)	interpretation	of	Wittgenstein’s	beetle	box	as	a	‘void’	still	involves	the	invocation	of	a	something.	Yet	the	“thing	in	the	box	has	no	place	in	the	language	game	at	all;	not	even	as	a	something”	(Wittgenstein,	1958,	cited	in	Biro,	2011,	p.	74,	emphasis	in	original).	Even	in	Throop’s	(2008,	2009)	ethnographic	work,	the	contradiction	between	positing	a	domain	outside	of	representational	definition	and	the	need	to	represent	this	domain	through	demarcating	a	boundary	is	apparent	in	his	reference	to	the	“barely	graspable”	nature	of	unreflected	experience	(2009,	p.	536,	my	emphasis).	This	interesting	phrase	captures	Throop’s	attempt	to	respect	the	necessary	absence	of	unreflected	experience	on	the	one	hand,	and	his	need	to	acknowledge	its	presence	in	the	world	of	representational	meaning.	What	is	simultaneously	both	graspable	(presence)	and	ungraspable	(absence)	transforms	into	the	barely	graspable.	Here	the	translational	bridge	is	not	totally	collapsed	(despite	claims	to	the	contrary),	and	it	is	indeed	possible	to	eff	the	ineffable,	but	‘barely’.	This	is,	of	course,	the	familiar	transformation	of	a	contradictory	absent-present	ontology	(where	the	translational	bridge	is	impossible)	into	one	of	elusiveness	(where	translation	is	possible,	but	difficult	–	barely	possible).	A	first-response	thus	ends	up	attempting	to	translate	absence	into	presence:	the	very	model	it	seeks	to	be	a	reaction	against.	
AFTER	TRANSLATION:	A	SECOND	RESPONSE	(OR,	ACCEPTING	RHETORIC	IN	FULL)	
A	‘first	response’	to	the	problem	of	simultaneity	of	absence	and	presence	does	not	fully	accept	the	rhetorical	nature	of	accounts	of	lived	experience.	The	previous	chapter	highlighted	how	a	flawed	translational	understanding	of	knowledge	arose	once	its	full	rhetorical	nature	becomes	bracketed,	allowing	the	conception	to	arise	that	an	unconstructed	‘out-there’	reality	causes	constructed	‘in-here’	representations	(Law,	2004).	However,	whilst	a	first	response	to	the	problem	of	simultaneity	rejects	a	translational	bridge	
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between	the	two	domains,	it	maintains	the	translational	assumption	that	the	out-there	reality	is	not	the	product	of	rhetoric.	Indeed,	there	is	even	an	inversion	of	the	translational	bridge,	where	a	rhetorical	domain	of	representation	threatens	to	colonise	a	pure,	non-rhetorical	external	reality.	Here	the	same	translational	principles	are	assumed,	but	rather	than	trying	to	enhance	translation	a	first	response	tries,	in	vein,	to	suppress	it.	By	contrast,	a	‘second	response’	to	the	problem	of	simultaneity	is	characterised	by	an	acceptance	that	both	the	representational	and	extra-representational	domains	are	the	product	of	rhetoric.	This	distinction	is	important	because	a	translational	understanding	privileges	an	attitude	of	
closure:	an	epistemological	promise	that	the	absolutism	of	‘out-there’	reality	can	be	successfully	translated	into	an	absolutism	in	its	representation.	However,	in	so	ignoring	the	full	rhetorical	nature	of	knowledge	it	ignores	the	perpetual	nature	of	practices	of	knowledge	production,	something	that	makes	absolutes	impossible.	But	as	will	be	made	clear,	a	second	
response	does	not	simply	dismiss	an	attitude	of	closure.	It	instead	introduces	the	additional	and	complicating	factor	that	closure	is	never	possible	in	a	world	where	the	practices	of	inscription	are	always	ongoing.	Rather	than	a	single	movement	towards	closure,	a	second	response	recognises	that	alongside	this	movement	there	is	a	simultaneous	second	movement	(introduced	by	the	unbracketing	of	the	rhetorical	nature	of	knowledge)	that	denies	closure.	In	this	way	the	absent-present	ontology	of	lived	experience	is	properly	embraced,	with	the	definite	closure	of	the	narrative	account	of	lived	experience	(presence)	existing	alongside	a	simultaneous	second	movement	where	the	perpetually	growing	and	open	nature	of	embodied	experience	resides	(absence).	To	be	clear,	a	second	response	to	the	problem	of	simultaneity	does	not	reject	the	movement	towards	closure,	but	rejects	the	translational	assumption	of	the	anteriority	of	an	a	prori	‘out-there’	reality	independent	of	rhetoric.	A	complicated	argument,	to	be	sure,	and	so	to	clarify	we	begin	at	the	first	movement:	the	establishment	of	closure	in	both	translational	(first	response)	and	non-translational	(second	response)	approaches.	
ON	CLOSURE:	THE	DEFINITIVE	ATTITUDE	OF	TRANSLATIONAL	REPRESENTATION	
In	the	previous	chapter	it	was	noted	how	the	generation	of	authority	can	be	regarded	as	the	increasing	solidification	of	knowledge	in	definite	form,	achieved	once	recognition	of	the	inscription	processes	involved	in	its	production	become	eliminated.	In	such	a	method,	presence	is	presumed	to	have	‘captured’,	‘mirrored’,	or	‘translated’	the	absence	it	refers	to	in	some	definite,	final,	or	absolute	sense,	even	whilst	it	is	conventionally	acknowledged	as	temporary,	partial,	and	inherently	fluid.	Law	(2004)	identifies	such	an	attitude	in	“Euro-American”	metaphysics	in	general,	noting	an	“assumption	that	the	world	is	properly	to	be	understood	as	a	set	of	fairly	specific,	
determinate,	and	more	or	less	identifiable	processes”	(p.	5,	emphasis	in	original).	Indeed,	
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these	are	“methodological	habits”	that	centre	around	“the	desire	for	certainty”	(p.	9).	This	conception	“assumes	that	there	is	a	reality	out-there	of	a	definite	form	waiting	to	be	discovered,	if	only	we	can	get	it	right”	(p.	22).	Whilst	there	are	many	forms	of	presence	that	could	be	(and	are)	crafted	about	a	particular	phenomenon,	such	multiplicity	is	denied	in	Euro-American	metaphysics.	Instead,	this	thinking	“prefers	to	represent	manifest	reality	as	singular”	(p.	92):	any	particular	presence	is	expected	to	apprehend	absence	definitively	by	itself.	Indeed,	the	methodologies	of	Euro-American	metaphysics	“demand	singularity,	and	singularity	demands	experts,	a	single	point	of	view”	(p.	98).	These	are	“completed	and	closed	accounts	of	method”,	of	“smooth	Euro-American	metaphysical	certainties”	(p.	143).	The	philosopher	Alfred	Whitehead	termed	this	“the	principle	of	simple	location”	(Whitehead,	1925,	cited	in	Cooper,	1998)	where	“clear-cut,	definite	things	occupy	clear-cut,	definite	places	in	space	and	time”	(Cooper,	1998,	p.	108,	emphasis	in	original).	Therefore,	as	Crapanzano	(1986)	notes	(specifically,	on	ethnography):	the	“ethnographer	must	make	use	of	all	the	persuasive	devices	at	his	disposal	to	convince	his	readers	of	the	truth	of	his	message”	(p.	52,	emphasis	in	original).	Also	discussing	ethnography,	Bryman	(2004)	notes	how	“the	author	rarely	presents	possible	alternative	interpretations”	(p.	503).	This	is	where	“the	phenomenon	in	question	is	presented	as	having	a	single	meaning	or	significance,	which	the	fieldworker	alone	has	cracked,”	where	we	are	“presented	with	an	inevitability”	(p.	503).	Bryman	references	Van	Maanen	(1988),	who	terms	this	interpretive	
omnipotence.	As	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter,	the	generation	of	authority	in	the	production	of	such	interpretive	omnipotence	is	expressed	even	in	the	most	contemporary	of	methodologies	that	purport	to	acknowledge	and	respect	the	fluidity	and	fragility	of	constructions	of	reality.	Thus,	methodologies	forming	part	of	the	‘reflexive	paradigm’	that	was	supposed	to	acknowledge	the	inherently	indefinite	nature	of	presence	through	the	concept	of	rhetoric	also	embody	the	attitude	of	closure.	In	this	regard,	Hendry	(2007)	discusses	the	tendency	of	narrative	method	to	assume	that	there	is	‘	“a”	story	[…]	out	there	to	be	captured’	(p.	490)	(see	previous	chapter).	In	similar	vein,	Reissman	(2012)	notes	that:	
We	get	drawn	into	compelling	stories	and	the	power	of	narrative	to	persuade	and	justify	a	particular	course	of	action	–	this	is	how	it	“really”	happened.	An	effective	storyteller	in	a	conversation	sets	up	a	situation	where	there’s	no	way	to	“read”	the	text	in	another	way.	(p.	377)	Law	(2004)	identifies	this	form	of	representation	as	“direct”	or	“literal”	(p.	89).	This	makes	the	claim	that	“their	statements	are	literal	depictions	of	a	reality	thereby	made	manifest.	‘Reality	is	that	way’,	they	tell	us,	at	least	within	technical	restrictions”	(p.	89).	“	‘It	really	is	that	way’,	they	tell	us”	(p.	89).	Implicit	in	this	understanding	is	that	there	is	an	‘out-there’	reality	of	absence	that	is	definite	and	absolute	which	is	then	translated	into	presence.	This	
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is,	of	course,	a	translational	model,	and	the	absolutism	of	absence	is	translated	into	an	absolutism	within	presence,	despite	conventional	claims	to	the	contrary.	Presence	takes	on	the	definitiveness	of	the	‘out-there’	reality,	which	is	transferred	into	presence	via	the	translational	bridge.	Thus,	the	processes	“that	work	to	produce	singularity	out	there”	(p.	75),	the	processes	generating	the	authority	of	knowledge	(and	that	eliminate	the	inscription	processes	for	producing	that	‘out-there’	reality),	generate	a	definitiveness	in	absence	that	is	then	translated	into	the	presence	of	‘in-here’	representation.	Crucially	for	a	second-response,	the	attitude	of	closure	is	at	the	root	of	the	paradox	of	absence	and	presence.	Each	moment	of	presence	takes	on	the	“pretensions”	(Vannini,	2015,	p.	1)	of	finally	equating,	capturing,	closing,	mirroring,	or	translating	absence.	Yet	this	is	the	attempt	to	merge	two	inherently	contradictory	entities	into	a	singularity,	creating	the	absent-present	paradox.	But	a	second	response	does	not	simply	reject	the	movement	towards	closure.	Instead,	it	suggests	this	movement	goes	alongside	a	simultaneous	and	destabilising	movement	that	serves	to	introduce	the	openness	of	multiplicity	(the	something	else	other	than	the	singular)	
alongside	the	singularity	of	closure,	where	there	is	“more	than	one,	but	less	than	many”	(Law,	2002,	p.	3,	emphasis	in	original).	The	problem	with	a	first	response,	like	all	forms	of	translational	knowing,	is	that	it	privileges	the	singularity	of	closure	and	simply	brackets	the	concurrent	multiplicity	in	its	bracketing	of	the	full	rhetorical	nature	of	knowledge.	A	means	of	beginning	to	make	sense	of	this	is	to	think	of	knowing	in	terms	of	the	philosophical	concept	of	the	event.	
CLOSURE	AND	‘THE	EVENT’	
Understanding	closure	in	terms	of	the	event	means	to	apprehend	that	within	closure	there	is	always	a	“simmering	potentiality	within	the	name	or	the	state	of	affairs”	(Caputo,	2007,	p.	51),	of	“something	astir	in	a	thing”	(p.	48).	The	event	“resists	contraction	into	some	finite	form	or	other”	(p.	51)	and	is	“ever	restless,	on	the	move,	seeking	new	forms	to	assume,	seeking	to	get	expressed	in	still	unexpressed	ways”	(p.	47).	Where	the	event	threatens	to	be	closed	within	a	definite	presence	generated	by	a	translational	attitude,	it	will	shock	the	rigid	fixity,	seeking	to	“twist	free	from	the	finite	containers	in	which	it	finds	itself	deposited”	(pp.	51-2).	It	is	“what	destabilizes	all	such	relatively	stable	structures	as	attempt	to	house	it”	(p.	55),	what	“jolts	the	world,	disturbs,	disrupts,	and	skews	the	sedimented	course	of	things”	(p.	59).	In	this	sense	it	is	“not	something	present	but	something	seeking	to	make	itself	felt	in	what	is	present”	(p.	47).	And	yet	the	very	shocking	and	shaking	of	the	finite	containers	that	would	presume	closure	are	themselves	dependent	on	the	promise	of	a	new	closure	in	a	something	else.	
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The	event	is	“always	already	ahead	of	us,	always	provoking	and	soliciting	us,	eternally	luring	us	on	with	its	promise”	(p.	55).	But	this	is	not	the	simple	faith	in	the	promise	of	definition	outlined	in	the	previous	two	chapters,	where	the	elusive	presence	of	pain	experience	is	deferred	to	a	future	time	in	the	face	of	current	absence.	For	just	as	in	Chapters	2	and	3,	this	is	a	realisation	that	the	elusive	promise	is	a	mask	for	an	absent-present	ontology	where	that	promise	can	never	be	fulfilled.	Indeed,	an	event	“solicits	and	invites,	calls	and	signals	us,	but	is	never	finally	named”	(p.	54).	“Events	make	promises	that	are	never	kept	by	any	actual	occasion”	(p.	55).	That	is,	the	necessary	absence	of	the	event	means	that	it	is	“never	finished	or	formed,	realized	or	constructed”	(p.	48).	But	at	the	same	time	this	does	not	nullify	the	promise	of	closure,	which	remains	as	an	eternal	lure,	such	that	“the	work	of	burning	off	the	old	metaphysics	of	omnipotence	[…]	can	never	cease”	(p.	67).	The	event	constitutes	the	tension	between	the	two,	or	what	Law	(2004)	refers	to	as	“knowing	in	tension”	(p.	98),	something	that	requires	making	two	things	visible	at	the	same	time.	
‘DOUBLE	VISION’:	ON	ALLEGORY	
A	second-response	to	the	‘problem’	or	‘paradox’	of	simultaneity	of	absence	and	presence	normalises	the	paradoxical	nature	of	the	problem	of	simultaneity.	Instead,	the	simultaneity	of	absence	and	presence	are	only	regarded	as	interminable	problems	when	viewed	from	the	perspective	of	an	attitude	of	closure	that	always	assumes	the	resolution	of	the	promise	in	presence	without	the	acknowledgement	that	this	resolution	is	always	denied.	By	contrast,	a	second-response	assumes	an	attitude	where	presence	is	always	becoming	(a	Deleuzian	term),	“always	an	ongoing	that	never	arrives	anywhere,	never	completes	itself”	(Cooper,	1998,	p.	112).	However,	as	noted,	an	eventful	attitude,	of	becoming,	is	not	simply	about	a	rejection	of	an	attitude	of	closure,	not	simply	a	rejection	of	the	‘direct’	or	‘literal’	form	of	representation.	If	there	is	no	attempt	to	hold	presence	firm	against	the	background	of	flux	and	indeterminacy,	there	can	be	no	promise	of	something	else	astir	within	it.	This	can	be	more	clearly	described	if	we	understand	the	production	of	knowledge	in	terms	of	how	Cooper	considers	an	assemblage.	This	is	the	“continuous	movement	of	parts	in	a	restless	flux	in	which	the	separate	identities	of	the	parts	give	way	to	a	mutual	coming	and	going,	uniting	and	separating”	(p.	110,	emphasis	in	original).	For	Cooper,	the	parts	are	definite	forms	of	presence,	but	through	their	relationship	with	each	other	they	always	express	something	else.	Indeed,	“in	establishing	relations	between	differences,	the	assemblage	asserts	its	intrinsic	incompleteness,	opens	up	new	worlds,	and	shows	becoming	as	a	process	of	renewal”	(p.	112,	emphasis	in	original).	In	this	sense,	the	parts	are	always	unfinished.	Yet	it	is	only	through	understanding	the	parts	as	definite,	fixed,	and	finished	elements	that	the	relationship	(and	the	expression	of	something	else)	can	be	materialised.	
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Thus,	parts	are	“always	part	of	and	apart	from;	they	are	separate	and	joined	at	the	same	
time”	(p.	118,	emphasis	in	original).	This	is	what	Derrida	termed	iterability,	which	“splits	an	
element	while	constituting	it”	(Cooper,	1998,	p.	115,	emphasis	in	original).	Deleuze	termed	this	point	of	iterability	the	middle,	and	becoming	can	be	considered	as	“the	movement	of	assemblage	around	the	middle”	(Cooper,	1998,	p.	114).	Thus,	the	discrete	and	fixed	binary	parts	of	“[b]efore	and	after,	original	and	copy,	cause	and	effect	now	have	to	be	seen	as	becomings	that	gyrate	around	a	mute,	mutable	and	motile	middle”	(p.	116).	Yet	“since	we’ve	been	so	conditioned	by	the	logic	of	simple	location,	it’s	difficult	for	us	to	think	becoming”	in	this	way	(p.	112,	emphasis	in	original).	An	eventful	attitude	therefore	requires	a	“double	vision”	(p.	118)	or	“split	vision”	(Law,	2004,	p.	98).	It	must	apprehend	the	absolute	claims	of	translational	forms	of	presence	in	order	to	apprehend	the	promise	of	something	more,	through	a	process	of	iterability.	This	double	vision	or	“double	movement”	(Cooper,	1998,	p.	123)	is	what	Law	(2004)	proposes	in	an	allegorical	attitude.	Allegory	is	where	“statements	come	out	(or	are	telling)	of	something	other	or	more	than	the	reality	they	describe”	(p.	89).	To	be	allegorical	is	“to	hold	two	or	more	things	together	that	do	not	necessarily	cohere”	(p.	90),	to	“see	and	to	make	several	realities	at	once”	(p.	98).	Law	(2002,	2004)	expresses	this	allegorical	attitude	in	his	understanding	of	reality	as	
fractional1	(see	also	Lee	and	Brown’s,	1994,	fractal	strategies).	This	uses	the	metaphor	of	the	fractal,	a	line	that,	when	magnified,	is	itself	composed	of	several	lines.	The	‘double’	or	‘split’	vision	is	here	seen	between	the	two	levels	of	perspective.	Crucially,	this	is	a	double	vision	of	iterability	which	breaks	the	either/or	thinking	of	“centers	or	dislocated	fragments”	characteristic	of	an	attitude	of	closure	through	reconceiving	it	as	“[b]oth/and”	(2002,	p.	4).	Cooper	(1998)	similarly	discusses	how	double	vision	is	expressed	in	cubist	art.	He	argues	that	cubism	addresses	“the	problem	of	simultaneity”	(p.	117)	through	representing	definite	forms	that	at	the	same	time	express	something	more	than	those	forms	can	contain.	It	is	only	through	an	apprehension	of	the	multiple	forms	of	the	elements	in	the	paintings	that	the	relationship	between	the	parts	reveals	a	singular	unity	that	is	more	than	those	elements	can	contain	alone	as	multiple	elements.	Thus,	in	addressing	Picasso’s	Portrait	of	Vollard,	the	elements	constituting	Vollard’s	face	“seam/seem2	to	make	up	a	visual	unity	but	which	reveal	the	body	as	a	multiplicity	of	aspects	and	parts”	(p.	117,	emphasis	in	original).	Using	Law’s	(2002,	2004)	fractal	analogy,	the	elements	constituting	Vollard’s	face	express	a	‘visual	unity’	that	show	that	they	are	in	fact	“less	than	[the]	many”	that	they	appear,	whilst	at	the	same	
time	this	visual	unity	can	only	be	apprehended	by	appreciating	that	it	is	made	up	of	these	discrete	elements,	that	it	is	in	fact	“more	than	one”	(Law,	2002,	p.	3,	emphasis	in	original).																																									 																					
1	Law	(2002)	cites	Strathern	(1991,	1992)	and	Wagner	(1991)	as	containing	an	earlier	discussion.	2	‘Seam’	is	here	used	as	a	synonym	for	the	middle	and	alludes	to	a	‘seam’	that	connects	two	or	more	separate	elements	to	constitute	a	whole	(such	as	in	garments	of	clothing).	
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For	Moreira	(2012),	double	vision	is	expressed	in	what	he	terms	“humour”,	which	he	uses	within	the	context	of	health	care	transformation	(p.	154).	As	above,	Moreira	argues	that	it	is	only	through	a	“robust	understanding	of	the	fabric	of	present	institutions”	that	the	“innova-tion”	and	“imagination”	constitutive	of	the	event	can	be	realised	(p.	155).	That	is,	it	is	only	through	apprehending	the	absolute	claims	of	presence	that	reveal	the	“possibilities	enclosed	in	the	present”	(p.	148),	of	“the	fragile	underpinnings	of	established	regimes	of	action”	(p.	149).	But	this	realisation	does	not	simply	imply	an	attempt	“to	replace	one	frame	of	meaning	with	another”	as	in	an	attitude	of	closure	(p.	150).	Indeed,	the	“power	of	humour	and	laughter”	lies	in	“inhabiting	multiple	conventions	at	once	and	enjoying	the	strain	this	provokes”	(p.	150).	It	is	a	knowing	in	tension	between	absence	and	presence	that	enjoys	the	
strain,	as	opposed	to	an	attitude	of	closure	that	finds	the	tension	paradoxical.	Double	vision	can	also	be	observed	through	another	metaphor:	that	of	the	hinge.	The	hinge	can	be	considered	another	synonym	for	the	middle,	the	point	“around	which	things	revolve	or	articulate”	(Cooper,	1998,	p.	121).	Cooper	argues	that	this	is	the	sense	that	Merleau-Ponty	meant	when	he	described	the	body	as	a	hinge.	This	chapter	earlier	noted	how	Honkasalo	(2000)	conceptualised	pain	as	a	hinge	that	acted	as	a	seam	between	pre-	and	post-	pained	worlds.	Whilst	discrete,	finished	elements,	they	nevertheless	express	in	relationship	to	one	another	something	more	than	those	discrete	elements	can	contain.	Apprehending	each	world	and	the	relationship	between	them	instigates	a	“passionate	movement”	(p.	203)	connecting	them	that	neither	one	can	account	for	alone.	Indeed,	there	is	a	sense	of	a	‘whole’	constituted	by	the	individual	elements	or	‘parts’.	But	neither	can	the	concept	of	the	‘whole’	(the	uniting	of	the	two	worlds	through	‘passionate	movement’)	encapsulate	the	meaning	of	pain	because	it	can	only	be	understood	through	apprehending	the	discrete	forms	of	presence	that	come	to	constitute	those	worlds.	In	other	words,	this	is	neither	part	nor	whole,	but	what	Cooper	(1998)	calls	the	“part-whole”	(p.	123).	Whilst	a	first-response	might	read	Honkasalo’s	(2000)	analysis	as	expressing	an	extra-representational	domain	of	pain	as	a	‘passionate	movement’	that	eludes	being	expressed	in	presence,	a	second-response	reads	it	as	enacting	a	double-vision	where	its	expression	in	the	part-whole	is	always	iterable,	and	thus	never	enacts	an	absolutism	of	representational	closure	that	initiates	the	paradox	of	absence	and	presence.	These	are	two	ways	of	reading	
pain	as	non-object.			Double	vision/movement,	allegory,	the	event,	iterability,	becoming,	the	middle,	humour,	seam,	fractionality,	cubism,	and	the	somatic	hinge	are	different	ways	to	describe	a	‘second-response’	to	the	‘problem’	of	simultaneity	of	absence	and	presence,	but	all	express	the	same	concern	with	accepting	an	absent-present	ontology	in	the	process	of	knowing,	something	necessary	in	approaching	the	problem	of	experience	that	this	thesis	is	concerned	with.	
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CHAPTER	CONCLUSION	
How	can	anything	reliably	stand	for	a	messy	mass	of	constituents?	A	strange	kind	of	double	vision	seems	required.	You	have	to	see	each	member	of	the	group	in	its	own	right.	At	the	same	time,	you	have	to	see	the	group	itself	as	a	singular	thing.	(Schaffer,	2005,	p.	196)	Faced	with	the	failure	of	a	translational	model,	this	chapter	has	explored	how	lived	experience	might	be	accounted	for	without	translation.	The	chapter	began	by	taking	the	position	that	if	translation	is	so	embedded	within	the	concept	of	representing,	then	the	next	logical	step	is	to	ask	how	we	can	avoid	it.	Different	ways	that	pain	experience	has	been	accounted	for	were	examined	where	it	could	be	re-imagined	as	a	non-object.	Here	pain	is	a	form	of	movement	that	connects	two	worlds	of	experience,	as	an	interpretation,	as	a	physical	language	mediating	social	relationships,	and	as	an	act	of	engagement	between	sufferers.	In	each	of	these	the	common	thread	is	that	pain	is	always	an	intangibility	that	avoids	definition	whilst	providing	the	movement	that	connects	representational	objects.	Reflecting	the	emphasis	in	the	thesis	on	the	way	texts	can	be	read	and	re-read	in	different	ways,	the	chapter	suggests	pain	as	non-object	can	be	read	according	to	two	different	responses	to	the	failure	of	translation.	The	‘first-response’	is	a	post-translational	world	where	the	dualism	between	an	‘out-there’	reality	(absence)	and	‘in-here’	representation	(presence)	exists,	but	where	the	translational	bridge	between	them	has	collapsed.	A	first-response	is	concerned	with	maintaining	the	separation	between	representational	and	extra-representational	domains.	However,	such	guardians	of	extra-representational	purity	inevitably	end	up	defining	boundaries	between	the	two	domains,	a	process	that	ends	up	representing	the	extra-representational.	A	first	response	thus	repeats	the	same	problem	of	translation	it	attempts	to	avoid:	trying	to	make	present	that	which	is	necessarily	absent.	A	‘second-response’	suggests	the	problem	continues	to	re-emerge	because	of	a	failure	to	fully	extend	the	rhetorical	nature	of	knowledge	to	both	aspects	of	the	sign,	with	a	first	response	continuing	to	posit	an	a	priori	external	reality	outside	of	the	realm	of	rhetoric.	A	second-response	extends	the	rhetorical	nature	of	knowledge	to	both	external	reality	and	in-here	representation,	and	in	so	doing	evaporates	the	absolutism	that	is	translated	through	to	presence.	It	does	this	not	through	abandoning	closure	but	making	a	second	movement	alongside	it.	This	second	movement,	or	double	vision,	has	many	different	names,	but	involves	
knowing	in	tension	between	the	interpretive	omnipotence	inherent	in	the	presumption	of	closure,	and	a	simultaneous	realisation	of	a	promise	of	something	else	that	shocks	and	shakes	any	notion	of	such	omnipotence.	It	is	posited	as	a	means	by	which	we	might	know	lived	experience	where	an	absent-present	ontology	is	made	fully	visible,	thus	offering	an	alternative	to	conventional	epistemological	methods.	The	question	remains,	however,	of	exactly	how	this	alternative	can	be	practiced.
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CHAPTER	5:	THE	PRACTICE	OF	(CENTRING	AND)	DECENTRING	
INTRODUCTION	
Having	established	a	second	response	as	an	adequate	theoretical	reaction	to	the	problem	of	simultaneity	of	absence	and	presence	in	accounts	of	lived	experience,	this	chapter	considers	how	it	can	be	practiced	as	a	viable	way	of	knowing	lived	experience	such	that	it	might	replace	the	integrative	paradigm’s	insufficient	epistemological	accounting	for	pain	experience.	It	starts	by	clarifying	that	if	the	‘first	movement’	of	the	‘double	movement’	or	‘double	vision’	of	fractionality	constitutes	a	process	of	centring	in	the	closure	of	presence,	then	the	second	movement	involves	making	visible	the	processes	that	puncture	the	boundaries	set	up	by	that	centring.	This	decentring	is	posited	to	occur	through	an	attention	to	the	practices	of	centring,	with	decentring	being	made	visible	in	either	the	distribution	of	multiplicity	into	singularities	of	space	and	time	or	the	coordination	of	multiplicity	into	singularity.	In	highlighting	this,	the	chapter	draws	on	a	particular	example	of	an	ethnographic	study	of	disease	as	it	is	enacted	in	a	hospital	to	reveal	how	multiple	centring	practices	produce	a	multiplicity	of	objects	for	the	disease,	but	which	nerveless	‘hang’	together	within	a	singular	notion	of	‘the	body’.		Whilst	the	enactment	of	disease	in	a	hospital	relies	predominantly	on	distributive	processes	for	achieving	singularity,	the	practices	in	producing	academic	texts	like	accounts	of	lived	experience	rely	predominantly	on	coordination,	namely	through	conflict.	And	whilst	unbracketing	distributive	practices	is	effective	in	revealing	the	multiplicity	of	decentring,	the	practices	of	coordination	are	more	complicated.	For	here	fractional	tension	is	not	actually	bracketed	in	an	epistemological	reading	but	readily	attended	to,	yet	conceived	as	a	
means-to-an-end	of	a	singularity.	An	attention	to	practice	where	there	is	a	conflict	requires	a	more	complex	understanding	of	how	the	fractional	tension	made	visible	by	the	attention	to	practice	can	be	converted	from	means-to-an-end	to	an	end-in-itself.	
DECENTRING	AND	ATTENDING	TO	PRACTICE	
Thinking	in	terms	of	the	event	(see	previous	chapter),	Caputo	(2007)	considers	what	it	means	to	react	to	the	first	movement	of	closure	when	pursing	an	eventful	attitude.	With	regard	to	his	specific	interest	in	pursing	an	eventful	attitude	to	theology,	he	writes	that	“my	intention	is	to	avail	the	event	of	the	most	flexible	form	available	to	safeguard	its	irreducibility”	(p.	53).	For	Caputo	the	“name	of	God	shelters	an	event,	and	the	task	of	thinking	about	or	meditating	upon	this	name	is	to	safeguard	that	event	and	release	what	is	
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stirring	there”	(p.	53).	In	this	sense,	a	“postmodern	theology”	(p.	49)	aims	“to	feel	about	for	the	event	that	has	so	disturbed	the	surface	of”	sacred	Christian	texts	(p.	60).	In	particular	he	refers	to	a	“loosening	up”	of	the	solidifying	tendency	we	earlier	saw	associated	with	the	
authority	of	knowledge	(and	the	bracketing	of	its	full	rhetorical	nature):	
I	am	always	interested	in	loosening	up	the	events	that	stir	within	beliefs	and	practices	that	have	gained	too	much	grip	on	us,	whose	prestige	threatens	to	intimidate	us,	which	have	grown	into	big	theories	and	big	stories,	big	deals	and	big	pains,	which	bring	along	with	themselves	a	history	of	intimidation,	oppression,	and	violence.	(p.	67)	Put	differently,	the	active	seeking	of	the	event	within	presence	is	another	way	to	“not	to	foreclose	on	the	realities	that	might	be	made	too	soon”	(Law,	2004,	pp.	117-18).	This	is	the	sense	with	which	Law	refers	to	the	“quiet”,	“slow”,	and	“modest”	methods	that	he	proposes	would	replace	those	that	establish	interpretive	omnipotence	(p.	15).	If	Caputo’s	(2007)	reaction	to	the	attitude	of	closure	is	to	seek	the	event	astir	within	presence,	to	‘loosen	up’	the	presumption	of	closure,	then	Law	(2004)	agrees	that	the	problem	with	conventional	methods	is	their	production	of	an	epistemological	object	that	“isn’t	sufficiently	fluid”	(p.	81).	This	second	movement	(or	vision)	alongside	the	first	can	be	thought	of	as	what	Law	(2002)	refers	to	as	decentring	the	object.	Decentring1	the	object	is	not	about	wholly	fragmenting	it	because	it	occurs	alongside	the	centring	movement	of	closure.	It	is	instead	about	unbracketing	the	messy	and	porous	nature	of	the	object’s	boundaries,	to	recognise	that	
alongside	its	centring	as	a	coherent,	distinct	structure	there	is	a	simultaneous	decentring	at	its	boundaries.	Or	put	differently,	that	the	interpretive	omnipotence	of	the	act	of	closure,	which	emerges	as	a	singularity,	exists	alongside	an	act	that	reveals	the	multiplicity	of	the	object.	The	introduction	of	decentring	alongside	centring	is	thus	to	know	objects	as	the	simultaneity	of	both	these	movements	as	opposed	to	the	fixations	of	objects	as	only	centred	entities	(as	in	epistemological	accounts).	Lee	and	Brown	(1994)	can	be	regarded	as	particularly	influential	in	drawing	attention	to	the	importance	of	complementing	centring	with	decentring	and	the	concomitant	development	of	fractionality	as	an	approach	within	
science	and	technology	studies,2	of	a	“deterritorializing,	rhizomatic	movement	of	irrevocably	splintered	entities	in	their	half-realized	fractal	strategies”	(p.	787).3	Paying	attention	to	inscription	processes	is	what	constitutes	the	decentring	movement	because	in	revealing	what	is	as	a	product	of	an	endless	process	of	practice,	as	opposed	to	the	absolutism	of	an	‘out-there’	reality	to	be	translated	into	presence,	an	object	is	realised	to	be																																									 																					
1	For	consistency	I	use	the	British	English	extension	of	the	words	‘centre’	and	‘decentre’	(centr-ing	and	decentr-ing),	even	though	Law	(2002)	uses	American	English	(center-ing	and	decenter-ing).	2	Much	of	the	theory	and	thinkers	this	thesis	draws	upon	are	associated	with	this	discipline,	although	the	author	would	not	seek	to	specifically	place	themself	or	this	thesis	within	it.	3	This	drawing	on	the	work	of	Giles	Deleuze	and	Félix	Guattari,	like	much	of	the	theory	in	this	thesis.	
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gifted	with	the	promise	that	it	might	always	be	something	else.	More	than	this,	attending	to	practice	can	reveal	that	an	object	always	already	is	something	else.1	Put	differently,	the	singularity	of	an	object	is	revealed	to	co-exist	with	an	inherent	multiplicity	of	the	object	as	it	is	produced	(multiply)	in	a	number	of	different	practices.		Annemarie	Mol’s	(2002)	ethnography	of	how	the	object	of	atherosclerosis	is	fractionally	enacted	in	a	hospital	thus	highlights	how	there	are	various	different	ways	of	inscribing	the	reality	of	atherosclerosis	throughout	the	hospital,	creating	multiple	objects	of	atherosclerosis	even	whilst	it	is	enacted	as	a	single	atherosclerosis	relevant	to	the	particular	body	of	a	patient.	In	paying	attention	to	the	practices	producing	atherosclerosis	the	multiplicity	of	the	object	is	revealed	alongside	its	singularity:	decentring	alongside	centring.	Similarly,	Law	(2002)	reveals	the	multiplicity	of	objects	of	the	TSR2	that	are	produced	in	the	planning	for	the	aircraft,	but	which	are	nevertheless	assumed	to	pertain	to	a	single	object	(the	planned	aircraft).2	This	attention	to	practice	reveals	the	“double	move”	involved	in	knowing	an	object,	which	is	(in	Mol’s,	2002,	ethnography)	“the	multiplication	of	a	single	disease	and	[…its]	singularity”	(p.	82,	emphasis	in	original).	Thus,	Mol	argues	for	what	she	terms	a	praxiography,	which	is	a	charting	of	how	knowledge	of	an	object	is	practiced	(or	enacted).	Referring	in	particular	to	the	enactment	of	atherosclerosis	(but	which	applies	to	the	practices	producing	objects	in	general),	she	notes	that	a	praxiography	“requires	that	we	keep	the	practicalities	of	doing	disease	unbracketed	–	in	the	forefront	of	our	attention”	(p.	119).	Mol	emphasises	how	if	“the	practicalities	of	enacting	disease	are	bracketed”	then	“disease	[becomes]	located	inside	the	body”	(p.	48).	This	is	a	specific	version	of	the	more	general	effect	(discussed	in	Chapter	3)	of	bracketing	inscription	processes:	that	whilst	signifier	and	signified	are	produced	in	a	particular	enactment,	the	signified	becomes	transposed	to	an	‘out-there’	reality	independent	of	the	rhetorical	act	that	produces	it,	and	comes	to	be	regarded	as	the	cause	of	representations	(Law,	2004).	That	is,	the	bracketing	of	rhetoric	serves	to	produce	an	epistemological	(translational)	form	of	knowing.	In	arguing	for	a	“shift	from	an	epistemological	to	a	praxiographic	appreciation	of	reality”,	Mol	(2002)	argues	that	the	attention	to	how	knowledge	is	produced	locates	knowing	to	the	tension	between	the	centring	and	decentring	practices	of	rhetoric	(p.	53).		
																																								 																					
1	The	important	distinction	between	rhetoric	as	revealing	something	that	could	be	otherwise	versus	revealing	something	that	is	otherwise	is	discussed	in	later	chapters.	2	An	assumption	that,	in	Law’s	(2002)	analysis,	led	to	the	cancellation	of	the	TSR2	project	since	the	differences	between	the	multiple	objects	of	the	TSR2	could	not	be	coordinated	(see	next	section)	into	such	a	singularity.	
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WIDER	LITERATURE	ON	PRACTICE:	NON-REPRESENTATIONAL	THEORY	
An	attention	to	the	practice	of	knowledge	production	that	is	not	simply	subsumed	within	a	translational	reading	(as	with	a	‘first	reading’	of	the	insight	of	rhetoric	or	the	‘first	response’	to	the	failure	of	translation	–	see	Chapters	3	and	4,	respectively)	can	be	observed	beyond	the	praxiographic	or	fractional	methodology	offered	by	Mol	and	Law.	A	related	(and	relatively	new)	strand	of	academic	thought	termed	non-representational	
theory	has	emerged	within	Geography.	Thrift	(2009)	defines	non-representational	theory	as	a	“style	of	engagement	with	the	world	that	aims	to	attend	to	and	intervene	in	the	taking-place	of	practices”	(p.	503).	Indeed,	it	attempts	to	attend	to	life	as	a	“process	of	becoming”,	and	is	also	interested	in	producing	“description	or	presentation”	that	attempts	“to	co-produce	new	events	by	engaging	with	and	intervening	in	the	practices	that	compose	life”	(p.	503).	Moreover,	Thrift	also	recognises	the	danger	inherent	in	seeking	an	anti-representational	account	that	maintains	the	dualistic	categories	of	representational	and	extra-representational	domains	as	a	reflex	to	the	inadequacy	of	representation	(discussed	in	terms	of	a	‘first	response’	in	Chapter	4),	stressing	that	“non-representational	theories	are	not	anti-representation”	(p.	504).	Anderson	and	Harrison	(2010)	also	link	non-representational	theory	to	the	concept	of	
the	event,	noting	that	it	“has	been	such	an	important	concept	and	empirical	concern	for	non-representational	theories	because	it	opens	up	the	question	of	how	to	think	about	change”	(p.	19).	Indeed,	non-representational	theories	“are	marked	by	an	attention	to	
events	and	the	new	potentialities	for	being,	doing,	and	thinking”	(p.	19,	emphasis	in	original).	Non-representational	theory	is	a	much	broader	theoretical	movement	than	the	fractional	and	praxiographic	methodologies	the	thesis	has	discussed	thus	far.	Thus,	Vannini	(2015)	points	out	how	non-representational	theory	actually	represents	a	diverse	range	of	approaches	that	are	captured	by	a	particular	spirit,	and	Anderson	and	Harrison	(2010)	write	of	non-representational	theories.	Vannini	(2015)	notes	how	there	is	no	particular	method	of	‘doing’	non-representational	theory.	Indeed,	following	Thrift,	he	suggests	that	rather	than	following	set	procedures,	“non-representational	theory	is	meant	to	be	experimental”	(p.	5).	Whilst	this	thesis	will	continue	to	follow	the	theoretical	strand	related	to	Law	and	Mol’s	work,	in	particular	Law’s	(2002,	2004)	pursuit	of	fractionality,	it	is	notable	that	the	spirit	of	a	‘second	response’	to	the	problem	of	the	simultaneity	of	absence	and	presence	can	be	recognised	more	widely,	and	that	the	production	of	ways	of	knowing	in	double-vision	is	a	project	with	seeds	of	growth	elsewhere.	
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TYPES	OF	PRACTICE:	DISTRIBUTION	AND	COORDINATION	
Mol’s	(2002)	ethnography	of	atherosclerosis	achieves	a	fractional	way	of	knowing	the	disease	because	she	manages	to	unbracket	the	process	of	distribution	of	the	multiple	objects	of	atherosclerosis	enacted	throughout	the	hospital.	The	epistemological	impossibility	that	would	otherwise	exist	in	trying	to	place	multiplicity	within	singularity	is	resolved	through	distributing	the	multiple	objects	to	separate	sites	across	the	hospital	where	they	do	not	‘clash’	in	a	singularity.	They	do	not	have	to	confront	the	inherent	multiplicity	of	something	that	is	(at	the	same	time)	a	singular	object.	Indeed,	the	“possible	tensions	between	different	variants	of	a	disease	disappear	into	the	background	when	these	variants	are	distributed	over	different	sites”	(p.	115).	Whilst	we	may	conventionally	understand	that	disease	is	done	differently	(and	thus	multiply)	in	different	sites	of	the	hospital,	practically	the	multiplicity	of	atherosclerosis	is	not	enacted.	It	disappears	as	a	distributional	effect.	However,	in	attending	to	this	process	of	distribution,	Mol	makes	the	multiplicity	of	atherosclerosis	visible	alongside	the	(centred)	sense	of	singularity	(in	the	body)	by	which	it	is	conventionally	known.	Through	attending	to	practice	we	are	forced	to	view	atherosclerosis	fractionally.	However,	as	Mol	makes	clear,	distribution	is	not	the	only	mechanism	that	a	fractional	way	of	knowing	an	object	is	made	palatable	to	an	epistemological	one	that	can	only	comprehend	singularities.	She	also	draws	attention	to	the	act	of	coordination.	Like	distribution,	this	resolves	differences	between	multiple	enactments	of	an	object	so	that	an	entirely	singular	object	emerges.	She	argues	that	this	occurs	in	three	ways.	First,	one	multiple	is	made	to	‘win’	over	the	others.	From	a	translational	perspective,	when	presented	with	multiple	signifiers	a	decision	is	made	(using	particular	epistemological	rules)	about	which	one	of	the	multiples	best	represents	the	singularity	of	the	‘out-there’	reality.	Second,	the	multiples	become	fused	as	a	“composite	object”	(p.	71),	where	they	become	“balanced,	added	up,	subtracted”	(p.	70),	forming	a	“patchwork	singularity”	(p.	72).	The	parts	of	the	composite	are	regarded	as	separate	objects	in	their	own	right,	such	as	a	collection	of	distinct	“indicators	of	success”	in	the	evaluation	of	a	particular	treatment	technique,	but	the	only	thing	that	matters	is	the	overall	tallying	up	of	the	indicators	into	a	singular	measurement	outcome	rather	than	how	the	multiple	objects	“hang	together	inside	the	body”	as	a	singularity	(p.	68).	“Don’t	bother	about	whether	they’re	really	similar	or	different.	[…]	Forget	about	the	body.	Just	add	up	your	findings”	(p.	68,	emphasis	in	original).	Thirdly,	the	multiples	are	made	to	correlate	with	one	another	through	a	common	variable,	such	as	when	two	particular	diagnostic	techniques	are	made	to	enact	atherosclerosis	in	terms	of	the	same	dependent	variable.	Mol’s	ethnography	reveals	that	within	a	coordinating	system	that	uses	the	first	technique	(of	one	multiple	‘winning’	over	the	other),	attention	to	practice	is	actually	used	to	resolve	the	multiplicity	of	the	objects	of	atherosclerosis	into	singularity.	Here	the	validity	of	a	diagnostic	
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test	result	(its	ability	to	translate	out-there	reality)	that	shows	no	thickening	(reduction	in	the	lumen)	within	the	artery	may	be	questioned	when	it	clashes	with,	for	example,	a	patient’s	clinical	diagnosis	(the	diagnosis	received	when	talking	to	the	patient	in	the	clinic).	Crucially,	this	questioning	involves	reflecting	on	how	the	result	was	obtained,	that	is,	attending	to	the	practice	through	which	the	particular	object	of	atherosclerosis	is	produced.	Thus,	the	validity	of	the	clinical	diagnosis	may	be	questioned	when	it	clashes	with	a	diagnostic	test:	the	patient	might	be	poor	in	language	skills,	or	they	have	a	related	condition	(such	as	diabetes)	that	means	that	they	don’t	feel	the	pain	of	atherosclerosis	in	their	legs	so	severely,	and	so	would	not	communicate	significant	pain	in	the	clinical	consultation.	Alternately,	physicians	may	question	how	the	method	of	a	particular	diagnostic	test	may	have	provided	a	false	reading.	In	each	case	there	is	reflection	on	the	practice	through	which	a	particular	object	of	atherosclerosis	is	enacted	in	an	attempt	to	detect	deviation	from	the	‘good	practice’	that	constitutes	the	epistemological	rules	determining	how	to	achieve	successful	translations.	Based	upon	these	deviations	one	representation	of	atherosclerosis	is	selected	as	being	a	more	accurate	translation	of	the	‘out-there’	reality	of	the	disease	(which	is	located	‘in	the	body’),	and	the	other(s)	discarded.	Like	previous	chapters,	this	can	be	thought	of	as	failing	to	fully	accept	the	insight	of	rhetoric:	to	acknowledge	that	both	aspects	of	the	sign	(signifier	and	signified)	are	produced	in	rhetorical	processes	(see	Chapter	4).	This	thesis	is	concerned	with	how	the	lived	experience	of	pain	is	enacted	within	an	integrative	paradigm	of	academic	social	analysis.	As	the	next	chapter	will	discuss,	this	is	largely	achieved	as	narrative	accounts	produced	in	interview	research.	Unlike	a	hospital	with	its	combination	of	distributed	and	coordinated	objects	of	disease,	a	narrative	is	a	theoretical	text,	and	the	epistemological	problem	of	multiplicity	within	texts	has	typically	been	dealt	with	by	means	of	coordination	rather	than	distribution,	namely	as	competing	realities	where	one	is	chosen	over	the	other.	Indeed,	as	Mol	notes:	“distribution	is	a	rare	way	of	solving,	or	rather	dissolving,	theoretical	tensions	inside	the	texts	of	theorists,	whereas	it	is	a	common	and	routine	way	of	doing	so	in	more	practical	settings	such	as	the	hospital”	(p.	99,	emphasis	in	original).	And	just	as	Mol	highlighted	how	attention	to	practice	can	be	used	as	a	means	to	centre	(rather	than	decentre)	in	a	coordinating	system	through	using	it	to	select	one	particular	enactment	as	a	better	translation	than	others,	so	too	does	interview	research	have	a	well-established	tradition	of	examining	interview	practices	as	a	means	of	determining	which	produce	better	translations	of	an	interviewee’s	experience.	But	then	it	is	in	the	contrast	established	during	coordination	by	the	conflict	of	multiples	that	multiplicity	is	made	visible	alongside	singularity,	establishing	a	knowing	in	tension	of	fractionality.	The	challenge	is	to	understand	how	this	practice	can	be	understood	not	as	a	
means-to-an-end	(the	end	being	the	singularity	that	results	from	the	resolution	of	multiplicity)	but	as	an	end-in-itself	(Law,	2004).	
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ON	THE	IMPORTANCE	OF	FRACTIONAL	PRACTICE	
Law	(2002)	draws	on	Delueze	and	Guattari	(1988)	to	define	an	epistemological	way	of	knowing	as	an	arborescence.	An	arborescence	is	“a	form	of	storytelling	that	is	treelike	in	structure”	(Law,	2002,	p.	173),	where	“[t]hings,	events,	and	considerations	are	made	to	stand	in	relation	to	one	another,	asymmetrically,	within	a	structure	of	branching	points”	(p.	174).	Branches	“come	together	to	form	a	story	and	make	a	conclusion”,	forming	a	hierarchical	structure	that	“also	reflects	and	maps	the	passage	of	time”	(p.	174).	This	conforms	to	the	standard	understanding	of	narrative	as	a	story	with	a	beginning,	middle,	and	end.		But	an	arborescence	is	not	made	epistemological	simply	by	this	arrangement	of	parts	into	a	time-dependent	hierarchical	structure.	Instead,	it	is	because	the	“arborescent	narrative	grows	in,	presupposes	and	creates,	[a]	kind	of	three-	or	four-dimensional	Euclidean	time/space	container”	(p.	174).	An	arborescence	“reenacts	conditions	of	possibility	that	assume	the	objects	in	the	world	are	contained	in	a	singular	Euclidean	space-time	box”	(p.	185).	It	“defines	and	performs	the	conditions	of	possibility	for	particular	stories”	(p.	185).	Here	the	notions	of	“space,	time,	and	scale	are	made	
together”	as	“arborescent	effects”	(p.	184).	If,	as	proponents	of	a	‘second	response’	to	the	failure	of	translation,	we	only	produce	knowledge	about	a	second	response	as	an	arborescence	(like	this	thesis	has	so	far),	then	it	serves	to	re-enact	the	very	epistemological	conditions	of	possibility	that	it	criticises.	We	“collude”,	in	Law’s	language	(p.	185).	If	a	second	response	is	to	avoid	colluding	with	epistemology	and	make	its	critique	meaningful	then	it	needs	to	practice	fractionality.	But	as	Cooper	(1998)	noted,	our	conditioning	to	the	logic	of	simple	location	makes	understanding	double	vision	difficult,	and	a	collusion	with	a	translational	way	of	knowing	is	readily	established	(as	the	previous	chapters	have	suggested).	Law	(2002)	argues	that	“we	have	not	yet	recognized	and	allowed	the	difficult	subjectivities	that	are	
needed	for	fractional	knowing”	(p.	4,	emphasis	in	original).	He	asserts	that	“Euro-American	culture	doesn’t	really	have	the	language	that	it	needs	to	imagine	possibilities	of	this	kind.	Its	conditions	of	possibility	more	or	less	preclude	the	fractional”	(p.	3).	It	is	here	that	the	practice	of	fractionality	takes	on	a	political	nature,	as	part	of	a	project	for	replacing	epistemological	conditions	of	possibility	with	fractional	ones.	And	this	is	a	relatively	novel	political	activity,	as	Mol	(2002)	notes:	
It	is	in	this	vein	of	instigating	change	in	academic	writing	practices	that	Law	(2002)	
However	much	“writing”	has	become	a	topic	that	is	theoretically	discussed,	there	still	aren’t	many	books	that	do	something	to	enrich,	complexify,	and	change	academic	writing	practices.	(p.	162,	emphasis	in	original)	
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intends	his	book	(Aircraft	Stories)	to	be	“an	intervention”,	a	“performance	of	fractional	ways	of	knowing”	about	the	planned	aircraft	(the	TSR2)	that	is	its	topic,	and	not	only	a	claim	to	authoritative	closure	regarding	the	fractional	ontology	he	outlines	within	his	text	(p.	5).	In	establishing	fractionality	as	a	viable	replacement	to	epistemological	ways	of	knowing	lived	experience	its	practice	is	thus	crucial.	The	important	implications	of	the	fractional	practice	of	fractionality,	as	both	promoting	and	being	engaged	in	fractional	conditions	of	possibility	(or	an	‘ontological	politics’),	is	discussed	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	7.	
CHAPTER	CONCLUSION	
In	seeking	to	define	a	method	of	practicing	fractionality,	this	chapter	has	suggested	that	this	requires	attending	to	the	centring	processes	seeking	to	establish	closure,	something	that	makes	visible	techniques	that	resolve	multiplicity	into	singularity	and	thus	reveal	the	multiplicity	of	an	object	in	these	processes.	This	supplementary	act	of	decentring	is	achieved	by	making	visible	one	of	two	different	processes.	The	first	is	where	the	multiplicity	of	an	object	is	distributed	into	singularities,	such	as	the	distinct	departments	of	a	hospital	in	the	enactment	of	a	disease.	Unbracketing	distributive	processes	through	an	attention	to	practice	collapses	the	distributive	effect,	forcing	the	differences	of	the	multiple	enactments	of	the	object	to	be	confronted	with	the	simultaneous	assumption	that	there	is	only	a	singular	object	(such	as	that	of	a	particular	patient’s	body).		The	second	is	where	the	multiplicity	of	an	object	is	coordinated	into	singularity,	which	can	work	on	the	basis	of	competition	between	multiples,	their	compositing,	or	correlation	with	additional	variables.	Unlike	the	enactment	of	a	disease	in	a	hospital,	knowing	lived	experience	through	the	generation	of	narratives	in	social	science	research	predominantly	relies	on	coordination	through	competition	between	variables.	This	is	more	complicated	than	distribution	because	in	this	technique	the	coordinating	effect	requires	an	attention	to	practice	rather	than	its	bracketing.	Differences	between	multiples	become	effaced	on	the	basis	that	the	different	practices	producing	the	multiples	of	the	object	are	deemed	more	or	less	epistemologically	reliable	than	others.	But	it	is	nevertheless	within	this	coordinating	process	that	multiplicity	is	revealed	alongside	singularity	in	a	knowing	in	tension	constitutive	of	fractionality,	and	the	possibility	that	this	attention	to	such	practice	might	regard	it	as	an	end-in-itself	rather	than	a	means	of	resolving	multiplicity	into	singularity	is	suggested.	This	examination	of	attention	to	practice	with	regard	to	a	controversy	is	examined	in	the	next	chapter,	which	focuses	specifically	on	a	core	method	for	producing	narrative	accounts	of	the	lived	experience	of	pain:	that	of	interview	research.
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CHAPTER	6:	INTERVIEW	RESEARCH	AND	THE	LIVED	EXPERIENCE	OF	PAIN	
INTRODUCTION	
The	previous	chapter	identified	that	a	‘second	response’	can	be	practiced	(rather	than	simply	theorised	about)	through	a	decentring	movement	consisting	of	an	attention	to	the	centring	practices	enacting	a	particular	object.	However,	it	also	identified	that	the	relationship	between	decentring	and	attention	to	practice	was	complicated	by	the	type	of	epistemological	strategy	used	to	manage	the	‘problem	of	multiplicity’.	It	is	argued	that	whilst	attention	to	practice	offers	the	possibility	of	revealing	multiplicity	within	singularity	(i.e.	the	fractionality	of	a	‘second	response’),	it	can	also	be	used	to	resolve	multiplicity	into	singularity,	such	as	in	the	typical	processes	used	to	produce	narrative	accounts	of	pain	experience.	The	current	chapter	explores	how	attention	to	such	practice	might	constitute	decentring,	making	it	relevant	to	knowing	pain	experience	through	focussing	on	a	key	method	used	to	produce	accounts	of	the	lived	experience	of	pain:	interview	research.	The	first	part	of	the	chapter	examines	the	contemporary	methodological	understanding	of	interview	research,	which	folds	within	it	the	‘narrative	of	succession’	outlined	in	Chapter	1	and	the	‘rhetorical	turn’	discussed	in	Chapter	3.	Understanding	the	contemporary	methodological	trend	in	interview	research	as	attention	to	the	practice	of	doing	research,	it	is	argued	that	attention	to	practice	is	appropriated	by	an	epistemological	understanding	that	serves	to	position	interview	research	as	a	translational	exercise.	The	second	part	of	the	chapter	examines	in	more	detail	what	is	involved	in	the	centring	practices	of	interview	research	in	social	science,	where	the	messy	‘noise’	of	the	interview	becomes	‘repaired’	into	coherent	‘speech’.	An	attention	to	such	processes	makes	visible	the	constructed	nature	of	narrative	accounts	of	experience,	and	most	importantly	the	fact	that	the	account	could	have	
been	otherwise.	Whilst	seeming	to	introduce	multiplicity	as	a	complement	to	the	singularity	of	the	centred	product,	it	is	argued	that	the	concept	of	could	have	been	otherwise	constitutes	another	epistemological	understanding	where	it	distributes	multiplicity	into	singularities	of	
time.	Instead,	it	is	only	in	making	visible	the	controversies	involved	in	the	practice	of	centring	in	interview	research	that	multiplicity	is	made	present	at	the	same	time.	But	this	needs	to	avoid	a	dialectical	understanding	of	the	controversy	since	this	involves	isolated	temporal	singularities	rather	than	a	fractional	knowing	in	tension.	Having	developed	an	understanding	of	the	importance	of	the	controversy	in	enacting	fractional	accounts	in	interview	research,	the	scene	is	set	for	introducing	a	method	for	making	controversies	visible	without	their	epistemological	appropriation.	
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CONTEMPORARY	METHODOLOGICAL	UNDERSTANDINGS	OF	INTERVIEWS		
PAIN	AND	THE	INTERVIEW	
There	are	countless	numbers	of	studies	investigating	pain	experience	that	involve	interviewing	sufferers1	(as	well	as	experiences	of	health	professionals	and	carers	involved	in	their	treatment	and	care2).	Understanding	how	pain	and	interview	research	relate	so	closely	involves	returning	to	the	narrative	of	succession	discussed	in	Chapter	1.	This	is	a	historical	narrative	produced	by	contemporary	social	science	of	a	succession	from	flawed	biomedical	paradigm	to	integrative	paradigm	seeking	to	make-good	biomedicine’s	failings.	It	outlines	how	the	patient	voice	was	seen	as	an	unreliable	source	of	knowledge	about	pain	from	the	19th	Century	onwards,	and	how	biomedicine	sought	to	limit	this	unreliability	by	excluding	it	from	methods	of	knowing	pain.	As	a	reaction	(in	the	late	20th	Century),	first	as	an	objection	against	the	exclusion	of	psychosocial	variables	(Engel,	1977),	and	later	against	a	mind-body	fragmentation	of	the	holistic	experience	of	the	patient,	emphasis	was	placed	on	the	patient’s	voice	as	expressing	the	theretofore-excluded	elements.	The	“narrative	surrender”	of	modern	patient	experience	could	now	be	reversed	by	decolonisation	of	the	patient’s	body	from	medical	authorities,	and	a	‘patient	voice’	could	re-claim	it	(Frank,	2013,	p.	6).	The	project	of	this	reclamation,	expressed	in	the	integrative	paradigm	of	pain,	could	be	achieved	by	translating	embodied	patient	experience	into	narrative	accounts.	The	interview	is	a	key	to	this	project,	with	its	construction	of	the	sufferer	as	a	valuable	source	of	experience	that	can	be	methodically	drawn	out	into	a	publically	shareable	narrative.																																									 																					
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THE	INTERVIEW	IN	CONTEXT	
Just	as	pain	is	historically	situated	within	the	‘narrative	of	succession’	produced	by	contemporary	social	science,	interview	research	is	also	historically	situated	within	a	narrative	produced	by	social	science.	The	SAGE	Handbook	of	Interview	Research	(Gubrium,	Holstein,	Marvasti	&	McKinney,	2012a)	might	be	regarded	as	a	bellwether	for	contemporary	methodological	thinking	on	the	topic.	In	its	introduction,	Gubrium,	Holstein,	Marvasti,	and	McKinney	(2012b)	position	interview	research	into	three	historic	stages.	“Early	challenges”	involved	the	establishment	of	an	interview	subject	as	a	source	of	answers	to	be	translated	from	experience	into	representation	via	the	interview	(p.	1).	This	consisted	of	the	“emerging	view”	in	the	19th	Century	that	“people	of	all	backgrounds	were	capable	of	giving	credible	voice	to	experience”	(p.	2).	Indeed,	as	Gubrium	and	Holstein	(2012)	argue	in	their	subsequent	chapter,	the	interview	can	be	regarded	as	a	Foucaldian	technology	of	the	self,	serving	as	a	practice	“through	which	a	sense	of,	and	information	about,	individual	identity	is	constructed”	(p.	29).	The	interview	“created	a	new	subjectivity	worth	communicating	about”	(p.	29).	However,	despite	the	emergence	of	this	new	subjectivity,	the	acceptance	of	the	interview	as	a	“systematic	method	for	obtaining	experiential	knowledge”	was	something	that	“would	have	seemed	peculiar”	even	by	the	early	20th	Century	(p.	28).	Nevertheless,	people	(“each	and	every	one	of	them”)	became	increasingly	regarded	as	“an	important	source	of	knowledge”	(p.	28),	as	a	“vessel	of	answers”	where	respondents	“are	seen	as	repositories	of	facts,	reflections,	opinions,	and	other	traces	of	experience”	(p.	32).	The	interview	became	a	means	to	access	these	answers	and	translate	them	into	representational	form	in	a	classic	epistemological	movement.	The	interview	was	regarded	as	a	technical	exercise	with	the	aim	to	“derive	as	objectively	as	possible	the	respondent’s	
own	opinions	on	the	subject	matter,	opinions	that	will	readily	be	offered	up	and	elaborated	on	by	the	respondent	when	circumstances	are	conducive	to	doing	so	and	the	proper	solicitations	extended”	(Gubrium	&	Holstein,	2012,	p.	29,	emphasis	in	original).	The	‘early	challenges’	of	constituting	an	interview	subject	as	a	vessel	of	answers	gave	way	to	a	period	concerned	with	developing	technical	protocols	regarded	as	being	best	able	to	provide	access	to	these	answers	(Gubrium	et	al.,	2012b).	This	“technical	forefront”	constitutes	the	second	period	of	interview	research	for	Gubrium	et	al.,	but	they	also	note	that	for	much	of	the	20th	Century	interview	protocols	were	relatively	“straightforward”:	interviewers	merely	had	“to	ask	the	right	questions,	and	the	responses	virtually	pour[ed]	out”	(p.	2).	The	technical	forefront	saw	an	increasing	complexity	of	these	protocols	as	they	sought	to	specify	“ways	of	asking	questions	that	will	not	interfere	with	or	contaminate	information	that	resides	with	respondents,	which	is	waiting	to	be	set	free”	(p.	2).	The	technical	complexity	expressed	in	these	protocols	would	permit	“an	atmosphere	conducive	to	open	and	undistorted	communication	between	the	interviewer	and	the	respondent”	(p.	2).	
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The	previous	chapter	discussed	Annemarie	Mol’s	(2002)	ethnography	of	atherosclerosis,	where	a	particular	type	of	coordination	of	multiple	objects	of	disease	enacted	within	the	hospital	involves	attention	to	practice,	with	one	of	the	multiples	chosen	as	being	a	more	accurate	translation.	In	this	way	multiplicity	is	resolved	into	singularity.	The	‘technical	forefront’	of	interview	research	corresponds	to	such	coordination,	where	attention	to	interview	practice	allowed	a	judgement	about	how	“authentic”	the	translation	of	the	participant’s	experience	is	(Gubrium	&	Holstein,	2012,	p.	31).	Indeed,	an	attention	to	practice	to	obtain	the	most	authentic	translation	of	a	patient’s	experience	intersects	with	the	narrative	of	succession’s	decolonisation	of	the	patient	body	through	the	emphasis	on	“empowering	interview	respondents”,	something	that	has	“set	a	tone	for	the	growing	appreciation	of	narrative	work	in	the	interview	context”	(p.	34).	Faced	with	a	multiplicity	of	interview	subjectivities	enacted	by	different	interview	techniques,	attention	to	the	nature	of	these	techniques	allows	their	authenticity	to	be	gauged.	Gubrium	and	Holstein	discuss	Mishler	(1986)	and	his	attempt	to	empower	the	voice	of	interview	participants	through	examining	the	way	that	interviews	are	performed,	and	assessing	how	successfully	(authentically)	they	translate	an	interviewee’s	experience.	For	Mishler,	how	well	the	researcher	can	hear	the	“respondents’	own	voice”	is	assessed	through	examining	the	“speech	exchanges”	of	the	interview	(Gubrium	&	Holstein,	2012,	p.	35).	Certain	practices	are	deemed	to	produce	authentic	representations	of	participant	voice,	whereas	others	are	not.	Thus,	Mishler	“advocates	more	open-ended	questions,	minimal	interruptions	of	accounts,	and	the	use	of	respondents’	own	linguistic	formulations”	(Gubrium	&	Holstein,	2012,	p.	35).	The	attention	to	practice	in	the	technical	forefront	can	be	understood	as	a	means-to-an-end	(Law,	2004),	the	end	being	the	authentic	product	the	privileged	technique	enacts.	But	this	has	increasingly	given	way	to	a	new	attention	to	practice	rejecting	the	notion	of	authenticity,	and	thus	the	relegated	status	of	practice	as	simply	means	to	an	(authentic)	end.1	Indeed,	reflecting	the	wider	rhetorical	turn	(see	Chapter	3),	the	technical	concerns	of	interview	protocols	“are	now	sharing	the	complexity	terrain	with	concerns	about	the	interview	as	a	form	of	knowledge	production”	in	its	own	right	(Gubrium	et	al.,	2012b,	p.	3,	emphasis	in	original):	practice	not	as	a	means-to-an-end	but	as	an	end-in-itself	(Law,	2004).	This	new	attention	to	practice	constitutes	the	third	period	in	interview	research	for	Gubrium	et	al.	(2012b),	and	the	discussions	within	the	various	chapters	of	the	Handbook	might	be	regarded	as	reflecting	this	concern.	Thus,	Reissman	(2012)	writes	about	“attend[ing]	to	the	interactional	and	institutional	contexts”	that	shape	a	particular	narrative	emerging	in	an																																									 																					
1	However,	there	nevertheless	persists	“a	neo-romantic	cult	of	the	spontaneous	narrating	self”	where	“the	[correctly	practiced]	interview	is	regarded	as	providing	an	authentic	gaze	into	the	other’s	soul”	(Kvale,	2006,	p.	493).	Further	discussion	of	the	persistence	of	authenticity	in	interview	research	despite	the	popularity	of	rhetorically-aware	philosophies,	as	part	of	the	‘Interview	Society’	as	a	whole	(Atkinson	&	Silverman,	1997),	can	be	found	in	Chapter	8.	
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interview	(p.	368).	Rapley	(2012)	notes	how	“both	interviewers	and	interviewees	work	to	locally	manage	their	identities”	according	to	“moral	adequacy”	(p.	545),	encouraging	researchers	“to	focus	on	how	they	interact	[in	the	interview],	as	opposed	to	solely	focusing	on	the	topical	content	of	interviewees’	talk”	(p.	548).	Narayan	and	George	(2012)	write	about	“understanding	how	narrative	traditions	are	creatively	reworked	by	particular	tellers	for	particular	social	ends”	(p.	518).	The	preceding	chapters	of	this	thesis	have	argued	that	the	insight	of	rhetoric	(that	knowledge	is,	in	all	its	aspects,	produced)	makes	visible	a	fractional	nature	of	knowing,	and	specifically	the	simultaneity	of	absence	and	presence	in	the	ontology	of	pain	experience.	However,	reflecting	another	theme	of	the	thesis,	practice	always	threatens	to	be	read	translationally.	It	is	possible	to	construct	a	fractional	reading	of	Narayan	and	George’s	chapter.	Thus,	they	refer	to	the	restlessness	of	practice	as	complementing	the	centring	processes	of	analysis,	noting	that	stories	“live	in	ongoing	reverberations	through	lived	practices,	not	just	in	analytic	reflection"	(p.	519).	Indeed,	their	account	seems	to	recognise	the	mismatch	between	an	epistemological	method	and	the	fractional	ontology	of	the	objects	of	knowledge	that	method	enacts.	Thus,	centring	processes	that	seek	“meaning	isolated	from	particular	contexts	of	retelling	or	remembering	may	appear	to	fix	meaning	in	inappropriate	ways”	(p.	519).	However,	their	conclusion	that	attention	to	practice	“enhances	appreciation	for	the	specificity	of	stories	that	emerge	within	interviews”	(p.	522)	threatens	to	refract	the	chapter	within	a	translational	reading	where	practice	serves	as	a	
better	means	of	centring	through	situating	the	narrative	to	the	particular	rhetorical	circumstances	that	produced	it	(referred	to	as	the	‘first	reading	of	rhetoric’	in	Chapter	3).	The	ease	of	switching	between	fractional	and	translational	readings	means	translational	(epistemological)	understanding	readily	emasculates	fractional	insight,	and	it	is	suggested	this	occurs	within	contemporary	methodological	understandings	of	interview	research.	To	demonstrate	this	further,	the	following	section	uses	a	chapter	of	the	Handbook	(that	of	Gubrium	and	Holstein,	2012)	to	show	the	ease	with	which	a	‘first	reading	of	rhetoric’	is	constructed,	before	revealing	the	difficulties	it	encounters	when	its	objects	of	study	express	a	fractional	nature	at	odds	with	the	centred	account	they	are	being	fitted	into.	
A	FIRST	READING	OF	RHETORIC	IN	INTERVIEW	RESEARCH	
The	first	part	of	Gubrium	and	Holstein’s	(2012)	chapter,	Narrative	practice	and	the	
transformation	of	interview	subjectivity,	critiques	what	they	consider	to	be	a	significant	chunk	of	conventional	approaches	to	interview	research,	particularly	those	“orientated	to	standardized	surveys”	(p.	31).	Such	research	is	“primarily	concerned	with	maximizing	the	flow	of	valid,	reliable	information	while	minimizing	distortions	of	what	
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the	respondent	knows”	(p.	31),	reflecting	the	second	historical	period	of	the	technical	complexity	of	interview	research	(Gubrium	et	al.,	2012b).	This	understanding	implies	a	notion	of	something	“authentic”	in	the	participant’s	“voice”	(Gubrium	&	Holstein,	2012,	p.	31).	The	notion	of	authenticity1	serves	to	“flag	an	epistemological	understanding,	namely,	that	the	true	voice	of	the	subject	is	internal	and	comes	through	only	when	it	is	not	externally	screened	or	otherwise	narratively	fettered”	(p.	31).	This	voice	serves	as	the	origin	of	experience,	existing	in	some	‘out-there’	extra-representational	domain,	and	is	only	regarded	as	‘authentic’	if	good	epistemological	interview	practice	permits	its	successful	translation	into	representation.	However,	this	ignores	that	“[a]uthenticity	itself	is	a	methodically	constructed	product	of	communicative	practice”	(p.	31).	Instead,	an	approach	that	“centers	on	the	constructive	hows	of	the	interview	process”	(p.	34,	emphasis	in	original)	reveals	the	contingency	of	the	interview	subject	on	a	potential	multitude	of	interview	practices,	resulting	in	“the	acknowledgement	of	multiple	subject	positions”	that	disrupts	the	notion	of	authenticity	(p.	38).	Attending	to	practice	means	understanding	the	interview	as	a	“set	of	positions	and	accounts	that	are	continuously	accomplished”,	where	nothing	like	an	‘authentic’	subject	position	could	exist	(p.	38).	Recognising	the	multiplicity	of	subject	positions	through	attending	to	the	hows	of	their	production	is	something	that	cannot	occur	in	an	epistemological	approach	only	dealing	in	singularities	of	authentic	subject	positions,	where	“one	needs	to	conclusively	settle	on	the	matter	of	who	the	subject	behind	the	respondent	is”	(p.	38).	Indeed,	a	“respondent	who	shifts	the	subjectivity	to	whom	she	is	giving	voice	poses	dramatic	difficulties”	for	this	approach	(p.	38).	Gubrium	and	Holstein’s	chapter	thus	appears	to	grasp	the	insight	of	rhetoric,	including	ticking	all	of	the	important	boxes	that	are	characteristic	of	the	rhetorical	turn	in	the	social	sciences.	It	explicitly	criticises	an	“epistemological	understanding”	(p.	31)	of	interview	research	through	attending	to	practice,	something	that	reveals	a	multiplicity	of	subject	positions	that	is	otherwise	bracketed	in	an	epistemological	approach	that	only	takes	into	account	the	conclusive	singularity	of	authenticity.	However,	having	rescued	multiplicity	from	the	mono-vision	focus	on	singularity	that	accompanies	authenticity,	in	expounding	this	critique	in	the	rest	of	the	chapter	Gubrium	and	Holstein	actually	go	on	to	use	attention	to	practice	to	re-bracket	multiplicity.	Echoing	work	on	the	performance	of	particular	narratives	in	response	to	ethical	demands	(see	Chapter	3),	going	as	far	back	to	the	1960s	in	Erving	Goffman’s	concept	of	‘moral	careers’,	the	role	of	rhetoric	in	producing	subject	positions	is	posited	by	Gubrium	and																																									 																					
1	With	reference	to	knowing	pain	experience,	this	can	be	seen	in	the	“ethnography	of	experience	of	persons	afflicted	by	chronic	pain”	promoted	by	Kleinman	et	al.	(1992,	p.	14,	emphasis	in	original)	that	seeks	to	“provide	an	authentic	representation	of	[…]	experience”	(p.	16)	(see	Chapters	1	and	3).	
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Holstein	as	offering	a	more	convincing	understanding	of	the	interview	than	those	looking	to	empower	the	interviewee’s	‘authentic	voice’.	Bringing	in	Everett	Hughes’	notion	of	‘going	concerns’	(the	“landscape	of	narrative	possibilities”,	Gubrium	&	Holstein,	2012,	p.	38),	this	introduces	the	idea	that	the	‘total	institutions’	(a	term	from	Goffman)	producing	particular	narrative	possibilities	“are	not	fixed”	but	subject	to	being	continually	produced	in	practice,	where	“considerable	narrative	work	keeps	them	going”	(Gubrium	&	Holstein,	2012,	p.	39).	This	is	an	attention	to	practice	that	would	seem	to	make	visible	a	decentred	multiplicity.	Building	upon	this,	the	authors	introduce	the	concept	of	a	“narrative	environment”	(p.	38).	A	narrative	environment	constitutes	“the	conditions	of	possibility	(Foucault,	1979)	for	narrative	footing	–	for	who	and	what	we	could	possibly	be”	(Gubrium	&	Holstein,	2012,	p.	39).	Yet	here	Gubrium	and	Holstein	are	fearful	that	the	centring	of	the	subject	in	the	narrative	environment	might	lead	to	the	elimination	of	an	indeterminacy	(or	sort	of	free	will)	that	they	regard	as	integral	to	the	subject,	and	so	they	wish	to	“guard	against	overdetermining	the	role	of	either	narrative	environments	or	narrative	work	in	the	production	of	interview	accounts”	(p.	39).	This	concern	occurs	because	Gubrium	and	Holstein’s	discussion	of	a	narrative	environment	serves	not	only	to	explain	the	multiplicity	of	subject	positions	but	also	explain	away	multiplicity.	In	so	understanding	the	rhetorical	circumstances	that	produce	particular	subject	positions,	attention	to	practice	serves	to	create	a	number	of	distinct	singularities	determined	by	the	particular	forms	of	practice	used	to	produce	them.	These	are	not	multiples	in	the	fractional	sense	because	just	as	Mol’s	(2002)	multiple	objects	of	atherosclerosis	were	distributed	across	the	space	of	the	hospital	as	an	epistemological	solution	to	the	‘problem	of	multiplicity’,	the	multiple	subject	positions	are	also	distributed	across	a	spatial	grid	of	a	‘narrative	environment’,	the	coordinates	of	which	are	determined	by	the	rhetorical	circumstances	of	their	production.	Whilst	Mol’s	(2002)	ethnography	served	to	undo	the	distribution	of	multiplicity,	and	introduce	multiplicity	alongside	singularity,	Gubrium	and	Holstein’s	(2012)	narrative	environment	does	the	reverse:	distributing	multiple	subject	positions	into	singularities.	A	narrative	environment	does	not	know	the	interview	subject	as	a	multiplicity	of	subject	positions	that	hang	within	a	singular	subject,	but	only	ever	as	a	single	subject	position	created	by	the	particular	rhetorical	circumstances	of	its	production.	Shifting	from	one	rhetorically-situated	subject	position	to	another	does	not	constitute	multiplicity	because	it	is	simply	jumping	from	one	singularity	to	another.	Faced	with	the	insufficiency	of	the	sterile,	determined	singularities	of	a	narrative	environment,	Gubrium	and	Holstein	then	introduce	an	additional	concept	to	allow	
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indetermined	multiplicity	to	be	re-admitted	to	their	theory,	that	of	“improvisation”	(p.	40).	“As	in	producing	jazz,	themes	and	improvisation	are	the	hallmarks	of	narrative	practice”	(p.	40).	Indeed,	they	argue	that	interview	narratives	are	“artfully	assembled”,	with	participants	being	“artful”	(Garfinkel,	1967,	cited	in	Gubrium	&	Holstein,	2012,	p.	40)	rather	than	“mechanistic”	in	“managing	their	roles	and	giving	voice	to	experience”	(Gubrium	&	Holstein,	2012,	p.	40).	In	‘improvisation’	there	is	an	attempt	to	transform	what	threatens	to	be	a	“passive”	subject	(of	fixed,	certain	narratives	and	predictable	futures)	(p.	32)	into	an	“active”	subject	(of	ongoing,	unpredictable	enactment)	(p.	33).	Improvisation	accounts	for	the	necessary	absence	in	the	determined	subject	positions	of	the	narrative	environment.	However,	having	re-introduced	indetermined	multiplicity	(absence)	via	improvisation,	this	multiplicity	sits	in	an	uneasy	tension	with	a	narrative	environment	that	can	only	comprehend	singularities.	A	narrative	environment	cannot	comprehend	a	fractional	subject,	yet	the	fractional	nature	of	a	subject	emerges	as	an	ontological	property	in	that	account.	Just	as	a	translational	approach	to	knowing	the	lived	experience	of	pain	conjures	the	paradox	of	a	necessary	absence	of	pain	that	accompanies	its	forms	of	presence,	a	narrative	environment	conjures	the	paradox	of	a	necessary	indeterminacy	of	the	subject	that	accompanies	its	determined	forms	of	presence	in	the	narrative	environment.	Both	enact	a	simultaneity	of	absence	and	presence,	but	can	only	deal	with	them	in	terms	of	either/or,	where	absence	is	a	problem	to	be	resolved	into	presence.	Improvisation	and	narrative	environment	as	two	complementary	aspects	of	the	double	vision	(fractionality)	of	the	subject	become	undone	because	the	absence	(or	indetermined	multiplicity)	offered	by	improvisation	constitutes	a	problem	to	be	resolved	into	determined,	singular	forms	of	presence.	Indeed,	having	recognised	the	insufficiency	of	a	narrative	environment	that	resolves	multiplicity	into	singularity,	and	having	then	rescued	multiplicity	from	its	grips	through	the	concept	of	improvisation,	the	authors	then	confront	the	insufficiency	of	a	multiplicity	that	has	not	been	boxed	out	into	the	singularities	of	an	epistemological	explanation.	As	a	result,	a	new	round	of	resolving	the	multiplicity	of	‘improvisation’	into	distinct	singularities	begins.	Thus,	“narrative	improvisations”	emerge	from	“biography,	perspective,	interests,	and	the	immediate	pertinences	of	the	process”	(p.	40).	Participants	are	artful	because	they	“draw	on	biographical	particulars	in	the	context	of	specific	research	questions”	(p.	40).	Yet	the	hard-won	prize	of	the	protection	of	indetermined	multiplicity	in	improvisation	threatens	to	be	lost	through	this	new	round	of	epistemological	resolution.	As	a	result,	the	authors	attempt	a	compromise	between	the	two,	appealing	to	the	sheer	complexity	of	determining	factors	that	produce	“a	discernable	range	of	possibilities	for	asking	and	
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responding	to	questions	about	what	we	are	and	what	our	worlds	are	like”	(p.	40).	The	indeterminacy	of	improvisation	thus	arises	from	a	determined	set	of	processes	so	complex	that	they	cannot	be	determined,	just	like	a	computer	passing	the	Turing	test.1	This	produces	“endless	senses	of	who	and	what	we	could	be,	and	variegated	perspectives	on	our	social	worlds”	(p.	40).	But	the	important	word	here	is	sense.	Indetermined	multiplicity	in	improvisation	is	simply	a	‘sense’	that	has	‘behind’	or	‘beneath’	it	a	determined	singularity.	It	is	an	innocuous	word	surreptitiously	doing	the	necessary	work	connecting	together	entities	supposed	to	be	kept	apart,	in	the	same	way	that	Throop	(2009)	does	not	find	the	absence	of	experience	as	ungraspable	to	presence,	but	as	“barely”	graspable	(p.	536)	(see	Chapter	4),	and	in	the	way	that	the	ontology	of	pain	outlined	in	Chapter	2	does	not	flag	the	impossibility	of	resolving	absence	into	presence,	but	substitutes	the	necessary	absence	of	presence	with	elusiveness.	Such	‘compromise	words’	carefully	and	covertly	do	the	work	of	recognising	the	ontological	connectedness	of	the	concepts	in	the	face	of	a	theory	that	maintains	their	strict	separation	(in	this	sense,	they	are	truly	fractional,	but	cannot	be	allowed	to	express	their	fractionality	in	these	epistemological	accounts).		However,	the	mismatch	between	the	fractional	nature	of	the	subject	and	the	epistemological	frameworks	such	authors	try	to	force	them	into	is	barely	hidden	by	such	moves.	The	struggle	to	(nominally)	recognise	(but	ultimately	deny)2	the	multiplicity	of	interview	subjectivity	fails	when	we	take	“a	close	look	at	what	objects	really	do	in	the	texts”	of	such	writers	(Latour,	2005,	p.	85).	The	objects	themselves	“deploy	many	other	ways	for	objects	to	act	than	the	ones	granted	to	them	by	their	author’s	own	philosophy	of	matter.	Even	as	textual	entities,	objects	overflow	their	makers”	(p.	85,	emphasis	in	original).	Thus,	Gubrium	and	Holstein	(2012)	produce	a	‘first	reading’	of	rhetoric	through	their	concept	of	a	narrative	environment	that	resolves	the	multiplicity	of	the	interview	subject	into	a	rhetorically-specific	set	of	singularities.	Facing	the	insufficiency	of	this	subject	(seen	in	fear	of	overdetermination),	they	introduce	improvisation	to	allow	the	return	of	indetermined	multiplicity.	However,	a	new	round	of	resolving	multiplicity	into	singularity	begins	as	improvisation	is	accounted	for	in	determined	singularities,	which	can	only	resist	this	epistemological	drive	to	resolve	multiplicity	through	being	construed	as	a	multiplicity-yet-to-be-resolved	due	to	the	complexity	of	its	determining	
																																								 																					
1	A	test,	developed	by	Alan	Turing,	which	judges	whether	a	computer’s	behaviour	is	sufficiently	complex	to	be	indistinguishable	from	human	behaviour.	2	The	bracketing	here	is	deliberate	to	reflect	the	bracketing	required	to	establish	coherence	(centring)	in	Gubrium	and	Holstein’s	(2012)	chapter.	
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factors.	Rather	than	the	insight	of	rhetoric	as	revealing	the	fractional	nature	of	the	subject	as	an	ontology	of	a	simultaneous	absence	and	presence,	the	space	of	Gubrium	and	Holstein’s	chapter	can	instead	be	read	as	an	either/or	lurching	between	resolving	indeterminacy	into	determined	entities	and	then	re-introducing	indeterminacy	as	a	new	problem	to	be	resolved.	“The	temptation”	to	follow	this	peculiar	looping	“is	all	the	greater	since[,…]	like	Ulysses’s	sirens,	[it]	might	generously	offer	its	profusion	of	loops	to	wrap	up	and	tie	off	such	compromises”	between	absence	and	presence	demanded	by	epistemological	conditions	of	possibility	(Latour,	2005,	p.	169).	
In	so	situating	interview	research	within	its	historical	context,	it	has	been	the	intention	thus	far	in	the	chapter	to	firstly	demonstrate	the	importance	of	interview	research	for	knowing	the	lived	experience	of	pain,	and	secondly	to	outline	current	methodological	thinking	about	interview	research	within	social	science.	Resting	on	the	importance	of	attention	to	practice,	it	has	argued	that	this	thinking	can	easily	be	read	translationally	(epistemologically),	even	whilst	that	reading	is	unable	to	account	for	the	fractional	ontology	it	enacts.	The	rest	of	the	chapter	examines	how	an	attention	to	practice	in	interview	research	may	produce	the	desired	decentring	movement	consistent	with	a	fractional	understanding	of	lived	experience	rather	than	be	appropriated	within	an	epistemological	reading	serving	only	to	centre.	
THE	PROCESS	OF	PRODUCING	THE	OBJECT	OF	PAIN	EXPERIENCE	
SOCIAL	ANALYSIS:	CENTRING	THE	OBJECT	
Harrison	(2010)	argues	that	the	social	analysis	associated	with	apprehending	embodied	experience	serves	to	produce	an	“individual	existent”	of	an	experiencing	subject	that	is	“fused	with	and	understood	as	a	moment	within	the	wider	(social)	context”	(p.	161),	which	is	consistent	with	the	interview	method	constituting	a	Foucauldian	technology	of	the	self	(discussed	earlier)	(Gubrium	&	Holstein,	2012).	For	Harrison	(2010),	social	analysis	of	testimony	is	a	gradual	process	of	centring	this	object	of	lived	experience	(subjects	within	a	social	context),	and	begins	initially	with	a	decentred	mess	that	“poses	a	problem”	for	the	centring	exercise	of	social	analysis	to	resolve	(p.	165).	The	testimony	offered	by	the	(produced)	subject	“has	yet	to	be	assessed	or	accredited”	(p.	165),	constituting	only	“noise”	(or	“voice”)	that	is	missing	its	full	understanding	as	“speech”	(p.	167).1	In	this	sense,	the	decentred	noise	is	read	by	social	analysis	as	incomplete	speech	–	of	speech	that	has	yet	to	be	adequately	centred.	Indeed,	“testimony	is	apprehended	as	problematic	speech	due	to	its	unaccredited	status;	problematic	only	insofar	as	its	lack	of	account	of	itself	stands	as	a	flaw	
in	need	of	repair”	(p.	168,	emphasis	in	original).	Providing	testimony’s	account	of	itself																																									 																					
1	Harrison	(2010)	notes	that	this	draws	on	a	distinction	made	by	Aristotle.	
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constitutes	the	transformation	of	voice	into	speech.	This	process	is	epistemological,	of	course:	to	apprehend	the	extra-representational	(expressed	in	the	absence	that	is	the	incoherent	decentred	mutterings	of	voice)	and	to	make	a	more	or	less	successful	translation	of	it	into	representation	(the	coherent	centred	logic	of	speech)	to	be	digested	as	knowledge.	Establishing	testimony’s	account	of	itself	involves	applying	“protocols”	that	permit	the	“elided	set	of	functions	and	meanings	[…to	be]	decoded	and	recovered	through	social	analysis”	(p.	168,	emphasis	in	original).	Whilst	Harrison	does	not	outline	specific	protocols,	they	can	be	observed	as	the	methodological	rules	constituting	what	it	means	to	create	a	successful	translation,	methodological	rules	encountered	in	any	social	science	study	to	be	taken	seriously.	For	Harrison,	the	protocols	act	in	three	ways:	revelatory	(“the	progressive	and	systematic	removal	of	barriers	to	shared	understanding”)	reparatively	(supplementing	fragmented	speech	so	that	it	might	be	centred	into	adequate	speech),	and	contextually	(returning	voice	to	its	‘proper’	place	in	a	particular	ordered	system	of	signification)	(p.	168).	In	a	phrase	echoing	the	elusiveness	of	pain’s	necessary	absence	(see	Chapter	2),	testimony	is	understood	as	“challenging	certainly	but	ultimately	resolvable”	(p.	169).	Repairing	speech	involves	already	deciding	in	advance	the	nature	of	what	is	in	the	interview.	As	Harrison	puts	it:	“testimony	is,	as	it	were,	pre-comprehended	by	the	systems	and	systemisations	of	analysis”	(p.	169).	Indeed,	Briggs	(2007)	notes	that	anthropology	produces	ethnographic	material	that	“generally	presupposes	and	reifies	particular	types	of	interview	ideologies	and	practices”,	something	that	can	be	regarded	as	applying	more	widely	to	interviewing	in	general	(p.	566).	In	particular,	he	contends	that	anthropological	interviews	constitute	“communicable	cartographies”	(p.	551)	that	format	interviews	and	interview	material	according	to	three	well-established	ideologies	in	Western	thought:	self-
expression	(“knowledge	emerges	as	individuals	contemplate	the	world	and	rationally	order	their	thoughts”),	publication	(“a	notion	of	public	discourse	[…]	requiring	particular	sorts	of	technologies	to	move	it	out	of	private	domains	and	into	the	public	sphere”),	and	social	
interaction	(a	reaction	against	“abstract,	disinterested,	decontextualized”	Enlightenment	representation	and	that	came	to	construct	“[f]ace-to-face	communication	[…]	as	primordial,	authentic,	quintessentially	human,	and	necessary”)	(p.	553).	A	cartography	of	interviewing	containing	these	three	ideologies	forms	part	of	the	historical	narrative	of	interviews	constructed	within	social	science	discussed	earlier	in	the	chapter.	However,	Briggs’	concept	of	a	‘communicable	cartography’	introduces	a	further	contention	that	the	processes	of	doing	the	anthropological	interview	serves	the	same	reparative	function	suggested	by	Harrison	(2010),	where	“subjects,	texts,	knowledge,	and	authority”	are	constructed	according	to	the	communicable	cartography	of	interview	research	that	already	pre-comprehends	the	interview	and	its	material	according	to	the	three	ideologies	(Briggs,	2007,	p.	552).	
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Significantly,	this	reparative	process	is	one	that	re-produces	epistemological	conditions	of	possibility,	generating	the	kind	of	arborescent	narrative	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter	including	the	Euclidean	space-time	containers	that	characterise	them	(Law,	2002).	The	practice	of	knowing	in	this	epistemological	manner	could	only	ever	produce	centred	objects	devoid	of	the	decentring	required	for	knowing	fractionally.	
DECENTRING	THROUGH	ATTENDING	TO	INTERVIEW	PRACTICE	
The	reflection	that	Harrison	(2010)	provides	on	the	process	of	producing	this	knowledge	reveals	the	multiplicity	of	what	could	otherwise	be.	This	recognises	“the	historicity,	generality	and	substitutability	intrinsic	to	all	systems	of	signification”	(p.	164),	that	the	account	is	produced	in	processes	that	could	be	different.	Indeed,	“when	you	are	guided	to	any	construction	site	you	are	experiencing	the	troubling	and	exhilarating	feeling	that	things	
could	be	different”	(Latour,	2005,	p.	89,	emphasis	in	original).	Alongside	the	singularity	of	the	narrative	account	offered	in	the	centring	movements	of	social	analysis	is	the	possibility	of	the	multiple	narrative	accounts	that	could	have	taken	its	place.	In	this	way,	attention	to	the	practice	of	doing	interview	research	thus	offers	the	potential	of	a	decentring	movement	alongside	the	centring	processes	of	the	analytical	protocols	themselves.	The	object	of	the	lived	experience	of	pain	thus	constitutes	a	(potentially	infinite)	multitude	of	narratives	and	the	singularity	of	the	particular	narrative	being	made	present.	However,	if	we	contrast	this	form	of	decentring	with	those	found	in	Mol	(2002)	and	Law	(2002)	(see	previous	chapter),	we	find	that	multiplicity	within	these	latter	studies	exist	as	an	actuality	rather	than	a	potentiality.	Thus,	Mol’s	(2002)	analysis	of	the	enactment	of	atherosclerosis	reveals	that	whilst	it	is	enacted	as	a	singularity	in	the	patient’s	body,	it	is	at	
the	same	time	enacted	multiply	in	different	spaces	of	the	hospital.	At	the	same	time,	but	not	in	the	same	space,	with	space	constituting	the	singularities	in	which	multiplicities	of	atherosclerosis	are	distributed.	Mol’s	attention	to	the	practices	of	producing	atherosclerosis	reveals	this	distributional	effect,	serving	to	collapse	the	different	spaces	of	the	hospital	into	the	singular	space	of	the	argument	in	her	book,	where	differences	inherent	in	multiplicity	can	no	longer	be	separated	out.	By	contrast,	whilst	space	is	not	a	dimension	to	distribute	multiplicity	in	the	interview,	in	discussing	the	potentiality	of	other	enactments	of	speech,	multiplicity	becomes	distributed	over	time.1	In	this	instance	attention	to	the	practices	of	the	interview	does	not	have	the	effect	of	unbracketing	multiplicity	like	attention	to	the	practices	
																																								 																					
1	The	philosopher	Henri	Bergson	would	contend	that	this	sense	of	‘time’	is	simply	space	by	another	name,	and	that	time	as	it	should	properly	be	conceived	cannot	be	segmented	into	discrete	singularities	for	the	distribution	of	multiplicity	(Guerlac,	2006;	Middleton	&	Brown,	2005;	Moore,	2012).	Bergson’s	philosophy	is	discussed	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	14.	
79	
of	producing	atherosclerosis	in	Mol’s	hospital	Z,	but	instead	has	the	opposite	effect:	of	distributing	multiplicity	into	distinct	singularities	of	time.1	
MULTIPLICITY	AND	ITS	SPACE-TIME	DISTRIBUTION	
In	a	fractional	understanding	the	incoherent	mess	of	‘noise’	is	freed	from	the	absolutism	of	an	‘out-there’	reality	of	epistemology,	and	is	no	longer	simply	a	problem	to	be	resolved,	but	the	necessary	Other	to	the	boundaries	made	about	it	(Law,	2004).	In	this	regard,	a	contrast	can	be	made	between	decentred	“flux”	(p.	10)	and	centred	“condensations”	(p.	103)	made	within	it,	condensations	that	necessarily	bracket	aspects	of	the	flux,	but	which	nevertheless	simultaneously	maintain	an	unbounded	connectedness	by	virtue	of	their	location	within	this	
flux,	“mess”	(Law,	2004,	p.	2),	or	“plasma”	(Latour,	2005,	p.	244).	Whilst	fractionality	can	apprehend	the	double	vision	of	both	flux	(absence	or	multiplicity)	and	solidity	(presence	or	singularity)	in	knowing	an	object,	the	Cyclops	of	epistemology	can	only	apprehend	solidity,	with	flux	understood	merely	as	a	solidity-in-the-making	(a	problem	to	be	resolved).	
Flux	is	an	important	fractional	concept	to	emerge	from	the	rhetorical	turn.	Law	(2004)	describes	flux	as	“the	sense	that	whatever	is	out	there	is	not	a	structure	with	a	discoverable	shape,	but	is	excessively	filled	with	and	made	in	heteromorphic	currents,	eddies,	flows,	vortices,	unpredictable	changes,	storms,	and	with	moments	of	lull	and	calm”	(p.	160).	The	modernism	that	preceded	the	rhetorical	turn	was	(is)	always	preoccupied	with	flux	in	its	critique	of	modernity,	with	an	understanding	of	the	“perpetual	disintegration	and	renewal”	that	embodies	this	experience	(Berman,	1983,	p.	15),	and	perhaps	best	reflected	in	Marx’s	statement	that	“all	that	is	solid	melts	into	air”	(cited	in	Berman,	1983,	p.	15).	But	this	flux	was	always	understood	as	a	means	to	achieving	end	products	of	grand	narratives	–	the	great	
isms	that	dominated	the	19th	and	20th	Centuries,	and	the	various	struggles	(social,	economic,	and	political)	that	constituted	flux.	Noncoherence	is	domesticated:	“turning	difference	into	something	that	coheres	after	all”	(Law	et	al.,	2014,	p.	180).	Indeed,	‘flux’	was	laden	with	an	interpretation	preoccupied	with	products,	be	it	the	joy	of	progress	towards	some	enlightenment,	or	the	despair	at	the	destruction	of	products	being	melted	away,	reflected	in	microcosm	in	social	science	in	the	progress	to	be	attained	via	the	“technical	forefront”	developing	interview	protocols	to	ensure	accurately-translated	products	of	participant	experience	(Gubrium	et	al.,	2012b,	p.	2)	and	the	despair	at	the	fragmentation	of	some	
authentic	patient	‘voice’	accompanying	such	‘progress’	(see	Chapter	1).	With	the	rhetorical	turn,	however,	came	the	promise	that	flux	might	be	understood	as	an	end-in-itself,	as	a	necessary	Other	to	product	(Law,	2004).	To	know	an	object	means																																									 																					
1	Law	et	al.	(2014)	describe	the	‘mode’	of	dealing	with	multiplicity	through	distributing	it	into	space	
or	time	as	separation.	
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apprehending	not	only	the	centring	of	closure	in	presence,	but	also	the	decentring	flux	that	closure	must	necessarily	bracket.	Indeed,	this	might	be	regarded	as	a	key	difference	in	the	
post-modernism	that	followed	modernism.	As	Borer	and	Fontana	(2012)	note,	“[p]ostmodernism	orients	to	theorizing	and,	indeed,	to	society	itself,	not	as	a	monolithic	structure	but	as	a	series	of	fragments	in	continuous	flux”	(p.	46,	my	emphasis).	But	this	‘postmodern’	understanding	of	flux	has	become	appropriated	by	a	translational	understanding	that	still	regards	it	as	a	means-to-an-end,	an	understanding	still	preoccupied	with	a	bias	of	product	over	process.	The	term	‘movement’	is	often	used	synonymously	with	flux,	but	it	is	in	the	understanding	of	movement	in	particular	that	the	translational	appropriation	of	flux	occurs.	Thus,	Cooper	(1998)	asserts	that	“[w]e	are	not	good	at	thinking	
movement”	(p.	108,	emphasis	in	original)	because,	as	Chapter	4	noted,	the	“instinctive	vocabulary	of	institutionalized	thought”	is	instilled	with	the	principle	of	simple	location	where	“clear-cut,	definite	things	occupy	clear-cut,	definite	places	in	space	and	time”	(p.	108),	denying	a	simultaneous	multiplicity.	As	a	consequence,	in	the	conventional	understanding	of	movement	there	“is	movement	of	a	kind:	the	simple	movement	of	definite	things	from	one	definite	place	to	another.	But	it’s	a	form	of	movement	which	denies	the	restlessness	of	transformation,	deformation	and	reformation”	(p.	108).1	Here	‘movement’	does	not	express	the	decentred	mess	subverting	the	omnipotence	of	centred	boundaries	but	is	instead	indicative	of	the	switch	from	one	singularity	to	another.	It	is	a	‘movement’	between	singularities	across	a	space	or	time	in	which	multiplicity	has	become	distributed,	movement	important	only	insofar	as	it	serves	to	traverse	the	distances	in	space	or	time	that	have	the	distributional	effect	of	muting	the	differences	of	multiplicity	that	truly	characterise	‘flux’.	This	allows	for	the	allusion	of	flux,	for	in	traversing	the	space-time	distances	it	is	possible	to	show	that	many	different	products	could	be	enacted	if,	for	example,	only	a	particular	space	of	Gubrium	and	Holstein’s	(2012)	narrative	environment	were	accessed	or	if	a	different	interview	technique	were	used	at	another	time.	Yet	this	form	of	flux,	or	movement,	respects	the	distances	within	the	“Euclidean	time/space	container”	(Law,	2002,	p.	174)	that	enable	the	distribution	of	multiplicity	into	singularity.	This	container	cannot	comprehend	multiplicity	alongside	singularity,	but	must	distribute	it	along	its	axes	of	space	and	time.		The	appropriation	of	flux	by	movement	occurs	in	the	reparative	enactment	of	social	science’s	methodological	conception	of	interview	research,	whose	epistemological	communicable	cartography	involves	“particular	spatializing	and	temporalizing	practices”	(Briggs,	2007,	p.	556)	that	structure	interviews	into	Euclidean	space-time	axes	that	permit																																									 																					
1	Henri	Bergson	describes	this	as	the	“cinematographical	mechanism	of	thought”,	where	time	is	(problematically)	conceived	to	unfold	in	a	series	of	‘snapshots’	(Middleton	&	Brown,	2005,	p.	181).	See	also	Zeno’s	paradoxes,	which	highlight	the	paradox	created	when	flux	is	split	into	distinct	units.	
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distribution	of	multiplicity	into	singularity.	However,	if	attention	to	the	practices	of	doing	an	interview	is	to	constitute	a	decentring	movement	then	it	must	reveal	the	multiplicity	of	the	object	of	lived	experience:	it	must	reveal	the	differences	between	multiples	rather	than	bracketing	it	through	distribution	in	space	and	time.	This	requires	a	focus	on	the	differences	that	arise	in	interviews:	to	the	disruptions,	epiphanies,	and	conflicts	of	interview	processes.	
TELOS	AND	THE	‘TEMPORALITY	OF	THWARTED	CONNECTION’	
Wasson	(2018)	identifies	the	temporal	distribution	discussed	above	as	problematic	for	narrative	accounts	of	chronic	pain	experience.	She	contends	that	conventional	understandings	of	narrative	contain	a	“sense	of	the	ending	to	which	it	moves”	(p.	106).	Such	a	teleological	assumption	threatens	to	pre-format	accounts	of	chronic	pain	experience	in	ways	that	silence	an	important	element	of	pain	experience	that	does	not	
fit	into	such	a	structure.	Barely	contained,	teleology	effects	this	as	a	current	absence	that	is	a	flaw	in	need	of	repair,	as	“a	temporary	stage	in	an	individual	journey	towards	a	coherent	self	and	voice”	(p.	109).	An	unsatisfactory	deferral	of	absence	or	incoherence	that	expresses	the	heart	of	the	problem	of	experience,	Wasson	is	instead	interested	in	“[r]eading	without	seeking	coherence”	(p.	108),	of	“making	a	space	for	story	that	does	not	fit	the	expected	form	of	‘story’	at	all”	(p.	107).	
For	Wasson	this	is	a	space	in	which	temporal	elements	cannot	be	made	to	fit	a	teleological	structure.	More	precisely,	it	is	a	space	of	lived	experience	in	which	there	is	an	attempt	to	organise	such	temporal	structure,	but	one	that	fails:	“experience	of	a	present	in	which	one	reaches	for	connection	[…]	while	aware	of	the	(justified)	anticipation	of	imminent	failure”	(p.	109).	This	“temporality	of	thwarted	connection”	serves	to	“render	many	people	in	chronic	pain	[as]	profoundly	precarious”	(p.	109,	emphasis	in	original).1	It	is	characterised,	for	example,	by	“particular	episodes	of	agony	without	taming	these	within	a	story	of	personal	transformation	or	enrichment”	(p.	109).2	Or	perhaps	more	accurately,	episodes	that	are	unable	to	be	tamed	by	any	sure	teleological	promise,	and	instead	“haunt”	the	reader	as	“rupture”	and	“breach”	(p.	111).	They	are	places	of	tense	ambiguity,	a	“suspended	impasse,	a	waiting	and	reaching”	(p.	110)	where	we	“can	heed	these	traces	of	embodied	suffering	before	they	solidify	into	story”	(p.	111).	We	might	argue	that	such	spaces	of	unsettling	telos	and	the	structure	of	distributed	temporal	singularities	it	generates	(see	elusivity	in	Chapter	2),	of	making	visible	the	absent-present	structure	of	pain	experience,	require	enacting	a	controversy.																																									 																					
1	On	the	production	of	(or	attunement	to)	such	precarious	forms,	see	Stewart	(2012)	on	precarity.	2	Promoting	an	“episodic	reading”	over	an	exclusive	narrative	teleology	is	central	to	Wasson’s	paper	(p.	106).	This	draws	on	a	distinction	discussed	in	earlier	work.	See,	in	particular,	Strawson	(2004).	
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MULTIPLICITY	AND	CONTROVERSY	IN	THE	INTERVIEW	
Harrison’s	(2010)	analysis	of	the	social	scientific	processes	for	knowing	the	testimony	of	a	participant	draws	particular	attention	to	the	disruptions	that	occur	when	the	noise	of	testimony	seems	to	resist	its	translation	into	speech.	Regarded	as	a	“failure”	for	an	epistemological	way	of	knowing	that	has	“already	defined	the	conditions	of	‘success’	to	which	failure	emerges	as	a	dialectical	corollary”,	Harrison	is	instead	interested	in	how	this	‘failure’	reveals	something	else	beyond	which	can	be	centred	by	the	particular	analytic	process	being	used	(p.	163).	Thus,	disruptions	to	the	successful	execution	of	the	processes	of	social	analysis	“demand	that	we	–	as	addressees	–	listen	and	read	again,	not	only	to	try	and	understand	better,	more	accurately	and	exactly,	but	also	to	try	to	hear	and	read	our	inability	to	hear	and	read”	(p.	163,	emphasis	in	original).	Harrison	(2007)	emphasises	the	
complementing	of	centring	with	decentring	in	these	moments,	rather	than	the	replacement	of	the	former	with	the	latter,	regarding	failure	as	revealing	a	“double	bind”	where	“reference,	that	is	to	say	some	type	of	correspondence,	one-to-the-other,	is	both	necessary	and,	at	the	same	time,	will	always	fall	short”	(p.	593).	In	particular,	Harrison	notes	that	such	a	moment	of	failure	“affirms	the	nonrelational”	(p.	592):	the	affirmation	of	the	necessary	absence	in	presence.	This	non-relational	constitutes	an	actuality	of	a	something	else	rather	than	merely	a	possibility.	The	affirmation	of	the	non-relational	affirms	the	seamless	relationship	of	a	familiar	centred	entity	with	the	noise	beyond	its	boundaries,	a	decentring	that	is	bracketed	in	epistemology,	which	can	only	regard	the	non-relational	in	the	centred	terms	as	a	flaw	to	be	corrected.	The	affirmation	of	the	non-relational	in	attending	to	the	failure	of	centring	processes	is	the	decentring	movement	that	complements	centring.	Latour	(2005)	asserts	that	attending	to	such	controversies	is	crucial	to	prevent	the	erroneous	imbuing	of	centred	entities	with	interpretive	omnipotence.	He	argues	that	the	conventional	accounts	of	social	science	(what	he	terms	the	sociology	of	the	social)	attempt	to	resolve	the	uncertainty	of	controversies	into	a	certainty	that	can	ultimately	be	traced	to	a	foundation	of	social	structures	‘below’	or	‘behind’	everything	else.	Such	accounts	“pretend	to	be	objective	because	they	claim	to	imitate	what	they	believe	to	be	the	secret	of	the	natural	sciences”	(pp.	124-5),	which	is	that	they	can,	through	good	translational	process,	mirror	the	Nature	that	lies	beyond	(and	is	the	cause	of)	the	representational	accounts	about	it.	Instead,	Latour	promotes	accounts	“that	try	to	be	objective	because	they	track	objects	which	are	given	a	chance	to	object	to	what	is	said	about	them”	(p.	125,	emphasis	in	original).	That	is,	where	the	centring	exercise	of	social	science	methods	fail	to	centre	the	objects	of	its	interest.	Thus,	Briggs	(2007)	notes	that	whilst	the	communicable	cartography	of	the	anthropological	interview	seeks	to	interpellate	subjects	in	the	reparative	process	of	centring,	people	may	
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respond	to	this	“by	refusing	to	locate	themselves	in	the	positions	they	offer,	critically	revising	them,	or	rejecting	them	altogether”	(p.	566)	(see,	for	example,	‘Gino’	in	Callon	and	Rabeharisoa,	2004).	But,	as	Latour	(2005)	asserts,	there	is	no	need	to	privilege	human	actors	as	objectors,	as	evidenced	in	Gubrium	and	Holstein’s	(2012)	book	chapter	(discussed	at	the	beginning	of	the	current	chapter)	where	the	objects	they	write	about	object	to	the	centring	narrative	logic	that	has	pre-comprehended	it.	Latour	(2005)	argues	that	“our	job	as	social	scientists	is	to	generate	recalcitrant	hard	facts	and	passionate	objectors	that	resist	social	explanations”	(p.	101,	emphasis	in	original).	This	does	not	simply	mean	attending	to	ways	in	which	social	scientists	produce	accounts,	but	to	
objections	that	its	objects	of	study	make	to	its	centring	processes.	This	means	making	visible	where	“texts	based	on	interviews	do	not	conform	to	received	communicable	understandings	of	interviews	but	rather	constitute	contested	terrains”	(Briggs,	2007,	p.	561).	Rather	than	viewing	the	“gaps”	in	interview	material	as	“technical	or	social	failures	to	link	texts”	(p.	562),	to	be	“supressed”	(p.	563)	through	the	reparative	function	of	centring,	generating	passionate	objectors	means	making	visible	such	gaps	as	“points	at	which	people’s	construal	of	the	pragmatics	of	interviewing	conflicts	with	ideological	projections	of	the	process”	(p.	562)	contained	within	the	“[d]ominant	communicable	cartographies”	(p.	565)	of	interview	research	in	social	science.	Importantly,	controversies	are	not	attended	to	simply	as	problems	to	be	resolved	into	certainty:	“controversies	are	not	simply	a	nuisance	to	be	kept	at	bay”	(Latour,	2005,	p.	25).	The	negative	urge	to	resolve	multiplicity	within	the	controversy	is	resisted:	“one	has	to	let	controversies	unfold	all	the	way”	(p.	25),	as	the	next	section	discusses.	
EPISTEMOLOGICAL	APPROPRIATION	OF	THE	CONTROVERSY	
Attending	to	interview	disruptions	as	a	valuable	methodological	technique	is	well	established	in	social	science,	following	an	established	narrative.	We	are	supposed	to	be	surprised	by	the	objections	of	interviewees,	by	the	moments	of	doubt,	and	to	value	them	rather	than	view	them	as	simply	an	expression	of	something	having	gone	wrong	with	the	interview	protocols	(valuing	interview	practice	as	an	end-in-itself	rather	than	purely	in	terms	of	how	it	affects	the	product	of	practice).	Indeed,	the	reporting	of	“mishaps,	mistakes,	and	miscommunications	between	the	researcher	and	the	researched”	is	part	of	a	“postmodern	dialogic	approach	to	interviewing”	(Borer	&	Fontana,	2012,	p.	49).	Drawing	on	particular	examples,	Borer	and	Fontana	note	how	authors	are	involved	in	“highlighting	discrepancies	and	problems	rather	than	minimizing	them”	(p.	49).		Also	within	the	Sage	Handbook	of	Interview	Research	(Gubrium	et	al.	2012a),	Reismann	(2012)	writes	of	the	“digressions”	in	the	interview	that	“can	be	extremely	productive”	because	they	“provide	contextual	and	associative	cues	and	sometimes	force	us	to	confront	
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the	very	assumptions	of	our	research	topics”	(p.	367).	Thus,	she	discusses	one	particular	participant	who	“worked”	to	“resist”	the	narrative	Reismann	was	attempting	to	create,	a	resistance	that	arose	because	the	participant	herself	“had	an	agenda	for	the	conversation,	an	identity	she	wanted	to	perform	and	stories	she	wanted	to	tell”	(p.	376).	For	Reismann	this	revealed	“fissures	in	the	master	narrative”	(p.	376)	within	the	field	of	her	research	interest	(infertility),	challenging	its	interpretive	omnipotence	of	‘this	is	how	it	“really”	happened’	(p.	377).	Indeed,	the	process	of	attending	to	the	“deviant	case”	(p.	376)	as	part	of	an	examination	of	the	processes	producing	a	particular	narrative	account	“reveals	the	contingency	of	all	our	observations”	(p.	377).	Becker	(1999)	applies	this	to	pain,	noting	that	the	“problem	of	expressing	pain	in	language	demands	attention	to	startling,	incoherent	and	disjointed	accounts”	(p.	74).	Exploring	the	“violation	of	narrative	conventions”	(p.	85)	within	interview	research	into	pain	experience	reveals	the	need	for	an	alternative	way	of	narrating	the	sufferer	that	goes	beyond	the	“modernist	tradition”	that	brackets	certain	‘others’	into	absence	(p.	86).	The	issue	at	hand,	however,	is	that	whilst	interview	deviance	constitutes	a	rupture	in	the	interpretive	omnipotence	of	the	products	that	social	analysis	seeks	to	centre,	thrusting	an	Other	that	is	both	different	yet	seamlessly	connected	within	the	enacted	mess	of	the	interview,	the	fractionality	expressed	in	this	moment	is	easily	apprehended	into	readings	that	are	distinctly	epistemological:	those	that	interpret	conflict	as	forcing	a	choice	between	difference	and	sameness	(either/or)	rather	than	acknowledging	the	simultaneity	of	both	(and).	Specifically,	it	is	contended	that	contemporary	interview	methodology	on	interview	deviance	does	not	know	how	to	deal	with	difference	fractionally,	and	tends	towards	epistemological	readings	that	resolve	the	controversial	difference	of	multiplicity	into	singularity.	Indeed,	this	epistemological	appropriation	of	multiplicity	is	an	ongoing	theme	throughout	this	thesis.	In	the	current	chapter	we	observed	how,	in	a	special	case	of	the	‘first	reading	of	rhetoric’,	Gubrium	and	Holstein’s	(2012)	chapter	can	be	read	as	attempting	to	distribute	multiplicity	across	the	space	of	a	narrative	environment,	as	well	as	how	focussing	on	the	non-relational	as	a	potential	(rather	than	an	actuality)	constitutes	a	distribution	of	multiplicity	into	singularities	defined	by	temporal	coordinates.	In	particular,	the	substitution	of	the	fractional	concept	of	flux	(as	the	seamless	connectedness	between	distinct	entities)	for	the	epistemological	concept	of	movement	(that	jumps	between	the	singularities	of	a	time-space	container	in	which	multiplicity	has	been	distributed)	was	also	discussed.	When	we	examine	what	this	means	for	the	concept	of	the	controversy,	this	raises	a	particular	type	of	epistemological	appropriation	in	the	form	of	the	Hegelian	dialectic,	or	more	specifically,	the	continual	dialectical	looping	that	is	the	expression	of	epistemological	‘movement’.	
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Hegel’s	dialectic	consists	of	three	entities:	a	thesis	that	combines	with	an	antithesis	to	form	a	
synthesis.	The	synthesis	can	become	a	new	thesis	and	the	dialectical	cycle	continues.	When	‘thesis’	and	‘antithesis’	can	be	regarded	as	‘presence’	and	‘absence’	(respectively),	we	can	see	that	this	dialectical	looping	expresses	the	paradox	of	pain	experience.	For	Latour	(2005)	the	problem	of	conventional	sociology	is	the	paradox	between	the	locating	of	singularities	to	the	local	site	or	the	global	site,	which	is	a	choice	that	needs	to	be	made	between	the	two	in	a	‘sociology	of	the	social’	that	can	only	deal	in	the	epistemological	either/or	of	singularities.	Placing	a	singularity	at	a	local	site	must	face	a	reality	that	there	are,	in	fact,	global	influences	beyond	the	local	site.	Placing	a	singularity	at	the	global	site	must	face	a	reality	that	the	singularity	emerges	from	a	local	act	of	practice.	Indeed,	social	scientists	“are	suddenly	pulled	in	the	opposite	direction	from	‘deep	structural	features’	back	to	the	more	‘real’	and	‘concrete’	interactions”	(p.	168).	For	Latour,	“the	recent	history	of	the	social	sciences”	has	“been	in	large	part	a	painful	oscillation	between	[these]	two	opposites	poles”	(p.	168).	We	might	imagine	such	an	oscillation,	as	it	“circles	through	some	dialectic	circles”	(p.	170),	is	an	acceptable	expression	of	fractionality.	Unlike	an	epistemological	appropriation,	it	does	not	resolve,	once	and	for	all,	multiplicity	because	a	synthesis	becomes	another	thesis	with	its	own	antithesis,	and	an	ongoing	movement	is	permitted.	Nor	does	it	try	to	keep	the	thesis	and	the	antithesis	each	in	their	own	splendid	isolation	like	the	‘non-translational	first	response’	discussed	in	Chapter	4.	Indeed,	the	fractionally	important	concept	of	the	event	(see	Chapter	4)	might	be	interpreted	as	a	dialectical	loop:	the	shocking	of	a	centred	entity	(thesis)	upon	the	detecting	of	the	excess	that	is	beyond	its	boundaries	(antithesis)	in	a	restless	loop	that	never	stops.	In	so	appearing	to	capture	the	ongoing	restlessness	of	flux,	multiplicity	seems	to	be	affirmed	alongside	singularity	in	a	fractional	respecting	of	an	absent-present	ontology.	However,	“pluralism1	sometimes	appears	to	be	dialectical	–	but	it	is	its	most	ferocious	enemy,	its	only	profound	enemy”	(Deleuze,	1962/2006a,	p.	8).	The	dialectic	is	unable	to	comprehend	fractionality	because	it	is	concerned	only	with	the	either/or	of	singularities.	The	decentred	multiplicity	that	is	observed	at	the	affirmation	of	the	antithesis	in	the	face	of	the	thesis	is	instead	understood	within	the	dialectic	as	simply	a	multiplicity-to-be-resolved	into	the	singularity	of	the	synthesis,	or	(to	re-quote	Harrison,	2010)	“as	a	flaw	in	need	of	repair”	(p.	168,	emphasis	in	original).	That	is,	inserted	into	the	unbounded	connectedness	between	thesis	and	the	excess	that	surrounds	it	(its	antithesis)	is	an	assumption	that	a	thesis	cannot	simultaneously	hold	in	light	of	this	excess	(which	is	the	double	vision	characterising	fractionality).2	This	assumption	is	what	Deleuze	(1962/2006a)	calls	the	“negative”	in	the	dialectic,	something	that	“is	not	present	in	the	essence”,	yet	the																																									 																					
1	In	the	sense	of	multiplicity	as	I	have	been	discussing	it.	2	We	might	here	be	reminded	of	the	despair	of	modernity	in	Yeats’	(1920/1997)	poem	The	Second	
Coming:	“Things	fall	apart;	the	centre	cannot	hold;	/	Mere	anarchy	is	loosed	upon	the	world”	(p.	60).	
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thesis	“denies	all	that	it	is	not	and	makes	this	negation	its	own	essence	and	the	principle	of	its	existence”	(p.	9).	That	is,	the	negative	as	an	effect	of	difference	(the	“abstract	thought	of	contradiction”)	becomes	misrecognised	as	the	essence	itself	(p.	10,	my	emphasis).	By	contrast,	in	“its	relation	with	the	other[,]	the	force	which	makes	itself	obeyed	does	not	deny	the	other	or	that	which	it	is	not,	it	affirms	its	own	difference	and	enjoys	this	difference”	(pp.	8-9),	which	is	the	fractional	knowing	in	tension	(Law,	2004	–	see	Chapter	4),	or	the	affirmation	of	the	non-relational	(Harrison,	2007).	A	dialectic	“is	an	exhausted	force	which	does	not	have	the	strength	to	affirm	its	difference”	(Deleuze,	1962/2006a,	p.	9).	Added	to	the	various	forms	of	epistemological	appropriation	discussed	so	far	is	the	dialectic,	with	its	pretence	to	flux	in	its	endless	loops	that	are	but	oscillations	or	“sudden	hiccups”	between	singularities	(Latour,	2005,	p.	193).	It	is	my	contention	that	the	concept	of	the	
controversy	has	become	regarded	as	important	to	social	scientific	method	but	in	methods	that	readily	read	it	as	reasserting	epistemology	rather	than	revealing	fractionality.1	If	attention	to	the	practice	of	centring	reveals	controversies	where	there	is	an	actuality	of	a	
something	else	in	the	affirmation	of	the	non-relational,	and	that	the	multiplicity	inherent	in	the	affirmation	threatens	to	be	resolved	by	centring	processes,	we	might	ask	how	it	is	possible	to	practice	a	method	whereby	the	observed	controversy	can	maintain	both	its	centring	and	decentring	movements	without	the	bracketing	of	the	latter:	where	the	controversy	is	affirmed	rather	than	resolved.	After	all,	the	argument	thus	far	has	largely	considered	how	not	to	practice	fractionality,	which	does	not	seem	to	be	a	method	at	all.	We	can	now	turn	to	the	penultimate	chapter	of	this	theoretical	section,	which	discusses	how	to	“create	a	space	of	metaphysical	tension”	(Law,	2006,	p.	11)	where	the	controversy	can	be	affirmed,	allowing	the	development	of	a	defined	method	for	fractionally	knowing	the	lived	experience	of	pain	via	the	interview.	
CLARIFYING	CONTROVERSIES	
The	‘controversy’	as	a	concept	is	important	at	this	point	in	the	thesis’	argument	because	it	is	presented	as	a	means	to	make	visible	a	juxtaposition	between	multiples	–	of	enacting	fractional	conditions	of	possibility.	Latour’s	(2005)	use	of	the	term	‘controversy’	carries	a	specific	usage	within	the	discipline	in	which	he	has	worked:	that	of	science	and	technology	studies	(STS).	Whilst	we	might	contend	that	its	usage	only	becomes	understandable	within	the	context	of	the	empiricism	that	he	employs,	something	that	is	explicated	in	the	following	chapter,	it	can	nevertheless	be	said	that	the	term	has	been	associated	with	conflict	(Mol,	2002).	And	one	strand	of	STS	thought																																									 																					
1	Such	as	abductive	analysis	(Timmermans	&	Tavory,	2012),	discussed	at	the	end	of	Chapter	7.	
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has	contended	that	the	controversy-as-conflict	is	not	the	only	way	in	which	to	make	visible	the	juxtaposition	of	fractionality,	or	even	the	most	common.	Mol’s	discussion	of	spatial	distribution	(see	previous	chapter)	highlights	one	way	in	which	differences	can	be	observed	without	a	“full-blown	fight”	(p.	104),	and	Law	et	al.	(2014)	highlight	how	
conflict	is	but	one	means	of	making	visible	juxtapositions	as	a	fractional	way	of	knowing	an	object.	
But	then	the	use	of	the	controversy	at	this	point	in	the	thesis	should	be	clarified.	It	has	suggested	that	controversies-as-conflicts	within	interview	research	are	conventionally	infused	with	a	temporal	distribution	that	lacks	the	juxtaposition	constitutive	of	fractionality.	As	a	flaw	in	need	of	repair,	as	a	“nuisance	to	be	kept	at	bay”	(Latour,	2005,	p.	25),	it	has	argued	that	this	distribution	constitutes	an	‘epistemological	appropriation’	that	brackets	the	complementary	decentring	movement.	Instead,	what	is	so	important	about	the	controversy-as-conflict	is	the	point	where	it	is	not	possible	to	have	already	decided	on	its	resolvability	(something	that,	to	prelude	discussion	of	the	following	chapter,	Latour’s	empiricism	deals	with	in	making	visible	mediators),	where	multiplicity	is	enacted	alongside	singularity	instead	of	being	distributed	into	time	and	space.	Here	the	use	of	the	concept	of	the	‘controversy’	is	an	interest	in	undoing	a	distribution	into	singularities	of	time	in	the	same	way	that	Mol	undoes	the	distribution	of	the	various	enactments	of	atherosclerosis	within	the	separate	spaces	of	the	hospital	through	collapsing	them	into	the	singular	space	of	the	argument	of	her	book.	It	highlights	the	sense	in	which	the	‘controversy’	as	a	concept	is	used	in	this	thesis	in	order	to	undo	the	distribution	(temporal	or	spatial)	of	multiplicity	that	prevents	a	fractional	means	of	knowing.	
The	point	that	there	“may	be	differences	without	conflict”	(p.	105),	that	accounts	of	conflict	are	not	the	only	ones	that	make	visible	the	double	vision	of	multiplicity	alongside	singularity,	and	that	they	are	likely	not	the	most	common	way	of	doing	so	(Mol,	2002;	Law	et	al.,	2014),	is	separate	to	the	sense	in	which	the	thesis	introduces	the	concept	of	the	‘controversy’	in	an	attempt	to	undo	temporal	distribution.	This	is	not	to	say	that	the	particular	mode	of	fractionality	that	is	enacted	in	knowing	an	object	is	not	important,	as	Chapter	14	will	discuss.	Inevitably,	clarification	of	terms	such	as	‘controversy’	emerge	through	the	gradual	weaving	of	the	narrative	of	the	thesis	given	its	centrality	as	a	topic	that	is	actively	explored,	rather	than	being	presented	as	totally	digestible	at	any	particular	moment.	However,	it	is	important	to	clarify	the	particular	usage	of	the	concept	of	the	‘controversy’	at	the	current	point	given	its	potent	history	within	STS	and	the	possibility	of	misunderstanding	its	use	within	this	thesis.	
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CHAPTER	CONCLUSION	
This	chapter	set	out	to	explore	how	attention	to	the	centring	practices	of	interview	research	could	constitute	the	decentring	movement	required	to	complement	centring	so	that	a	fractional	approach	to	knowing	the	lived	experience	of	pain	can	be	enacted.	It	began	by	exploring	the	historical	narrative	of	interview	research	established	within	social	science,	with	it	consisting	of	three	historic	phases	involving	the	establishment	of	an	interview	subject	to	be	a	source	of	translation,	the	utility	of	attention	to	practice	to	perfect	the	translation	from	the	subject,	and	(finally)	attention	to	the	practice	of	doing	interview	research	in	its	own	right.	This	latter	phase	is	consistent	with	the	rhetorical	turn	in	the	social	sciences,	but	like	the	rhetorical	turn,	it	has	become	appropriated	by	translational	readings	within	contemporary	methodological	thinking	about	interview	research.	The	chapter	then	explored	in	more	detail	the	process	of	centring	the	decentred	‘mess’	of	interview	data,	which	(in	this	process)	is	regarded	as	a	flaw	in	need	of	repair.	Whilst	revealing	the	centred	entity	as	the	product	of	inscription	processes	offers	the	potential	for	
something	else,	thus	apparently	offering	multiplicity,	it	was	argued	that	this	constitutes	a	distribution	of	multiplicity	across	singularities	in	time,	and	was	thus	insufficient	to	offer	a	fractional	means	of	knowing.	Indeed,	the	distribution	of	multiplicity	into	the	singularities	of	space	and	time,	whilst	simultaneously	appearing	as	a	‘movement’	(almost)	like	a	decentred	seamless	flux	but	actually	being	hiccups	between	singularities,	was	highlighted	as	another	expression	of	the	epistemological	appropriation	of	fractional	concepts.	Instead,	an	actuality	of	the	something	else	can	be	found	in	the	controversies	that	occur	in	research.	In	the	controversy	a	centred	concept	actually	(rather	than	potentially)	encounters	the	non-relational.	This	encounter	is	fractional	if	the	non-relational	is	affirmed:	where	a	decentred	multiplicity	is	held	in	tension	with	centred	singularity.	However,	the	epistemological	appropriation	of	the	controversy	seen	within	contemporary	social	science	seeks	to	resolve	the	controversy	by	distributing	multiplicity	into	singularities	of	spatiotemporal	coordinates,	such	as	occurs	in	a	dialectical	understanding	of	the	controversy.	Whilst	the	chapter	finds	that	a	complementary	decentring	movement	can	be	attained	through	attending	to	controversies	in	the	centring	processes	of	interview	research,	the	problem	of	how	to	prevent	their	epistemological	appropriation,	of	how	to	first	allow	the	full	unfolding	of	controversies	and	then	how	to	maintain	the	affirmation	of	the	non-relational,	remains.	The	following	chapter	will	consider	how	we	can	provide	a	surface	on	which	we	can	make	visible	the	knowing	in	tension	required	of	fractionality,	a	surface	where	difference	is	made	irreducible.		
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FIRE	STARTERS:	TWO	READINGS	OF	CRITICAL	INTERLOPING	
Stella	Bolaki’s	(2016)	book,	Illness	as	Many	Narratives,	is	an	attempt	to	respond	to	the	narrative	crisis	discussed	in	Chapter	1	(and	expanded	upon	in	Chapters	2	and	3),	where	narrative	is	regarded	as	failing	in	its	professed	role	of	capturing	lived	experience.	Bolaki’s	response	is	to	suggest	that	narrative	has	much	wider	conditions	of	possibility	than	is	conventionally	regarded.	Notably	relevant	to	the	current	thesis,	her	book	“starts	from	the	premise	that	illness	narratives	are	characterised	by	multiplicity”	(p.	1).	She	highlights,	for	example,	the	way	her	father’s	own	unpublished,	handwritten	story	of	cancer	is	full	of	“fragmentation,	discontinuity”	and	“switches	to	alternative	genres”	(p.	2).	Within	her	chapters	Bolaki	in	particular	focuses	on	the	way	in	which	a	wider	range	of	artistic	forms	than	those	usually	regarded	as	‘narrative’	can	be	shown	to	form	“juxtaposition”	(p.	3),	such	as	between	“word	and	image	in	photography”,	“performance	art	and	theatrical	conventions	in	autobiographical	theatre”,	or	“animated	drawing	and	documentary	voice	in	animated	documentary”	(p.	7).	Indeed,	she	attempts	to	make	visible	the	“collision”	between	these	multiple	practices	(p.	16).	
Bolaki’s	book	might	be	seen	as	reflecting	a	broader	trend	within	the	so-called	‘second	wave’	of	medical	humanities,	also	referred	to	as	the	‘critical’	medical	humanities	(Viney,	Callard	&	Woods,	2015;	Whitehead	&	Woods,	2016).	Deliberately	unbounded,	this	is	a	discipline	defined	only	insofar	as	it	“names	a	series	of	intersections,	exchanges	and	entanglements	between	the	biomedical	sciences,	the	arts	and	humanities,	and	the	social	sciences”	(Whitehead	&	Woods,	2016,	p.	1).	This	emphasis	on	the	intersection	of	multiples	reflects	the	fact	that	the	“practices	that	make	up	the	medical	humanities	are	deeply	and	irrevocably	entangled	in	the	vital,	corporeal	and	physiological	commitments	of	biomedical	research”	(Viney,	Callard	&	Woods,	2015,	p.	4).	
Bolaki	(2016)	refers	to	her	method	of	creating	new	relationships	of	juxtaposition	as	“critical	interloping”,	which	she	describes	as	“recontextualisation	and	cross-fertilisation”	(p.	13,	emphasis	in	original).	In	particular,	it	works	by	“inserting	a	variety	of	artistic	and	cultural	representations	that	explore	illness	within	the	field	of	the	medical	humanities”,	as	well	as	“modelling	ways	in	which	the	arts	and	arts/media	scholarship	can	enlarge	their	practices	and	critical	approaches”	(p.	13).	Her	interloping	is	‘critical’	because	rather	than	just	adding	different	representations	inertly,	her	
The	work	of	burning	off	the	old	metaphysics	of	omnipotence,	which	can	never	cease,	must	always	be	a	way	to	fan	the	flame	or	build	the	fire	of	the	event	that	transpires	in	the	name	of	God.	(Caputo,	2007,	p.	67)		Cinders	there	are,	and	we	are	here	only	in	relation	[to]	them,	marked	by	them	from	the	outset	[…].		(Harrison,	2015,	p.	299)	
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approach	involves	“actively	opening	up	space	for	them	to	reshape	or	challenge	existing	practices	across	disciplines”	(p.	14).	Narratives	here	might	no	longer	be	seen	simply	as	coherences,	but	an	intersection	between	multiple	ways	of	knowing,	ways	that	she	actively	encourages	finding	more	of.	Critical	interloping	might	thus	be	conceived	as	a	means	to	make	visible	multiplicity	as	it	is	involved	in	a	controversy,	and	therefore	be	seen	as	a	fractional	reading	of	narrative.	And	like	any	controversy,	the	outcomes	are	uncertain.	Reading	one	particular	documentary	film,	the	juxtaposed	intersections	mean	that	the	film	“cannot	give	assurance	of	its	intentions”,	producing	“ambiguity”	(p.	149)	(an	important	indicator	of	a	mediator,	which	the	next	chapter	will	discuss).	
But	then,	as	a	sort	of	response	to	this	ambiguity,	the	film	“affirms	the	need	to	continue	creating	new	ways	of	looking	at,	and	responding	to,	the	experiences	and	relationships	portrayed	in	the	film”	(p.	149).	Here	critical	interloping	risks	being	read	as	relegating	the	controversy	as	a	means-to-an-end.	The	controversy	risks	becoming	“productive”	(p.	13)	to	particular	ends,	like	“engaging	with	a	range	of	illness	narratives	and	multiple	perspectives	[so	that	they]	can	help	the	arts,	cultural	studies	and	the	medical	humanities	to	overcome	divisions	and	amplify	the	goals	and	scope	of	their	respective	work”	(p.	14).	Whilst	this	works	on	the	basis	of	“encounters	with	difference”	(p.	153),	these	are	“productive	collisions”	(p.	221)	that,	like	the	telic	demand	driving	Scarry’s	(1986)	man-as-creator	(see	Chapter	2),	fuel	the	kind	of	“need	to	continue	creating”	that	Bolaki	(2016,	p.	149)	discusses,	of	establishing	the	“creative	potential	of	the	arts	and	humanities”	(p.	221).		
This	is	a	fuel	that	needs	constant	replenishing,	requiring	the	ongoing	identification	of	difference	so	that	the	medical	humanities	can	“remain	pluralistic	and	experimental”	(p.	7).	It	is	a	fervour	that	promotes	the	“fearless	questioning	of	representations”,	one	that	has	made	the	medical	humanities	“hostile,	dogged,	sceptical”	(Viney,	Callard	&	Woods,	2015,	p.	4).	To	use	Law	and	Singleton’s	(2005)	terminology,	fractionality	here	works	like	a	fire	that	burns	as	the	differences	of	a	newly	visible	absence	are	thrust	onto	that	which	is	made	present,	serving	to	“work	upon	those	presences	and	transform	them”,	generating	new	(and	typically	not	predictable)	presences	(p.	345).	These	transformed	presences	introduce	the	possibility	of	further	juxtaposed	absence	that	can	lead	to	an	unpredictable,	“undomesticated”	(p.	349)	“bush	fire”	(p.	347).	
For	Law	and	Singleton	this	is	not	a	fire	“in	which	the	fuel	that	feeds	it	can	be	limited	and	the	ashes	raked	out”,	with	it	“drawing	on	and	making	a	constant	set	of	absences	and	presences”	as	it	“jumps,	creatively,	destructively	and	more	or	less	unpredictably,	from	location	to	location”	(p.	347).	For	those	engaged	in	the	critical	medical	humanities	their	task	is	to	facilitate	the	burning	of	this	fuel	through	experimental	and	critical	
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methods	like	Bolaki’s	(2016)	critical	interloping,	as	what	is	made	present	is	“deformed	and	transformed”	(Viney,	Callard	&	Woods,	2015,	p.	4)	so	that	the	medical	humanities	can	“remain	a	broad	and	dynamic	movement”	(Bolaki,	2016,	p.	120).		
But	in	this	reading	such	dialectical	looping	is	one	that	denies	its	fractional	nature,	conceived	as	it	is	as	a	fire	that	‘jumps’	between	singularities,	a	form	of	movement	that	isn’t	really	movement	at	all	(Cooper,	1998).	Beautiful	and	exciting	though	it	is,	in	this	thesis’	quest	to	make	(and	keep)	visible	the	absent-present	nature	of	lived	experience,	we	have	no	use	for	fire,	at	least	not	by	itself.	For	with	fire	we	risk	forgetting	what	is	necessarily	burned	in	favour	of	the	burning	itself,	as	the	ashes	(cinders)	are	blown	away	to	make	way	for	the	next	round	of	dialectical	creative	destruction	rather	than	held	visible	in	tense	juxtaposition:	“in	burning	there	is	only	asymmetry	and	irreversibility”	(Harrison,	2015,	p.	299).	Instead,	we	need	a	pinboard.
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CHAPTER	7:	PINBOARDS	
INTRODUCTION	
The	previous	chapter	argued	that	attending	to	the	centring	practices	of	interview	research	methods	serves	to	reveal	that	alongside	the	embryonic	centred	narrative	product	of	the	interview	research	process	is	the	encounter	with	that	which	does	not	fit	–	with	its	non-relational	element.	This	expresses	itself	as	a	controversy,	which	is	important	to	a	fractional	way	of	knowing	since	controversies	expose	the	difference	of	a	something	else	beyond	the	centred	entity	that	exists	in	tension	with	the	centring	demands	of	the	narrative	being	enacted	by	the	interview	research	method.	The	challenge	of	the	current	chapter	is	to	envisage	a	method	through	which	this	metaphysical	tension	can	be	made	visible	without	it	progressing	to	a	resolution	(where	multiplicity	becomes	distributed	into	singularity	in	an	epistemological	appropriation	of	the	controversy).	In	the	first	part	of	the	chapter	how	this	aim	is	understood	is	discussed.	Following	Chapter	5,	it	argues	that	this	involves	a	fractional	intervention	on	epistemological	conditions	of	possibility,	but	that	there	are	two	readings	of	this	intervention.	One	understands	it	as	the	emergence	of	the	given	fractional	nature	of	what	it	is	to	know,	a	reading	that	replicates	epistemological	conditions	of	possibility.	A	second	acknowledges	that	practicing	fractionality	as	an	intervention	means	that	this	intervention	is	itself	fractional	in	nature.	The	choice	to	intervene	does	not	mean	to	conquer	and	unify	metaphysics	into	some	singular	theory	of	fractionality,	but	to	interfere	and	produce	controversy	in	epistemological	metaphysics.	The	intervention	must	acknowledge	its	engagement	in	ontological	politics	lest	it	be	epistemologically	appropriated	as	the	translation	of	some	transcendent	property	of	
knowing	and	forget	its	role	as	a	practice	interfering	with	other	practices.	Having	established	how	to	understand	the	practice	of	the	intervention	as	fractional,	the	remainder	of	the	chapter	explores	a	technique	that	makes	visible	the	affirmation	of	difference:	John	Law’s	(2002,	2006)	concept	of	the	‘pinboard’.	This	understanding	is	introduced	in	three	phases.	The	first	considers	the	pinboard	as	a	surface	upon	which	the	tension	of	the	controversy	is	held	firm	in	the	same	space	and	time.	The	pinboard	is	a	space	that	at	its	most	literal	is	a	corkboard	with	bits	and	pieces	pinned	on	it.	It	allows	the	observer	to	visualise	these	bits	and	pieces	as	both	distinct	and	overlapping:	a	knowing	in	tension	that	can	be	apprehended	by	the	observer	without	being	resolved.	The	logic	of	the	pinboard	is	transferrable	(and	thus	its	exact	form	varies),	but	this	understanding	also	needs	to	be	complemented	by	conceptualising	the	pinboard	as	something	that	is	practiced.	This	second	phase	introduces	the	enactment	of	the	pinboard,	conceptualised	by	Law	(2004)	as	a	method	
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assemblage.	Embodying	much	of	the	theory	discussed	in	the	thesis	thus	far,	a	method	assemblage	is	where	coherent	centred	entities	are	enacted,	or	made	manifest,	whilst	a	
something	else	that	threatens	to	reveal	multiplicity	is	actively	bracketed.	In	so	charting	the	distribution	of	items	made	manifest	and	bracketed,	a	pinboard	is	able	to	make	visible	the	bracketing	of	the	non-relational	and	reveal	the	tension	of	simultaneous	connection	and	distinctiveness.	However,	method	assemblages	do	not	exist	outside	of	the	practices	of	knowing	them,	and	the	third	phase	of	understanding	the	pinboard	introduces	the	process	of	
observing	method	assemblages.	This	unites	the	enactment	of	the	pinboard	with	the	insight	of	the	thesis	thus	far:	that	centring	is	complemented	with	a	decentring	movement	(and	becomes	fully	fractional)	when	attention	to	centring	practice	reveals	controversies.	This	observation	involves	the	enactment	of	an	empiricism.	It	starts	with	the	construction	of	a	‘naive	reader’	who	follows	closely	the	centring	logic	of	a	method	assemblage	without	pre-judgement,	a	close	attention	involving	the	exploration	of	the	boundaries	of	the	centred	entity	being	enacted,	making	visible	imperfections	that	constitute	controversies.	This	observation	reveals	the	bracketed	non-relational	alongside	the	centred	account	made	manifest,	extending	the	field	of	vision	to	encapsulate	the	full	fractional	metaphysics	of	a	method	assemblage.	Charting	the	observation	of	a	method	assemblage	crystallises	the	juxtaposition	between	centring	and	decentring	constitutive	of	fractionality,	and	is	concluded	as	a	viable	method	for	knowing	the	lived	experience	of	pain	fractionally.	
ONTOLOGICAL	POLITICS:	TWO	READINGS	OF	FRACTIONAL	INTERVENTIONS	
In	Chapter	5	it	was	argued	that	if	the	critique	of	epistemology	is	to	be	taken	seriously	then	fractionality	needs	to	be	more	than	simply	a	theory	of	practice	because	producing	such	a	theory	simply	reproduces	the	very	epistemological	conditions	of	possibility	that	it	criticises.	A	theory	of	fractionality	invites	us	to	go	further	and	practice	the	conditions	of	possibility	that	it	imagines.	In	this	regard,	the	current	chapter	seeks	to	find	“procedures	for	putting	elements	together	in	ways	that	respect	their	tension”	(Law,	2006,	p.	5),	where	there	is	an	“irreducible	difference”	between	fractional	multiples	(Mol	&	Mesman,	1996,	p.	437).	It	seeks	a	method	to	affirm	the	difference	within	a	controversy.	What	this	means	is	to	prevent	the	resolution	of	difference	into	singularity,	and	instead	to	‘hold’	fractionality	visible.	Thus,	our	aim	to	practice	the	fractional	involves	not	practicing	the	epistemological.	As	should	be	apparent	to	the	reader	thus	far,	the	seeking	of	a	fractional	way	of	knowing	is	always	set	
against	the	epistemological.	But	we	should	be	reminded	that	fractionality	emerges	from	epistemology	whilst	it	is	also	against	it.	It	is	only	through	attending	to	the	insufficiency	of	the	centring	mono-vision	that	characterises	epistemology,	expressed	in	the	detection	of	the	controversy,	that	fractionality	emerges	as	a	metaphysical	explanation.	
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Epistemology	being	against	fractionality	effects	a	striking	difference	between	the	two.	But	this	thesis	goes	further	and	argues	that	not	only	is	fractionality	a	different	metaphysics	to	epistemology,	but	is	a	better	metaphysics.	It	is	better	insofar	as	it	permits	knowing	without	the	problematic	paradoxes	thrown	up	by	epistemology.	There	are	two	ways	to	narrate	this	story	of	fractionality	being	better	than	epistemology.	The	first	is	to	suggest	fractionality	is	more	in	touch	with	what	it	means	to	know,	of	making	visible	the	absent-present	ontological	tension	found	in	controversies,	of	being	more	attuned	to	the	way	that	knowing	really	is.	But	conceiving	of	the	nature	of	knowing	as	“something	to	get	in	touch	with”	(Mol,	2002,	p.	165)	is	to	reproduce	epistemological	conditions	of	possibility	where	multiplicity	has	become	bracketed	in	favour	of	some	transcendent	singularity	existing	‘out-there’	to	be	the	source	of	translation.	And	as	is	customary	with	epistemological	appropriation,	it	brackets	the	fact	that	metaphysics	is	itself	practiced,	and	that	other	ways	of	enacting	metaphysics	are	being	enacted	but	are	erased	to	produce	only	singularity.	Indeed,	it	is	only	because	of	the	controversial	encounter	of	epistemology	with	fractionality,	flowing	seamlessly	from	one	to	another	(as	flux)	yet	also	hardening	around	two	opposed	and	distinct	entities,	that	fractionality	can	itself	exist	within	the	very	fractional	conditions	of	possibility	that	it	promotes.	This	is	the	second	way	of	narrating	how	fractionality	is	better	than	epistemology.	Both	stories	claim	fractionality	offers	a	better	way	of	understanding	the	process	of	knowing	than	epistemology,	and	that	this	can	be	revealed	by	an	attention	to	centring	processes.	However,	the	first	suggests	this	is	because	the	theory	of	fractionality	comes	closer	to	some	‘out-there’	singularity	about	the	nature	of	knowing.	The	second	puts	the	claim	in	context	and	argues	that	the	claim	itself	is	constituted	in	practice	as	a	fractional	object,	as	an	enacted	controversy.	As	Mol	writes,	“[d]oing	good”,	such	as	selecting	a	better	metaphysics,	“does	not	follow	on	finding	out	about	it,	but	is	a	matter	of,	indeed,	doing”	(p.	177).	The	two	readings	can	be	applied	to	what	was	discussed	in	Chapter	5,	following	Law	(2002),	as	a	need	to	
intervene	on	epistemological	ways	of	practice	in	order	to	generate	fractional	practice.	The	first	(epistemological)	reading	understands	the	intervention	as	a	technique	to	offer	a	better	translation	of	what	it	means	to	practice	the	process	of	knowing.	The	second	(fractional)	reading	understands	the	intervention	as	enacting	a	controversy.	Intervention	in	the	first	story	is	still	about	the	resolution	of	the	controversy	into	a	singular	metaphysical	‘solution’	(and	the	bracketing	of	multiplicity),	but	in	the	second	story	the	focus	of	the	intervention	is	its	interference	with	other	practices,	expressed	as	controversies.	The	second	story	is	“a	philosophical	shift	in	which	knowledge	is	no	longer	treated	primarily	as	referential,	as	a	set	of	statements	about	reality,	but	as	a	practice	that	interferes	with	other	practices”	and	which	“therefore	participates	in	reality”	(Mol,	2002,	pp.	152-3,	emphasis	in	original).	Practicing	fractionality	means	the	enactment	of	an	ontological	politics,	which	can	be	understood	as	an	“interference	in	the	conditions	of	possibility	for	the	kinds	of	things	that	
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might	exist	in	the	world”	(Law,	2002,	p.	198).	It	describes	a	world	where	appeals	to	some	‘out-there’	reality	as	arbiter	of	truth	have	been	replaced	by	centring	logics	that	are	“not	given	in	the	order	of	things,	but	needs	to	be	established”	(Mol,	2002,	p.	177).	And	that	includes	practicing	a	fractional	metaphysics	as	an	interference	on	epistemological	practices.	
THE	FRACTIONAL	NATURE	OF	FRACTIONALITY:	ENCOUNTERING	
FRACTIONALITY’S	NON-RELATIONAL	
Law	and	Lin	(2010)	discuss	a	2009	academic	conference	in	Taiwain	organised	by	the	latter	author	where	Law	spoke	at	a	seminar	in	which	he	outlined	much	of	the	theory	related	to	fractionality	discussed	in	this	thesis.	This	included	arguing	for	ways	of	“juxtaposing	different	narratives	in	ways	that	resist	coherence	and	instead	enact	non-coherence	or	‘mess’	”	(pp.	138-9)	as	opposed	to	the	“smooth	narratives	common	in	social	science”	(p.	138).	However,	many	of	the	participants	in	the	seminar	were	“not	completely	convinced	by	Law's	position”	(p.	139).	Indeed,	the	suggestion	was	made	by	some	of	the	participants	that	what	Taiwan	needed	was	not	to	make	visible	the	incoherence	of	juxtaposed	narratives,	which	was	already	visible	enough,	but	the	coherence	promised	by	Western	modernisation.	Law	became	“disconcerted”	because	he	was	being	told:	“your	contexted	metaphysics	don’t	work	here”	(p.	141).		
For	Law	this	disconcertment	was	experienced	as	a	bodily	sensation	that	Law	and	Lin	interpret,	after	Helen	Verran,	as	“disjunction”	that	serves	to	highlight	“when	radically	different	metaphysics	intersect”	(Law	&	Lin,	2010,	p.	141).	It	revealed	Law	“was	talking	to	a	Taiwanese	audience	as	if	the	need	for	a	messy	method	was	a	decontextualized	truth”,	an	interpretive	omnipotence	that	became	challenged	when	it	encountered	its	non-relational	in	the	dissidence	of	the	objects	that	would	not	dance	to	its	metaphysical	tune	(Law	&	Lin,	2017a,	p.	215).	“To	put	it	mildly,	this	was	uncomfortable”	(p.	215).	Instead,	in	his	talk	about	ontological	politics	Law	was	himself	engaged	in	an	ontological	
politics,	his	presentation	constituting	a	practice	that	interfered	on	other	practices,	in	a	fractional	way,	with	all	of	the	controversy	this	involves.1	
																																								 																					
1	Law	and	Lin	(2017a)	argue	that	this	misrecognition	extends	beyond	Law’s	personal	example,	suggesting	that	whilst	science	and	technology	studies	(the	discipline	within	which	much	of	the	theory	of	fractionality	has	been	produced)	has	developed	an	awareness	of	the	situated	nature	of	knowing	and	how	displacement	to	other	situations	produces	controversy,	“what	it	has	not	quite	brought	into	focus	is	the	way	in	which	its	character	as	a	discipline	remains	a	creature	of	place	and	time”	(p.	222).	This	is	not	a	novel	lesson,	however.	An	influential	paper	by	Lee	and	Brown	(1994)	highlighted	how	actor-network	theory	(ANT)	generated	an	interpretive	omnipotence	(“a	closure”)	that	bracketed	its	placement	within	a	hegemonic	discourse	of	liberal	democracy	establishing	ANT’s	“radical	fairness”	as	a	rhetorical	technique	that	made	it	“the	only	fully	qualified	speaker”	(p.	780).	
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The	concept	of	an	ontological	politics	means	that	a	choice1	between	a	fractional	metaphysics	and	an	epistemological	metaphysics,	can	still	be	made	–	“open	endings	do	not	imply	immobilization”	(Mol,	2002,	p.	184)	–	but	that	the	choice	of	a	fractional	metaphysics	is	enacted	in	fractional	conditions	of	possibility	where	choice	means	interfering	with	other	practices	in	a	controversy.	A	commitment	to	fractionality	as	a	better	way	of	knowing	involves	contextualising	even	fractionality	as	fractional.	Not	keeping	this	in	mind	means	wielding	‘fractionality’	as	an	intervention	that	is	anything	but	fractional.	
ON	THE	GOOD	OF	CHOOSING	TO	BE	FRACTIONAL	
The	section	above	notes	that	the	fractional	intervention	proposed	by	this	thesis	is	a	political	goal	because	fractionality	is	regarded	as	a	better	metaphysics	than	epistemology.	It	is	‘better’	insofar	as	it	permits	an	absent-present	ontology	of	pain	experience	to	be	made	fully	visible	and	accepted	rather	than	unconvincingly	masked	in	a	translational	model	that	subsequently	produces	a	paradox	of	representation.	This	applies	more	widely	than	a	methodological	problem	of	representing	pain	experience	in	social	science,	however.	Chapter	2	noted	how	chronic	pain	sufferers	face	an	existential	paradox	in	trying	to	locate	their	experience	of	pain	to	an	entity	that	will	not	be	named.	This	thesis	also	highlighted	how	the	methodological	problem	of	representation	extends	to	knowing	in	general,	a	practice	that	(at	least	in	the	West)	is	distinctly	epistemological	(see	Chapter	3).	When	this	is	inevitably	applied	to	knowing	one’s	own	lived	experience,	this	creates	an	existential	crisis	when	the	interpretive	omnipotence	of	the	object	of	one’s	being	is	challenged	by	the	manifestation	of	its	non-relational.	
Indeed,	for	Jacques	Lacan	the	child	comes	to	identify	its	being	with	the	image	seen	in	the	mirror,	a	fundamental	misrecognition	or	ignorance	(méconnaissance)	(Felluga,	2011b)	realised	in	a	powerful	horror	when	the	boundary	between	this	ideal	ego	and	the	world	around	it	breaks	down	in	moments	Julia	Kristeva	terms	abject,	such	as	the	image	of	a	corpse	that	connects	both	the	life	of	this	idealised	formulation	of	being	and	the	death	of	the	rotting	flesh	constituting	it	(Felluga,	2011a)	(see	also	Chapter	10).	
																																								 																					
1	Mol	(2002)	argues	that	“choice”	is	an	“ill-suited	term	for	articulating”	what	it	means	to	enact	reality	in	one	way	or	another	since	it	might	imply	that	this	‘choice’	ignores	the	“interdependence	between	different	versions”	(p.	178)	by	simply	selecting	one	and	bracketing	others.	Moreover,	it	might	imply	that	there	is	some	entity	“to	stand	outside	or	above	them,	able	to	master	them	or	choose	between	them”	(p.	181).	This	is	to	understand	‘choice’	epistemologically	rather	than	fractionally.	But	choice	in	ontological	politics	is	a	practice	of	choosing	–	“[a]ction,	like	everything	else,	is	enacted	too”	(p.	181).	Here	a	‘choice’	means	to	interfere	in	a	particular	way	on	other	practices,	involving	the	emergence	of	controversies	rather	than	their	resolution.	
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Methods	like	those	in	integrative	paradigm	interview	research	that	produce	narratives	of	lived	experience	engage	in	the	enactment	of	such	alienating	entities,	where	“the	more	you	recall,	retell,	narrate	yourself,	the	further	you	risk	moving	away	from	accurate	self-understanding,	from	the	truth1	of	your	being”	(Strawson,	2004,	p.	447).	Fractionality	offers	not	only	a	logical	solution	to	the	crisis	of	representation,	but	to	an	existential	crisis	resulting	from	the	misattribution	of	being	to	the	products	of	epistemological	methods.	Developing	a	fractional	intervention	that	might	be	used	in	an	ontological	politics	related	to	knowing	the	lived	experience	of	pain	in	social	science	thus	has	wider	significance	in	promoting	fractional	subjectivities	as	part	of	a	wider	post-epistemological	project	that	has	important	implications	for	what	it	means	to	be.	
We	can	now	turn	to	explore	one	particular	technique	that	can	be	practiced	as	an	intervention	on	epistemological	ways	of	practice.	
AFFIRMING	THE	NON-RELATIONAL	
PINBOARDS	AS	INTERFERENCE	
John	Law’s	(2002,	2006)	concept	of	the	pinboard	is	a	way	of	knowing	that	is	designed	to	constitute	an	interference	on	epistemological	conditions	of	possibility.	Chapter	5	discussed	how	(in	Euro-American	culture)	objects	are	usually	accounted	for	as	arborescences,	which	are	tree-like	structures	that	enact	a	continuity	between	“a	project	beginning	and	a	project	end”	(2002,	p.	183).	Constructing	an	arborescence	means	“enacting	a	singular	project	by	effacing	the	productive	interferences	of	[…]	multiplicity”	(p.	185),	to	distribute	multiplicity	amongst	singularities	in	space	and	time,	which	arise	as	“arborescent	effects”	(p.	184).	By	contrast,	the	pinboard’s	“logic”	is	“one	of	juxtaposition”	(p.	189).	At	its	most	literal	an	actual	pinboard	of	bits	of	paper	pinned	to	a	corkboard	has	value	for	our	political	goal	of	intervening	on	arborescences	because	“these	bits	of	paper,	these	postings	[…]	exist	together	on	the	same	surface	[at	the	same	time]	and	may	expose	themselves	without	the	necessity	of	a	single	order”	(p.	189).	The	pinboard	acknowledges	that	these	parts	“may	make	links	with	each	other	or	overlap.	[…]	But	this	is	a	logic	that	also	supposes	that	they	do	not,	except	coincidentally,	belong	to	one	another	as	part	of	a	single,	larger	whole”	(p.	189).	Indeed,	reflecting	the	fractional	nature	of	knowing,	a	pinboard	is	not	solely	focussed	on	singularity	nor	the	“postmodern”	style	that	is	“a	celebration	of	fragmentation,	the	breaking	of	a	modernist	whole”	(p.	191).	The	“bits	and	pieces”	are	“partially	connected”	but	“they	are	
																																								 																					
1	‘Truth’	being	understood	as	a	competent	awareness	of	what	being	is	practiced	as	when	we	try	to	narrate	it	(an	absent-present	ontology)	rather	than	an	‘out-there’	reality	to	get	in	touch	with.	
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partially	disconnected	as	well”	(2006,	p.	10,	emphasis	in	original).	The	pinboard	involves	“working	in	a	more	or	less	broken	or	juxtapositionary	mode”	(2002,	p.	192).	Indeed,	in	Craige’s	(2015)	explication	and	evaluation	of	the	pinboard	as	a	methodological	technique	he	argues	that	“the	notion	of	‘constant	contrast’	is	constructed	as	[its…]	core	analytic	strategy”	(p.	221).	Crucially,	the	logic	of	the	pinboard	means	there	is	a	“refusal	to	reduce”	(Law,	2006,	p.	20),	thus	constituting	the	irreducible	nature	of	difference	that	characterises	fractionality.	Differences	cannot	be	distributed	into	spatiotemporal	singularities	since	multiples	are	held	in	the	same	space	at	the	same	time	on	the	pinboard.	The	logic	of	the	pinboard	as	an	intervention	is	transferable	from	bits	of	paper	pinned	on	a	board	of	cork.	Thus,	Law	(2006)	contends	that	a	‘pinboard’	can	exist	as:	
[…]	public	notice	boards	(but	no	censorship);	collections	of	artefacts	(again	no	censorship);	bits	and	pieces	lying	around	in	a	landscape;	the	rooms	in	a	house;	streaming	images	across	a	screen;	multiple	computer	windows;	CDs	[…];	linked	electronic	files	[…];	exhibitions;	Heterogeneous	meetings	[…];	and	then,	very	prosaically,	the	making	of	pinboards.	(p.	10)	The	pinboard	can	be	practiced	in	a	way	that	produces	many	different	forms,	but	all	are	“surfaces	of	tense	juxtaposition”	(p.	10,	emphasis	in	original).	Yet	Craige	(2015)	highlights	how	the	pinboard	“is	a	method	which	has	seen	very	little	use”	(p.	2).	Indeed,	he	found	that	by	“examining	the	415	citations	of	Aircraft	Stories	[(Law,	2002	–	the	first	discussion	of	the	pinboard	method)]	listed	by	Google	Scholar,	only	one	(Law,	2006)	explicitly	refers	to	and	deploys	a	pinboard	account”	(Craige,	2015,	p.	50,	emphasis	in	original).1	In	part	this	can	be	attributed	to	the	fact	that,	as	Craige	himself	notes,	the	principles	of	the	pinboard	as	a	precise	method	are	not	explicitly	established	by	Law	(2002,	2006).	Indeed,	exploring	how	to	practice	the	pinboard	is	itself	the	intended	primary	contribution	of	Craige’s	(2015)	study.	In	this	vein	Craige	notes	how	he	largely	relied	on	how	Law	practiced	the	pinboard	in	Aircraft	
Stories	in	order	to	derive	three	principles	for	its	enactment:	(1)	the	use	of	“points	of	interest”,	which	are	“exhibits	derived	directly	from	source	material,	or	may	be	short	stories	or	narratives	that	have	been	synthesised	from	that	material	instead”,	(2)	“explicating	these	points	of	interest	and	relating	them	to	one	another	on	a	‘flat’	surface”	as	opposed	to	distributing	them	amongst	the	singularities	of	a	hierarchy,	and	(3)	“a	literal	pinboard	is	used	as	a	means	of	exploring	the	data	and	juxtaposing	different	elements”	(p.	53).	Through	constructing	several	pinboards	about	early	telemedicine	in	the	United	States	according	to	these	principles,	Craige	concludes	that	“the	notion	of	constant	contrast	can	replace	these	principles	as	the	central	component	of	the	pinboard	method”	(p.	221,	my	emphasis).																																									 																					
1	In	addition,	Roberts	(2010)	explicitly	refers	to	and	deploys	Law’s	concept	of	the	pinboard	to	make	visible	the	juxtapositions	apparent	in	what	it	means	to	know	early	puberty	(the	paper	references	Law’s	2006	paper	but	not	Aircraft	Stories).	
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Constant	contrast	(juxtaposition)	collapses	the	first	two	principles	since	(1)	points	of	interest	that	(2)	contrast	on	a	‘flat’	surface	are	both	necessary	assumptions	of	a	constant	contrast	anyway,	to	be	found	in	any	standard	analytical	technique	in	social	science.	Moreover,	Craige	found	that	(3)	the	use	of	a	literal	pinboard	was	either	not	necessary	because	juxtaposition	was	already	permitted	from	existing	forms	of	representation	(such	as	a	list	of	thematic	codes)	or	was	not	practical.	Practicality	is	important	in	two	senses.	Firstly,	Craige	found	the	physical	space	required	to	construct	a	literal	pinboard	was	“prohibitive”,	and	that	accessing	the	material	within	this	construction	for	the	write-up	was	difficult	(p.	220).	But	perhaps	more	importantly,	Craige	noted	that	the	practice	of	writing-up	the	pinboard	jarred	with	its	literal	solidification	as	a	product	of	a	collection	of	papers	that	he	had	methodically	placed	across	his	floor.	He	found	that	whilst	he	had	completed	the	literal	pinboard	“the	analytical	work	went	on	even	as	the	Chapters	[constituting	the	write-up	of	each	of	his	pinboards]	were	being	written”	(p.	220).	Whilst	surfaces	of	tense	juxtaposition	can	be	made	visible	and	thus	provide	an	interference	on	arborescent	narratives,	we	should	remember	that	these	surface	are	effects	(products)	of	the	process	of	juxtaposing:	as	something	that	is	enacted.	The	pinboard	“performs	objects,	more	overtly,	as	collages	or	pastiches,	as	multiplicities	or	fractionalities	that	escape	the	possibilities	of	singular	narrative”	(Law,	2002,	p.	198,	my	emphasis).	Whilst	retaining	the	importance	of	surfaces	of	juxtaposition,	to	understand	the	pinboard	further	we	need	to	introduce	a	further	complexity:	to	consider	it	as	constituted	in	a	set	of	juxtapositionary	
practices.	This	is	perhaps	best	described	in	Law’s	(2004)	concept	of	a	method	assemblage.	
METHOD	ASSEMBLAGES:	PINBOARD	PROCESSES	
A	method	assemblage	can	be	defined	as	the	process	of	centring	discussed	by	Harrison	(2010)	(see	previous	chapter),	where	the	non-relational	category	of	‘voice’	or	‘noise’	as	a	
flaw	in	need	of	repair	is	repaired	into	‘speech’.	However,	Law	(2004)	adds	to	this	by	articulating	what	happens	in	this	reparative	process	between	things	that	are	made	manifest	and	things	that	are	bracketed.	A	method	assemblage	distributes	things	amongst	three	categories.	The	first	category	is	that	which	is	made	present.	These	are	“	‘in-here’	statements,	data	or	depictions”:	representations	or	signifiers	(p.	42).	Second,	these	forms	of	presence	‘point	to’	manifest	absences,	which	are	“	‘out-there’	realities	reflected	in	those	in-here	statements”	(p.	42).	These	are	“absent,	but	recognised	as	relevant	to,	or	represented	in,	presence”	(p.	157).	These	are	absences	that	are	made	knowable,	and	are	thus	referred	to	as	
manifest.	They	might	be	absent	for	the	practical	reason	that	“there	is	not	enough	room	for	everything”	inside	presence,	and	so	some	black-boxing	has	to	occur:	“present	complexity	is	
self-limiting”	(2002,	p.	95,	emphasis	in	original).	Or	there	might	be	“material	absence”	(p.	97,	emphasis	in	original),	which	refers	to	things	that	cannot	be	brought	into	presence	because	it	
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is	materially	impossible	rather	than	just	impractical,	such	as	when	a	number	in	an	equation	for	the	maximum	G-force	for	a	planned	fighter	jet	points	towards	an	air	crew’s	fear	and	nausea:	“[t]here	is	no	room	for	sweat	in	formalisms”	(p.	98).	This	relationship	between	presence	and	manifest	absence	is	what	Law	(2002)	refers	to	as	heterogeneities,	and	he	offers	descriptions	of	many	versions	of	the	relationship	other	than	the	two	just	noted.	Presence	and	manifest	absence	constitute	one	another,	with	manifest	absence	being	“the	necessary	Other	to	presence,	which	is	enacted	along	with	[presence],	is	constituted	with	it,	and	helps	to	constitute	it”	(2004,	p.	157).	Manifest	absence	might	also	be	referred	to	as	that	which	is	signified,	forming	with	the	signifier	the	two	parts	of	a	Saussurean	sign.	The	third	category	of	‘stuff’	is	what	Law	(2004)	refers	to	as	absence	as	Otherness	(or	sometimes	simply	‘Otherness’).	Whilst	absence-as-Otherness	is	“necessary	to	presence”,	it	is	not	made	manifest:	“it	disappears”	(p.	85).	This	might	be	because	it	is	uninteresting	with	regard	to	what	is	being	made	manifest	(such	as	the	power	supply	necessary	for	a	social	scientist	to	make	manifest	their	theory	on	their	computer	screen).	But	it	might	also	be	because	“what	is	being	brought	to	presence	and	manifest	absence	cannot	be	sustained	unless	it	is	Othered”	(p.	85).	It	is	through	distributing	things	into	absence-as-Otherness	that	multiplicity	can	be	made	to	disappear.	Another	term	for	‘bracketing’,	epistemological	centring	processes	rely	heavily	on	absence-as-Otherness	in	order	to	enact	singularity.1	Indeed,	in	a	method	assemblage	“what	is	being	made	and	gathered	is	in	a	mediated	relation	with	whatever	is	absent,	manifesting	a	part	while	Othering	most	of	it”	(p.	146).	Method	assemblages	“manifest	realities/signals	on	the	one	hand,	and	generate	non-realities/silences	and	Otherness	on	the	other”	(p.	113).	A	method	assemblage	constructs	a	particular	optical	position	(as	an	effect	or	product)	where	what	is	absent-as-Otherness	cannot	be	observed.	The	pinboard,	by	comparison,	construct	its	own	particular	optical	position	(also	as	an	effect	or	product)	where	the	construction	processes	of	a	method	assemblage	are	made	fully	visible.	From	the	vantage	point	of	the	pinboard	what	is	absent-as-Otherness	is	made	visible	and	can	be	thrust	into	juxtaposition	with	what	is	made	manifest,	whilst	at	the	same	time	retaining	the	original	centring	logic.	In	other	words,	absence-as-Otherness	is	visible	but	can	still	be	distinguished	from	that	which	a	method	assemblage	makes	manifest.	The	pinboard,	fractional	as	it	is,	does	not	dispense	with	centring,	but	simply	contextualises	it.	The	pinboard,	like	allegory	(see	Chapter	4),	thus	“makes	manifest	what	is	otherwise	invisible.	It	extends	the	fields	of	visibility”	(p.	90).																																									 																					
1	Law	(2011)	further	distinguishes	absence	as	Otherness	into	“the	practical”,	which	includes	“endless	ramifications”	of	“material	and	social”	things	practically	necessary	to	sustain	a	practice	of	knowing,	and	“the	metaphysical”,	which	is	the	“implicit	metaphysical	work”	done	in	establishing	fundamental	assumptions	within	the	knowledge	being	made	present	(p.	9,	emphasis	in	original).	For	Law,	the	metaphysics	being	done	straddles	explicity	(presence	and	manifest	absence)	and	the	implicity	of	Otherness,	and	it	is	the	latter	element	that	sustains	“the	idea	that	there	is	a	single	reality”	(p.	10).	
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What	are	simply	absent-presences	that	are	fitted	into	the	structure	of	some	centred	entity	from	the	vantage	point	created	by	a	method	assemblage,	or	what	Latour	(2005)	terms	
intermediaries	(discussed	later	in	the	chapter),	have	an	extra	property	imbued	upon	them	from	the	vantage	point	created	by	the	pinboard.	In	addition	to	serving	to	form	the	structure	of	a	centred	entity	they	are	also	observed	to	have	absences	that	are	impossible	to	be	brought	into	singularity	with	that	made	manifest.	This	is	what	Latour	terms	mediators.	
METHOD	ASSEMBLAGES	AND	THE	INTERVIEW	
We	might	read	Briggs	(2007)	as	discussing	the	juxtapositionary	practices	of	method	assemblages,	and	the	Othering	processes	involved	to	conceal	juxtapostion,	in	terms	of	the	(anthropological)	interview	(even	if	he	does	not	make	explicit	reference	to	Law’s,	2004,	concept).	Briggs	(2007)	contends	that	the	interview	is	a	site	of	intersection	between	the	dominant	communicable	cartographies	of	interviewing	in	social	science	(see	Chapter	6)	and	other	cartographies:	where	“anthropological	modes	of	knowledge	production	have	increasingly	intersected”	with	“other	forms	of	knowledge	making	and	interpretive	practices”	(p.	561).	Through	the	processes	of	being	“continually	decontextualized	and	recontextualized”,	of	being	“extracted	from	certain	texts,	genres,	contexts,	and	social	worlds	and	inserted	in	others”	the	discourse	of	the	interview	becomes	a	juxtaposition	between	these	cartographies,	consisting	of	“both	links	and	
gaps”	between	them	(p.	562,	emphasis	in	original).	
Briggs	regards	these	‘gaps’	as	“points	at	which	people’s	construal	of	the	pragmatics	of	interviewing	conflicts	with	ideological	projections	of	the	process”,	or	perhaps	more	precisely,	a	controversy	where	the	“common	communicative	ideologies”	of	interviewing	expect	a	link	where	there	is	a	gap	(p.	562).	As	such,	the	practice	of	“received	communicable	understandings	of	interviews”	(p.	561)	involves	“constant	metapragmatic	work	to	construe	intertextual	and	social	relations	as	links	and	to	
suppress	awareness	of	gaps	throughout	the	course	of	the	research”	(p.	563,	my	emphasis).	Where	they	do	become	visible	(as	a	controversy)	they	are	regarded	as	“technical	or	social	failures	to	link	texts”	(p.	562).	Indeed,	“[m]ethodological	cookbooks	in	anthropology,	other	social	sciences,	and	professional	fields	envision	any	gaps	that	become	visible	as	problems	to	be	identified	and	eliminated”	(p.	563).	
Briggs	thus	argues	that	conventional	communicable	cartographies	of	interviewing,	like	method	assemblages,	involve	practices	that	their	centred	vantage	point	cannot	account	for,	and	which	therefore	need	Othering	into	absence	(or	else	resolved	as	a	means-to-an-end):	“the	pragmatics	of	interviewing	involve	complexities	that	are	not	easily	contained	by	representations	based	on	basic	and	common	communicative	ideologies”	(p.	562).	
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The	processes	of	a	method	assemblage	should	not	be	conceived	of	as	existing	‘out-there’.	Like	everything,	they	are	enacted	in	practice.	And	the	enactment	of	the	pinboard	is	the	process	of	observing	method	assemblages	crafting	realities	and	non-realities.	And	observing	too	is	something	that	is	enacted.	Indeed,	“reality	does	not	precede	the	mundane	practices	in	which	we	interact	with	it,	but	is	rather	shaped	within	these	practices”	(Mol,	1999,	p.	75).	To	complete	our	understanding	of	the	pinboard	we	need	to	fully	introduce	the	enactment	of	
observing	method	assemblages,	to	enact	an	empiricism,	and	thus	combine	it	with	the	central	insight	developed	in	the	previous	chapters:	that	attention	to	centring	practices	introduces	the	complementary	decentring	movement	required	of	fractionality.	
EMPIRICISM	(I):	CONSTRUCTING	NAIVETY	
To	enact	an	object	as	a	pinboard	means	to	observe	a	method	assemblage	in	action.	It	means	to	firstly	observe	the	centring	processes	of	(in	the	case	of	this	thesis	and	the	lived	experience	of	pain)	interview	research	on	interview	data.	Centring	comes	first	because	of	an	“inescapability	of	interpretation”	(Caputo,	2007,	p.	72).	If	the	metaphysics	of	fractionality	tells	us	that	the	world	is	made	up	of	“wicked	problems”	constituting	“a	diagnosis	of	the	multiplicity,	heterogeneity	and	politically-contestable	character	of	contemporary	attempts	at	ordering	fragilities	of	all	kinds”	that	cannot	be	resolved	into	the	singularity	of	a	solution	(Law,	2014,	p.	8),	then	it	also	tells	us	that	“the	only	way	of	handling	wicked	problems	is	to	
treat	them	as	if	they	were	benign”	(p.	10,	emphasis	in	original).	Centring	is	the	only	way	to	make	sense	of	things	for	the	observer	because	it	“is	simply	not	possible	to	handle	the	indefinite	extension”	associated	with	flux	(pp.	10-11).	The	first	section	of	this	chapter	established	that	observing	is	not	a	passive	act	of	letting	reality	come	through,	but	that	we	must	enact	observation.	Law	(2002)	suggests	that	this	begins	in	“the	creation	of	the	naive	reader”	(p.	32),	of	the	“initial	assumption	of	naïveté	[as]	a	methodological	position”	(p.	15).	Law	considers	naivety	to	mean	“throwing	taken	for	granted	assumptions	into	relief”	(p.	206).	The	‘relief’	refers	to	the	vantage	point	of	the	pinboard,	which	extends	the	field	of	vision	of	the	taken-for-granted	assumptions	that	construct	centred	vantage	points	of	interpretive	omnipotence	through	Othering.	But	this	explanation	says	more	about	the	aim	of	naivety	as	a	methodological	position	than	how	we	can	construct	it.	Naivety	might	be	understood	as	the	fostering	of	an	attitude	that	reality	
might	be	otherwise,	with	the	theory	of	a	fractional	metaphysics	serving	to	prime	an	attitude	of	imagination	that	is	able	to	resist	the	seduction	into	interpretive	omnipotence	offered	by	method	assemblages.	However,	as	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter,	an	attitude	focussing	on	the	possibility	of	the	non-relational	is	an	epistemological	appropriation	since	it	constitutes	a	distribution	of	multiplicity	into	singularities	of	time.	Instead,	the	type	of	naivety	we	are	trying	to	get	at	is	best	given	in	its	dictionary	definition:	“[l]ack	of	experience,	
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wisdom,	or	judgement”	(Naive,	n.d.,	my	emphasis).	The	naive	reader	we	are	constructing	has	nothing	to	do	with	being	imaginative	or	open	to	possibility	but	instead	being	led	‘naively’	by	some	actuality	of	processes	without	using	some	already-established	order	to	judge	whether	or	not	it	is	a	‘wise’	choice	to	be	led.	To	be	‘naive’	is	often	regarded	as	undesirable,	as	evidenced	in	a	dictionary	example	usage:	“the	rather	naive	young	man	had	been	totally	misled”	(Naive,	n.d.,	emphasis	in	original).	But	this	reflects	the	hegemony	of	an	epistemological	way	of	knowing	that	not	only	seeks	to	establish	singularity,	but	has	already	decided	the	nature	of	that	singularity	beforehand,	as	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter.	This	is	also	the	argument	made	by	Latour	(2005),	who	contends	that	epistemological	ways	of	doing	social	science	(what	he	terms	the	sociology	of	
the	social)	substitute	what	they	observe	for	“the	well-known	repertoire	of	the	social	which	is	supposed	to	be	hidden	behind	it”	(p.	49).	In	the	sociology	of	the	social,	things	simply	become	
intermediaries	for	the	structures	of	pre-comprehension.	An	intermediary	“transport[s…]	faithfully	some	social	meaning”	(p.	40)	originating	in	an	anterior	‘out-thereness’,	and	thus	“nothing	will	be	present	in	the	effect	that	has	not	been	in	the	cause”	(p.	58).		Instead,	being	‘naive’	means	to	follow	what	is	without	pre-judgement,	to	‘go	with	the	flow’	of	what	is,	to	be	empirical,	and	to	start	from	a	position	of	total	uncertainty.	Put	another	way,	being	naive	means	“to	learn	how	to	feed	off	uncertainties,	instead	of	deciding	in	advance	what	the	furniture	of	the	world	should	look	like”	(p.	115).	In	addition	to	many	other	example	usages	provided	by	Oxford	Dictionaries	in	which	the	word	‘naive’	is	presented	as	an	undesirable	trait,	it	also	tells	us	that	the	word	has	a	Latin	root	(nativus)	that	means	native	(Naive,	n.d.).	It	is	in	this	sense	that	Latour	(2005)	proposes	that	sociologists	“follow	the	natives,	no	matter	which	metaphysical	imbroglios	they	lead	us	into”	(p.	62).	But	who	are	the	natives?	If	interpretation	is	inescapable	then	all	attempts	to	know	will	involve	the	centring	efforts	of	a	method	assemblage	as	it	makes	things	manifest	and	absent-as-Otherness.	It	is	the	very	pre-formatted	structures	constituting	a	“hinterland”	(Law,	2004,	p.	28)	or	“communicable	cartographies”	(Briggs,	2007,	p.	551)	that	informs	the	crafting	of	intermediaries	in	method	assemblages	that	actually	provide	the	content	of	what	is	that	presents	itself	to	the	naive	reader.	Being	naive	thus	means	we	are	naively	led	by	centring	processes	without	judging	them.	Here	the	“actors	are	allowed	to	unfold	their	own	differing	cosmos,	no	matter	how	counter-intuitive	they	appear”	(Latour,	2005,	p.	23).	But	being	led	by	centring	processes	does	not	mean	that	a	naive	reader	must	be	led	to	a	method	assemblage’s	vantage	point	of	interpretive	omnipotence.	For	to	do	so	relies	on	resolving	controversies	in	the	centring	process,	of	Othering	into	absence	multiplicity	as	a	method	assemblage	creates	chains	of	intermediaries.	Instead,	a	naive	reader	so	closely	follows	the	natives	that	they	do	not	miss	
104	
the	subtle	Othering	practices	that	enable	the	establishment	of	centred	singularity.	Indeed,	a	naive	reader	is	so	nativised	that	they	know	the	native	better	than	the	native	claims	to	know	itself.1	Rather	than	being	led	away	from	objects	that	object	(Latour,	2005)	to	the	centring	logic	of	the	particular	method	assemblage,	here	the	naive	reader	also	listens	to	these	natives	too,	and	the	controversy	that	occurs	in	the	objection.	
EMPIRICISM	(II):	THE	(IM)PERFECTIONS	OF	SMALL	MIRACLES	
Law	(2014)	contends	that	the	centred	products	of	method	assemblages	“need	constant	maintenance”	(p.	6)	in	making	things	manifest	and	absent-as-Otherness	to	ensure	coherence.	Indeed,	“anything	we	put	together	is	profoundly	fragile”	(p.	10,	emphasis	in	original).	Things	that	hold	together	are	“miracles”	(p.	7).	Because	practices	are	ongoing	there	is	always	the	possibility	of	interferences	that	need	to	be	resolved	by	absenting	things	into	Otherness.	And	these	interferences	become	apparent	when	we	naively	follow	the	natives.	Discussing	‘matters	of	fact’	that	have	established	an	interpretive	omnipotence	through	projecting	its	absence	into	an	absolute	‘out-there’	reality,	Latour	(2005)	notes	that	“the	empirical	multiplicity	of	former	‘natural’	agencies	overflows	the	narrow	boundary	of	matters	of	fact”	(p.	111).	It	has	been	argued	throughout	this	thesis	that	the	epistemological	techniques	to	try	and	resolve	multiplicity	into	singularity	always	fail	upon	a	careful	examination	of	the	practices	of	centring.	When	we	follow	the	objects	involved	in	these	narratives	we	find	they	behave	in	unexpected	ways	that	cannot	be	tamed	by	centring	techniques,	despite	their	best	efforts.	They	reveal	their	non-relational	element	that	can	only	be	comprehended	through	an	awareness	of	the	practice	of	centring,	rather	than	simply	an	awareness	of	the	interpretive	omnipotence	proffered	in	the	product	of	that	centring.	We	suddenly	find	the	existence	of	‘compromise	words’	like	the	elusiveness	of	pain	(see	Chapter	2),	of	a	barely	graspable	absence	(Throop,	2009	–	see	Chapter	4),	and	the	sense	of	indeterminism	in	a	subject	(Gubrium	&	Holstein,	2012	–	see	Chapter	6).	These	are	words	that,	upon	a	closer	examination	than	an	epistemological	reading	offers,	reveal	themselves	to	be	conduits	of	multiplicity	as	well	as	singularity	in	centred	accounts,	but	barely	disguised	as	only	innocuous	singularities	in	a	valiant	but	vain	attempt	to	absent-into-Otherness	their	multiplicity.	Rather	than	intermediaries	serving	as	elements	in	the	(pre-established)	structure	of	a	method	assemblage’s	centring	logic,	the	visibility	of	the	(newly	visible	absented-into-Otherness)	non-relational	offers	an	actuality	of	a	something	else	that	expresses	the																																									 																					
1	The	‘native’	being	a	method	assemblage	that	has	had	to	Other	into	absence	part	of	what	it	has	enacted	in	order	to	produce	singularity.	To	create	its	centered	vantage	point	requires	eliminating	from	view	what	is	a	necessary	part	of	its	construction.	
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multiplicity	of	knowing	the	objects	in	question.	That	is,	an	intermediary	becomes	converted	into	a	mediator	(Latour,	2005).	A	mediator	is	something	that	“make[s]	others	do	unexpected	things”	(p.	106,	emphasis	in	original),	that	objects	to	the	way	in	which	it	is	being	made	to	carry	meaning	by	the	method	assemblage.	“Instead	of	simply	transporting	effects	without	transforming	them,	each	of	the	points	[…]	may	become	a	bifurcation,	an	event”	(p.	128).1	As	this	thesis	has	discussed	in	relation	to	the	insight	of	rhetoric,	once	the	imperfections	have	been	found	out	(the	unbracketing	of	multiplicity),	a	method	assemblage	can	find	new	ways	of	explaining	away	multiplicity:	of	enacting	a	new	epistemological	reading.	As	Latour	notes:	
It’s	precisely	because	it’s	so	difficult	to	maintain	asymmetries,	to	durably	entrench	power	relations,	to	enforce	inequalities,	that	so	much	work	is	being	constantly	devoted	in	shifting	the	weak	and	fast-decaying	ties	to	other	types	of	links.	(p.	66,	emphasis	in	original)	However,	once	we	chart	the	encounter	with	the	non-relational	as	a	mediator,	we	have	an	account	that	crystallises	juxtaposition.	This	contains	the	surface	of	juxtaposition	of	the	logic	of	the	pinboard	because	a	mediator	is	both	necessary	to	the	coherence	of	the	centred	account	made	manifest	yet	also	constitutes	a	conduit	for	the	non-relational	to	interfere	with	it.	It	constitutes	a	surface	for	the	confrontation	between	a	centred	account	and	its	non-relational	element	that	is	both	necessary	to	its	construction	yet	also	impossible	for	the	coherence	of	that	account.	But	what	is	traced	on	this	surface	is	the	account	of	the	process.	This	is	not	simply	the	static	juxtaposition	between	multiples	but	the	juxtaposition	between	(on	the	one	hand)	the	interpretative	omnipotence	transmitted	in	intermediaries	and	(on	the	other)	their	objections	when	they	are	revealed	as	mediators.	This	is	an	interference	expressed	as	“the	increase,	in	the	accounts,	of	the	relative	share	of	mediators	over	
intermediaries”	(p.	61,	emphasis	in	original).	We	can	thus	state	that	a	method	for	intervening	on	an	epistemological	way	of	representing	the	lived	experience	of	pain	is	to	provide	an	account	of	the	enactment	of	a	pinboard	in	knowing	such	lived	experience,	which	is	to	say	an	account	of	the	observation	of	a	method	assemblage	that	naively	leads	a	reader	towards	controversies.	As	the	logic	of	the	pinboard	is	expressed	through	charting	the	observations	of	a	method	assemblage,	this	is	a	method	based	very	simply	on	tracing	the	enactment	of	empiricism:	of	following	the	natives.	Indeed,	the	“name	of	the	game	is	to	get	back	to	empiricism”	(p.	146).	
																																								 																					
1	The	transportation	of	transformations	between	mediators	(which	may	then	be	traced)	is	given	the	technical	term	‘translation’	within	actor-network	theory	and	wider	STS	(Latour,	2005;	Latour	&	Law,	n.d.).	This	should	not	be	confused	with	the	cultural	anthropological	use	of	the	word	‘translation’	introduced	in	Chapter	3	and	used	throughout	this	thesis.	The	STS	use	of	‘translation’	is	discussed	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	14.	
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EMPIRICISM	(III):	RESISTANCE	TO	COSMOLOGY	
The	above	argument	contends	that	a	naive	reader,	in	paying	careful	attention	to	what	is	being	done	(being	empirical),	is	able	to	observe	both	the	centring	logic	of	a	method	assemblage	and	the	moments	of	overflow.	But	an	additional	argument	is	that	the	centring	logic	is	so	seductive	that	an	additional	methodological	technique	is	required	to	be	fully	empirical:	the	means	to	resist	the	tendency	for	overflow	to	be	bracketed	from	view.	Being	naive	means	to	be	led	by	the	centring	logic	of	a	method	assemblage,	but	not	led	far	enough	that	it	is	able	to	bracket	the	non-relational	from	our	field	of	vision.	Thus,	Law	and	Lien	(2012)	argue	that	researchers	“attend	to	the	textures	on	the	margins”	(p.	373)	in	order	to	recover	multiplicity	repressed	by	the	undisturbed	assumption	in	Western	thought	(present	since	the	ancient	Greeks)	that	“the	cosmos	is	endowed	with	a	single	order”	(p.	364).	Akin	to	a	form	of	post-colonialism,	this	is	a	choice	to	attend	to	what	is	being	done	at	the	margins	of	the	centred	entity	a	method	assemblage	is	enacting.	Being	aware	of	the	boundaries	and	what	may	lie	outside	of	them	(the	non-relational)	means	an	intimate	familiarity	with	the	centred	narrative	being	constructed	by	a	method	assemblage.	As	Moreira	(2012)	notes:	“innovation	is	underpinned	by	a	robust	understanding	of	the	fabric	of	[the]	present”	(p.	155).	Such	‘imagination’	“works	on	the	possibilities	enclosed	in	the	present	by	tentatively	exploring	the	consequences	of	the	limits	of	regimes	of	action”	constituting	that	present	(p.	148).	Drawing	on	the	enactment	of	salmon	in	a	fish	farm,	Law	and	Lien	(2012)	argue	that	there	are	3	main	ways	that	“practices	are	productive	around	the	margins”	(p.	372):	the	production	of	“nearly	salmon”	(salmon	that	are	selected	out	and	left	to	die	in	a	tank,	usually	because	they	are	underweight),	“the	failures	in	choreography”	(where	the	ordering	of	the	salmon	in	the	farm	fails	and	things	are	out	of	order),	and	the	presence	of	the	“elusive”	(such	as	salmon	that	can’t	be	seen	when	they	dive	deep	enough,	but	are	nevertheless	there)	(p.	372).	Making	the	choice	to	attend	to	these	boundary	products	constitutes	a	methodological	technique	of	resistance	of	the	controversy	to	the	Othering	techniques	of	a	method	assemblage.	It	can	be	equated	with	Timmermans	and	Tavory’s	(2012)	promotion	of	several	qualitative	research	methods	in	abductive	
analysis1	(such	as	the	constant-comparison	technique	of	grounded	theory)	to	“increase	the	resistance	of	the	phenomenon	to	our	interpretations”	by	thrusting	empirical	findings	up	against	the	centred	account	we	are	trying	to	fit	it	into	(p.	175).		
																																								 																					
1	This	influential	method	is	discussed,	and	ultimately	dismissed	as	a	means	of	fractional	intervention,	in	a	separate	section	at	the	end	of	the	current	chapter.	
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PINBOARDS	AND	LIVED	EXPERIENCE	
The	proposal	that	we	might	apply	the	kind	of	empiricism	discussed	above	to	the	
problem	of	experience	is	not	novel.	Indeed,	in	addressing	“the	problem	of	the	apparent	ineffability	of	embodied	experience”	within	research	in	psychology,	Brown,	Cromby,	Harper,	Johnson,	and	Reavey	(2011,	p.	496)	propose	a	return	to	a	“radical	empiricism”	already	“prefigured”	by	earlier	thinkers	such	as	William	James	(who	coined	the	term)	and	John	Dewey	(p.	511).	Similar	to	the	empiricism	this	thesis	has	discussed,	this	is	characterised	by	a	naivety	that	regards	particular	occasions	as	irreducible	to	some	abstract	structure,	requires	a	close	description	of	what	happens	in	that	occasion,	treats	objects	as	relationally	defined	(like	the	chains	of	intermediaries	and	mediators	discussed	above),	and	stresses	the	importance	of	using	existing	concepts	in	order	to	“illuminate”	the	particular	(irreducible)	event	(without	reifying	it	to	a	generalisation)	(which	might	be	regarded	as	a	way	of	being	‘productive	around	the	margins’)	(p.	511).	
As	noted	within	this	chapter,	the	pinboard	as	a	method	is	relatively	underdeveloped	and	underused.	Its	application	to	understanding	lived	experience	is	even	more	new.	None	of	the	four	studies	that	have	explicitly	practiced	the	pinboard	method	(Craige,	2015;	Law,	2002,	2006;	Roberts,	2010)	have	applied	it	as	a	way	of	knowing	lived	experience.	This	is	not	surprising	since	the	pinboard	method	emerged	from	science	and	
technology	studies	and	travelled	through	actor-network	theory	(see	Craige,	2015,	for	a	history	of	the	pinboard’s	emergence),	which	have	not	been	directly	concerned	with	an	understanding	of	human	experience	in	the	same	way	that	the	likes	of	the	integrative	
paradigm	has	(see	Chapter	1).	However,	the	underlying	philosophy	of	the	pinboard,	that	of	fractionality,	shares	with	such	approaches	an	important	appreciation	of	an	absent-present	ontology	of	what	it	means	to	know,	something	that	is	identified	in	this	thesis	as	a	crucial	element	that	arises	in	attempts	to	know	lived	experience.	Indeed,	the	‘hinterlands’	(Law,	2004)	of	both	the	pinboard	and	the	problem	of	experience	can	be	regarded	as	overlapping	as	part	of	a	wider	post-epistemological	project.	
But	most	importantly	for	this	thesis,	the	pinboard	and	the	hinterland	it	brings	offer	the	opportunity	to	readily	operationalise	a	method	to	fractionally	know	lived	experience,	a	practical	intervention	that	has	been	identified	as	lacking	within	the	wider	post-epistemological	project	(as	Chapter	5	discussed).	An	uncertain	cross-fertilisation	combining	fractal	juxtapositions,	method	assemblages,	radical	empiricism,	and	an	absent-present	ontology	of	experience,	it	is	one	that	this	thesis	suggests	is	worth	experimenting	with	as	an	attempt	to	manage	the	problem	of	experience	encountered	in	knowing	lived	experience.	
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CHAPTER	CONCLUSION	
This	chapter	has	explored	the	concept	of	the	‘pinboard’	as	a	means	of	making	visible	the	juxtaposition	of	controversies,	and	holding	them	still,	so	that	it	might	know	the	lived	experience	of	pain	fractionally.	It	has	argued	that	the	choice	to	produce	a	pinboard	both	enacts	and	engages	in	an	ontological	politics	because	fractionality	is	not	some	eternal,	fundamental	aspect	of	what	it	means	to	know	but	something	that	is	itself	enacted	in	the	never-settled	world	of	practice.	The	pinboard	might	be	considered	as	a	surface	on	which	distinct	entities	are	allowed	to	exist	yet	overlap,	creating	juxtapositions	that	express	the	double-vision	of	fractionality.	But	a	pinboard	is	also	something	that	is	practiced,	existing	as	a	set	of	processes	that	can	be	comprehended	in	the	concept	of	a	method	assemblage	and	charted	on	a	surface.	Whilst	a	method	assemblage	constructs	a	restricted	field	of	vision	as	it	makes	things	manifest	whilst	absenting	other	things	into	Otherness,	the	vantage	point	of	the	pinboard	is	able	to	observe	all	the	processes	of	a	method	assemblage,	including	absenting-into-Otherness.	But	this	observation	from	an	extended	vantage	point	is	not	given:	it	must	be	enacted.	It	has	been	argued	that	being	able	to	successfully	observe	a	method	assemblage	starts	with	the	construction	of	a	‘naive’	reader	that	does	not	pre-judge	the	centring	processes	of	a	method	assemblage,	but	is	instead	naively	led	by	it.	This	close	attention	to	the	work	of	a	method	assemblage,	facilitated	by	a	conscious	attention	to	productive	practices	at	the	boundaries	of	the	centred	narrative	being	constructed,	serves	to	uncover	imperfections	that	are	absented	into	Otherness,	revealing	this	absenting	process	and	thus	the	fractional	processes	of	the	method	assemblage.	What	is	absented	into	Otherness	is	shown	as	both	seamlessly	connected	and	necessary	to	that	which	is	made	manifest	whilst	also	being	impossible	to	exist	as	a	singularity	with	it.	Intermediaries	that	simply	transported	the	meaning	of	some	pre-comprehended	structure	in	the	centring	logic	of	the	method	assemblage	are	transformed	by	this	empiricism	into	entities	that	bifurcate	in	their	transportation	of	meaning,	where	there	is	uncertainty	about	where	it	will	be	transported,	where	there	is	controversy.	Charting	the	naive	observation	of	a	method	assemblage	as	it	produces	controversies	is	thus	concluded	as	a	means	to	fractionally	intervene	on	an	epistemological	means	of	knowing	the	lived	experience	of	pain,	with	the	surface	of	the	pinboard	holding	still	the	juxtaposition	between	(on	the	one	hand)	the	singularity	of	a	centring	logic	and	(on	the	other)	the	multiplicity	of	the	decentring	logic	once	the	non-relational	is	made	visible	and	charted	on	this	surface.	The	following	chapter	operationalises	this	method.			
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TWO	READINGS	OF	ABDUCTION	AND	THE	CONTROVERSY	
An	ongoing	theme	throughout	this	thesis	is	the	enactment	of	two	readings	about	the	particular	issue	being	discussed.	One	reading	is	an	arborescence,	whilst	the	other	is	fractional.	The	presentation	of	the	two	readings	can	be	regarded	as	the	enactment	of	the	pinboard	method	(as	this	chapter	has	described	it),	where	the	limited	epistemological	conditions	of	possibility	of	an	arborescence	results	in	overflow	once	the	centring	logic	of	the	first	reading	is	followed,	an	overflow	that	is	made	visible	in	the	second	reading	(i.e.	from	the	vantage	point	of	the	pinboard).	We	should	not	be	surprised	by	this	if	the	process	of	knowing	is	only	ever	the	interference	of	one	form	of	practice	on	another	(Mol,	2002).	But	as	the	first	section	of	this	chapter	noted,	the	overflow	necessary	for	the	production	of	a	second	reading	is	not	some	predestined	law	of	nature,	but	is	itself	a	practice	that	can	be	practiced	otherwise.	Indeed,	it	is	practiced	otherwise	in	the	form	of	the	first	reading,	which	manages	to	absent	into	Otherness	the	overflow	that	problematises	it.		
The	particular	choice	of	method	practiced	thus	makes	a	difference	as	to	whether	the	vantage	point	of	the	method	assemblage	or	the	vantage	point	of	the	pinboard	is	enacted.	Different	methods	are	more	or	less	successful	at	absenting	overflow	into	Otherness,	more	or	less	successful	at	allowing	controversies	to	unfold	and	be	kept	visible.	I	have	argued	that	the	pinboard	method	is	more	successful	than	conventional	methods	in	social	science	at	doing	so	(indeed,	that	conventional	methods	see	controversy	as	anathema),	and	have	done	so	by	enacting	its	principles	as	a	second	reading.	The	pinboard	method	draws	its	theoretical	account	from	a	hinterland	of	actor-network	theory	(ANT)	and	‘post-‘	or	‘after-‘	ANT	research,	an	influential	seam	of	thought	in	social	science	that	has	sought	to	enact	problems	in	conventional	methods:	to	explicitly	enact	controversies.	But	it	is	by	no	means	the	only	such	seam.	
In	2012	Timmermans	and	Tavory	published	an	influential	paper	discussing	abductive	
analysis,	which	they	defined,	following	the	“pragmatist	scientist-philosopher”	Charles	Peirce,	as	“the	creative	production	of	hypotheses	based	on	surprising	evidence”	(Timmermans	&	Tavory	2012,	p.	168).	The	concept	of	the	controversy	is	central	to	abduction,	and	the	method	involved	in	abductive	analysis	discussed	in	the	paper	has	many	similarities	with	the	pinboard	method	as	it	is	outlined	in	the	current	chapter.	Here	I	wish	to	provide	two	readings	of	abduction	from	Timmermans	and	Tavory’s	paper.		
The	first	enacts	fractional	conditions	of	possibility,	and	the	second	epistemological.	I	here	diverge	from	the	standard	practice	of	the	thesis	thus	far	(and	as	outlined	in	the	
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pinboard	method	discussed	in	this	chapter)	of	charting	an	account	of	how	a	‘first’	
epistemological	reading	gives	rise	to	a	‘second’	fractional	reading	that	incorporates	the	first	in	its	extended	field	of	vision.	The	divergence	is	deliberate	as	my	intention	is	not	to	demonstrate	how	an	epistemological	method	enacts	fractional	conditions	of	possibility	it	cannot	account	for,	but	how	a	seemingly	fractional	method	enacts	epistemological	conditions	of	possibility.	In	narratively	switching	from	a	fractional	to	an	epistemological	reading	it	is	my	intention	to	suggest	that	Timmermans	and	Tavory’s	enactment	of	abductive	analysis	in	their	paper	constructs	their	abductive	method	as	less	successful	(as	methods	go)	in	holding	visible	the	juxtaposition	of	controversies,	and	more	successful	in	regarding	it	as	a	means-to-an-end,	in	common	with	the	conventional	Euro-American	methods	that	they	are	positioned	as	a	radical	critique	of.	Indeed,	it	is	for	this	reason	that	I	contend	that	the	concept	of	abductive	analysis	derived	from	their	paper	is	not	a	preferred	method	for	practicing	the	fractional	intervention	this	thesis	aims	for.	
Like	the	pinboard	method	discussed	above,	for	Timmermans	and	Tavory	abductive	analysis	depends	on	the	tension	generated	by	“anomalous	and	surprising	empirical	findings”	(p.	169).	Moreover	it	“rests	on	the	cultivation”	of	such	findings	(p.	169,	my	emphasis).	This	cultivation	comes	in	two	parts.	First,	the	role	of	theory.	The	authors	argue	that	to	cultivate	anomalies	requires	that	the	researcher	have	“an	affinity	and	familiarity	with	broader	theoretical	fields”	(p.	173).	Being	“theoretically	sensitized”	(p.	173)	serves	cultivation	in	two	ways:	it	provides	a	theoretical	base	with	which	empirical	observations	can	be	made	to	contrast	in	an	anomalous	way,	and	it	provides	the	theory	required	to	provide	an	innovative	interpretation	of	the	empirical	observation.	Indeed,	abduction	“depends	on	the	inability	to	frame	findings	in	existing	theoretical	frameworks	as	well	as	on	the	ability	to	modify	and	extend	existing	theories	in	novel	ways”	(p.	173).	
The	second	element	of	cultivation	involves	the	role	of	method.	Methods	such	as	taking	field	notes,	theoretical	sampling,	coding,	and	constant	comparison	can	be	understood	as	a	way	of	“pushing	the	data	against	existing	theories”	(p.	179).	Just	as	a	method	assemblage	attempts	to	absent	into	Otherness	inconvenient	objects	that	cannot	be	made	to	fit	into	singularity,	a	researcher	has	the	“tendency	[…]	to	modify	our	field	experience	retroactively	so	that	it	fits	better	with	our	theoretical	proclivities	or	with	the	kind	of	narrative	we	want	to	tell”	(p.	175).	Method	serves	to	“increase	the	resistance	of	the	phenomenon	to	our	interpretations”	(p.	175)	just	as	objects	are	permitted	to	object	in	Latour’s	(2005)	empiricism,	and	are	encouraged	to	do	in	Law	and	Lien’s	(2012)	exploration	of	boundary	processes.	
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Both	theoretical	sensitisation	and	the	use	of	method	can	be	equated	to	the	empiricism	discussed	in	the	pinboard	method.	Both	‘follow	the	natives’	(Latour,	2005)	to	make	controversies	visible	(cultivate	anomalous	findings).	Indeed,	we	might	liken	the	establishment	of	researchers	as	“informed	theoretical	agnostics”	(Timmermans	&	Tavory,	2012,	p.	169)	to	the	construction	of	the	‘naive	reader’.	In	this	fractional	reading	the	surprising	finding	that	is	cultivated	constitutes	an	interference	caused	as	the	combination	of	a	broad	theoretical	repertoire	combines	(through	interpretation)	with	an	empirical	finding	to	interfere	on	a	pre-established	theoretical	base.	
But	it	is	at	this	moment	that	the	conversion	to	an	epistemological	reading	begins.	For	in	this	new	reading	the	controversy	becomes	backgrounded	as	a	means-to-an-end,	as	a	means	of	establishing	a	new	singularity	at	the	expense	of	an	old	one.	It	is	thus	important	to	“make	the	most	of	the	possibility	of	generative	abduction”	to	achieve	the	“goal	of	constructing	theories”	(p.	181,	my	emphasis).	The	partial	connection	and	disconnection	(Law,	2006)	of	the	controversy	is	now	transformed	from	a	knowing-in-tension	to	making	a	digital	switch	from	one	isolated	territory	to	another	(an	old	theory	versus	a	new	one).	This	either/or	logic	separating	singularities	of	old	versus	new	product	is	found	in	how	‘cultivation’	is	assessed:	producing	“conditions	that	can	[either]	enable	or	obstruct	the	production	of	theory”	(Timmermans	&	Tavory,	2012,	p.	181,	my	emphasis)	rather	than	overlapping	fractionally.	There	is	a	privileging	of	(repeatedly)	achieving	an	end	theoretical	product	in	all	its	splendidly	isolated	singularity.		
This	logic	is	also	expressed	in	the	characterisation	of	“abduction	as	socially	located,	positional	knowledge”	(p.	172).	This	assumes	that	“[w]e	always	occupy	a	certain	position	(as	parents,	as	academics,	as	middle-class	Latinas,	etc.),	and	this	position	colors	our	vision,	[…]	allowing	us	only	a	partial	access	to	the	field”	(p.	172)	and	“arming	us	with	prototheories”	to	“case”	phenomena	we	observe	(p.	173).	The	word	‘partiality’	may	suggest	fractionality,	but	such	notions	are	dispelled	as	the	authors	point	to	the	“danger”	of	using	“these	ready-made	categorizations	to	obliterate	the	complexity	of	personal	and	professional	lives,	to	self-stereotype”	(p.	173).	Just	as	the	subject	Gubrium	and	Holstein	(2012)	construct	in	their	chapter	objects	to	its	overdetermination	(see	Chapter	6),	so	here	does	a	metaphysics	dealing	only	in	singularities	threaten	to	produce	a	cardboard	subject	that	misrecognises	the	subject	it	claims	to	know	and	which	subsequently	overflows	its	boundaries.	
In	this	second	reading	the	abductive	process	is	a	“dialectic	between	data	and	generalization	as	a	way	to	account	for	empirical	findings”	(p.	167),	or	more	precisely	a	“dialectic	of	cultivated	theoretical	sensitivity	and	methodological	heuristics”	(p.	180).	This	is	a	dialectic	that,	to	paraphrase	Deleuze	(1962/2006a),	is	the	most	ferocious	
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enemy	of	multiplicity	as	it	seeks	to	resolve	rather	than	affirm	difference	(see	previous	chapter).	
No	one	reading	is	necessarily	more	definitive	than	the	other,	of	course,	as	to	know	anything	(even	abductive	analysis)	is	to	understand	it	as	a	controversy.	But	Timmermans	and	Tavory	(2012)	made	choices	(like	everyone	has	to)	to	enact	their	object	in	a	particular	way.	Choices	that	make	their	concept	of	‘abductive	analysis’	more	or	less	successful	in	enacting	epistemological	or	fractional	conditions	of	possibility.	And	it	is	my	contention	that	the	way	the	concept	of	abductive	analysis	is	enacted	in	their	paper	too	successfully	enacts	an	epistemological	reading	to	make	it	a	viable	choice	for	the	intervention	sought	by	this	thesis.
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CHAPTER	8:	METHOD	
INTRODUCTION	
In	the	pinboard	method	the	previous	chapter	established	that	charting	a	method	assemblage	as	it	produces	a	centred	account	is	sufficient	to	introduce	a	decentring	movement	through	revealing	controversies	that	arise	from	naive	observation,	constituting	an	interference	that	expresses	a	fractional	way	of	knowing.	This	thus	offers	a	‘solution’	to	the	paradox	of	representing	pain	experience	introduced	by	an	integrative	paradigm	that	seeks	embodied	accounts	of	pain	experience	through	capturing	patient	narratives.	This	chapter	seeks	to	operationalise	the	pinboard	method	such	that	it	can	be	readily	practiced.	Specifically,	the	chapter	provides	details	of	method	that	were	practiced,	producing	the	fractional	accounts	of	the	lived	experience	of	pain	that	can	be	found	in	Part	II.	Performing	this	method	constitutes	an	experiment	exploring	its	validity,	and	offers	the	opportunity	for	feedback	to	enhance	it.	The	chapter	is	split	into	three	parts.	The	first	discusses	the	selection	of	the	particular	method	assemblage	that	was	charted,	which	was	drawn	from	interview	research.	Choosing	to	intervene	on	an	interview	research	method	is	important	because,	as	Chapter	6	noted,	it	is	a	popular	method	for	obtaining	narratives	of	the	lived	experience	of	pain.	The	method	of	practicing	fractionality	developed	in	this	chapter	is	thus	potentially	readily	transportable	to	similar	types	of	research	within	the	integrative	paradigm.	The	chosen	interview	research	method	was	performed	by	the	researcher,	a	performance	that	required	following	particular	details	of	method,	which	were	selected	on	the	basis	of	both	their	hegemony	and	efficacy	in	providing	embodied	accounts	of	pain	experience	relevant	to	the	epistemological	and	ideological	goals	of	the	integrative	paradigm.	The	second	part	of	the	chapter	is	a	short	section	justifying	repeating	the	intervention	for	several	cases	in	order	to	demonstrate	its	robustness,	and	what	this	therefore	meant	for	numbers	of	participants,	number	of	interviews,	and	interview	length.	Having	justified	the	selection	of	particular	details	of	method,	the	third	part	of	the	chapter	provides	a	full	outline	of	the	method	used,	including	study	design,	participant	details,	data	collection,	analysis,	and	ethical	considerations.	
(1)	CHOOSING	A	METHOD	ASSEMBLAGE	TO	INTERFERE	UPON	
Chapter	6	identified	interview	research	methods	as	a	well-established	epistemological	means	of	investigating	the	lived	experience	of	pain,	and	which	therefore	offered	a	readily	accessible	method	assemblage	to	interfere	upon,	as	well	as	(by	extension)	making	the	intervention	relatable	to	similar	methods	used	to	know	the	lived	experience	of	pain.	This	study	chose	to	perform	this	interview	research	method	(with	the	researcher	–	LR	–	
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Interviewing)	(1)	as	analysis	of	an	individual	case	(selected	purposively),	(2)	using	an	open-ended	structure,	(3)	with	multiple	interviews	with	the	same	participant,	(4)	lasting	60-90	minutes,	and	(5)	analysed	using	thematic	analysis.	These	particular	elements	of	method	were	selected	because	of	both	their	popular	use	in	the	integrative	paradigm	and	efficacy	in	obtaining	narratives	of	the	embodied	experience	of	pain	in	relation	to	its	epistemological	and	ideological	goals.	Understanding	the	nature	of	these	goals	in	relation	to	the	methods	used	to	achieve	them	is	important	in	order	to	generate	the	familiarity	with	the	centring	logic	of	the	method	assemblage	that	the	naive	reader	seeks	to	closely	follow.	In	effect,	establishing	such	familiarity	can	be	understood	as	an	important	part	of	the	construction	of	a	naive	reader	that	can	be	readily	led	by	the	epistemological	and	ideological	goals	of	the	method	assemblage	this	thesis	wishes	to	intervene	on,	as	well	as	permitting	appropriate	details	of	method	to	be	selected	such	that	the	centring	processes	of	such	a	method	assemblage	can	be	enacted.	What	follows	is	the	specific	justification	for	selecting	each	of	the	numbered	elements	in	relation	to	these	epistemological	and	ideological	goals,	which	can	be	understood	as	how	to	best	enact	the	communicable	cartography	(Briggs,	2007)	of	integrative	paradigm	interview	research.	
INTERVIEWING	A	SINGLE	CASE:	ON	THE	AUTHENTIC	INDIVIDUAL	
The	choice	of	a	single	case	requires	understanding	the	role	of	authenticity	in	both	interview	research	and	the	integrative	paradigm.	Whilst	the	most	recent	stage	of	the	historical	narrative	of	interview	research	(outlined	in	Chapter	6)	has,	as	part	of	the	wider	rhetorical	
turn	(see	Chapter	3),	involved	attention	to	the	practices	of	interview	research	that	has	served	to	conventionally	problematise	the	notion	of	subject	authenticity	(Gubrium	et	al.	2012b;	Gubrium	&	Holstein,	2012),	the	concept	of	the	“authentic	self	of	the	person”	persists	more	widely	in	society	(Denzin,	2003,	p.	145).	Indeed,	Atkinson	and	Silverman	(1997)	write	of	the	“interview	society”,	which	functions	on	the	basis	that	“face-to-face	interviews	[…]	reveal	the	personal,	the	private	self	of	the	subject”	(p.	309),	embodying	the	three	ideologies	(self-expression	of	an	individual	mind,	that	can	be	made	public,	authentically	via	face-to-face	communication)	identified	by	Briggs	(2007).	Atkinson	and	Silverman	(1997)	contend	that	even	analysis	of	qualitative	data	has	(at	least	up	to	their	time	of	writing)	remained	dominated	by	the	assumption	of	authenticity,	with	them	noting	that	“too	many	authors	–	including	those	committed	to	various	radical	or	alternative	models	of	research	–	celebrate	the	interview	and	the	narrative	data	it	produces	as	an	especially	authentic	mode	of	social	representation”	(p.	312).	Indeed,	the	“radical	critiques	and	transformations	of	the	interview”	characteristic	of	the	third	stage	of	the	historical	narrative	of	interview	research	discussed	in	Chapter	6	remain	“an	incomplete	program”	(p.	312).	Briggs	(2007)	argues	that	within	his	discipline	of	anthropology,	
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researchers	“are	themselves	so	swayed”	by	the	three	ideological	constructions	(noted	above)	establishing	authenticity	“that	anthropological	interviews	largely	remain	black	boxes”	(p.	555),	suggesting	(like	Atkinson	&	Silverman,	1997)	that	the	impact	of	the	rhetorical	turn	on	social	science	has	been	more	limited	than	the	historical	narrative	of	interview	research	might	suggest.	Indeed,	the	dominant	interview	cartography	being	used	within	social	science	today	might	be	characterised	as	one	that	establishes	an	authentic	experience	of	a	subject	out	of	which	a	publically	shareable	narrative	account	can	be	translated	through	face-to-face	interaction	with	the	researcher	(Briggs,	2007).	The	persistence	of	authenticity	in	interview	research	is	not	simply	because	of	“methodological	or	technical	issues”	but	“as	the	enactment	of	ethical	and	ideological	commitments”	(Atkinson	&	Silverman,	1997,	p.	313).	Thus,	Chapter	1	discussed	how	a	reaction	against	the	inhumanity	of	biomedicine,	and	then	later	against	Engel’s	(1977)	fragmentary	biopsychosocial	model,	favoured	the	production	of	narratives	to	capture	‘authentic’	(or	‘embodied’)	integrated	experiences	of	illness	that	were	previously	denied.1	Briggs	(2007)	notes	that	whilst	interviews	“magically	appear	to	embody	all	three”	of	the	ideologies	he	identifies,	“different	types	of	interviews	privilege	one	or	more”	(p.	554).	Those	of	the	integrative	paradigm	are	similar	to	“psychiatric,	oral	historical,	and	life	history	interviews”	(p.	554)	insofar	as	they	focus	on	both	the	Lockean	notion	of	the	individual	autonomous	mind	as	the	“privileged	locus	of	communication”,	and	the	notion	that	authentic	experience	is	obtained	through	“primordial,	authentic,	quintessentially	human,	and	necessary”	face-to-face	communication	(p.	553).	This	form	of	interview	research	focuses	on	“individual	interviewees	and	the	process	of	self-disclosure”,	and	paints	“interviews	as	powerful	windows	into	a	person’s	experiences,	memories,	and	feelings”	(p.	554).	Interview	research	within	the	integrative	paradigm	has	thus	tended	to	focus	on	making	visible	individual	subjects	translating	their	experience	through	the	humanism	of	a	face-to-face	encounter,	epitomised	by	the	“ethnography	of	experience”	(Kleinman,	et	al.	1992,	p.	14,	emphasis	in	original)	in	the	volume	Pain	as	Human	Experience	(DelVecchio	Good	et	al.,	1992).	Within	this	book	perhaps	the	archetypal	piece	of	integrative	paradigm	interview	research	is	Byron	Good’s	(1992)	chapter,	where	he	discusses	an	interview	with	‘Brian’.	The	chapter	begins	by	making	clear	that	the	story	being	presented	emerged	from	a	particular	face-to-face	interview	encounter.	Thus,	we	learn	that	Brian	was	accompanied	to	the	interview	with	his	father,	who	was	“tall	and	fairly	thin,	with	a	sagging	face	that	showed	sadness	and	concern”	(p.	29).	Such	observations	not	only	leave	little	doubt	about	how	face-to-face	this	was	(evidenced	in	sagging	flesh),	but	already	express	the	“primordial”,	“quintessentially	human”	role	of	the	face-to-face	encounter	as	a	window	into	the	soul																																									 																					
1	Briggs	(2007)	traces	this	to	a	reaction	against	the	Enlightenment’s	cold	formalism.	
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(Briggs,	2007,	p.	553).	In	this	case	a	window	of	a	worn-out	face	through	which	we	can	see	a	father	carrying	the	burden	of	his	son’s	illness,	an	aspect	of	humanity	missed	by	cold	diagnostic	tests	like	the	“[p]anoramic	X-rays”	taken	to	seek	a	diagnosis	for	Brian’s	persistent	pain	(Good,	1992,	p.	35).	“What	followed	[in	the	interview	with	Brian]	was	a	remarkable	story	of	a	life	of	pain”	(p.	29),	a	publicised	account	that	Good	then	used	to	reflect	(in	his	chapter)	on	an	even	more	public	discourse	regarding	the	contrast	between	a	person	in	pain’s	telic	demand	to	objectify	pain	and	the	alienation	that	this	inflicts	to	the	“experiencing	and	acting	self”	that	refuses	to	be	reduced	to	an	object	(p.	39).	This	enacts	the	second	of	the	ideologies	outlined	by	Briggs	(2007)	(publication	of	a	personal	account	in	public	discourse).	But	what	is	perhaps	most	striking	is	the	enactment	of	the	first	ideology:	an	individual	mind	contemplating	their	world.	The	whole	of	Good’s	(1992)	chapter	is	about	Brian,	“centering	on	an	individual,	who	becomes	the	origo1”	(Briggs,	2007,	p.	557,	emphasis	in	original).	Indeed,	as	Good	(1992)	notes,	his	chapter	is	“meant	[…]	to	bear	witness	to	a	single	life”	(p.	47).	The	individual	is	not	scrambled	in	an	analysis	that	dissects	it	and	mixes	its	parts	into	an	amalgam	with	many	others	where	the	individual	remains	only	a	starting	point.	Instead	we	are	presented	with	the	rational	reflections	of	an	individual	mind	on	the	sensations	that	make	up	his	lived	experience	of	pain.	This	is	a	reflection	that	demands	participants	“convey	transparent	and	precise	models	of	the	contents	of	their	minds	to	others”	(Briggs,	2007,	p.	553),	but	which	is	failed	in	this	action	by	the	biomedical	models	Brian	has	put	his	faith	in,	which	cannot	name	his	pain.	The	chapter	reveals	an	experience	structured	by	the	ontology	of	pain	outlined	in	Chapter	2,	where	chronic	pain	sufferers	are	“constantly	seeking	a	name	for	their	suffering,	an	image	that	will	name	its	source	and	allow	it	to	be	set	off	from	the	self,	an	image	that	will	provide	the	symbolic	structure	for	a	remaking	of	the	world”	(Good,	1992,	p.	43).	This	failure	to	name	might	be	understood	as	an	interference	on	the	communicable	cartography	of	the	interview	where	the	enactment	of	a	rationally	reflecting	individual	as	an	origin	of	an	experience	of	pain	that	can	be	made	publically	visible	through	the	face-to-face	encounter	(making	pain	present)	becomes	problematised	by	an	ontology	of	pain	that	has	a	necessary	absence	(see	Chapter	2).	Instead,	in	Good’s	(1992)	chapter	this	controversy	is	claimed	for	the	individual,	where	the	chapter	becomes	“witness	to	a	single	life	and	to	an	experience	deeply	resistant	to	language”	(p.	47).	The	controversy	itself	becomes	Brian’s																																									 																					
1	Latin	for	‘origin’.	In	pragmatics	the	origo	or	deictic	origo	is	also	often	used	to	mean	the	deictic	centre	of	an	utterance.	For	particular	words	or	phrases	whose	full	understanding	requires	the	provision	of	context,	the	deictic	centre	is	the	“central	anchorage	point”	around	which	they	are	relationally	organised	(Huang,	2012,	p.	85).	Briggs	(2007)	does	not	define	his	use	of	‘origo’,	though	does	frequently	and	explicitly	locate	his	article	with	reference	to	the	“complex	pragmatics	of	interview	practice”	(p.	561).	I	here	understand	the	term	to	refer	to	the	establishment	of	the	interviewee	as	a	central	anchorage	point	around	which	the	communicable	cartography	of	the	interview	is	organised.	
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‘experience’,	and	Good’s	chapter	as	the	publicised	account	of	it,	authentically	obtained	through	Good’s	fleshy	encounter	with	Brian	and	his	father.	This	is	the	enactment	of	an	
elusive	ontology	of	pain,	and	emphasises	the	importance	of	the	individual	voice	as	a	rational	reflector	of	even	his	own	lack	of	reflections,	of	his	public	account	of	the	interminable	‘void’	of	pain	waiting	to	be	filled	with	(authentic)	representations	of	experience	(Biro,	2011).	The	replication	of	the	communicable	cartography	of	the	interview	that	has	particular	emphasis	on	the	individual	is	found	in	many	other	chapters	of	Pain	as	Human	Experience.	DelVecchio	Good	(1992)	thus	provides	discussion	of	her	interviews	with	each	of	two	woman	about	their	experience	of	pain	and	employment:	“the	case	of	Mrs.	Able”	(p.	53)	and	“the	case	of	Ms.	Graham”	(p.	61).	Brodwin	(1992)	discusses	the	social	performances	in	the	“case	of	Diane	Reden”	(p.	77),	where	the	responses	to	ethical	demands	are	made	to	be	owned	by	the	participant	he	interviewed.	Garro	(1992)	presents	“Mary	Bartlett’s	story”	of	chronic	illness,	including	the	obligatory	discussion	of	the	interviewer’s	observations	of	the	interviewee’s	body	(“she	conscientiously	maintained	her	posture	throughout	the	long	interview	session”,	p.	105).	And	Kleinman	(1992)	presents	three	separate	‘cases’	of	chronic	pain	experience,	two	of	interviews	with	a	single	participant,	and	a	third	of	his	ethnographic	work	in	China.	Many	recent	studies	exploring	the	experience	of	pain	have	also	sought	to	focus	on	the	individual	by	drawing	on	a	small	number	of	interview	participants	(for	example,	the	following	studies	draw	upon	data	from	6	participants	or	less:	Becker,	1999;	Buchbinder,	2010;	Corbett	et	al.,	2007;	Flores	et	al.,	2012;	Honkasalo,	2000;	Mengshoel	&	Heggen,	2004;	Osborn	&	Smith,	2006;	Richardson,	2005;	Robinson	et	al.,	2013;	Ryan	et	al.,	2014;	Shapiro,	2006;	Sheedy	et	al.,	2017;	Smith	&	Osborn,	2007;	Winkler,	2018).	Whilst	many	other	studies	have	included	somewhat	larger	numbers	of	interview	participants	whilst	still	seeming	to	retain	a	focus	on	the	individual	through	presentational	techniques	of	individualising	particular	responses	(often	through	using	direct	quotation),	it	was	reasoned	that	the	integrative	paradigm’s	goal	of	rescuing	the	individual	voice	of	a	patient’s	experience	of	pain	is	more	effectively	established	with	a	more	explicit	focus	on	smaller	numbers,	with	the	archetype	being	a	single	case.	This	thesis	therefore	chose	to	perform	interview	analysis	of	individual	cases.	The	selection	of	such	individuals	was	performed	purposively	since	it	is	interested	in	a	particular	population	(those	with	experiences	of	pain)	(details	of	the	exact	population	drawn	from	is	discussed	in	the	third	section	of	this	chapter).	
OPEN-ENDED	INTERVIEW	PROTOCOL:	ACHIEVING	DEPTH	
A	difference	is	frequently	drawn	up	in	the	methodological	literature	between	in-depth	and	structured	interviews.	In-depth	interviewing	involves	an	open-ended	or	semi-structured	format	that	allows	greater	deviation	from	the	interview	protocol,	with	open-ended	
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interviewing	offering	the	greatest	freedom.	Structured	interviews	are	typically	used	where	the	researcher	seeks	specific,	predictable	information	in	line	with	an	agenda.	It	is	argued	that	an	open-ended	interview	style	is	suited	to	the	integrative	paradigm	for	two	reasons.	First,	the	desire	for	‘depth’	in	an	interview	is	frequently	framed	within	a	narrative	seeking	to	
reveal	meaning	that	is	otherwise	covered.	Here	the	interviewer	is	hoping	to	“uncover	greater	detail,	depth,	and	complexity	of	meaning”,	of	seeking	to	“unlock	very	sensitive	experiences”	(Grinyer	&	Thomas,	2012,	p.	220,	my	emphasis).	In-depth	interviewing	is	enacted	as	a	means	of	tapping	into	the	origo	of	experience,	and	for	it	to	do	so	effectively	it	must	be	done	in	a	particular	way.	Thus,	Grinyer	and	Thomas	suggest	that	the	‘uncovering’	process	is	achieved	because	of	the	development	of	trust	and	rapport	between	interviewer	and	interviewee	such	that	the	interviewee	feels	more	comfortable	in	constructing	alternative	accounts	(less	constrained	by	perceived	ethical	demands).	Johnson	and	Rowlands	(2012)	similarly	agree	that	it	is	important	to	“progressively	and	incrementally	build	a	mutual	sense	of	cooperative	self-disclosure	and	trust”	in	order	to	establish	the	‘depth’	of	meaning	desired	(p.	104).	More	specifically,	they	suggest	this	occurs	on	the	basis	of	mutual	reciprocity,	where	both	interviewer	and	interviewee	share	experiences	as	part	of	the	same	group	(‘strict	reciprocity’)	or	where	the	interviewer	offers	“some	form	of	assistance	or	other	form	of	information”	to	the	interviewee,	such	as	(ethically)	sharing	stories	from	other	interviewees	(‘complimentary	reciprocity’)	(p.	104).	Second,	an	open-ended	interview	can	be	posited	as	more	‘natural’	or	‘authentic’	than	structured	and	semi-structured	interviews.	This	is	consistent	with	the	“quintessentially	human”	style	of	face-to-face	interviewing	of	one	of	Briggs’	(2007)	ideologies,	posited	as	necessary	for	drawing	out	authentic	experiences	(p.	553).	The	concepts	of	trust,	rapport,	and	
reciprocity	as	important	technical	elements	to	achieve	depth	are	all	imbued	with	humanistic	connotations	appealing	to	this	dominant	ideology.	Indeed,	in-depth	interviews	“develop	and	build	on	intimacy”	and	that	“in	this	respect,	they	resemble	the	forms	of	talking	one	finds	among	close	friends”	(Johnson	&	Rowlands,	2012,	p.	100).1	In-depth	interviewing	is	assumed	to	allow	“conversation	to	take	its	natural	course”	(Booth	&	Booth,	1994,	p.	420,	my	emphasis).	Enacting	this	humanistic	trait	as	an	interview	technique	appeals	to	an	ideology	offering	the	promise	of	an	authoritative	translational	link	between	the	embodied	experience	deep	within	the	individual	and	the	narrative	accounts	produced	for	public	consumption.																																									 																					
1	But	note	that	this	humanistic	enactment	of	the	in-depth	interview	as	‘friendly	talk’	is	problematised	by	the	contrast	with	the	researcher’s	goal	of	collecting	data,	because	in	friendship	that	“kind	of	talk	is	an	end	in	itself”	rather	than	as	a	means	to	collecting	data	(Johnson	&	Rowlands,	2012,	p.	100).	Here	the	humanistic	enactment	of	face-to-face	interviewing	is	interfered	upon	by	an	enactment	of	face-to-face	interviewing	as	an	inhuman	technical	exercise,	a	controversy	that	arguably	becomes	relegated	to	methodological	discussions	of	interview	ethics	without	disrupting	the	broad	humanistic	enactment	of	the	interview	outlined	by	Briggs	(2007).	
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This	study’s	open-ended	interview	protocol	had	the	broad	aim	of	exploring	participants’	experiences	of	chronic	pain.	It	included	“two	or	three	introductory	icebreakers	to	get	the	ball	rolling”	(Johnson	&	Rowlands,	2012,	p.	106),	and	used	stimulus	material	prepared	by	participants	prior	to	their	interviews	(see	third	section	of	this	chapter	for	more	detail).	
REPEAT	INTERVIEWS	
Grinyer	and	Thomas	(2012)	suggest	that	interviewing	participants	on	multiple	occasions	(as	opposed	to	a	single	interview)	is	also	conducive	to	establishing	the	kind	of	‘depth’	discussed	above	and	thus	the	communicable	cartography	of	integrative	paradigm	interview	research	that	the	pinboard	method	aims	for	as	part	of	the	construction	of	a	naive	reader.	Specifically,	Grinyer	and	Thomas	suggest	development	of	trust	and	rapport	is	enhanced	over	multiple	interviews,	with	such	development	regarded	as	a	relatively	slow	process	(Johnson	&	Rowlands,	2012).	In	addition,	drawing	on	Earthy	and	Cronin	(2008),	Grinyer	and	Thomas	(2012)	point	to	other	benefits	of	interviewing	participants	on	multiple	occasions,	including	a	practical	issue	relating	to	exhaustion	(it	“may	be	less	exhausting	for	both	parties”),	that	it	is	easier	for	participants	who	are	unwell	to	feel	able	to	terminate	a	particular	interview	early	(knowing	that	there	can	be	other	sessions),	and	that	the	time	in	between	interviews	enables	reflection	to	be	used	to	promote	“greater	depth”	in	the	next	interview	(p.	220).	
INTERVIEW	LENGTH	
It	was	also	regarded	that	longer	interviews	offered	greater	potential	depth.	However,	respecting	practical	limitations	(such	as	comfort	and	time	constraints	on	participant	and	researcher),	the	researcher	aimed	for	an	interview	length	of	between	60	and	90	minutes.	
THEMATIC	ANALYSIS	
Thematic	analysis	was	chosen	to	analyse	data.	This	is	a	sense-making	exercise	of	condensing	data	into	themes	used	to	construct	an	account	(Braun	&	Clarke,	2012).	It	“is	a	method	for	systematically	identifying,	organizing,	and	offering	insight	into	patterns	of	meaning	(themes)	across	a	data	set”	(p.	57).	Besides	thematic	analysis,	other	methods	of	analysis	appropriate	to	a	communicable	cartography	of	integrative	paradigm	interview	research	might	have	been	selected	as	the	centring	technique	used	in	this	thesis,	such	as	narrative	
analysis,	interpretative	phenomenological	analysis	(IPA),	and	grounded	theory.	Thematic	analysis	differs	from	such	other	data	analysis	techniques	in	that	it	might	be	regarded	as	constituting	a	basic	method	common	to	all	qualitative	data	analysis	methods.	In	this	way,	thematic	analysis	“provides	the	qualitative	researcher	with	a	foundation	in	the	basic	skills	needed	to	engage	with	other	approaches	to	qualitative	data	analysis”	(p.	57).	Indeed,	it	“offers	a	way	into	qualitative	research	that	teaches	the	mechanics	of	coding	and	analysing	
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qualitative	data	systematically”	(p.	58).	Merriam	and	Tisdell	(2016)	identify	a	common	foundational	qualitative	research	method	as	categorisation	of	data	via	constant	comparison,	such	that	they	write	that	“[c]ategory	construction	is	data	analysis”	(p.	204,	my	emphasis).	The	benefit	of	using	thematic	analysis	over	alternative	qualitative	data	analysis	techniques	is	that	it	presents	the	pinboard	method	developed	in	this	thesis	with	potentially	greater	theoretical	transportability	to	a	range	of	qualitative	data	analysis	methods	since	the	range	of	method	assemblages	to	intervene	on	is	as	wide	as	qualitative	data	analysis	itself.	Alternative	techniques	come	with	“broader	theoretical	or	conceptual	issues”	(Braun	&	Clarke,	2012,	p.	58)	that	subscribe	to	specific	ontologies	that	might	limit	such	transportability.	In	this	sense,	we	might	not	simply	talk	about	them	as	a	method	but	as	a	methodology.	Indeed,	other	qualitative	methodologies	require	an	“additional	dimension”	to	be	added	to	a	common	technique	of	qualitative	analysis	(Merriam	&	Tisdell,	2016,	p.	24,	emphasis	in	original),	such	as	IPA’s	subscription	to	a	phenomenological	philosophy	(Smith	et	al.,	2009).	By	contrast,	thematic	analysis	“is	only	a	method	of	data	analysis	rather	than	being	an	approach	to	conducting	qualitative	research”,	and	thus	“offers	a	way	of	separating	qualitative	research	out	from	these	broader	debates”	(Braun	&	Clarke,	2012,	p.	58,	emphasis	in	original).	This	is	not	to	say	that	the	method	assemblage	this	thesis	attempted	to	practice	was	not	itself	guided	by	theoretical	and	conceptual	issues.	Indeed,	the	previous	sections	of	this	chapter	have	attempted	to	develop	details	of	method	based	upon	the	theoretical	and	conceptual	issues	of	a	communicable	cartography	of	integrative	paradigm	interview	research	that	the	pinboard	method	seeks	to	be	naively	led	by.	The	difference	is	that	use	of	thematic	analysis	does	not	further	fracture	this	cartography	into	a	number	of	sub-regions	that	limit	the	theoretical	transportability	of	the	pinboard	method	as	it	is	developed	in	this	thesis.	
	(2)	DEMONSTRATING	ROBUSTNESS	OF	THE	INTERVENTION	
Enactment	and	observation	of	the	method	assemblage	noted	in	the	previous	section	was	repeated	such	that	it	was	enacted,	and	attended-to,	for	a	total	of	five	individual	cases	(meaning	five	separate	case	studies	were	performed).	This	repetition	was	planned	in	order	to	(potentially)	demonstrate	robustness	of	the	fractional	intervention	since	an	intervention	using	only	a	single	participant	might	be	dismissed	for	idiosyncratic	reasons.	Having	five	participants	also	mitigated	for	potential	attrition	of	participants	(though	no	participant	did	drop	out),	something	that	would	be	particularly	detrimental	with	a	single	case.		As	noted,	repeating	interviews	with	the	same	participant	is	a	technique	enacting	the	‘depth’	required	of	the	communicable	cartography	of	integrative	paradigm	interview	research,	and	thus	this	study	sought	as	many	repeat	interviews	as	was	logistically	possible.	As	such,	5	interviews	were	performed	with	each	of	the	5	participants	(for	a	total	of	25	interviews).	
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(3)	DETAILS	OF	METHOD	
STUDY	DESIGN	
Five	open-ended	one-on-one	interviews	with	each	of	five	chronic	pain	patients	were	performed	(25	interviews	in	total)	with	the	aim	of	providing	an	account	of	their	individual	experiences	of	chronic	pain.	Their	data	was	provisionally	analysed	individually	after	each	interview	in	order	to	better	establish	the	story	being	enacted.	This	intra-interview	familiarisation	permitted	an	exploration	of	the	narrative	in	subsequent	interviews	with	that	participant	in	order	to	add	an	ever-increasing	intricacy	to	the	narrative	that	can	be	equated	with	‘depth’.	This	process	of	fleshing-out	the	structure	of	the	narrative	accounting	for	a	participant’s	experience	of	pain	also	permitted	the	defining	and	subsequent	exploration	of	the	boundaries	of	this	narrative,	an	exploration	that	involved	the	conversion	of	intermediaries	to	mediators	once	products	of	boundary	processes	were	identified.		Full	analysis	after	all	of	an	individual	participant’s	interviews	were	completed	split	their	data	into	two	‘movements’.	The	first	(consistent	with	centring)	constitutes	a	thematic	analysis	that	produced	a	coherent	narrative	of	pain	experience.	The	second	(consistent	with	
decentring)	constitutes	the	identification	of	elements	of	this	narrative	(products	of	boundary	processes)	that	also	produced	(using	thematic	analysis)	an	alternative	narrative	that	did	not	fit	with	the	first	(this	capturing	the	conversion	of	intermediaries	to	mediators).	
ON	THE	FRACTIONALITY	OF	FRACTIONAL	PRACTICE	
The	formalised,	coherent	nature	of	the	method	discussed	in	this	chapter	and	the	last	can	be	contrasted	with	the	researcher’s	experience	of	putting	it	into	practice.	Whilst	Part	II	of	this	thesis	importantly	reflects	on	this	practice	from	the	perspective	of	the	abstract	theoretical	principles	of	the	pinboard	method,	another	complimentary	approach	is	to	more	closely	take	the	position	of	the	interviewer’s	particular	experience	as	a	subject	constructed	within	this	process.	Such	a	reflection	can	be	found	in	Appendix	1,	which	draws	upon	reflective	notes	made	by	the	researcher	after	every	interview.	In	these	the	researcher	struggles	with	the	‘paradox’	of	enacting	assumptions	of	naive	empiricism	that	(as	part	of	that	enactment)	must	subdue	expectations	that	are	necessarily	embodied	in	those	very	assumptions.	This	struggle	is	amplified	by	the	way	in	which	the	researcher	attaches	his	own	(coherent)	sense	of	self	to	enacting	the	pinboard	method,	provoking	an	anxiety	for	certainty	that	can	only	be	achieved	through	embracing	uncertainty.	This	captures	the	theme	throughout	the	thesis	that	any	practice	takes	place	in	conditions	of	possibility	that	are	necessarily	fractional	(see	Chapters	5	and	7).	
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PARTICIPANTS	
Five	participants	(four	female,	one	male)	experiencing	non-malignant	chronic	pain,	conventionally	taken	for	convenience	to	mean	pain	experienced	continuously	for	at	least	3	months	(Merskey	&	Bogduk,	1994),	took	part.	Recruitment	was	facilitated	by	a	physiotherapist	working	within	a	physiotherapy	department	at	an	NHS	hospital	in	North	East	England.	Four	participants	were	contacted	by	post	due	to	their	voluntary	enlistment	on	an	NHS	patient-public	involvement	(PPI)	program	whilst	attending	the	physiotherapy	department,	a	scheme	that	facilitates	public	involvement	in	health	research.	These	four	participants	replied	indicating	that	they	were	interested	in	taking	part.1	A	fifth	participant	expressed	interest	in	participating	after	receiving	information	about	the	study	from	the	facilitating	physiotherapist	whilst	attending	the	physiotherapy	department.	
DATA	COLLECTION	
Prior	to	the	interviews	each	participant	was	asked	to	either	write	or	video-tape	a	short	piece	about	aspects	of	their	pain	they	felt	were	not	understood	by	other	people	(all	participants	chose	to	write	the	piece).	This	was	examined	by	the	researcher	and	used	to	initiate	discussion	in	the	first	interview.	All	interviews	sought	to	explore	the	participant’s	experience	of	chronic	pain	and	were	open-ended	insofar	as	no	interview	schedule	of	questions	or	prompts	was	used.	Interviews	were	recorded	with	an	audio	recorder	and	transcribed	verbatim	by	the	researcher	before	the	subsequent	interview.	Each	transcript	was	provisionally	analysed	before	the	next	interview	in	order	to	promote	further	discussion	in	subsequent	interviews.	There	was	a	minimum	period	of	a	week	between	interviews	to	enable	sufficient	reflection	and	analysis.	Each	of	the	25	interviews	lasted	been	52	and	90	minutes	with	an	average	length	of	67	minutes	(total	interviewing	time	was	1667	minutes),	and	took	place	from	mid-2015	to	early	2016.	Interview	locations	were	participants’	homes	(two	participants),	at	Durham	University	(two	participants),	and	at	a	participant’s	workplace	(one	participant).	The	two	participants	who	travelled	to	Durham	University	were	reimbursed	for	their	travel	costs	with	retail	vouchers.	All	costs	were	covered	by	a	research	grant	provided	as	part	of	the	researcher’s	ESRC	studentship.	
ANALYSIS	
Interview	transcripts	were	analysed,	split	by	individual	participant	(producing	five	separate	case	studies),	using	thematic	analysis	aided	by	NVivo	computer	software.	This	involved	the																																									 																					
1	These	participants	had	earlier	provided	written	feedback	to	the	researcher	with	regard	to	the	effectiveness	of	the	communication	of	an	earlier	version	of	the	Participant	Information	Sheet,	as	part	of	the	NHS	research	ethics	approval	process	(see	later	in	the	current	chapter).	
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gradual	reduction	of	data	from	a	larger	to	smaller	set	of	categories	that	were	arranged	into	a	narrative	for	each	participant.	Merriam	and	Tisdell	(2016)	remind	us	that	“data	analysis	is	the	process	used	to	answer	your	
research	question(s)”	(p.	202,	emphasis	in	original),	and	that	analysis	begins	by	“identifying	segments	in	your	data	set	that	are	responsive	to	your	research	questions”	(p.	203).	Just	as	epistemological	ways	of	knowing	pre-comprehend	the	world	with	epistemological	conditions	of	possibility,	fractional	ways	of	knowing	must	also	pre-comprehend	with	fractional	conditions	of	possibility.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	7,	the	enactment	of	fractionality	is	a	political	choice,	not	an	inevitable	expression	of	some	fundamental	trait	of	what	it	means	to	know.	As	such,	Gibson	and	Brown	(2009)	suggest	that	the	research	question	means	that	thematic	analysis	may	begin	with	certain	codes	already	established.	These	are	“apriori1	codes”	(p.	130),	and	“serve	as	general	categories	that	derive	from	one’s	research	interests,	and	form	a	basic	skeleton	outline	for	preliminary	categorization	in	order	to	begin	the	exploration	of	the	data”	(p.	133).	The	skeleton	for	preliminary	categorisation	for	this	study’s	fractional	intervention	is	sketched	out	in	Chapter	7,	and	we	can	identify	two	categories	from	this.	The	first	is	the	centred	narrative	enacted	by	the	method	assemblage,	and	can	be	referred	to	as	the	first	movement.	The	second	is	a	non-relational	element	arising	from	attending	to	the	centred	narrative,	where	its	intermediaries	are	re-identified	as	mediators	connecting	both	the	narrative	and	its	non-relational.	This	second	apriori	code	can	be	termed	the	second	movement.	These	apriori	codes	inform	the	“empirical	codes”	that	“emerge	through	the	exploration	of	data”	(p.	133).	Any	pre-comprehension	may	be	found	to	be	inappropriate	in	light	of	the	empirical	material.	Indeed,	Gibson	and	Brown	note	that	whilst	empirical	codes	“may	be	a	derivative	of	an	apriori	category”	they	may	also	be	“something	entirely	new	that	was	not	foreseen	in	the	original	research	formulation”	(p.	133).	The	difference	between	epistemological	pre-comprehension	and	fractional	pre-comprehension	is	that	this	overflow	exceeds	the	former’s	conditions	of	possibility,	whereas	it	is	built	into	the	latter’s.	However,	it	was	entirely	possible,	though	unlikely	(given	the	fragility	of	things),	that	objects	would	not	object	to	their	metrification	as	chains	of	intermediaries,	and	that	a	second	movement	would	therefore	be	inappropriate.	The	empirical	codes	informed	by	the	apriori	categories	were	generated	in	a	thematic	analysis	by	firstly	identifying	“unit[s]	of	data”	(Merriam	&	Tisdell,	2016,	p.	203).	For	Merriam	and	Tisdell	(2016)	these	are	the	smallest	segments	of	information	possible	that	have	some	meaning	without	requiring	information	beyond	the	study’s	broader	context.																																									 																					
1	An	alternative	form	of	a	priori	(with	a	space).	
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Then,	through	a	process	of	comparison	with	other	units	of	information,	certain	regularities	that	allow	the	units	of	information	to	be	grouped	into	a	smaller	number	of	categories	(which	can	themselves	be	grouped	together)	were	established.	Gibson	and	Brown	(2009)	suggests	that	this	comparison	is	based	upon	“commonalities,	relationships	and	differences”	(p.	127).	That	is,	the	regularities	constituting	a	category	do	not	have	to	be	based	simply	upon	commonality.	For	the	first	movement	this	constructed	a	narrative	of	the	participant’s	experience	of	pain.	For	the	second	movement	this	identified	elements	of	the	first	movement	narrative	that	were	also	part	of	a	second	narrative	that	did	not	fit	with	the	first.	The	process	of	categorisation	began	with	reading	through	an	interview	transcript,	making	notes	of	interesting	material.	Merriam	and	Tisdell	(2016)	note	that	as	analysis	proceeds,	the	categorisation	becomes	increasingly	deductive	as	the	researcher	attempts	to	“check	out”	a	particular	category	scheme	against	the	data	(p.	210).	Indeed,	they	remind	us	that	the	process	of	analysis	depends	upon	iteration,	of	the	feedback	of	insights	of	analysis	on	the	process	of	analysis	itself.	Importantly,	Merriam	and	Tisdell	argue	that	the	start	of	analysis	should	not	wait	until	data	collection	ends,	but	gradually	develop	throughout	data	collection.	Indeed,	it	was	material	generated	from	reflection	on	the	data	between	interviews	that	was	crucial	to	discussion	in	the	next	interview.	Analysis	was	regarded	as	completed	when	“saturation”	was	reached,	which	is	“the	point	at	which	you	realize	no	new	information,	insights,	or	understandings	are	forthcoming”	(p.	210).	Craige	(2015)	found	that	the	application	of	the	pinboard’s	logic	of	juxtaposition	can	be	regarded	as	the	“inversion”	of	conventional	qualitative	analysis	(p.	221).	Whilst	“conventional	practices	of	qualitative	data	analysis	work	by	drawing	and	redrawing	comparisons	between	themes	and	cases	so	as	to	produce	ever-larger	conceptual	categories	(Bryman,	2012;	Schutt,	2012)”,	the	pinboard	serves	“to	multiply	realities	through	accentuating	their	differences	rather	than	working	to	reduce	realities	by	subsuming	their	differences	within	broad	conceptual	schema”	(Craige,	2015,	p.	221).	Importantly,	Craige	found	that	the	thematic	coding	of	his	interviews	had	already	provided	the	constant	contrast	of	the	pinboard’s	logic	of	juxtaposition:	producing	a	pinboard	“required	no	more	work	than	had	been	done	originally”	in	the	thematic	analysis	(p.	152).	In	fact,	it	required	even	less	work.	“All	that	was	required”	was	to	avoid	collapsing	the	differences	between	first-order	codes	into	higher	level	categories	(p.	152).	Indeed,	Craige	argued	that	“a	refusal	to	practice	that	kind	of	second-order	coding	is	definitive	of	the	pinboard	method,	for	it	is	in	that	refusal	that	the	complexity,	messiness	and	diversity	of	data	is	maintained”	(p.	152).	In	this	sense,	the	presence	of	first	and	second	movements	as	apriori	codes	can	be	regarded	as	a	conceptual	‘clamp’	that	maintains	a	juxtaposition	that	might	otherwise	have	been	resolved	into	coherence	through	empirical	coding	in	conventional	forms	of	thematic	analysis.	
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ETHICS	
The	study	was	carried	out	according	to	the	established	research	ethic	of	informed	consent.	Marzano	(2012)	notes	that	informed	consent	is	“grounded	primarily	on	the	principle	of	individual	autonomy”	and	“secondarily	on	that	of	beneficence”	(p.	443).	Specifically,	Marzano	identifies	informed	consent	as	“the	obligation	to	furnish	the	potential	participants”	(p.	443)	about:	the	purpose	of	the	research,	its	duration,	methods	used,	risks	and	benefits	of	participation,	‘confidentiality’,	and	their	right	to	withdraw	at	any	point.	Potential	participants	were	provided	with	this	information	via	an	information	sheet	(Appendix	2)	and	then	via	verbal	discussion	with	the	researcher.	Potential	participants	interested	in	taking	part	made	contact	with	the	researcher	using	the	contact	details	on	the	information	sheet,	or	using	a	contact	form	included	with	it	–	one	for	PPI	patients	(Appendix	3a)	and	a	slightly	different	form	for	non-PPI	patients	(Appendix	3b).1	A	generic	copy	of	the	recruitment	letter	sent	to	PPI	patients	is	shown	in	Appendix	4.	Each	participant’s	consent	to	participate	was	obtained	via	signature	on	an	informed	consent	form	(Appendix	5).	The	open-ended	nature	of	the	interview	discussion	coupled	with	the	strategy	of	exploring	boundaries	meant	a	risk	of	conversation	that	caused	emotional	distress	to	participants.	This	risk	was	mitigated	by	informing	participants	prior	to	the	interviews	that	they	could	(at	any	point	without	giving	a	reason)	ask	to	change	the	subject,	take	a	break,	or	end	the	interview.	Participants	were	also	made	aware	they	could	withdraw	completely	from	the	study,	view	their	transcripts,	and	withdraw	data	for	up	to	2	months	after	a	particular	interview.	Moreover,	should	a	participant	have	suggested	a	risk	of	harming	themself	(or	others),	appropriate	disclosure	of	information	to	relevant	authorities	would	have	occurred	(and	participants	were	informed	of	this	possibility	in	advance).	The	researcher	had	experience	in	being	able	to	identify	and	respond	to	emotional	distress	through	previous	work	performing	psychological	assessment	interviews	as	an	assistant	psychologist	(including	instances	where	individuals	indicated	risk	of	harming	themselves).2	Ethical	approval	for	the	study	was	granted	by	(1)	the	Applied	Social	Sciences	Ethics	Committee	at	Durham	University,	and	(2)	an	NHS	Research	Ethics	Committee.3	Permission	to	carry	out	recruitment	via	the	hospital	was	granted	by	the	Research	and	Development	Department	at	the	NHS	Foundation	Trust	responsible	for	the	hospital.																																								 																					
1	The	difference	mainly	reflects	communication	about	management	of	their	data	held	by	the	NHS	Foundation	Trust	in	relation	to	the	PPI	programme.	2	Participants	were	also	informed	that	they	could	potentially	benefit	from	being	able	to	talk	in	depth	about	their	pain,	but	that	this	should	not	be	regarded	as	a	substitute	for	(psychological)	therapy.	3	IRAS	Project	ID:	158248.	See:	https://www.hra.nhs.uk/planning-and-improving-research/application-summaries/research-summaries/a-qualitative-account-of-pain-enactment-with-persons-in-chronic-pain/	
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INTRODUCTION	TO	PART	II	
Having	developed	a	method	for	practicing	the	pinboard	as	a	means	of	knowing	the	lived	experience	of	pain	fractionally,	as	an	attempt	to	circumvent	the	paradox	of	pain	initiated	by	epistemological	methods	within	the	integrative	paradigm,	Part	II	of	this	thesis	concerns	the	
practice	of	this	method.	The	purpose	of	this	practice	is	to	enable	an	assessment	of	the	viability	of	the	method	as	a	fractional	intervention	on	integrative	paradigm	epistemological	methods.	Chapters	9	through	14	(inclusive)	contain	the	pinboards	of	individual	participants’	lived	experience	of	pain.1	In	addition	to	numerous	boxes	found	throughout	these	chapters,	Chapter	15	contains	a	reflection	on	the	practice	of	this	method	in	relation	to	its	viability	as	a	fractional	intervention,	as	well	as	a	consideration	of	how	it	might	be	applied	beyond	the	methodological	confines	of	this	thesis.																																																			 																					
1	All	names	used	are	pseudonyms,	and	any	information	that	was	deemed	likely	to	result	in	identification	through	deductive	disclosure	(Kaiser,	2012)	was	removed	during	transcription.	Every	quote	given	from	a	participant	has	a	reference	to	a	relevant	transcript,	given	at	the	end	of	each	chapter,	in	the	form	of:	[Interview	number	for	participant:	line	numbers	of	transcript].	For	example,	[I1:200-3]	refers	to	interview	1,	lines	200-3	for	a	particular	participant	(denoted	by	the	particular	chapter).	Where	quotes	from	the	interviewer	(myself)	are	given,	these	are	clearly	indicated	as	such,	and	all	unmarked	quotes	should	be	attributed	to	the	participant.	Some	quotes	have	been	modified	slightly	from	how	they	appear	in	the	transcripts	in	order	to	improve	communication	of	meaning	(e.g.	punctuation	added/modified,	filler	words	such	as	‘err’	and	‘erm’	removed,	minimal	responses	from	the	interviewer	such	as	‘right’	and	‘yeah’	removed).	Note	also	that	whilst	the	term	‘[sic]’	is	used	in	the	standard	sense	to	denote	grammatical	errors	made	in	the	original	interview	(as	opposed	to	having	arisen	during	transcription),	its	use	has	been	limited	only	to	instances	where	the	error	is	considered	small	enough	that	it	might	be	mistaken	for	a	transcription	error.	Enquiries	about	the	transcripts	can	be	made	by	contacting	the	author.	
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CHAPTER	9:	STEPHANIE	
FIRST	MOVEMENT:	A	NARRATIVE	OF	ADJUSTING	TO	PAIN	
Stephanie	is	a	woman	in	her	40s	who	experiences	persistent	back	pain	as	a	result	of	a	major	horse-riding	accident	that	occurred	17	years	before	our	interviews.	Her	narrative	of	chronic	pain	experience	can	be	characterised	as	a	contrast	between	pre-	and	post-	accident	worlds,	and	the	difficulties	she	has	encountered	in	making	the	adjustment	from	the	former	to	the	latter.	This	narrative	has	been	split	into	four	themes:	(1)	the	problems	pain	has	presented,	(2)	a	stoic	attitude	of	living	her	life	as	usual	that	makes	it	difficult	to	accept	‘weakness’	and	seek	help,	(3)	tension	between	these	two	themes,	and	(4)	potential	resolution	through	reappraising	the	nature	of	her	stoic	attitude.	
(1)	‘THE	ACCIDENT’	AND	THE	PROBLEMS	OF	PAIN	
For	Stephanie,	the	accident	is	“very	much	[…]	a	milestone	in	my	life.	I	have	‘before’	the	accident	and	‘after’	the	accident,	and	they	are	different	lives”1.	Being	such	a	crucial	juncture,	it	was	accorded	significant	detail	in	Stephanie’s	account.		The	accident	happened	at	her	weekly	horse-riding	lesson.	The	horse	she	was	riding	started	spinning	round	and	reared	up,	causing	Stephanie	to	slip	backwards	onto	the	ground.	Whilst	rearing,	the	horse	then	“lost	her	balance	and	came	over	backwards”2,	falling	onto	Stephanie	and	crushing	her	pelvis.	She	recalls	how	“incredibly	painful”3	it	was	as	she	lay	on	her	back	whilst	the	horse	got	up	and	galloped	away.	She	said	“I	remember	thinking	if	I	can	crawl	away	from	this	place	where	I’m	laid,	I	can	make	the	pain	go	away”4.	After	being	taken	to	hospital	it	was	found	that	Stephanie’s	pelvis	was	broken	in	three	places,	and	she	underwent	immediate	surgery	to	fit	an	external	pelvic	fixator	(“metal	prongs	coming	out	of	my	hips	with	a	bar	attaching	them	across	the	front	of	my	tummy”5)	to	hold	the	broken	bones	in	place.	After	several	weeks	she	underwent	further	surgery	“to	fix	[her	pelvis]	internally”6,	undergoing	three	operations	altogether.	These	were	“pretty	big	operations”7,	with	significant	risk.	However,	she	felt	that	the	morphine	she	was	taking	“took	the	horror	out	of	what	was	happening”8,	and	even	allowed	her	to	romanticise	the	possibility	of	death:	
I	remember	going	down	for	the	last	operation	and	thinking	I	might	not	see	my	husband	again.	I	might	not	see	my	parents	again.	And	it	wasn’t	as	shocking	as	it	should	have	been.	It	was	as	though	it	romanticised	it.	It	was	a	romantic	notion	that	I	could	get	wheeled	away	into	an	operating	theatre	and	might	not	come	out	again.	[I1:292-5]	
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The	morphine,	coupled	with	the	immobilisation	of	her	pelvis,	meant	her	pain	was	minimal	much	of	the	time.	However,	post-operative	pain	was	significant.	The	last	operation	was	“probably	the	most	painful,	even	more	painful	than	the	accident	itself”9.	Stephanie	was	in	hospital	for	6	weeks	before	returning	home.	She	had	reduced	mobility,	and	so	initially	slept	downstairs	in	her	lounge,	and	was	given	a	“wheelchair,	crutches,	things	to	help	me	get	in	and	out	of	the	bath,	things	to	help	me	sit	on	the	toilet,	that	sort	of	thing”10.	She	always	assumed	she	would	make	a	full	recovery,	albeit	potentially	slowly:	
[…]	once	I	knew	that	I	had	broken	my	pelvis,	and	I	learned	that	the	very	first	night,	to	me	it	was	just:	okay,	it’s	a	broken	bone,	they’ll	patch	me	up,	put	me	back	together,	and	I’ll	be	fine.	It	might	take	a	while,	it	might	be	a	bit	painful	while	they	do	it,	but	it’s	fine.	They	can	fix	it.	[I1:350-3]	However,	she	experienced	persistent	pain	in	her	back	related	to	the	injury,	and	a	year	after	the	accident	(six	months	after	returning	to	her	joba)	she	realised	that	this	pain	“wasn’t	going	to	go	away	completely”11.	This	presented	two	problems	to	Stephanie.	First,	physical	functioning	exacerbated	her	pain,	meaning	either	limiting	functioning	or	else	suffering	pain.	Practically,	this	means	she	“can	do	less	now”12	than	before	the	accident.	This	expresses	itself	in	everyday	choices	such	as	avoiding	standing	for	prolonged	periods,	and	taking	the	lift	rather	than	stairs.	Whilst	she	returned	to	horse-riding	(specifically,	dressage),	she	was	unable	to	function	to	the	same	level	as	before	because	“it	was	just	too	painful”13.	In	such	a	“perfectionist	sport”14	where	she	feels	the	need	to	“be	the	best	I	can	be”15,	she	found	that	“when	you’ve	been	better	it’s	hard	to	accept”16	such	reduced	functioning.	Nowhere	was	this	need	for	reduced	physical	function	more	apparent	than	her	return	to	work.	She	struggled	to	do	physical	tasks	like	lifting	items	to	and	from	storerooms	without	getting	significant	pain.	The	pressured	nature	of	the	job	(“rushing,	always	needing	things	doing	yesterday	[…]	that	kind	of	job	where	[…]	everybody’s	on	your	back”17)	made	this	pain	worse,	and	eventually	it	became	too	much:	
I	was	just	in	so	much	pain.	Every	night	I	was,	you	know,	crying	driving	home	with	the	pain	and	[…]	knowing	that	I	had	to	get	up	and	do	it	all	again	the	next	day.	And	knowing	that	you’ve	got	that	until	you	retire.	That’s,	that’s	a	long	time	(slightly	laughing)	to	think,	you	know,	I	was,	what,	31,	32	at	the	time,	thinking	I’ve	just	got	to	keep	doing	this.	And	it	wasn’t	long	after	that	that	I,	I	just,	everything	sort	of	fell	over.	I	fell	over	(laughs),	and	I	went	on	the	sick,	and	I	was	on	the	sick	for	a	few	weeks	with	it.	[I1:569-76]	
																																								 																					
a	The	relatively	niche	nature	of	her	job	means	that	stating	its	title	or	area	of	employment	could	compromise	anonymity,	and	so	therefore	it	is	not	given	here	or	in	the	transcripts.	
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Whilst	her	employer	subsequently	took	steps	to	minimise	Stephanie’s	physical	burden,	she	continues	to	struggle:	“there	are	still	days	when	I	[…]	drive	away	from	here	and	I	think:	I	
can’t	do	this	again	tomorrow	(whispering)”18.	The	second	problem	pain	posed	to	Stephanie	is	others’	misunderstanding	of	it.	Stephanie	described	many	situations	(usually	at	work)	where	she	is	forced	to	endure	pain	because	others	have	not	realised	that	she	needs	help.	She	also	talked	about	how	her	pain	treatment	from	medical	professionals	has	been	unsuitable	because	it	fails	to	relate	to	her	circumstances,	namely	that	she	is	already	very	active	for	a	chronic	pain	sufferer.	Stephanie	also	noted	becoming	excluded	in	social	situations	because	of	her	inability	to	stand	for	prolonged	periods,	having	to	either	endure	the	pain	of	standing	(such	as	with	friends	at	a	bar	or	with	colleagues	she	bumps	into	in	the	corridor	at	work)	or	else	choosing	to	sit	down	away	from	them.	Perhaps	most	significantly,	she	also	noted	how	misunderstanding	leads	to	her	being	negatively	morally	judged.	Thus,	she	discussed	taking	the	lift	at	work:	
All	of	us	had	been	to	a	meeting.	Three	of	us	were	waiting	for	a	lift	to	come	back	upstairs	and,	and	another	throwaway	comment:	‘Oh,	look	at	the	lazy	ones	waiting	for	the	lift’.	That’s	all	it	is.	But	it’s	happened	to	me	oh,	I	don’t	know,	a	dozen,	twenty	times.	And	you	do	get	fed	up	with	it,	you	really	do.	[I2:572-81]	Being	negatively	judged	as	morally	unacceptable	by	others	with	regard	to	her	motivation,	even	where	it	might	be	posited	in	humour	(such	as	in	the	above	example),	is	something	that	has	been	hurtful	to	Stephanie,	particularly	as	she	feels	her	job	is	now	“twice	the	effort”19.	Similarly,	she	discussed	feeling	that	others	may	judge	her	as	being	deceptive	about	her	pain	for	personal	gain	(namely	financial).	Thus,	she	talked	about	wanting	medical	staff	to	make	her	feel	“justified”20	for	her	treatment:	
I	cost	the	NHS	a	lot	of	money.	Appointments,	pills,	physio.	And	[…]	the	way	things	stand	none	of,	none	of	the	people	I’ve	seen	have,	have	given	me	the	impression	that	they	truly	believe	that	there’s	a	problem.	And	that	could	be	purely	in	my	head.	I	don’t	know.	[I1:1003-9]	Not	having	privileged	access	to	the	thoughts	of	others,	these	beliefs	must	frequently	persist	as	fears	and	suspicions	for	Stephanie	rather	than	as	certain	facts.	This	lack	of	privileged	access	also	means	she	is	never	sure	of	the	motive	for	others’	misunderstandings	of	her	pain	experience,	with	Stephanie	alternating	between	regarding	others	as	blamelessly	unaware	or	culpably	negligent	in	their	unawareness.	Blameless	unawareness	arises	because	pain	is	not	visible	to	others,	and	they	thus	cannot	be	held	responsible	for	their	unawareness	(“I’ve	learned	over	the	years	that	people	can’t	understand,	people	can’t	see	pain.	So	you’ve	got	to	cut	them	some	slack”21).	This	also	arises	because	Stephanie	regards	her	life	circumstances	(working	an	intensive,	full-time	job	and	maintaining	a	household)	and	carry-on	attitude	to	life	(discussed	in	detail	in	the	next	section)	as	particularly	unique	and	therefore	difficult	to	
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empathise	with.	More	fundamentally,	she	expressed	doubt	about	how	well	a	person	could	actually	be	understood	(“I	don’t	think	anybody	ever	truly	knows	anyone”22).	The	culpably	negligent,	by	contrast,	are	those	who	have	been	deemed	wanting	in	appreciating	Stephanie’s	circumstances.	These	might	make	a	“throwaway	comment”23	at	the	lift,	and	through	not	comprehending	the	insensitivity	of	their	actions	generate	Stephanie’s	anger	towards	them,	an	anger	(rarely	openly	expressed)	that	may	be	nevertheless	quickly	doused	with	guilt	as	she	switches	her	assessment	from	culpable	to	blameless	once	she	puts	herself	“in	their	position”24.	Stephanie	thus	remains	caught	within	an	oscillation	between	“frustration”25	at	others	and	a	general	fatalistic	melancholy.	More	fundamentally	Stephanie	had	a	feeling	of	being	alone	from	others	because	of	her	pain,	a	separation	that	started	from	the	moment	of	the	accident.	As	she	lay	on	the	ground	surrounded	by	people	it	was	“probably	the	loneliest”26	feeling	she	had	felt:	“I	knew	that	an	ambulance	would	come	and	cart	me	way	and	these	people	would	all	go	home	and	have	a	cup	of	tea	and	go	to	bed.	[…]	Whereas	my	life	had	just	suddenly	changed	completely”27.	Stephanie	hoped	that	one	day	she	would	encounter	someone	who	would	finally	be	able	to	empathise	with	her	struggle	with	pain,	which	she	assumed	would	be	someone	with	her	same	unique	circumstances.	“I	would	look	for	somebody	who	is	in	the	same	position	as	me	because	it’s	only	somebody	that’s	done	the	same	I	think	would	think	the	same”28.	Indeed,	“it	would	be	lovely	to	talk	to	somebody”29	with	mirror	circumstances,	but	since	the	accident	she	has	“never	met	anybody	yet	in	the	same	position”30	as	herself.	As	noted,	Stephanie	feels	fellow	chronic	pain	sufferers	do	not	relate	to	her	unique	circumstances	such	that	“in	17	years,	of	all	the	people	I’ve	met	through	the	pain	clinic	and	all	the	rest	of	it	and	general	life	[…]	I’ve	never	come	across	anybody	in	[the	same]	position”31.	Moreover,	she	had	doubts	that	meeting	this	one	person	would	have	the	transformative	effect	she	desires:	
I’m	classing	[meeting	someone	in	the	same	position]	as	the	Holy	Grail,	and	I	think	what	would	actually	change	even	if	I	did?	It	would	be	lovely	to	have	somebody	to	have	a	nice	chat	with	[…]	and	have	a	mutual	whinge	(laughing	slightly).	But	nothing	would	change	at	the	end	of	that	conversation.	[I4:618-22]	It	seemed	that	Stephanie	was	keeping	herself	separate	from	those	in	chronic	pain	–	as	if	she	saw	something	in	them	so	unacceptable	to	her	own	sense	of	self	that	she	had	to	maintain	this	distance.	Indeed,	in	the	following	section	it	is	suggested	that	those	in	chronic	pain	represent	‘weakness’	for	Stephanie,	something	that	she	cannot	accept	as	part	of	her	identity.	Crucially,	this	rejection	of	weakness	means	the	rejection	of	potential	help	that	could	mitigate	the	problems	of	pain	outlined	above.			
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(2)	STOICISM	AND	THE	REJECTION	OF	‘WEAKNESS’	
Stephanie	discussed	how	she	has	a	“no	such	word	as	can’t”32	attitude,	something	she	applied	to	her	chronic	pain.	This	attitude	involves	supressing	the	problems	of	pain	in	order	to	function,	and	it	“helps	enormously.	You	sit	around	thinking	about	your	back	pain	and	it	[…]	overwhelms	you.	You	put	it	to	the	back	of	your	mind	and	just	get	on	with	other	things	and	you	deal	with	it”33.	More	broadly,	this	attitude	involves	regarding	emotion	as	problematic	to	functioning	(and	thus	her	attitude	might	be	described	as	stoica),	with	her	characterising	herself	as	“more	practical	than	emotional”34,	as	a	rational	scientist	who	solves	problems	without	the	drama	of	emotion	(“I’m	a	scientist.	Once	I	realised	we	had	this	problem,	I	just	set	about	solving	it”35).	After	the	accident	Stephanie	applied	her	effort	and	attitude	to	the	process	of	recovery,	undertaking	much	physical	activity	despite	the	pain,	in	order	to	get	fit.	“As	soon	as	I	could	drive	I	started	to	go	to	aqua-fit	and	got	myself	out	walking	and	got	myself	as	fit	as	I	could”36.	This	culminated	in	a	long-distance	walking	event	and	then	a	half	marathon	approximately	a	year	after	the	accident.	This	“was	me	proving	that	I	could	get	back	to	how	I	was”37.	However,	the	realisation	that	her	pain	was	not	going	away	meant	she	began	to	appreciate	that	the	‘normal’	(pre-accident)	activities	of	her	day-to-day	life	required	the	real	focus	of	her	effort	and	attitude:	
[…]	that’s	what	I	didn’t	understand	when	I	set	myself	the	goal	of	the	[half	marathon].	I	thought	if	I	can	do	that,	I’m	better.	And	I	was	wrong.	And	it’s,	you	know,	it’s	the	(pause)	sort	of	living	happily	ever	after	that	is	the	hard	bit.	[I4:456-8]	Indeed,	discussing	a	TV	program	where	maimed	former	soldiers	of	the	war	in	Afghanistan	undertook	an	expedition	to	the	South	Pole,	she	questioned	the	notion	that	such	dramatic	demonstrations	of	physical	ability	(in	light	of	disability)	represented	the	height	of	stoic	fortitude	that	they	are	often	posited	as:	
[…]	the	commentator	on	[the	show]	said	it	was	the	ultimate	test	of	endurance.	And	my	mum	and	I	were	watching	it	together	and	I	said	‘that’s	not	the	ultimate	test	of	endurance.	Try	working	full-time	for	20	years	with	your	injury.	That’s	the	ultimate	test	of	endurance’.	[I4:441-6]	
																																								 																					
a	Specifically,	the	familiarity	of	Stephanie’s	attitude	with	the	philosophy	of	stoicism	is	the	effort	to	attain	a	state	where	one	is	not	disturbed	by	emotion	(apatheia).	Stoicism	regards	such	disturbance	as	an	expression	of	actions	that	have	deviated	from	actions	that	are	in	accordance	with	the	proper	functioning	of	nature	(kathekon)	(Sedley,	2015).	It	is	more	difficult	to	read	this	latter	concept	in	Stephanie’s	attitude,	however,	and	indeed	other	concepts	from	the	stoic	canon.	Thus,	use	of	the	terms	
stoic	and	stoicism	with	reference	to	Stephanie’s	attitude	should	be	regarded	more	as	a	term	of	convenience	to	refer	to	her	attitude	than	any	deeper	familiarity	with	stoic	philosophy	beyond	
apatheia.	
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The	application	of	a	stoic	attitude	to	tasks	of	daily	life	provided	Stephanie	with	a	practical	tool	allowing	her	to	partake	in	the	“nice	things	about	life”38	(namely	“the	going	out	with	your	friends,	[…]	the	horse-riding,	the	gardening”39).	It	also	means	she	mitigates	some	of	the	problems	of	being	in	pain:	she	can	continue	to	work	and	run	her	house,	avoid	negative	judgement	from	others,	and	stop	exclusion	in	social	situations.	However,	there	seemed	to	be	something	more	fundamental	to	Stephanie’s	enactment	of	the	stoic	attitude	that	went	beyond	mitigating	the	problems	of	pain.	Indeed,	there	was	something	very	significant	for	Stephanie	about	being	stoical	in-and-of-itself.	It	seemed	that	allowing	pain	to	change	her	life	was	so	devastating	less	because	of	the	problems	pain	presented	than	because	the	act	of	
change	itself	represents	a	failure	to	be	stoical.	This	emphasis	on	the	act	of	change	as	evidence	for	the	failure	of	stoicism	was	notable	in	Stephanie’s	interviews.	Thus,	she	said	“just	the	very	idea	of	letting	[her	injury]	affect	me,	letting	it	affect	my	life,	is,	to	me,	it’s	like	I’ve	failed”40.	Similarly,	fellow	chronic	pain	sufferers	remain	non-relatable	to	Stephanie	because	in	holding	up	a	mirror	to	her	own	life	they	represent	the	horrifying	possibility	of	Stephanie	as	an	end	product	of	the	act	of	change	that	was	her	accident,	and	thus	as	proof	of	that	act	of	change:	
S:	[…]	all	I	see	are	these	people	talking	about	their	injuries,	their	accidents,	their	operations,	their	pain,	how	it	affects	their	lives,	and	I	think	I	don’t	want	to	be	that	[…]	L:	What	would	it	mean	to	be	that?	S:	That	would	mean	that	the	accident	has	won	and	I	had	just	become	a	product	of	an	accident.	[I4:663-71]	Chronic	pain	sufferers	constitute	embodied	evidence	for	the	failure	of	stoicism,	and	relating	to	them	would	threaten	to	make	the	act	of	change,	and	thus	the	failure	of	her	own	stoic	attitude,	a	reality	for	Stephanie.		The	imperative	to	enact	stoicism	in-and-of-itself	reflects	the	fact	that	it	has	been	so	important	in	coming	to	define	who	she	is.	As	she	said	repeatedly	in	the	interviews,	her	stoic	attitude	is	“how	I’ve	been	brought	up”41:	
You’ll	see	parents	with	children	and	the	child	falls	down	and	skins	their	knee.	Some	parents	will	go	‘oh,	poor	thing.	Let’s	go	and	sit	you	down	and	look	at	it’,	and	some	parents	will	stand	you	up,	brush	you	down	and	say	‘	‘way	you	go.	Get	back	playing’.	And	I	was	in	the	second	category,	and	that	defines	who	you	become.	[I3:164-71]	In	contrast,	to	fall	within	the	first	category	means	being	“weak”42.a	Not	being	stoical	in	this	way	is	something	that	Stephanie	regards	as	a	morally	inferior	position	(“I	think	you	can	look	
																																								 																					
a	This	word	and	its	stem-words	were	used	a	total	of	61	times	by	Stephanie	and	myself	across	the	interviews.	
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down	your	nose	at	people	who	aren’t	like	that”43).	Notably,	this	stoic	morality	is	incredibly	
social	in	its	enactment	because,	for	Stephanie,	to	be	stoical	means	avoiding	weakness	in	the	eyes	of	others.	Thus,	she	said	that	at	work	“I	could	do	with	[…]	help	and	it’s	embarrassing	that	[work	colleagues]	know	I	need	it”44.	Moreover,	she	remains	alert	to	the	socially	identifiable	markers	of	weakness.	Whilst	having	a	visibly	identifiable	sign	of	her	pain	might	help	to	garner	understanding	insofar	as	it		
would	be	a	visible	thing	so	that	people	could	see	it	and	realise	that	I’m	in	pain,	to	me	it	feels	like	it’s	a	sign	of	weakness	and	I	shouldn’t	[show	it].	As	much	as	I	want	people	to	cut	me	some	slack,	I	guess,	because	of	my	pain,	I	also	don’t	want	to	admit	to	them	that	I’m	in	pain.	[I1:122-6]	The	social	nature	of	her	stoicism	means	that	the	suppression	of	emotion	takes	on	the	form	of	hiding	it	from	the	view	of	another,	and	its	discovery	by	another	is	a	failure	of	stoicism	(“I	guess	I	consider	people	who	can’t	hide	their	emotions,	when	they	want	to,	are	weak”45).	Being	seen	as	weak	by	others	risks	losing	their	“respect”46	(asking	for	help	from	work	colleagues	may	mean	they	“respect	me	a	little	less”47).	Indeed,	being	stoical	has	the	effect	of	establishing	a	moral	virtuousness,	or	‘respect’,	of	Stephanie	in	the	eyes	of	others.	Moreover,	Stephanie	seemed	to	feel	that	the	enactment	of	stoicism	deserved	an	acknowledgement	of	respect	from	others.	Thus,	having	received	little	acknowledgement	for	her	stoic	struggle	with	pain,	she	found	herself	seeking	it:	“I	don’t	even	like	admitting	it	to	myself	[but]	I	think	I	want	a	bit	of	praise.	I	think	I	want	somebody	to	say	to	me	‘you	do	quite	well’	”48.	Stephanie’s	concept	of	stoicism	might	be	seen	as	a	social	contract,	the	rules	of	which	stipulate	that	respect	from	others	is	earned	for	the	burden	involved	in	silently	(or	invisibly)	managing	problems.	And	when	Stephanie’s	stoicism	has	not	produced	the	expected	degree	of	acknowledgement	(as	per	the	rules	of	the	stoical	social	contract),	this	makes	her	become	even	more	stoical	in	order	to	try	and	earn	the	respect	from	others	(“I	think	it	makes	me	try	more.	So	I	keep	going	in	this	sort	of	treadmill	of	trying	to	get	approval”49).	Entering	into	the	social	contract	of	stoicism	means	that	there	must	be	agreement	that	making	pain	socially	visible	is	morally	unacceptable.	Thus,	when	she	discussed	people	as	“not	interested”50	in	talking	about	pain,	this	was	expressed	almost	as	if	it	were	a	social	rule	that	(for	the	most	part)	she	herself	accepted	without	complaint	(i.e.	stoically).	I	have	suggested	that	Stephanie’s	stoic	social	contract	has	a	moral	nature	insofar	as	it	divides	people	into	socially	acknowledged	categories	of	virtuous	and	deplorable	depending	on	whether	or	not	they	can	satisfy	the	terms	of	the	contract.	Its	moral	character	is	given	weight	through	the	emphasis	that	Stephanie	places	on	justice	(“I’m	quite	big	on	justice,	of	it	being	a	just	world”51).	Believing	in	justice	means	believing	in	the	terms	of	social	contracts,	be	it	a	contract	to	be	honest	when	claiming	state	welfare	benefits	in	circumstances	of	incapacity	(hence	her	desire	to	feel	“justified”52	in	using	NHS	services),	a	contract	to	work	
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hard	in	their	job	in	exchange	for	a	secure	source	of	money	(“I	think	everybody	ought	to	earn	their	money	[in	their	job]	otherwise	they	should	be	out	on	their	ear”53),	or	to	receive	punishment	only	when	a	crime	is	permitted	(at	school	her	sister	“was	[wrongly]	blamed	[by	teachers]	quite	a	lot	(laughing)	and	I	so	(emphasis)	wanted	to	put	it	right.	I	wanted	to	go	to	the	teachers	and	say	‘you’ve	got	this	wrong’	”54).	These	are	social	contracts	that	she	expects	others	to	abide	by,	and	for	justice	to	make	a	correction	when	they	don’t	(“I	expect	people	to	live	up	to	my	standards	and	I’m	harsh	when	they	don’t”55).	Thus,	when	the	stoic	social	contract	is	not	fulfilled	it	is	regarded	as	an	injustice,	amplifying	her	feeling	that	she	deserves	praise	for	her	stoic	handling	of	pain.	Indeed,	the	anger	and	frustration	at	being	misunderstood,	which	is	certainly	an	injustice	in	her	eyes	(“if	there’s	some	sort	of	injustice	like	[…]	if	I’m	misjudged,	or	judged	by	somebody	who	doesn’t	have	all	the	facts,	then	I	feel	it	quite	keenly”56),	can	be	interpreted	as	arising	from	the	injustice	she	feels	at	not	being	acknowledged	for	her	stoic	handling	of	chronic	pain.	Stoicism	for	Stephanie	can	thus	be	regarded	as	a	social	contract	with	significant	moral	consequences,	one	that	has	its	roots	within	her	upbringing.	Whilst	it	is	something	she	regards	as	very	positive	to	her	(she	is	“absolutely	glad”57	that	her	family	raised	her	that	way),	the	fact	that	its	enactment	must	come	at	the	expense	of	seeking	help	for	the	problems	of	pain	she	encounters	(as	outlined	in	the	first	theme)	created	significant	conflict,	as	the	next	section	discusses.	
(3)	CONFLICT	BETWEEN	THE	NEED	FOR	HELP	AND	THE	STOIC	ATTITUDE	
Throughout	the	interviews	Stephanie	gave	examples	of	how	the	problems	of	pain	outlined	in	the	first	theme	might	be	mitigated.	For	example,	she	might	choose	to	limp	in	order	to	move	with	less	pain	(this	“takes	the	weight	off	where	the	pain	is”58),	to	sit	down	rather	than	stand	(“I’ll	sit	until	I	feel	a	little	bit	better”59),	or	to	get	help	from	a	work	colleague	with	a	physical	task	(one	instance	of	assistance	“was	just	a	simple	one-minute	job	[for	her	colleague,	but…]	to	me	it’s	such	a	difference”60).	There	is	also	the	possibility	that	she	could	connect	to	fellow	chronic	pain	patients	through	questioning	the	negative	conception	she	has	of	them	as	a	‘product	of	an	accident’	(she	recognised	that	her	perspective	is	partial	because	she	“only”61	sees	them	in	the	“artificial	situations”62	of	the	pain	clinic	–	“that’s	the	only	bit	of	them	I	see”63).	However,	Stephanie	talked	about	“battles”64	that	went	on	in	her	head	between	the	desire	to	seek	help	for	her	pain	and	her	stoic	attitude	that	regards	seeking	help	as	a	moral	failure.	Indeed,	talking	about	her	experience	at	work	she	said:	
There	is	tough	little	me	saying	‘get	on	with	it,	it’s	your	job’,	and	then	there’s	this	little	common	sense	angel	or	devil,	I’m	not	sure	which,	sat	on	my	shoulder	saying	‘you	could	do	with	some	help	here’.	[I5:70-3]	
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In	the	above	quote	the	attitude	that	seeks	help	is	regarded	as	“common	sense”,	whilst	in	other	parts	of	the	interviews	it	is	the	stoic	attitude	that	is	regarded	as	such	(see	the	previous	section).	This,	and	her	uncertainty	over	whether	the	help-seeking	attitude	is	“angel	or	devil”,	indicates	the	shifting	terrain	that	accompanies	the	battle	between	these	two	attitudes.	Reflecting	the	social	nature	of	the	stoic	social	contract,	the	conflict	between	the	attitudes	frequently	pivoted	on	whether	her	pain	would	be	made	visible	to	others	(something	that	would	be	an	enactment	of	weakness).	For	example,	she	said	that	
if	I	[…]	come	into	work	on	a	morning	and	somebody	stands	and	talks	to	me,	I	am	in	agony	stood	there	before	I’ve	had	my	pills,	and	morning	is	my	worst,	most	painful	time.	[…But]	I	would	swallow	razor	blades	before	I’d	say	to	them	‘I’m	going	to	have	to	go	and	sit	down,	I’m	sore’.	[…I]t’s	a	sign	of	weakness.	[I1:129-36]	Pressed	between	a	desire	to	alleviate	her	pain	by	sitting	down	and	a	need	not	to	show	weakness,	she	chooses	to	endure	significant	pain	to	maintain	her	stoicism.	Similarly,	while	seeking	help	from	others	when	she	is	struggling	with	a	physical	task	would	alleviate	her	pain,	her	stoic	attitude	fights	against	such	a	visible	sign	of	weakness.	Thus,	she	discussed	one	example:	
I	was	doing	some	pretty	physical	stuff	on	the	[work	task]	and	I	was	at	my	limits	[…]	of	what	I	can	lift,	and	it	was	stuff	that	was	way	up	aheight,	so	it	was	at	the	limit	of	what	I	could	reach	as	well.	And	there	was	a	[…nearby	room	that]	was	full	of	[work	colleagues]	who	were	sat	around	having	a	coffee	and	a	natter	and	watching	me	struggle.	And	I	thought	there’s	no	way	on	god’s	earth	I’m	going	to	go	and	ask	them	for	help	(laughing	slightly).	[I3:57-63]	Sometimes,	however,	the	stoic	attitude	fails,	and	that	which	is	supressed	cannot	be	contained.	The	time	when	she	(metaphorically)	“fell	over”65	following	her	return	to	work	(see	the	first	theme,	above)	is	an	example	of	this,	where	she	could	no	longer	endure	the	pain	that	was	experienced	on	a	day-to-day	basis	in	her	job.	This	period	of	time	was	associated	with	significant	outpouring	of	emotion	(and	visibly	so	to	others),	something	that	Stephanie	felt	embarrassed	about	but	could	not	prevent:	
S:	I	do	remember	going	to	see	the	occupational	health	nurse	and	talking	to	him,	and	he	said	to	me	‘you	seem	a	bit	down.	Are	you	all	right?’	And	I	welled	up.	And	I	was	absolutely	mortified.	L:	Mortified	about	welling	up?	S:	Yeah.	Yeah,	absolutely.	Weakness	again.	[I1:724-31]	Despite	the	weakness,	she	“couldn’t	have	hidden	that	emotion”66.	Her	“snapping”67	at	work	colleagues	making	throwaway	comments	at	the	lift	about	her	being	too	lazy	to	use	the	stairs	might	similarly	be	seen	as	a	situation	where	a	problem	of	pain	(being	misunderstood)	becomes	too	much	to	be	stoically	contained.	Nevertheless,	such	moments	where	her	stoic	attitude	is	overwhelmed	do	not	constitute	some	lasting	resolution	to	the	conflict.	As	noted	in	
137	
the	first	theme,	whilst	she	was	then	able	to	return	to	work	with	greater	levels	of	physical	assistance,	she	still	continued	to	struggle	with	physical	tasks	without	seeking	help.	Moreover,	the	snapping	at	others	is	regarded	with	guilt	(“it’s	not	something	I	should	have	done”68)	–	as	a	temporary	aberration	from	the	moral	virtuousness	of	stoicism.	The	failure	of	stoicism,	and	thus	of	a	potential	resolution	to	the	conflict,	is	therefore	only	temporary.	Stephanie	did	seem	to	be	able	to	be	able	to	receive	a	limited	degree	of	help	whilst	also	maintaining	a	stoic	attitude.	Thus,	the	instances	where	she	snapped	at	others	permitted	a	communication	of	her	experience	of	pain	whilst	also	being	positioned	into	a	tolerable	stance	for	the	stoic	attitude	because	of	her	expressions	of	regret	and	the	relative	infrequency	of	these	events	(she	insisted,	in	what	seemed	to	be	an	embarrassed	way,	that	they	are	“very	rare”69).	Moreover,	she	would	accept	help	from	others	as	long	as	she	did	not	have	to	ask	for	help,	emphasising	the	importance	of	the	social	enactment	of	weakness.	Moreover,	she	said	“I	would	love	for	everyone	to	know	[she	is	in	pain]	without	me	having	to	tell	them”70,	and	she	did	not	lose	the	respect	of	others	when	her	employer	reduced	the	physical	burden	of	her	job	because	“the	difference	was	somebody	else	was	telling	them”71	to	give	her	help	with	physical	tasks.	However,	it	was	apparent	that	the	degree	of	help	she	received	was	not	sufficient	to	resolve	the	conflict	between	the	two	attitudes.	Indeed,	later	in	the	interviews	she	said	“I	do	need	to	find	a	compromise,	there’s	no	doubt	about	it.	I	can’t	carry	on	like	this”72.	
(4)	A	COMPROMISE	TO	COME	
The	possibility	of	such	a	compromise	rested	on	the	belief	that	she	needed	to	begin	to	somehow	accept	that	she	does	need	help,	and	thus	(from	a	stoic	perspective)	accept	that	she	is	weak	(“I’ve	got	to	acknowledge,	and	I	do	acknowledge,	that	to	some	degree	I	am	weak.	In	some	situations	I	am	weak”73).	Accepting	that	she	needs	help	also	means	being	able	to	ask	for	that	help	(“I’m	going	to	have	to	learn	to	[…]	say	more	often	‘I’m	struggling,	can	I	have	some	help?’”74).	However,	such	a	‘compromise'	must	manage	the	confrontation	involved	in	saying	‘I	can’t’	(when	accepting	the	need	for	help)	in	the	face	of	the	stoic	upbringing	that	has	taught	her	that	there	is	“no	such	word	as	can’t”75.	Indeed,	in	the	interviews	we	discussed	the	problem	in	terms	of	an	inability	to	replace	her	existing	stoic	identity	with	another.	She	said	“I	can’t	think	of	a	way	of	doing	that.	[…]	That	is	a	brick	wall”76	Reflecting	the	notion	(discussed	earlier)	that	it	is	the	act	of	change	that	is	significant,	she	said	“I	cannot	think	of	a	way	of	doing	it	that’s	not	got	a	negative	vibe	to	it”77.	However,	despite	such	pessimism	about	the	possibility	of	a	compromise,	her	desire	to	avoid	the	unbearable	existence	within	the	conflict	(“I	can’t	carry	on	like	this”78)	combined	with	a	number	of	reappraisals	of	how	she	conceived	her	stoic	attitude.	
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The	blind	nature	with	which	she	makes	assumptions	about	how	others	are	perceiving	her	(“I	can’t	even	imagine	that	I	would	ever	find	out”79	how	they	actually	perceive	her)	(see	second	theme)	led	her	to	question	whether	the	she	has	accurately	assessed	that	people	interpret	her	actions	as	weak:	
And	it	might	be	that	when	I	try	[seeking	help,	that]	other	people’s	reaction	to	it	isn’t	as	bad	as	I’m	imagining.	[…]	Maybe	my	imagination	is	too	fertile	with	these	things	and	I	need	to	just	try	them	instead.	[I4:924-7]	Moreover,	she	also	questioned	whether	others’	perceptions	should	hold	such	significance	in	defining	her	(“I	have	noticed	through	talking	to	you	that	I	think	too	much	about	what	other	people	think	of	me,	and	I	need	to	not	do	that	so	much”80).	More	fundamentally,	Stephanie	also	began	to	explore	that	whilst	her	stoic	attitude	is	nominally	present	for	the	purposes	of	helping	her	in	life	(the	reason	her	family	instilled	it	in	her),	its	rigidity	in	refusing	help	meant	it	has	become	unhelpful:	
[…]	whilst	I’m	glad	I’ve	been	brought	up	with	that	[‘no	such	word	as	can’t’]	mantra,	perhaps	I’ve	got	to	recognise	that	I’ve	taken	it	a	step	too	far	and	I	need	to	be	sensible	about	it.	It’s	[…]	a	saying	that	is	meant	to	encourage,	[…]	not	kill	you	off	early	(laughing).	I’m	not	meant	to	kill	myself	trying.	[I5:199-204]	Our	interviews	ended	with	her	affirming	the	need	to	achieve	this	compromise.	It	represented	a	sort	of	theoretical	resolution	to	the	conflict,	one	that	she	recognised	had	always	lingered	as	a	possibility,	but	never	with	the	same	level	of	conviction	to	actually	put	it	into	practice	due	to	the	sheer	embeddedness	of	her	stoic	attitude	(“it’s	having	the	guts	to	do	something	about	it	I	think	is	the	new	thing”81).	Having	now	fully	committed	to	the	compromise,	a	form	of	narrative	closure	had	been	achieved.	But	the	story	was	one	that	had	not	reached	full	completion.	Stephanie’s	narrative	of	chronic	pain	experience	had	a	final	chapter	that	was	yet	to	be	written,	but	which	had	nevertheless	already	been	plotted	out	by	the	narrative	we	had	produced	over	our	interviews,	where	the	theoretical	commitment	to	the	compromise	was	put	into	practice:	
I’ve	ignored	this	part	of	me	maybe	asking	for	help	or	admitting	to	others	that	I	need	help.	And	I	think	just	going	through	this	(emphasis)	process	with	you	has	made	me	realise	[…]	how	much	I	don’t	do	that	and	how	that	could	be	another	chapter	in	learning	to	manage	my	pain.	[I5:47-51]					
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SECOND	MOVEMENT:	THE	UNRAVELLING	OF	STOICISM	
The	non-relational	element	to	the	above	narrative	arose	in	the	enactment	of	Stephanie’s	stoicism	as	containing	elements	that	are	profoundly	unstoical.	This	section	is	split	into	two	parts.	The	first	discusses	the	extended	field	of	vision	(from	the	vantage	point	of	the	method	assemblage	to	the	vantage	point	of	the	pinboard),	revealing	that	alongside	the	first	movement	narrative	there	is	a	second	narrative	that	is	necessarily	Othered-into-absence	to	permit	the	coherence	of	the	first.	The	second	part	of	the	section	identifies	the	boundary	objects	explored	that	permitted	this	extension	of	vision,	discussing	their	conversion	from	intermediaries	of	the	first	movement	narrative	to	mediators	that	provide	a	conduit	to	an	additional	narrative.	
AN	EXTENDED	FIELD	OF	VISION	
The	first	movement	narrative	enacted	stoicism	as	a	social	contract	where	a	person	should	be	acknowledged	as	morally	virtuous	if	they	keep	their	problems	from	others,	and	morally	lacking	if	they	reveal	them.a	This	social	contract	constitutes	a	moral	code	that	emotionally	affected	Stephanie,	both	in	terms	of	despair	at	being	regarded	as	weak	when	she	did	reveal	her	problems,	and	anger	when	others	didn’t	acknowledge	her	virtuousness	in	concealing	them.	Both	express	a	constitutive	element	of	Stephanie’s	stoicism	of	an	emotional	need	to	be	approved	by	others.	Yet	this	emotional	need	is	very	anti-stoical	when	it	is	contrasted	with	how	she	also	constructs	stoicism	around	a	binary	opposition	between	the	“practical”82	logic	of	a	disinterested	scientist	(stoical)	versus	being	emotional	(not	stoical).	In	the	first	movement	this	internal	contradiction	is	never	made	fully	visible,	but	only	opaquely	acknowledged.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	7,	‘overflow’	cannot	be	denied	outright	but	is	more	or	less	successfully	shoehorned	into	an	account	that	can	‘barely’	contain	it,	an	account	that	is	unravelled	upon	a	close	reading.	This	sub-section	considers	how	the	emotional	basis	of	stoicism	was	Othered-into-absence	in	the	first	movement	narrative.	First,	the	emotional	affect	Stephanie	experienced	at	the	thought	of	being	regarded	as	‘weak’	by	others	was	causally	attributed	to	the	impact	of	the	accident	(in	terms	of	pain	affecting	her	ability	to	function).	Rather	than	being	recognised	as	an	expression	of	an	emotional	need	for	approval	necessary	for	the	enactment	of	stoicism,	in	the	first	movement	narrative	it	is	projected	onto	an	external	category	of	the	consequence	of	the	accident,	leaving	stoicism	to	
																																								 																					
a	This	can	be	found	in	wider	cultural	expressions	such	as	Rudyard	Kipling’s	(1910/2001)	poem	“If–”:	“If	you	can	keep	your	head	when	all	about	you	/	are	losing	theirs	[…]”,	“And	lose,	and	start	again	at	your	beginnings	/	And	never	breathe	a	word	about	your	loss”	(p.	127),	“Yours	is	the	Earth	and	everything	that’s	in	it”	(p.	128).	
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be	defined	only	by	its	anti-emotional	nature.	The	internal	contradiction	of	stoicism	is	thus	rebranded	as	a	conflict	between	her	need-for-help	and	her	stoic	attitude.	The	internal	contradiction	was	less	easy	to	Other	in	the	second	emotional	manifestation	of	Stephanie’s	stoic	need	for	approval:	the	affect	she	experienced	when	she	didn’t	get	the	approval	she	‘deserves’	for	concealing	her	problems.	In	the	first	movement	narrative	Stephanie	described	being	caught	on	a	“sort	of	treadmill	of	trying	to	get	approval”.83	Here	the	lack	of	acknowledgement	from	others	in	praise	of	her	stoic	carry-on	attitude	makes	her	“try	more”84	to	get	this	approval.	This	trying	to	be	more	stoical	involves	hiding	(or	denying)	the	emotional	upset	of	lack	of	approval	that	might	actually	prompt	the	approval	she	requires,	whilst	simultaneously	requiring	an	even	greater	demand	for	social	approval	because	of	the	greater	degree	of	stoic	non-disclosure	enacted.	Just	like	a	treadmill,	the	increased	‘speed’	of	being	more	stoical	does	not	result	in	the	greater	travelled	‘distance’	of	approval	from	others,	something	which	prompts	a	further	increase	in	speed	to	achieve	what	is	always	an	unachievable	aim.	In	this	sense,	the	treadmill	analogy	expresses	a	consequence	of	the	internal	contradiction	of	stoicism	between	an	emotional	need	for	approval	and	a	principle	of	denying	emotional	reactions	that	might	actually	provoke	the	approval	she	needs.		In	the	treadmill	analogy	the	internal	contradiction	of	stoicism	is	only	expressed	as	an	implied	(and	unseen)	cause.	However,	there	was	at	least	one	moment	of	explicit	expression	in	the	first	movement	narrative,	where	she	experiences	horror	at	the	realisation	that	approval	is	a	powerful	emotional	need	for	her:	
S:	This	is	going	to	sound	horrible,	and	I	hat-,	and	I	don’t	even	like	admitting	it	to	myself	[that]	I	think	I	want	a	bit	of	praise.	L:	Okay.	S:	I	think	I	want	somebody	to	say	to	me	‘you	do	quite	well’.	L:	Why	is	that	horrible?	S:	I	suppose	that	is	self-pitying	isn’t	it,	in	a	way,	it’s,	I	don’t	know,	it’s	not	a	charitable	thing	to	think	[…].	[I1:930-6]	The	emotional	need	for	approval	has	to	be	‘admitted’	because	it	does	not	properly	fit	with	the	first	movement	narrative’s	construction	of	stoicism	as	anti-emotional.	Whilst	the	‘horrible’	nature	of	this	realisation	might	be	equated	to	the	sudden	destabilisation	of	stoicism	from	a	purely	anti-emotional	enactment,	it	also	offers	a	solution	for	Othering	stoicism’s	emotional	need	for	approval	into	absence.	For	rather	than	re-conceiving	the	need	for	approval	as	a	part	of	what	it	means	to	be	stoical,	it	becomes	projected	as	something	outside	of	stoicism	that	is	a	threat	to	it,	just	as	occurs	with	her	emotional	upset	at	being	regarded	as	‘weak’.	Indeed,	both	expressions	of	the	emotional	need	for	approval	are	
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constructed	as	a	suddenly-realised	external	threat	to	stoicism,	a	threat	to	be	neutralised	by	being	more	stoical.	She	thus	talked	of	the	“revelation”85	(generated	through	talking	in	our	interviews)	that	she	thinks	“too	much”86	about	what	other	people	think	of	her,	and	that	she	needs	“to	not	do	that	so	much”87.	The	revelation	had	“come	as	quite	a	shock	to	me	because	I	always	thought	I	was	more	of	a	[…]	confident	enough	person	to	do	what	I	think	is	right”88,	and	that	“grown-ups	shouldn’t	care	so	much	what	people	say.	They	should	have	the	confidence	to	live	their	life	as	they	see	fit”.89	This	insight	offers	the	promise	of	denouement,	of	a	narrative	closure	to	the	(rebranded)	controversy	of	her	stoic	attitude.	If	she	is	not	able	to	reappraise	the	attitudes	of	others	then	she	needs	to	be	more	stoical	through	not	allowing	herself	to	be	emotionally	affected	by	their	opinions.	This	resolution	allows	us	to	leave	behind	the	controversy	of	the	current	(first	movement)	narrative	as	soon-to-be	resolved,	allowing	her	to	begin	“another	chapter”90	in	her	experience	of	chronic	pain.	In	this	conceptualisation	she	Others	into	absence	the	fact	that	her	construction	of	stoicism	requires	acknowledgment	from	others,	something	that	is	distributed	into	a	separate	part	of	the	transcript	that	is	never	openly	connected	with	its	anti-emotional	enactment.	At	the	same	time,	she	is	nevertheless	able	to	acknowledge	the	presence	of	the	need	for	emotional	approval	that	is	a	necessary	(but	controversial)	part	of	the	enactment	of	stoicism.	
FROM	INTERMEDIARIES	TO	MEDIATORS	
Whilst	the	first	movement	may	have	managed	to	(barely)	contain	this	excess	and	Other	into	absence	the	internal	contradiction	of	Stephanie’s	stoicism,	an	exploration	of	the	boundary	objects	in	the	first	movement	narrative	drew	attention	to	absent-presences	that	made	the	emotional	basis	of	this	stoicism	impossible	to	bracket	in	any	analysis	(thus	permitting	the	extended	field	of	vision	of	the	previous	subsection).	Exploring	intermediaries	that	served	to	enact	the	meaning	of	the	first	movement	narrative	resulted	in	their	re-constitution	as	mediators	enacting	another	narrative	in	addition	to	the	first	movement.	This	process	began	in	the	exploration	of	stoicism	in	relation	to	Stephanie’s	family.	In	the	first	movement	narrative	her	stoical	attitude	had	its	source	in	her	family,	who	passed	it	on	to	her	whilst	growing	up.	Indeed,	when	examining	the	reasons	why	she	chose	to	follow	various	moral	rules,	she	repeatedly	cited	her	upbringing	as	the	original	cause.	For	example,	she	said	“that’s	how	I’ve	been	brought	up”91,	“it’s	just	the	way	I’ve	been	brought	up”92,	and	“that’s	my	upbringing”93.	She	noted	that	“this	[stoical]	attitude,	this	upbringing	that	I’ve	had,	means	that	I	can	do	all	sorts	of	stuff	[…such	that]	I	consider	myself	an	equal	to	my	husband	and	he	considers	me	an	equal”94.	Two	family	members	in	particular	were	identified	by	Stephanie	as	strong	stoical	role	models	bequeathing	the	‘no	such	word	as	can’t’	stoical	
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mantra	to	her:	her	mother	and	her	grandmother.	In	our	interviews	we	discussed	how	in	her	stimulus	material	she	explicitly	named	these	two	women	as	the	source	of	the	mantra.	Thus,	Stephanie	noted	how	her	mother	“is	absolutely	of	the	same,	same	attitude	[as	Stephanie].	She	has	her	own	health	problems	and	she	keeps	on	keeping	on.	So	she’s,	she’s	just	taught	me	what	she	does”95.	But	perhaps	most	of	all	‘no	such	word	as	can’t’	belonged	to	her	“tough	cookie”96	grandmother	(“it	was	her,	her	mantra	[…]	and	she	always	lived	by	that”97).	Such	feminine	strength	meant	she	grew	up	empowered	instead	of	a	“little	woman”98	that	“you	see	[in]	certain	marriages”99.	She	said	that	if	she	had	had	children	of	her	own	“I’d	have	wanted	them	brought	up	to	be	tough”100	in	the	same	way	she	was.	Exploring	why	she	behaves	in	a	stoical	manner	always	ultimately	led	back	to	the	simple	explanation	that	this	was	because	of	her	upbringing	–	“it’s	just	the	way	I’ve	been	brought	up”101	(my	emphasis).	All	roads	of	enquiry	led	to	the	same	‘upbringing’	terminus,	shutting	down	further	explanation	that	the	exploration	of	her	stoicism	sought	and	which	the	objects	constituting	the	first	movement	narrative	had	been	obliged	to	provide	through	their	positioning	in	causal	relationships.	But	in	being	so	insufficient	this	simplicity	prompted	further	questions	that	pushed	against	this	boundary	of	the	first	movement	narrative:	
L:	[…]	you’ve	said,	you	know,	‘that’s	the	way	that	I’ve	been	brought	up’.		S:	Mmm.	L:	But,	you	know,	there	must	be	feelings	associated	with	that	that	drive	you	to	[act	stoically	….]	not	just	‘oh	well	that’s	the	way	I’ve	been	brought	up’	and	there’s	just	this	kind	of	script	in	your	mind.	[I3:379-84]	Opening	up	the	meaning	of	her	upbringing	in	relation	to	her	stoic	attitude	further	revealed	the	significance	of	her	mother	to	her.	She	said	“I’m	very	close	with	my	mum”102,	noting	that	“we	talk	2	or	3	times	a	day”103.	In	particular,	her	mother	was	one	of	the	lone	voices	who	had	provided	the	approval	for	Stephanie’s	practicing	of	the	‘carry	on’	attitude	with	regard	to	her	chronic	pain:	“I’m	wrong	to	say	that	[…]	people	haven’t	praised	me.	My	mum	[…]	understands	more	than	most	what	I’m	going	through	and	she	does	say	‘you	do	really	well’	”104.	Moreover,	her	mother	has	even	provided	a	mechanism	that	might	induce	this	approval	from	others:	“if	we’re	talking	to	somebody	she’ll	suddenly	butt	in	and	say	‘Stephanie	broke	her	pelvis	you	know,	she	does	ever	so	well’	(laughs)”105.	Seeking	praise	for	her	actions	was	characteristic	of	Stephanie’s	childhood	(“I’ve	always	sought	approval,	I	think”106),	and	not	just	from	her	mother.	One	of	her	earliest	memories	was	being	praised	by	the	headmistress	of	her	infant	school	for	being	“a	very	good	pupil”107.	Indeed,	she	said	“I	was	so	good	at	school	because	I	wanted	the	teachers	to	tell	me	I	was	good.	Yeah,	I	was	the	swot	because	it	was	good	to	be	told	that	I	was	good”108.	This	extended	to	her	working	environment	as	she	got	older,	even	though	she	had	found	praise	lacking	from	
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her	employers	and	work	colleagues	(“I	guess	praise	isn’t	important	to	everybody	so	they	don’t	think	to	[…]	do	it”109).	And	just	as	others’	lack	of	signalled	approval	for	Stephanie’s	enactment	of	stoicism	was	seen	as	an	injustice	(see	the	first	movement),	lack	of	praise	from	her	employers	was	understood	similarly:	
The	guys	who	don’t	do	anything	get	exactly	the	same	level	of	praise	as	I	do	[…]	and	so	you	do	[…]	step	back	and	think	well	why	am	I	running	myself	ragged,	hurting	my	back	so	much?	Just	[…]	back	off.	Earn	your	money,	absolutely,	but	leave	it	at	that.	[I5:556-60]	Such	injustices	were	expressed	as	anger	or	frustration.	In	early	childhood	this	expressed	itself	as	an	“impotent	fury”110	that	gradually	gained	potency	as	she	became	more	confident	in	standing	up	to	injustice:	
When	I	was	younger	I	would	have	this	sort	of	impotent	fury	because	I	wouldn’t	have	had	the	guts	to	do	anything	about	an	injustice	that	I	saw.	And	as	I	got	older	and	more	stroppy	I	try	and	do	[sic]	something	about	it.	I’m	known	[at	work]	as	speaking	my	mind.	[I3:285-90]	The	flip	side	to	approval	is	disapproval.	If	the	anger	and	frustration	she	expresses	at	not	having	her	attitude	to	concealing	pain	positively	acknowledged	by	others	can	be	related	to	the	childhood	praise	she	expected	from	behaving	according	to	various	sets	of	moral	principles	from	significant	others,	the	same	can	be	explored	with	regards	to	instances	of	disapproval.	The	first	movement	narrative	highlights	how	not	hiding	her	pain	from	others	enacted	her	as	weak.	But	when	we	examine	what	this	meant	in	terms	of	her	childhood	experiences	if	she	behaved	in	a	way	that	contravened	a	particular	moral	code	we	find	that	weakness	transmogrifies	into	a	slightly	different	concept:	of	disappointing	others.	In	particular,	Stephanie	discussed	great	fear	of	disappointing	the	two	matriarchs	of	her	family	in	her	childhood	–	her	mother	and	(most	of	all)	her	grandmother:	
S:	She	[(her	grandmother)]	was	always	my	favourite	and	me	hers.	L:	Mmm.	S:	There’s	no	two	ways	about	that.	L:	I’m	the	same	with	my	nanna.	S:	(Laughs)	And	perhaps	I	took	that	as	like	being	the	teacher’s	pet.	If	you’re	the	teacher’s	pet	you	want	to	please	the	teacher.	L:	Yeah.	S:	[…]	We	were	best	buddies	and	so	I	wanted	to	stay	her	best	buddy.	L:	And	not	doing	[…]	things	that	you	think	she	would	approve	would	mean	that	you’re	not	her	best	buddy?	S:	(Long	pause)	Yeah.	She	wasn’t	slow	in	telling	me	if	she	was	cross	with	me	(laughing).	
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L:	Yeah?	S:	That’s	for	sure.	L:	Okay.	S	But	if	she	did	that	(pause)	I-,	I	was	gutted.	L:	Yeah?	S:	Because	I’d	let	her	down,	yeah.	[I5:705-22]	Disapproved	behaviours	included	“the	usual	childhood	things,	you	know,	being	selfish,	fighting	with	my	sister,	not	coming	home	when	I	told	her	I	was	going	to	come	home	(laughing	slightly),	things	like	that”111.	Her	grandmother		
would	sit	me	down	and	shout	at	me	if	I	did	wrong	and	she	would	tell	me	why	she	was	cross,	and	I	would	understand	why	she	was	cross,	and	then	I	would	[…]	just	be	so	cross	with	myself	for	[…]	doing	that.	[I5:730-2]	This	sense	of	disappointing	a	significant	other	with	her	behaviour	“would	be	true	with	my	parents	as	well”112,	but	“there	was	probably	just	a	bigger	sense	of	having	let	myself	down	with	my	gran,	I	think”113.	This	sense	of	disappointing	her	grandmother	was	directly	applied	to	her	contemporary	challenge	of	needing	to	accept	herself	as	‘weak’	so	that	she	could	ask	for	more	help	with	her	chronic	pain:	
S:	I	think	I’ll	struggle.	I	do.	I	feel-,	I	wonder	what	my	gran	would	have	thought.a	L:	Right.	S:	(Pause)	[…]	and	yeah,	I	wonder	if	[…]	I’m	a	disappointment,	I	suppose.	I	think	not.	I	think	she	was	all	for	common	sense	as	well.	[…]		L:	Disappointment	[…]	to	who?	To	[…]	your	nanna?	S:	Yeah	to	her.	[…]		L:	Why	would	you	feel	a	disappointment	to	her?	S:	Just	because	[…]	it	was	her	[…]	mantra	[(‘no	such	word	as	can’t’)].	It	was...	L:	Mmm.	S:	And	she	always	lived	by	that.	[I5:222-5,228-9,234-7]	Exploring	what	it	meant	to	disappoint	her	mother	and	grandmother,	she	gave	a	story:	
																																								 																					
a	Stephanie	noted	that	her	grandmother	died	5	years	prior	to	our	interviews.	
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I	remember	once	my	mama	gave	me	a	hard	time	about	something.	I	can’t	remember	what	it	was.	And	she	started	to	cry	[…]	and	I	was	so	shocked	that	I’d	made	my	mum	cry	that	it’s	stuck	in	my	mind	ever	since,	and	again	I	was	just	so	(emphasis)	disappointed	in	myself	because	I’d	[…]	done	that	and	it	was	such	an	extreme	reaction	from	her,	[which	was]	something	that	she	never,	ever	did.	And	it	really	brought	me	up	short.	[I5:737-41]	This	“shocked”114	Stephanie	because	“it	showed	her	[mother]	to	be	more	human	than	I’d	ever	considered	before”115.	Far	from	being	the	strong	woman	of	the	first	movement	narrative	who	‘carries	on’	regardless	with	a	stoical	anti-emotional	mantra,	here	her	mother	is	subject	to	emotional	collapse.	The	very	anti-emotional	‘carry	on’	mantra	passed	down	to	Stephanie	by	the	stoical	matriarchal	role	models	is	now	understood	as	a	mechanism	for	containing	their	emotional	fragility:	“it	made	me	realise	just	the	reaction	my	actions	were	having	on	her.	It’s	learning	consequences,	isn’t	it?	It’s	learning	how	your	consequences	affect	other	people.	All	part	of	growing	up.”116	Indeed,	following	others’	moral	rules	is	a	mechanism	for	protecting	the	emotional	fragility	of	those	close	to	her:	
[…]	if	you’re	fundamentally	a	good	person	and	you	toe	the	line,	you	know,	follow	the	rules,	then	you’re	not	causing	grief	to	people.	And	if	you	start	rule-breaking	in	whatever	way	then	that	causes	the	people	close	to	you	to	worry,	to	feel	disappointment	in	you.	It	can	cause	them	hassle,	aggro.	And	so,	yeah,	I	strive	not	to	do	that.	[I5:882-6]	It	was	apparent	that	Stephanie	saw	herself	as	having	what	I	descried	as	an	“imperative	to	protect”117	her	various	family	members	since	childhood.	She	noted	that	“particularly	with	my	mum	there’s	very	much	a	protective	thing	there”118.	The	exploration	of	her	upbringing	in	relation	to	how	she	enacts	her	stoicism	thus	revealed	that	instead	of	Stephanie	simply	being	an	inheritor	of	a	‘strong’	‘carry	on’	anti-emotional	attitude,	this	is	an	attitude	that	is	also	a	mechanism	used	to	protect	the	emotional	fragility	of	others.	That	is,	a	mechanism	who’s	enactment	is	predicated	on	the	presence	of	strong	emotions	in	others,	strong	emotions	that	transmit	to	Stephanie	in	the	form	of	‘disappointment’,	being	‘gutted’,	and	‘so	cross	with	myself’	when	there	is	a	risk	that	it	cannot	be	contained	in	others	through	controlling	her	behaviour.	And	central	to	making	this	visible	is	the	role	of	her	mother	and	grandmother.	For	no	longer	distributed	to	different	parts	of	the	interview	transcripts,	the	two	contradictory	but	necessary	elements	of	Stephanie’s	stoicism	are	made	present	in	the	same	space	in	the	form	of	her	mother	and	grandmother.	No	longer	simply	the	embodied	role	models	of	an	anti-emotional	principle	of	strength	inherited	by	Stephanie,	they	are	now	also	(at	the	same	time)	the	source	of	a	profound	emotional	fragility	that	is	central	to	its	enactment	as	an	emotional	need	for	approval.																																									 																					
a	Other	than	this	one	instance,	Stephanie	always	referred	to	her	mother	as	‘mum’	rather	than	‘mam’.	Assuming	this	is	not	simply	a	transcription	error	(the	audio	files	are	no	longer	available	to	check),	its	one-off	usage	here	perhaps	reflects	a	mirroring	of	my	own	use	of	‘mam’	in	the	interviews.	
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THE	GOOD,	THE	BAD,	AND	THE	FRACTIONAL	
The	‘first	movement’	accounts	discussed	in	this	thesis	reflect	similar	narratives	of	those	experiencing	chronic	illness	that	have	been	extensively	collected	in	previous	decades.	One	of	the	most	influential	and	eloquent	of	these	collections	can	be	found	in	Kathy	Charmaz’s	(1991)	book:	Good	Days,	Bad	Days.	Briefly	discussed	in	Chapter	1,	this	contends	that	illness	experience	is	defined	by	the	negotiated	process	of	seeking	a	coherent	narrative	self-concept	when	illness	threatens	to	disrupt	such	coherence.	Her	book	condenses	over	150	interviews	with	almost	100	people	experiencing	chronic	illness	to	outline	the	nature	of	this	process,	a	generalisation	nevertheless	rooted	in	examples	drawn	from	particular	illness	experiences.	The	first	movement	narratives	of	the	participants	interviewed	in	this	thesis	can	be	readily	fitted	within	Charmaz’s	framework,	as	each	involve	participants	performing	work	to	maintain	or	re-develop	a	coherent	narrative	of	the	self	in	response	to	the	interruption	on	it	posed	by	illness.	
For	Charmaz	such	work	involves	constructing	a	narrative	of	the	self	within	time.	Thus,	chronic	illness	experience	might	involve	the	definition	of	“timemarkers”	and	“turning	points”	(p.	196)	where	illness	“underscores	and	marks,	and	sets	boundaries	between	events”	(p.	198),	such	as	Stephanie	discussed	in	relation	to	her	life	‘before’	and	‘after’	her	accident.	Not	static,	these	are	constructions	of	the	self	in	time	that	are	dependent	upon	a	“telling	and	retelling”	of	narrative	self-concepts	defined	by	the	spaces	of	time	contained	within	them	(p.	219).	This	active	work	of	an	illness	sufferer,	seen	in	an	“inner	conversation	he	or	she	has	with	self	about	self”	(p.	227)	can	be	defined	as	what	Charmaz	terms	the	“dialectical	self”	(p.	70).	The	dialectical	self	is	one	of	“dialogue	and	negotiation”	(p.	71)	of	the	controversy	introduced	by	the	disruption	of	self-concept	by	illness,	where	the	narrative	of	the	self	must	confront	a	non-relational	element.		
Like	any	good	dialectic	dealing	in	the	either/or	of	exclusive	singularity	(see	Chapter	6),	the	dialectical	self	seeks	to	resolve	the	controversy	of	illness-induced	self-concept	disruption	into	a	new	coherent	self-concept,	if	not	as	an	actuality	than	as	a	potentiality.	For	the	chronic	illness	sufferer	this	might	easily	involve	“putting	brackets	around”	the	illness	(p.	12),	of	“defining	[…]	illness	as	an	interruption”	that	can	be	readily	separated	from	the	existing	self-concept	(p.	13).	Time	may	be	experienced	within	such	self-concepts	in	terms	of	a	“waiting	time”	(p.	30)	where	the	sufferer	endures	a	temporary	present	distinct	from	a	past	that	“remains	so	close”	(p.	22):	‘[t]hey	wait	to	get	through	the	present	so	that	“real	life”	can	go	on	in	the	future	just	around	the	corner’	(p.	30).	
Where	the	multiplicity	of	the	controversy	cannot	be	readily	distributed	into	temporal	singularities	through	defining	illness	as	a	temporary	interruption,	that	is,	where	illness	
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becomes	(in	Charmaz’s	terms)	intrusive,	new	strategies	for	maintaining	exclusive	singularities	are	implemented	by	the	dialectical	self.	Charmaz	contends	that	most	experiencing	intrusive	illness	“reconcile	themselves	to	their	illness”,	which	means	“acknowledging	and	handling	pain,	slowness,	or	fatigue”	(p.	47).	But	‘acknowledgement	of	illness	lies	within	“acceptable”	limits	or	boundaries.	Accepting	anything	beyond	those	boundaries	seems	beyond	human	capacity’	(p.	48).	In	particular,	‘[d]ividing	life	into	“good”	days	and	“bad”	days	provides	one	measure	of	experiencing	an	intrusive	illness	and	a	part	of	the	taken-for-granted	lexicon	through	which	illness	becomes	understandable	and	explainable’	(p.	49).	A	‘good’	day	is	where	disruption	to	a	coherent	self-concept	is	“minimal”	(p.	50),	and	a	‘bad’	day	where	it	is	“intensified”	(p.	51).	Importantly,	being	able	to	divide	time	into	good	and	bad	days	makes	it	possible	to	locate	a	more	authentic	self-concept	to	a	coherent	narrative	achieved	on	good	days.	By	contrast,	the	controversy	of	self-concept	interruption	of	bad	days	can	be	dismissed	as	inauthentic:	‘ill	people	often	say,	“I’m	not	myself	today.”’	(p.	52).	Indeed,	‘[u]nder	these	conditions,	people	feel	out	of	self.	That	is,	the	self	presently	experienced	bears	little	resemblance	to	someone’s	“real”	or	“ideal”	self’	(p.	52,	emphasis	in	original).	
But	when	bad	days	begin	to	predominate	and	the	ability	to	enact	a	coherent	self-concept	through	good	days	becomes	scarce	enough,	it	might	not	be	possible	to	dismiss	the	controversy	of	the	bad	days	to	a	background	bracketed	from	a	coherent	self-concept.	Instead,	in	this	immersion	in	illness,	“[i]llness	and	disability	stay	in	the	foreground	–	ever	present	and	ever	vexing.	For	such	people,	illness	and	disability	affront	self”	(p.	79).	Unable	to	scaffold	a	coherent	self-concept	over	any	significant	period	of	time	through	bracketing	the	controversy	as	a	temporary	aberration	or	as	a	superficiality,	instead	the	dialectical	self	shrinks	the	time	over	which	the	narrative	of	self	can	be	established.	People	instead	live	“one	day	at	a	time”,	allowing	a	coherent	self-concept	to	be	constructed	over	short-term	time	periods	(p.	178).	“It	gives	a	sense	of	control	over	one’s	actions	and,	by	extension,	a	sense	of	control	over	self	and	situation”	(p.	178).	But	at	its	most	extreme	illness	can	mean	that	even	such	short-term	coherence	cannot	be	achieved.	Charmaz	calls	this	experience	“existing	from	day	to	day”	rather	than	simply	‘living’	day	to	day	(p.	185).	Existing	day	to	day	“occurs	when	a	person	plummets	into	continued	crises	that	rip	life	apart.	It	reflects	loss	of	control	of	health	and	the	wherewithal	to	keep	life	together”	(p.	185).	Here	“life	is	beyond	control”,	of	“[c]onstant	crises”	(controversies)	“with	no	viable	solutions,	no	resolutions”	(p.	186).	
Yet,	as	discussed	in	Scarry’s	(1986)	againstness	(see	Chapter	2),	there	exists	the	enactment	of	a	sort	of	primal	exclusive	division	between	a	coherent	self-concept	and	an	entity	that	almost	penetrates	it,	where	the	multiplicity	of	the	controversy	within	the	self-concept	is	never	actually	established.	As	Kleinman	(1988)	notes,	“[c]hange,	caprice,	
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and	chaos,	experienced	in	the	body,	challenge	what	order	we	are	led	to	believe”	exists,	but	this	order	is	nevertheless	something	that	we	“need	to	believe”	exists	(p.	55).	Pain	is	thrust	aside	as	not	oneself	in	a	foundational	ontological	move,	a	drive	that	is	“almost	impossible	to	extinguish”	(Biro,	2011,	p.	61)	as	the	dialectical	self	engages	in	an	endless	struggle	to	resolve	crises	into	splendidly	isolated	singularities,	singularities	that	have	already	been	established	in	a	foundational	ontological	move	as	a	potential.a	For	the	chronic	illness	suffer	this	“means	struggling	to	rest,	worrying,	watching	television,	perhaps,	reading,	but	most	likely,	simply	trying	to	exist”	(Charmaz,	1991,	p.	188).	The	lack	of	a	clear	promise	of	coherence	as	an	outcome	to	such	struggle	simply	results	in	a	struggle	for	coherence	fought	with	increasing	desperation,	such	that	the	self-concept	only	ever	slips	to	a	never-ending	edge	of	coherence,	a	quickening	of	the	cycle	of	‘movement’	from	one	singularity	to	another	rather	than	the	multiplicity	of	flux	(Cooper,	1998	–	see	Chapter	6).	Thus,	“existing	from	day	to	day	means	living	on	the	edge	–	the	edge	of	control,	the	edge	of	coping,	the	edge	of	desperation”	(Charmaz,	1991,	pp.	189-90),	but	never	actually	falling	out	of	control	and	into	flux.b	
Indeed,	for	Charmaz	the	dialectical	self	and	its	enactment	of	a	coherent	narrative	self-concept	(either	as	actuality	or	potentiality)	from	the	controversy	of	illness-induced	self-concept	disruption	constitutes	the	conditions	of	possibility	of	illness	experience.	Whilst	she	brings	an	attention	to	this	process,	the	possibility	that	this	process	might	be	(or	indeed	is)	enacted	otherwise	is	never	seriously	considered.	Thus,	for	“most	people”	(p.	257)	illness	is	experienced	as	a	point	in	a	continuum	between	the	“reevaluation	and	renewal”	(p.	258)	of	a	coherent	self-concept,	and	the	“loss	of	self”	(p.	257)	that	only	actually	ever	reaches	an	edge	of	control	and	coherence	defined	by	the	desperate	struggle	of	a	dialectical	self	that	has	already	created	the	coherent	self	as	an	undeniable	potentiality.	That	is,	illness	experience	is	necessarily	dialectical,	where	coherence	is	achieved	actually	or	potentially.	This	primacy	of	coherence	as	a	good	is	both	implicit	and	explicit	throughout	the	book,	perhaps	most	prominently	in	characterising	‘good’	days	as	those	where	coherent	self-concepts	can	be	established	(and,	conversely,	the	‘bad’	days	where	that	appears	threatened).	Moreover,	Charmaz	takes	for	granted	that																																									 																					
a	Drawing	upon	Jonathon	Lear’s	(2006)	concept	of	radical	hope,	Frank	(2013)	alludes	to	this	in	his	assertion	of	the	“important	human	need”	(p.	209)	to	aspire	to	“new	practices	that	express	virtue	and	excellence”	(p.	208)	even	after	the	ability	to	narrate	specific	aspirations	becomes	inhibited	by	illness,	that	is,	even	“after	losing	the	world	where	it	was	possible	to	aspire	to	certain	virtues	and	forms	of	excellence”	(p.	210).	This	is	a	“new	and	viable	form	of	hope	that	does	not	mean	hoping	for	some	pre-decided	outcome”	(p.	209,	emphasis	in	original),	but	“believing	in	the	future,	and	acting	to	bring	that	future	into	being,	in	the	absence	of	any	specific	imagination	of	that	future”	(p.	217).	Indeed,	“[w]hat	is	radical,	or	paradoxical,	about	this	hope	is	that	at	present,	those	new	forms	of	living	cannot	be	imagined”	(p.	217).	b	Likewise,	in	discussing	radical	hope,	Frank	(2013)	asserts	that	his	book	“is	about	ill	people’s	capacity	to	act	when	constructive	action	seems	impossible”	(p.	212,	my	emphasis).	
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the	loss	of	self	is	something	that	should	be	avoided,	with	her	reflecting	at	the	end	of	the	book	on	what	“changes	can	be	made	in	the	system	[of	care	for	chronic	illness	sufferers]	that	would	promote	autonomy	and,	therefore,	reduce	loss	of	self”	(p.	263).	
This	thesis	has	suggested	that	such	a	mono-vision	focus	on	singularity	instigates	a	representational	paradox	that	has	undesirable	implications	not	only	methodologically	but	also	existentially.	It	instead	seeks	to	provide	a	narrative	account	of	experience	and	self	that	makes	visible	both	multiplicity	and	singularity,	not	simply	the	latter.	In	Good	
Days,	Bad	Days	this	comes	closest	in	two	instances.	The	first	is	the	recognition	that	a	“few	people	reveled	in	the	freedom	that	they	found	in	loosening	[of…]	anchors”	of	a	coherent	self-narrative	(p.	90).	One	woman	“influenced	by	Zen	Buddhism”	thus	contended	that	the	narrative	distribution	of	self	into	the	space	and	time	of	an	Euclidean	time-space	container	constituted	a	form	of	“bondage”	(p.	90).	However,	this	thread	is	never	explored	in	any	detail,	being	Othered	into	the	realm	of	“spiritual	discovery	and	development”	and	the	black-box	of	an	oriental	(versus	occidental)	philosophical	system	(Zen	Buddhism)	that	does	not	impact	the	assumption	that	loss	of	self	could	be	anything	other	than	impossibly	horrific.		
Secondly,	and	perhaps	more	significantly,	Charmaz	discusses	an	experience	of	time	she	terms	the	“intense	present”	(p.	245).	The	intense	present	involves	an	experience	of	the	self	that	is	not	partitioned	into	temporal	units	of	past,	present,	and	future,	but	only	ever	as	an	integrated	entity	in	an	ongoing	present.	There	is	a	disconnect	of	self-concept	from	past	and	future:	the	“past	separates	from	the	present	and	the	future	grows	distant”	(p.	245).	Echoing	an	argument	elucidated	by	Tolle	(1999/2016),	this	involves	a	realisation	that	consciousness	is	not	the	self-concept	scaffolded	in	time,	but	can	only	ever	be	the	ongoing	present:	“[t]here	was	never	a	time	when	your	life	was	not	now,	nor	will	there	ever	be”	(p.	41,	emphasis	in	original).	As	one	of	Charmaz’s	(1991)	participants	similarly	notes	of	the	intense	present:	“you	can	always	savor	it;	it	never	goes	away”	(p.	250).	Not	having	“the	pressure	of	mapped	futures”,	people	“can	anticipate	selected	future	events	without	feeling	trapped	by	them”	(pp.	249-50).	Likewise,	they	can	“look	back	on	the	past	with	less	regret”	(p.	249).		
This	can	be	read	as	a	fractional	understanding	of	self,	where	the	controversy	initiated	by	the	enactment	of	a	singularity	is	built	into	the	understanding	of	self	as	it	is	located	in	an	ongoing	present.	Yet	this	fractional	reading	is	subverted	in	Charmaz’s	book,	leading	to	an	epistemological	reading	of	Good	Days,	Bad	Days	that	provides	no	possibility	of	an	alternative	to	the	dialectical	self.	Thus,	Charmaz	contends	that	“[s]ituating	the	self	in	the	intense	present	tends	to	be	a	fragile	arrangement”,	arguing	that	“daily	routines	dull	and	supersede	the	intense	present”	(p.	249).	Indeed,	she	argues	that	an	intense	present	
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is	frequently	initiated	by	an	extreme	crisis	that	creates	the	dissociation	of	self-concept	from	a	temporal	distribution	within	time,	but	that	the	self-concept	becomes	gradually	re-built	into	past	and	future	as	time	since	the	crisis	passes,	almost	as	an	inevitability.	We	might	link	this	fading	to	a	tendency	to	embrace	the	present	as	only	a	coherent	temporal	entity,	even	whilst	the	implications	of	such	a	location	must	involve	the	necessary	noncoherence	associated	with	the	ongoing	nature	of	processes	constituting	that	intense	present.	The	“positive	paradox”	(p.	245)	of	an	intense	present	which	embraces	life	through	the	immediacy	of	death	is	subverted	when	the	coherence	it	initiates	is	embraced	alone	without	the	noncoherence	that	makes	that	coherence	possible.a	Here	noncoherence	is	Othered	into	absence,	leaving	only	the	‘self’	as	an	exclusively	coherent	entity	scaffolded	in	time	through	the	“hope	for	a	future”	(p.	242).	
But	in	Stephanie’s	‘second	movement’	a	narrative	of	self	is	cast	where	the	multiplicity	of	a	controversy	cannot	be	resolved	into	temporal	or	spatial	singularities,	either	actually	or	potentially.	What	is	made	visible	in	this	narrative	is	that	the	coherence	of	Stephanie’s	self-concept	is	itself	dependent	on	the	enactment	of	noncoherence,	a	consciousness	lacking	in	narratives	of	chronic	illness	that	cannot	offer	an	alternative	to	the	ontology	of	a	dialectical	self	(largely)	found	in	texts	like	Good	Days,	Bad	Days.	
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CHAPTER	10:	ERIC	
FIRST	MOVEMENT:	THE	AVOIDANCE	OF	DECLINE	
Eric,	aged	80	and	retired,	experiences	persistent	back	and	leg	pain.	Eric’s	chronic	pain	experience	can	be	characterised	as	a	challenge	posed	to	his	identity	as	a	successful,	active,	motivated	man	(or	‘younger	man’).	His	narrative	is	split	into	three	parts:	(1)	problems	with	pain	and	painkillers,	and	a	potential	solution	in	exercise.	However,	this	is	confounded	by	(2)	lack	of	motivation	that	strikes	at,	and	reveals,	a	fundamental	challenge	to	his	‘younger	man’	identity,	and	(3)	oscillation	between	three	possible	routes	of	resolution.	
(1)	PAIN,	PAINKILLERS,	AND	EXERCISE	
Eric	talked	about	being	“besotted	with	pain,	you	know,	totally	dopey.	Cannot	concentrate	or	do	anything	with	pain”1.	His	pain	started	approximately	5	years	prior	to	our	interviews,	and	he	“was	told	that	it	was	because	of	a	calcium	build	up	in	my	spine”2.	Eric	received	surgery	to	remove	some	of	the	calcium	deposit,	and	whilst	this	initially	led	to	improvement	in	pain,	it	returned	with	time	(“for	a	while	I	felt	really	good	[…but]	I	just	seem	to	have	deteriorated”3).	Further	surgery	is	not	a	realistic	option	(“very	few	if	anybody	has	ever	had	a	second	operation”4).	The	failure	of	surgery	to	provide	a	permanent	solution	expressed	a	more	general	feeling	of	lack	of	support	from	the	medical	profession.	This	derived	from	poor	advice	following	his	recovery	from	surgery,	lack	of	explanation	from	doctors	(“he	didn’t	explain	anything”5),	clinical	neglect	(being	told	to	simply	“go	home”6	when	he	was	haemorrhaging	blood),	and	administrative	errors.	Indeed,	when	discussing	the	medical	profession	he	said	“I’ve	been	on	my	own	[…]	with	pain"7.	These	feelings	should	not	be	misunderstood	as	lack	of	faith	in	medical	solutions,	however,	or	even	in	the	competence	of	all	medical	professionals,	as	will	become	clearer	later	in	the	chapter.	Eric	relies	on	painkillers	to	lessen	pain,	taking	them	three	times	a	day	(sometimes	more).	He	“couldn’t	possibly	live	without	them”8.	However,	they	also	make	him	tired	and	lethargic	(“I’m	totally	dopey	and	dizzy	with	painkillers”9),	as	was	apparent	during	our	interviews:	
Looking	at	you	now	[…]	I	am	sleepy.	I	could	just	shut	my	eyes.	If	there	was	anywhere	to	lie	down	I	would	go	out	like	that	(emphasis,	
and	clicks	fingers	simultaneously).	(Clicks	fingers	again).	This	happens	to	me	at	home.	When	I’m	tired	I	usually	go	and	lie	down	and	that’s	it	(clicks	fingers)	for	about	an	hour.	[I2:357-61]a	
																																								 																					
a	When	Eric	indicated	tiredness,	I	offered	a	break	or	to	end	the	interview.	However,	on	each	occasion	he	stated	that	he	wished	to	continue.	
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Eric	said	that	this	painkiller-induced	lethargy	meant	he	was	“not	living	a	full	life”10.	For	example,	it	meant	household	tasks	like	cutting	the	grass	are	“much	more	of	a	struggle	and	there’s	less	job	satisfaction	than	there	used	to	be”11.	Whilst	painkillers	prevented	the	unbearable	sensation	of	pain,	they	had	a	life-affecting	side	effect	that	meant	he	was	ultimately	dissatisfied	with	painkillers	as	a	solution	to	pain.	However,	Eric	had	recently	attended	a	pain	clinic	workshop	where	he	was	inspired	to	resolve	his	pain	through	physical	exercise.	In	particular,	the	experience	of	fellow	chronic	pain	sufferers	at	the	workshop,	who	had	stopped	taking	painkillers	because	of	the	effect	of	exercise,	had	persuaded	him	that	this	was	a	realistic	solution	to	his	own	pain.	Eric	was	thus	“trying	to	stop	taking	the	pills	so	as	I’m	not	dopey”12,	having	decided	that	“I’ll	try	and	overcome	this	with	exercise”13.	Eric	realised	that	the	positive	effect	of	exercise	on	pain	was	in	fact	reinforced	by	his	own	experience	(“when	I	do	[exercise],	I	do	feel	better”14).	With	an	array	of	gym	equipment	in	his	house	(including	a	treadmill,	free	weights,	and	a	weight-lifting	machine),	and	having	followed	a	relatively	intensive	daily	regime	of	aerobic	and	resistance	exercises	in	the	past,	he	was	now	determined	to	stick	with	exercise	so	that	he	could	reduce	his	pain	and	come	off	painkillers.	He	said	“I	feel	that	if	I	did	all	my	exercises	every	day	I’ll	be	a	young	man	again”15.	What	was	variously	referred	to	in	the	interviews	as	a	‘young	man’	or	‘younger	man’	signified	a	particular	identity	that	Eric	had	held	over	his	whole	life,	one	characterised	by	an	array	of	positive	traits,	most	of	all	being	high	achievement	(success).	Being	pain	and	painkiller	free	(or	close	to	it)	meant	more	to	Eric	than	simply	lack	of	pain	sensation	or	drowsiness.	It	meant	he	would	be	able	to	enact	a	persona	he	had	always	identified	with,	a	“full	life”16	that	had	been	threatened	by	pain	and	painkillers.	Indeed,	the	very	performance	of	the	exercises	constitutes	the	enactment	of	this	identity	since	it	demonstrates	fitness	and,	above	all,	the	
motivation	to	act.	Being	motivated	is	the	fundamental	move	at	the	heart	of	positive	traits	of	the	younger	man,	just	as	success	is	the	main	final	outcome.	Yet	Eric	encountered	a	crisis	in	motivation	that	threatened	not	just	his	ability	to	exercise,	but	his	default	identity	as	a	‘younger	man’.	
(2)	MOTIVATIONAL	CRISIS	AND	ERIC	AS	THE	‘YOUNGER	MAN’	
Despite	being	inspired	to	exercise,	Eric	had	found	it	increasingly	difficult	to	find	the	motivation	to	act	on	it.	He	said	“I	feel	that	my	motivation	is	so	low	and	[it]	is	so	difficult	to	do	anything”17,	with	him	encountering	problems	in	functioning	beyond	simply	exercising:	
I	am	not	as	motivated	as	I	want	to	be.	Even	for	80,	I’m	not.	I	am	aware	of	that	because	I	know	what	I	can	do	at	home,	around	hobbies	and	things	like	that,	and	I	really	have	to	drive	myself	to	do	things	that	I	love	doing.	[I4:162-5]	
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Specifically	on	exercising,	whilst	lack	of	motivation	meant	he	was	unable	to	overcome	his	problem	with	pain	and	painkillers,	his	inability	to	motivate	himself	to	exercise	had	a	deeper	emotional	impact:	
You	feel	guilty.	You	feel	a	wimp	because	you’re	thinking	well	you’ve	only	got	to	get	yourself	moving,	which	I	know	and	I	do	get	myself	moving	on	occasion.	But	I	cannot	do	it.	Every	morning	I	got	up	and	I	used	to	do	all	my	exercises	while	the	kettle	was	boiling,	[and…]	when	I	went	in	the	workshop	I	did	my	other	exercises.	[…W]hat	else	can	I	say?	I’m,	I’m	losing	my	motivation.	[I1:172-8,182]	The	possibility	that	Eric	could	be	losing	his	motivation	had	such	a	significant	emotional	impact	because	Eric	relied	on	motivation	to	enact	a	longstanding	identity.	This	involved	Eric	as	a	successful	and	achieving	individual	who	was	superior	to	others	in	all	that	he	does,	but	it	was	one	that	required	constant	enactment:	“when	I	analyse	myself	at	80	years	of	age,	it	possibly	is	a	type	of	(pause)	arrogance	or	feeling	a	bit	superior	[to	others]	and	then	having	to	prove	it!	(Laughs)”18.	Lacking	the	motivation	to	‘prove	it’	anymore,	Eric	was	“becoming	frustrated”19,	such	as	when	he	reflected	on	the	fact	that	he	now	hired	a	gardener:	
God!	I’m	paying	somebody	to	do	the	garden.	It’s	unheard	of!	I’ve	got	everything	you	need.	I’ve	got	a	rotavator,	a	self-propelled	mower	with	four	gears	(takes	a	sharp	breath	in)	and	I’m	paying	somebody	to	do	the	garden.	[I1:268-71]	Eric	spent	much	of	our	time	giving	examples	of	his	actions	that	demonstrate	the	performance	of	this	identity	throughout	his	life.	Given	the	significance	of	this	identity,	I	will	now	spend	time	discussing	its	nature.	Eric	gave	many	examples	of	achievements	that	demonstrate	him	as	both	successful	and	skilled.	These	included	being	elected	to	a	high	post	within	his	profession,	giving	regular	lectures	at	various	educational	establishments,	and	being	elected	as	a	parish	councillor	(“even	my	grandchildren	come	[sic]	and	read	how	many	votes	I’d	got”20),	amongst	other	achievements.	As	Eric	noted,	“I	have	achieved	a	lot	of	notable	things	in	my	life.	And	so	I’ve	always,	always	(emphasis)	been	trying	to	do	something”21,	emphasising	the	link	between	being	a	successful	person	and	actions	that	prove	it.	Proving	his	success	requires	an	audience	to	prove	this	to.	In	the	interviews	it	seemed	I	was	his	audience,	and	on	several	occasions	I	felt	obliged	to	praise	him	for	his	successes.	In	discussing	the	landscaping	of	his	former	riverside	home,	which	required	the	technically	difficult	feat	of	adding	piles	to	the	riverbed,	Eric	already	had	me	in	mind	as	his	positively	affirming	audience:	“if	you	go	around	[to	the	property]	now,	ever,	next	summer,	when	I’m	dead,	whatever,	you’ll	say	‘oh,	Eric	did	that’.	And	it	was	me.	I	didn’t	hire	anybody.	I	did	it”22.	Often	the	audience	was	present	within	the	stories	of	success	themselves.	Thus,	in	another	story	where	Eric	made	a	speech	at	a	town	council	meeting	opposing	plans	for	a	car	park,	immediately	after	he	had	finished	the	speech:	
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There	was	a	stunned	silence.	Anyway,	when	it	come	[sic]	to	the	vote	it	was	unanimous.	They	never	got	it	(laughing	slightly).	The	vote	was	unanimous	against.	Now	probably	some	people	hate	my	guts.	I	don’t	care.	[…]	When	I	left,	some	of	the	councillors	came	up	to	me	and	they	said	‘Eric,	you’ve	always	got	something	to	say’.	And	it	was	meant	as	a	compliment.	[I4:822-31]	Eric’s	demonstrations	of	achievement	extended	to	his	family,	with	him	producing	two	sons	that	are	both	“absolutely	highly	successful”23.a	Eric’s	achievements	are	amplified	through	understanding	the	“primitive”24	conditions	he	overcame	in	his	youth.	This	included	having	no	water	or	electricity	at	his	home,	and	an	outside	toilet	without	any	flush.	It	also	involved	being	in	an	isolated	village	that	required	him	to	cycle	up	steep	valley	sides	to	get	to	school	or	work	(“it	was	a	hell	of	a	climb	out	of	that	village	[...and]	I	did	that	every	(emphasis)	morning	and	every	night”25),	and	even	needing	to	row	a	boat	in	stormy	conditions	across	the	river	beside	his	house	(“I	went	to	night	schools	three	nights	a	week	with	all	my	books,	lashing	down	with	rain	in	the	little	boat	to	row	across	[the	river]	to	get	the	bus”26).	Eric	also	alluded	to	some	deeper	trauma	during	childhood,	but,	on	his	request,	I	did	not	pursue	it	(“the	early	years	were	very,	very	traumatic,	but	I’m	not	going	into	that”27).	Eric	said	“my	early	life	was	really	tough”28	and	that	he	had	“a	very	rough	bloody	childhood”29,	yet	had	succeeded	despite	it	all.	Achievement	means	being	brave,	such	as	not	being	scared	to	take	on	difficult	jobs	at	work.	Moreover,	being	so	active	in	achieving	also	means	being	physically	fit.	Thus,	these	related	traits	define	what	it	means	to	be	the	young	man	for	Eric,	traits	that	ultimately	lead	to	the	success	that	validates	this	identity.	As	noted,	achieving	also	means	being	better	than	others,	and	having	the	“arrogance”30	to	presume	so	(“I’ve	always	felt	that	I	could	do	things	better	than	anybody	else”31).	Being	better	creates	jealousy	in	others,	however,	such	as	from	other	managers	at	his	workplace	(“there	was	a	hell	of	a	lot	of	jealousy	that	I	was	in	charge”32)	or	the	head	of	the	parish	council	(“he’s	jealous	[so]	he	doesn’t	want	me	to	have	any	kudos	in	the	council”33).	The	idea	of	Eric	being	better	than	others	was	traced	to	his	childhood,	where	he	was	brought	up	by	his	mother	to	believe	that	he	was	“a	different	class”34	from	others	in	the	village:	“mum	used	to	say	[…]	‘you	don’t	want	to	end	up	like	them’,	and	there	would	be	a	bit	of	that	in	it	to	motivate	me,	and	it	stuck”35.	As	a	result,	Eric	deliberately	maintained	distance	between	himself	and	others	in	the	village,	and	sought	to	prove	this	separation	through	achieving	things	that	they	could	not.	Whilst	achievement	is	very	important	in	defining	who	Eric	is,	it	was	not	the	only	dimension	of	the	younger	man	identity.	Alongside	success	were	actions	that	demonstrate	good	
morality.	This	involves	Eric	standing	up	for	justice,	such	as	fighting	corruption	on	the	parish																																									 																					
a	Eric	provided	specific	details	of	his	sons’	prestigious	qualifications,	forms	of	employment,	and	awards.	They	have	been	omitted	here	in	order	to	reduce	the	likelihood	of	deductive	disclosure.	
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council	(“I’m	thinking	‘that’s	not	right’	”36)	or	foiling	the	plot	of	a	neighbour	manipulating	others	(“he	thought	he	could	[…]	manoeuvre	people	and	get	them	to	do	this	and	do	that.	And	I	took	umbrage	to	this”37).	It	also	involves	Eric	showing	kindness	in	helping	others,	such	as	sitting	for	“hour	after	hour”38	every	day	comforting	his	terminally	ill	mother-in-law,	an	action	that	proved	his	morality	(as	greater	than	that	of	others)	to	staff	at	the	nursing	home	(“the	staff	were	quite	impressed.	They	said	nobody’s	done	that	[before]”39).	Overall,	Eric	believed	that	“I	haven’t	been	[…]	a	bad	guy,	you	know	(laughing	slightly)”40.	In	each	example	his	moral	action	is	successful	(he	manages	to	achieve	justice	or	provide	a	high	level	of	care),	emphasising	the	importance	of	achievement	even	in	the	enactment	of	morality.	Yet	Eric	now	found	himself	lacking	the	motivation	to	perform	the	actions	that	enact	the	morality	and	(above	all)	the	achievement	that	defines	this	identity,	provoking	a	crisis	for	him.	Eric	felt	“shame”41	at	being	unable	to	take	everyday	opportunities	to	prove	himself,	having	instead	to	become	dependent	on	others	for	his	wellbeing.	Indeed,	the	young	man	identity	means	being	able	to	look	after	himself	and	his	family	through	his	own	successful	actions,	with	dependency	being	anathema	(“I	do	not	like	to	have	to	get	people	to	do	things	for	me”42).	The	possibility	of	not	enacting	achievement	where	the	opportunity	presents	itself	was	a	position	that	Eric	could	not	exist	within:	
L:	What’s	wrong	with	not	achieving	things?	[…]	What’s	wrong	with	not	being	able	to	achieve?	E:	I	don’t	want	to	be	there!	L:	Why	not?	E:	I	don’t	know,	I	just,	[it’s]	just	not	me.	I	just	don’t	want	to	be	there.	[I2:720-3]	Indeed,	it	provoked	a	challenge	to	his	very	existence	(“I	couldn’t	live	if	I	[…]	I	wasn’t	proud	of	myself”43),	and,	as	the	next	section	discusses,	one	serious	possible	resolution	that	Eric	saw	to	a	wider	degeneration	(of	which	loss	of	motivation	was	a	part)	that	prevented	him	enacting	the	younger	man	identity	was	choosing	to	die	through	euthanasia.	This	competed	with	two	other	possible	resolutions	that	involved	regaining	motivation,	in	a	constant	oscillation	between	hope	and	a	fatalistic	acceptance	of	decline	characterised	by	a	need	to	choose	death.	Unable	to	conceive	of	an	identity	not	based	around	enacting	achievement,	what	was	at	stake	in	this	oscillation	was	Eric’s	very	life	itself.	
(3)	UNCERTAIN	RESOLUTION	
Eric’s	crisis	in	motivation	can	be	understood	as	part	of	a	wider	spectre	of	decline	that	haunted	him.	This	decline	was	characterised	as	“getting	older”44,	and	(appropriately)	getting	older	meant	motivational	and	physical	impairments	that	made	the	enactment	of	the	young	
man	identity	increasingly	difficult,	something	he	found	hard	to	accept:	
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Well	I’m	trying	to	explain	that	I-	(breathes	out),	I’m	reluctantly	becoming	aware	that	I	cannot	do	things.	Whereas	I	used	to	feel	I	not	only	could	do	things,	I	could	do	them	better	than	any	bugger	else!	But	I’m	having	to	accept	that	I	can’t,	and	I	don’t	want	to	do	that.	[I5:450-2]	His	attempts	to	demonstrate	superiority	over	others	were	“having	to	disappear	because	of	my	age	and	my	health”45	He	noted	that:	
I	have	found	myself	backing	away	[from	tasks].	I’m	not	a	coward	but	I	have	found	myself,	if	I	knew	that	something	was	beyond	me,	I’ve	found	myself	backing	away	and	just	leaving	it.	That	will	probably	become	greater	as	I	get	older.	[I2:625-9]	Backing	away	induced	feelings	of	“cowardice”46	and	being	“lazy”47.	Eric	had	also	developed	several	medical	problems,	something	largely	left	out	in	our	interviews	in	favour	of	his	frequent	demonstration	of	his	young	man	attributes,	but	reluctantly	admitted	at	one	point	(“I	can’t	tell	you	too	much	but	(pause),	I	wouldn’t	say	I’ve	hidden	a	little	bit	[from	LR],	but	I’ve	got	quite	a	few	medical	problems”48).	In	addition	to	chronic	back	and	leg	pain,	these	included	prostate	cancer	(previously	controlled,	and	although	it	was	now	“coming	back”49,	he	was	not	worried	because	the	tumour	was	only	slowly	growing),	a	stroke,	asbestos	in	his	lungs,	high	blood	pressure,	and	persistent	cramping	in	his	fingers.	Moreover,	between	our	third	and	fourth	interviews	Eric	was	diagnosed	with	diabetes	after	suddenly	developing	a	number	of	symptoms	(including	temporarily	losing	sight	in	one	eye).	Decline	was	associated	with	major	illness,	something	that	had	horrified	him	in	his	experience	of	the	illness	of	friends	and	family,	and	which	now	threatened	him	through	his	own	growing	list	of	medical	conditions.	This	horror	was	twofold:	the	suffering	endured	and	the	indignity	of	failing	functionality.	His	mother-in-law	had	died	of	throat	cancer,	which	he	found	such	a	“horrible	(emphasis)	way	to	die”50	due	to	the	pain	endured	that	he	“just	couldn’t	bear	to	see	her	fed	because	it	was	just	prolonging	the	agony”51	(she	stated	an	intention	not	to	eat	or	drink).	More	significant	than	the	suffering,	and	related	to	the	failing	enactment	of	the	young	man	identity,	was	the	inability	to	function	even	in	the	most	basic	ways.	Thus,	he	described	a	friend	(he	had	known	since	childhood)	with	dementia,	and	considered	how	this	would	affect	his	own	sense	of	identity	if	it	happened	to	him:	
I	mean,	she’s	in	a	terrible	state,	and	when	she	comes	to	our	house	she’ll	say	‘why	are	we	here’	and	‘are	we	going	home	now’	and	all	this.	What	a	carry	on.	She’s	terrible.	If	somebody	gave	me	a	needle	I	couldn’t	stick	it	in,	if	you	know	what	I	mean.	But	if	I	get	to	that	stage	(sighs),	I’m	a	guy	who’s	been	captain	of	industry.	I	was!	I	was	elected	[high	post	within	profession],	toasting	Her	Majesty	at	[government	building…].	And	so	to	come	down	to	that.	I	don’t	want	to	be	remembered	for	that.	I	want	to	be	remembered	for	the	things	I’ve	done.	[I2:423-7,430-1].	
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For	Eric,	it	was	better	to	die	whilst	still	“independent”52	as	a	successful	young	man	rather	than	risk	it	being	undermined	by	dependency	during	old-age	decline:	
I	saw	the	Three	Musketeers	recently.	The	modern	film,	which	I	don’t	like	much.	But	as	they	were	all	going	to	die	towards	the	end	of	the	film	[one	of	the	Musketeers]	said	‘come	on’	and	he	says	‘let’s	face	this	lot.	I	don’t	want	to	die	an	old	man.	Now.	I	don’t	want	to	die	in	my	own	piss’.	That’s	what	he	said.	You	know,	incontinence	and	all	the	rest	of	it.	And	I	thought	well	(laughing)	that	just	about	sums	it	up!	[I1:662-71]	Reflecting	this,	Eric	was	writing	a	letter	he	referred	to	as	a	“living	will”53,	which	he	completed	and	presented	to	his	family	by	our	fourth	interview.	This	expressed	his	wishes	for	euthanasia	if	he	became	“really	old	and	gaga”54:	
So	I	am	writing	this	letter	and	I’m	flannelling	around	it	saying	things	like	‘when	a	baby	is	due	[…]	there’s	great	celebration	in	the	family,	everybody’s	expecting	and	buying	clothes	and	at	that	time	[people]	wondered	if	it	would	be	a	girl	or	boy	and	when	the	baby	comes	there’s	all	celebrations	and,	you	know,	everybody’s	happy.	
Why	can’t	(emphasis)	you	leave	(emphasis)	the	planet	in	a	similar	manner	to	what	you	came?	Which	means	that	you’re	celebrated	and	you’re	sent	on	your	way’.	[I1:597-604]	He	said	“I	do	not	want	to	just	fade	and	fade	and	fade”55.	To	be	clear,	Eric	was	not	arranging	a	euthanasia	procedure	at	the	time	of	our	interviews,	nor	did	he	seem	suicidal.	However,	with	the	spectre	of	decline	present	in	the	motivational	and	physical	impairments	he	associated	with	getting	older,	the	possibility	of	euthanasia	was	nevertheless	on	the	horizon.	Indeed,	Eric	foresaw	the	possibility	of	a	level	of	decline	that	would	justify	euthanasia	in	“six	or	seven	years	from	now”56,	although	elsewhere	in	our	interviews	he	stressed	that	“the	euthanasia	is	only	much,	much	longer	term”57,	suggesting	he	perhaps	had	a	longer	period	in	mind.	Such	apparent	uncertainty	over	what	will	happen	in	the	future	with	regard	to	decline	meant	that	throughout	our	interviews	there	was	an	oscillation	between	pessimism	associated	with	decline	and	optimism	about	renewing	motivation.	Thus,	after	talking	about	finding	himself	“backing	away”58	from	tasks	(see	block	quote,	earlier)	we	see	a	fatalistic	acceptance	of	decline	quickly	met	by	a	stubborn	refusal	to	accept	it:	
Well,	I	mean	I’m	human	like	everybody	else	and	I	mean	I’m	not	immortal,	but	I’m	not	ready	(emphasis)!	I	mean	my	wife	keeps	saying	to	me	‘take	it	easy,	you’re	nearly	80’.	I	don’t	want	to	be	80!	(Laughs)	I	feel	that	80	shouldn’t	be	a	problem	to	me.	[I2:639-42]	The	refusal	existed	as	more	than	an	emotional	reaction,	however.	Eric	foresaw	that	decline	could	be	halted,	and	even	reversed,	through	two	possibilities	for	the	return	of	motivation.		The	first	involved	a	medical	fix,	which	itself	came	in	two	forms.	Earlier	in	his	life	Eric	had	had	high	levels	of	thyroxine	in	his	body,	a	hormone	controlling	“how	energetic	[you	feel:	whether…]	you	want	to	go	and	do	[something]	or	whether	you	just	want	to	lie	in	a	chair	and	go	(groans)	(laughs)”59.	However,	after	taking	two	doses	of	radioactive	iodine	to	slow	his	
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thyroid’s	output	of	thyroxine,	it	became	necessary	for	him	to	take	thyroxine	orally	every	day	(and	he	had	done	so	for	decades).	Early	in	our	interviews	Eric	tended	to	attribute	his	lack	of	motivation	to	lack	of	thyroxine:	“I	feel	that	my	motivation	is	so	low	and	[it]	is	so	difficult	to	do	anything	that	I	feel	my	thyroxine’s	way	down	below	where	it	should	be”60.	The	solution	to	his	motivational	crisis	was	simple:	increasing	his	dosage	of	thyroxine.	However,	this	first	required	a	medical	measurement	of	his	thyroxine	levels,	and	he	had	scheduled	such	a	test	between	our	second	and	third	interviews.	There	were	“great	hopes”61	that	the	thyroxine	was	the	cause	of	his	lack	of	motivation,	but	there	was	always	the	possibility	that	it	might	not,	and	the	pessimistic	spectre	of	decline	thus	haunted	our	first	two	interviews:	
L:	But	I	suppose	what	I’m	getting	at	is	this	[…]	idea	that	if	you	can’t	motivate	yourself	and	if	you	can’t	get	the	motivation	back	with	a	medical	fix…	E:	That	will	be	major.	L:	Then	that	will	be	major.	E:	It	will	be.	[I2:275-9]	However,	by	our	third	interview	it	was	confirmed	by	Eric’s	doctors	that	his	thyroxine	was	“a	bit	low”62	and	that	“it	should	be	upped”63.	Jubilation	greeted	this	news	and	Eric	felt	that	“I’m	one	step	up	the	ladder”64,	with	him	immediately	taking	an	increased	dosage.	Whilst	the	effects	of	the	extra	thyroxine	were	yet	to	fully	materialise	(“I’ve	been	on	these	extra	pill	[sic]	now	for	over	a	week	and	it’s	just	beginning	to	hurry	me	up	a	bit”65),	and	that	his	dosage	might	need	increasing	even	further	(in	his	opinion),	there	was	optimism	for	a	positive	future	where	he	was	able	to	prove	himself	as	the	young	man:	
[…]	once	it	gets	up	to	a	level	that	suits	me,	I	will	be	the	younger	man.	There’s	no	doubt	in	my	mind	at	all.	I	can	leave	60	year	olds	behind	once	I	get	going	(laughs).	I	feel	very	good	that	way.	[I3:382-7]	However,	between	our	third	and	fourth	interviews	Eric	experienced	sudden	health	problems	that	meant	our	fourth	interview	was	postponed	for	several	months.	Symptoms	included	loss	of	sight	in	one	eye,	problems	walking,	and	a	large	reduction	in	blood	pressure	(to	below-normal	levels),	and	he	was	(after	some	time)	eventually	diagnosed	with	diabetes.	In	the	face	of	recovering	motivation	based	on	the	thyroxine	medical	fix,	this	health	setback	shook	the	optimism	observed	in	our	third	interview.	Nevertheless,	by	the	fourth	interview	Eric	was	again	confident	in	a	medical	fix	for	decline.	Not	only	was	his	loss	of	eyesight	and	balance	quickly	restored	upon	diagnosis	(“[the	doctor]	sent	me	straight	round	to	the	diabetic	nurse.	I	got	these	pills.	And	within	24	hours	I	was	cured”66),	but	low	blood	pressure	now	replaced	thyroxine	levels	as	the	chief	culprit	of	lack	of	motivation	(“I	don’t	think	it’s	the	thyroxine.	I’m	pretty	sure	now	it’s	blood	pressure,	and	I’m	hoping	that	the	doctor	will	let	me	raise	my	blood	pressure	a	bit	because	I	feel	that	that’s	why	I’m	lethargic	and	tired”67).	
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Whilst	Eric	hoped	a	medical	fix	would	resolve	the	motivational	crisis,	the	possibility	that	this	might	fail	was	met	with	a	final	backup	of	mustering	motivation	within	himself.	Thus,	he	said	“if	it’s	not	my	thyroxine	I’m	going	to	have	to	prick	myself	with	a	needle	or	something	and	get	moving”68.	He	would	have	to	“give	myself	a	good	shake”69	because	“I’m	not	going	to	let	myself	get	into	decline”70.	This	required	applying	willpower:	
[…]	I	have	been	able	to	apply	myself.	I	have	(emphasis)	achieved	things	with	willpower.	And	alright	it	might	take	me	a	bit	longer	as	I’m	getting	a	bit	older,	but	I	haven’t	given	up.	I	have	not	(emphasis)	given	up.	[I2:715-19]	Of	course,	such	strong	protestations	simply	invert	the	fear	that	decline	is	inevitable.	The	final	move	against	decline	after	the	medical	fix	has	failed,	it	is	a	climax	of	the	tension	between	recovery	and	decline,	between	the	glorious	vitality	of	a	young	man	and	the	shameful	death	of	an	old	one.	Here	within	such	moments	the	oscillation	between	pessimism	of	inevitable	decline	and	optimism	of	renewal	clash	as	an	internal	battle	for	self-motivation,	to	be	fought	(“my	attitude	is	that	I’m	going	to	fight”71)	with	the	doubting	promise	of	a	confident	man	now	filled	with	self-doubt:	“I	promise	you	I’m	not	going	to	let	it	beat	me”72.	A	tension	unresolved	in	our	interviews,	a	resolution	nevertheless	threatened	throughout.	
SECOND	MOVEMENT:	FAILURE	AND	THE	ABJECT	
THE	THREAT	OF	THE	OTHER	
Eric’s	recounting	of	his	successes	in	life	dominated	much	of	our	time	together.	As	the	interviews	went	on	I	found	them	increasingly	uninsightful	insofar	as	they	seemed	well-rehearsed	(and	often	repeated)	intermediaries	serving	a	message	I	had	already	fully	received:	Eric	is	successful.	After	the	third	interview	I	wrote	a	note	of	reflection	stating	I	“felt	frustrated	that	I	could	not	take	the	topic	away	from	Eric	demonstrating	how	successful	he	was”.	This	went	on	to	consider	how	my	frustration	was	a	symptom	that	I	had	stopped	‘following	the	natives’	in	favour	of	my	own	expectations	of	identifying	excess	(which	did	not	happen).	That	is,	I	was	not	‘naive’	enough,	and	there	was	a	conflict	between	my	a	priori	
coding	that	expected	two	movements	versus	following	what	happens	(being	empirical)	(see	also	Appendix	1).	However,	I	reasoned	my	frustration	was	not	actually	about	something	missing	that	I	as	a	researcher	wanted	to	be	there,	but	that	there	really	was	something	there	but	‘barely’	being	Othered	into	absence.	My	frustration	expressed	the	presence	of	a	
something	else	not	openly	stated	but	nevertheless	implicitly	acknowledged.	Eric’s	endless	success	stories	seemed	an	overcompensation	(the	lady	doth	protest	too	much),	and	suggested	that	far	from	being	secure	in	an	identity	of	a	successful	person,	this	was	actually	in	doubt.	
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Certainly,	his	successful	identity	was	being	put	into	doubt	because	of	the	motivational	crisis	he	was	now	experiencing,	and	the	prospect	of	failing	health	in	general.	Overcompensation	might	thus	be	perfectly	expected	on	this	basis,	being	consistent	with	the	first	movement	narrative	of	a	newly-threatened	identity.	But	his	stories	seemed	so	well	rehearsed,	following	a	style	that	Eric	must	have	perfected	long	before	his	current	motivational	crisis	and	health	problems,	something	that	does	not	fit	with	the	first	movement	narrative	of	Eric	having	always	been	a	successful	person	throughout	his	life.	This	was	my	inclination,	anyway.	And	in	our	interviews	it	prompted	an	exploration	of	what	he	was	overcompensating	about,	of	some	
Other	to	success	that	threatened	it.	This	Other	manifested	itself	as	the	population	of	his	childhood	village.	The	first	movement	noted	how	he	felt	superior	them,	and	more	than	this,	he	feared	becoming	them	unless	he	worked	hard,	as	his	mother	warned:	“she	would	say	you’ll	end	up	like	them	if	you	don’t	[…]	do	your	work,	you	know,	schoolwork	and	stuff	like	that”73.	In	pinpointing	exactly	who	Eric	felt	superior	to,	at	times	he	referred	to	the	children	he	grew	up	alongside,	but	there	seemed	to	be	a	broad	brush	stroke	over	the	entre	village	based	on	economic	class.	“I	can’t	get	away	from	class”74.	The	rest	of	the	village	“were	all	[…]	a	different	class”75	to	his	family,	“what	we	would	all	call	lower-working	class”76.	This	divide	manifested	itself	materially:	“our	house	was	bigger	than	anybody	else’s,	and	it	was	isolated,	a	little	bit,	it	was	segregated”77.	Segregation	was	not	simply	physical	or	economic,	but	also	moral,	with	Eric	describing	these	Others	as	“lowlives”78.	A	‘lowlife’	is	conventionally	understood	as	a	“criminal	or	disreputable	person”	(Lowlife,	n.d.),	and	might	be	regarded	as	a	harsh	moral	stigmatisation	that	unsettles	conventional	societal	norms	about	judging	others,	particularly	entire	social	groups	like	a	village	or	economic	class.	This	was	not	lost	on	Eric,	but	he	nevertheless	used	the	term	for	its	truth:	“it’s	a	word	I	don’t	like	to	use	but	it’s	a	fact.	[…]	It	describes	it	exactly”79.	Whilst	not	(necessarily)	criminal,	they	were	nevertheless	disreputable	in	their	moral	inferiority.	For	a	start,	they	cared	little	for	education	(“they	couldn’t	give	a	monkey’s,	[…]	nobody	wanted	to	study”80),	and	were	financially	irresponsible.	Moreover,	they	“had	no	motivation	to	do	anything	in	their	life	at	all”81,	expressing	an	individual	responsibility	for	their	inferiority.	And	this	meant	Eric	too	was	individually	responsible	for	not	becoming	a	lowlife	through	following	his	mother’s	counsel	to	validate	a	different	identity	by	being	
successful.	And	Eric	had	been	successful,	thus	managing	to	overcome	the	threat	of	becoming	the	Other	of	the	lowlife.		This	Other	to	success	is	made	present	in	the	first	movement	narrative,	but	as	an	entity	segregated	from	Eric’s	identity	as	a	young	man,	where	the	threat	of	it	infecting	this	identity	was	only	ever	a	vague	potentiality	that	never	materialised.	Yet	this	conception	of	a	solid	boundary	did	not	account	for	why	Eric	seemed	to	try	so	hard	to	prove	his	success.	
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MAKING	FAILURE	PRESENT	
The	possibility	of	a	better	explanation	came	after	our	fourth	interview,	as	my	post-interview	reflection	recorded:	
After	the	tape	was	turned	off	I	said	that	I	want	our	challenge	next	week	to	be	to	explore	the	things	that	are	driving	his	desperation	to	maintain	the	successful,	independent,	motivated,	superior	identity	status.	He	then	said	we	could	talk	about	the	“nightmare	of	failure”.	Whilst	the	interviews	up	until	this	point	sought	to	explore	what	“not	achieving”82	meant,	the	word	‘failure’	had	not	actually	been	mentioned	by	either	myself	or	Eric.	Indeed,	in	the	first	four	interviews	words	with	the	stem	‘fail-’	were	not	used	by	either	of	us	other	than	two	instances	that	related	to	NHS	notifications	of	Eric’s	‘failure’	to	attend	medical	appointments83.	By	contrast,	our	fifth	(and	final)	interview	explicitly	explored	the	“nightmare	of	failure”	in	Eric’s	life,	and	words	using	the	stem	‘fail-’	were	used	35	times.	Initially	in	this	interview	‘failure’	was	something	he	admitted	to,	but	was	qualified	as	something	he	has	always	managed	to	narrowly	escape	from.	“[It	is]	total	arrogance	[…]	if	I	said	I’ve	never,	ever	failed.	But	when	I’ve	had	a	failure	I’ve	managed	to	wriggle	out	and	put	it	right	(laughs)”84.	When	asked	to	discuss	what	he	meant	by	“nightmare	of	failure”	he	said	he	“very	nearly	had	a	bad	failure	once	in	my	life”85	(my	emphasis),	when	he	was	a	manger	building	a	particular	ship.	It	“was	almost	a	failure”86	(my	emphasis)	insofar	as	there	was	a	risk	the	ship	would	not	be	completed.	But	Eric	escaped	even	‘almost’	failing	through	positioning	himself	as	not	responsible	for	the	circumstances	producing	it.	Eric	noted	that	building	was	beset	by	poor	planning	and	poorly	skilled	labour,	such	that	a	previous	manager	had	quit	because	“he	couldn’t	stand	it”87.	Eric	was	assigned	as	his	replacement,	but	“there	was	an	enormous	(emphasis)	amount	of	work	and	testing	to	do”88,	and	skilled	labour	was	already	taken	up	building	ships	in	other	shipyards	within	the	company	(which	therefore	“had	all	the	best	men,	all	the	best	foremen.	All	the	skills	were	on	their	ships”89).	It	“was	just	a	no-win	situation	and	I	was	put	on	there	and	(pause)	it	was	like	walking	in	deep	mud	(laughs)”90.	When	the	ship	was	finished	“there	was	a	lot	of	grief	and	a	lot	of	unhappiness	about	all	of	it”91,	with	Eric	noting	that	“I	thought	at	one	stage	I	was	going	to	get	the	sack”92.	At	a	meeting	with	his	bosses	“I	remember	saying	that	if	I	got	the	sack,	which	they	never	mentioned,	that	in	such	a	small	town	nobody	would	speak	to	me	and	[…I	would	have]	been	remembered	for	a	lifetime”93.	When	asked	by	me	“why	would	you	be	seen	as	responsible	[by	his	bosses]	if	you	are	saying	that	it	wasn’t	your	fault”94,	Eric	replied:	“they	were	looking	for	a	scapegoat”95.		Thus,	this	‘failure’	for	Eric	is	not	just	‘almost’,	but	one	he	is	not	responsible	for.	As	discussed	earlier,	whether	a	person	enacts	the	success	of	the	young	man	or	the	failure	of	the	lowlife	depends	on	actions	the	individual	is	responsible	for.	But	where	the	choice	to	enact	their	own	
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success	or	failure	is	not	available,	their	identity	cannot	be	defined	by	the	outcome	of	the	action.	Thus,	this	‘almost’	failure	does	not	infect	Eric’s	young	man	identity,	yet	he	is	nevertheless	able	to	incorporate	these	potentially	inconvenient	but	unavoidably	empirical	events	into	his	narrative	of	success.	Whilst	the	Other	of	failure	is	here	more	of	a	threat	than	the	lowlives	of	his	childhood	village,	it	nevertheless	does	not	penetrate	the	boundary	segregating	his	identity	of	success	from	failure.	
POLLUTING	SUCCESS	
The	hypothetical	Other	that	Eric	was	overcompensating	for	thus	involves	failure	(and	not	just	‘almost’	failure)	for	which	he	is	responsible.	Having	previously	recognised	the	importance	of	heeding	his	mother’s	advice	of	succeeding,	towards	the	end	of	our	fifth	interview	I	sought	to	explore	the	Other	of	failure	by	asking	if	there	were	instances	where	he	hadn’t	lived	up	to	his	mother’s	expectations	of	success.	Eric	thought	that	“if	she	was	around	I	think	she’d	be	pleased	as	punch”96	with	his	achievements,	but	nevertheless	admitted	that	there	were	instances	of	him	failing	when	she	was	alive	that	he	would	not	disclose	to	her:	“I	would	never	tell	my	mother	if	I	had	a	failure.	Not	out	of	arrogance.	I	just	know	she	would	be	upset”97.	Eric	reflected	on	how	he	tried	to	hide	failure	from	his	mother,	and	this	led	him	to	talk	about	an	important	episode	of	failure	in	his	life:	
E:	Oh	my	mum	would	care	[if	he	failed].	But	I	would	find	a	way	to	disguise	it	knowing	that	other	things	happen.	You	know,	once	in	my	life	(pause)	wait	a	minute,	yes,	you	could	talk	about	failure.	A	failure	that	we	haven’t	discussed.	L:	Oh	yeah?	E:	Mostly	because	I’ve	forgotten	about	it,	but	it	was	quite	a	big	failure.	[I5:640-44]	Whilst	Eric	said	“I’m	not	going	into	it,	it	would	take	too	long”98,	he	nevertheless	proceeded	to	tell	the	story	of	this	failure,	a	failure	where	“it	was	me	that	made	the	mistake”99.	Whilst	working	as	a	manager	in	the	shipyards	Eric	was	asked	to	provide	advice	to	“a	very	rich	man	in	the	town”100	on	the	purchase	of	a	ship,	being	directed	to	give	information	to	the	rich	man’s	associate.	Subsequently,	Eric	proposed	a	separate	venture	to	this	associate:	that	they	buy	a	ship	together	and	run	it	as	a	business	transporting	freight,	a	proposal	that	the	associate	accepted.	After	buying	a	ship,	a	friend	of	his	new	business	partner	ran	it	on	their	behalf,	and	his	business	partner	kept	Eric	informed	with	updates	indicating	its	success:	
[…]	he	came	along	one	day	and	he	said	‘we’re	making	an	absolute	bloody	fortune’,	and	he	had	this	sheet	with	everything	written	down.	I	remember	in	one	place	it	had	‘nylon	rope	–	8	pound.	And	I	thought,	by,	he’s	really	gone	into	details	here.	He	said	‘it’s	now	time	to	buy	the	second	ship	and	then	you	pack	your	job	in’.	[I5:707-10]	
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Convinced	by	the	success	of	the	first	ship,	Eric	agreed	to	purchase	the	second,	with	the	funds	obtained	by	mortgaging	the	childhood	house	he	lived	in	with	his	mother,	wife,	and	two	children,	on	the	advice	of	his	business	partner	(“he	says	‘it’ll	mean	putting	your	house	up’	”101).	However,	after	leaving	his	job	in	the	shipyards	to	work	in	the	business,	and	providing	his	business	partner	with	the	funds	for	the	second	ship,	he	found	out	that	the	documents	indicating	the	financial	success	of	the	business	had	been	falsified.	“[W]e	weren’t	making	a	bloody	fortune”102.	His	partner	had	presented	Eric	with	false	information	in	order	to	obtain	further	investment	in	the	failing	business.	“He	was	hoping	that	buying	the	second	ship	would	pull	things	round.	Well	it	didn’t”103.	Eric	hired	an	“international	solicitor”104	(it	was	not	clear	whether	this	was	to	deal	with	the	deception	or	the	legal	obligations	relating	to	his	financial	difficulties),	but	it	“turned	out	[the	solicitor]	was	[his	business	partner’s]	bloody	pal.	They’d	been	at	school	together”105.	The	solicitor	was	“in	cahoots”106	with	his	business	partner	and	“all	he	did	was	run	me	up	a	hell	of	a	bill	and	do	bugger	all”107,	something	that	he	was	alerted	to	when	he	received	a	letter	from	a	well-wisher	warning	Eric	that	he	was	(still)	being	deceived.	Eric’s	financial	situation	meant	that	“I	lost	my	house”108,	with	the	bank	taking	ownership.	This	was	the	childhood	house	expressing	his	family’s	superiority	in	the	village.	Ownership	enacted	the	success	that	segregated	his	family	from	the	failure	of	the	lowlives,	and	foreclosure	due	to	Eric’s	bad	decisions	(that	he	accepted	responsibility	for)	is	an	uncomfortable	breach	of	the	boundary	of	success	by	failure.	That	his	mother,	the	ethical	voice	of	the	imperative	to	maintain	the	purity	of	success,	was	forced	to	leave	and	move	in	with	her	sister	serves	to	reinforce	the	contrast	between	the	first	movement	narrative	of	an	Other	of	failure	completely	contained	and	segregated	from	his	successful	identity	and	a	second	narrative	where	this	boundary	is	spectacularly	breached	by	failure.	Whilst	instances	of	Eric’s	overcompensation	might	have	been	the	spark	prompting	the	exploration	revealing	this	contrast	in	narratives,	their	objections	to	being	positioned	as	intermediaries	for	Eric’s	narrative	of	success	were	relatively	subtle.	By	contrast,	the	subsequent	revealing	of	the	foreclosure	of	the	house	provides	a	stark	objection	to	the	house’s	role	as	such	an	intermediary.	It	has	become	a	mediator	that	also	offers	an	alternative	account	of	failure	that	must	be	Othered	into	absence	in	the	first.	But	this	contrast	did	not	arise	simply	because	of	a	random	retracing	of	historical	events	previously	lost	to	absent-mindedness	(as	Eric	seemed	to	suggest),	where	the	narratives	are	only	connected	in	time	and	can	be	conveniently	distributed	into	its	splendidly	isolated	singularities	(see	Chapter	6).	It	arose	because	Eric	failing	was	both	impossible	to	the	enactment	of	the	first	movement	narrative	of	a	successful	identity	yet	also	entirely	necessary	for	it.		
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FAILURE	AS	NECESSARY	AND	IMPOSSIBLE	
To	enact	the	young	man	identity	required	the	possibility	that	Eric	might	fail.	Each	enactment	was	thus	a	roll	of	the	dice	that,	whilst	could	be	stacked	in	favour	of	success	(through	motivation	and	inherent	skill),	might	end	in	failure.	And	because	of	the	many	occasions	for	the	possibility	of	failure,	there	were	occasions	when	he	did	fail.	These	were	occasions	that	had	to	be	Othered	into	absence	in	the	first	movement	narrative	because	the	division	between	a	successful	young	man	and	a	failing	lowlife	is	a	sharp	division	that	maintains	the	purity	of	success	and	failure.	The	enactment	of	the	young	man	required	him	to	always	succeed,	but	the	need	to	enact	success	meant	that	failure	was	inevitable	at	some	point	and	to	some	degree	(“[it	is]	total	arrogance	[…]	if	I	said	I’ve	never,	ever	failed”109).	Eric’s	moments	of	failure	are	akin	to	Julia	Kristeva’s	abject,	which	is	the	point	that	the	strict	division	between	self	and	other,	life	and	death,	are	shown	to	be	seamlessly	connected	in	the	materiality	of,	for	example,	the	rotting	flesh	of	a	corpse	(Felluga,	2011a).	In	the	abject	the	division	disintegrates,	to	be	barely	purified	by	practices	of	horror	such	as	a	veil	put	over	the	face	of	the	corpse.	Similarly,	we	see	that	success	and	failure	are	seamlessly	connected	in	the	materiality	of	the	foreclosed	house,	at	once	an	intermediary	for	the	segregation	of	Eric’s	success	from	the	failure	of	the	lowlives	yet	also	perhaps	the	most	potent	infection	of	his	success	by	failure,	just	as	the	corpse	is	“death	infecting	life”	(Kristeva,	1982,	cited	in	Felluga,	2011a,	par.	5).	With	this	extended	field	of	vision	we	similarly	see	that	the	lowlives	of	the	village	are	repugnant	to	Eric	not	simply	because	they	are	the	opposite	of	what	he	wants	to	be,	but	also	because	he	sees	in	them	the	failure	that	he	has	already	enacted,	a	seamless	connectedness	of	himself	to	their	failure	that	is	established	by	the	very	conditions	of	what	it	means	to	succeed	(that	an	action	might	fail),	just	as	life	depends	on	the	materiality	of	flesh	that	might	die.	Deferring	failure	and	death	to	some	(purposively	bracketed)	future	where	they	exist	as	singularities	set	apart	from	present	singularities	of	success	and	life	(respectively)	can	work	to	maintain	the	boundary	only	until	the	seamlessness	of	success	and	failure,	life	and	death,	are	visible	in	the	(controversial)	abject	of	the	foreclosed	house	or	corpse.	
THESIS	AS	PINBOARD,	INTERVIEW	AS	FIRE	OBJECT	
Whilst	this	thesis	aims	to	construct	the	vantage	point	of	the	pinboard	from	interview	data,	an	end	product	that	intervenes	on	the	centred	singularity	of	a	method	assemblage,	this	is	an	arbitrary	stoppage	that	is	never	the	end	of	the	story	for	interview	practice.	And	in	our	interview	the	failure	of	Eric’s	house-loss	had	another	element	–	of	what	happened	after	Eric	was	confronted	with	this	nightmare	of	failure:	
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Here	Eric’s	acceptance	of	failure	into	his	identity	contrasts	with	his	rigid	refusal	to	accept	failure	in	the	first	movement	narrative,	where	he	would	rather	choose	death	through	euthanasia.	This	contrast	prompted	the	consideration	that	he	might	accept	having	‘gone	down	in	the	world’	through	decline,	something	I	put	to	Eric	(“so	when	we	talk	about	your	loss	of	motivation	[…]	and	your	increasing	dependency,	why	don’t	you	feel	that	way	about	that?”110).	Eric	did	not	offer	an	immediate	explanation	(“I	don’t	know.	(Pause)	I	don’t	know”111),	and	time	constraints	limited	further	exploration,	but	what	is	significant	is	that	making	visible	this	Othered-into-absence	element	served	to	offer	the	possibility	of	a	transformation	of	the	first	movement	narrative.			In	the	practice	of	the	interview,	controversies	don’t	have	to	remain	unresolved,	held	still	on	a	pinboard	for	the	purpose	of	intervening	on	epistemology.	Rather,	the	narrative(s)	of	the	interview	acted	like	a	fire	object	(Law	&	Singleton,	2005),	where	presences	are	not	only	“generated	in,	and	generative	of,	realities	that	are	necessarily	absent”	(p.	343)	but	that	realities	Othered-into-absence	can	“work	upon	those	presences	and	transform	them”	(p.	345).	Indeed,	“[f]ire	objects	[…]	depend	upon	otherness,	and	that	otherness	is	generative”	(p.	344).	This	contrast	between	the	construction	of	a	surface	that	makes	visible	a	juxtaposition	that	is	both	necessary	and	impossible	to	a	first	movement	narrative	and	the	subsequent	reaction	to	this	captures	an	issue	to	do	with	how	the	pinboard	enacts	time,	and	this	is	taken	up	in	Chapter	14.	
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CHAPTER	11:	ALICE	
FIRST	MOVEMENT:	THE	(UN)MAKING	OF	ILLNESS	
Alice	is	a	middle-aged	woman	who	experiences	chronic	back	pain	alongside	a	range	of	other	neurological	symptoms.	Her	narrative	can	be	understood	as	tension	between	the	failure	of	medical	authorities	to	legitimise,	or	make	real,	her	bodily	sensations,	and	a	telic	demand	for	definition	that	these	sensations	exert.	Her	narrative	is	split	into	three	parts:	(1)	living	with	
functional	neurological	symptoms	(FNS),	(2)	persistent	regression	to	a	‘void’	of	unreality	where	she	struggles	to	explain	her	bodily	sensations,	and	(3)	the	contested	attempt	to	fill	this	void	through	performing	work	to	make	FNS	real.	
(1)	FUNCTIONAL	NEUROLOGICAL	SYMPTOMS	
From	my	first	contact	with	Alice	she	was	clear	in	her	understanding	of	her	pain:	it	is	a	symptom	of	a	medical	condition	know	as	functional	neurological	symptoms	(FNS).	At	our	informed	consent	meeting	she	directed	me	to	a	website	(Stone,	n.d.)	written	by	a	neurological	specialist	(Dr	Jon	Stone),	a	website	she	herself	had	been	directed	to	by	her	neurologist.	Through	this	website	she	had	become	knowledgeable	about	FNS.	As	the	website	notes,	FNS	(which	is	given	various	different	names	on	the	site)	is	not	a	disease	that	involves	tissue	damage	to	any	part	of	the	body	(including	the	nervous	system).	Instead,	it	is	understood	as	dysregulation	in	nervous	system	functioning	(“something	that	has	caused	the	system	to	get	out	of	sync”1,	to	use	Alice’s	words),	producing	a	range	of	symptoms	(the	website	lists	25)	that	patients	may	have	more	or	less	of.	Stone	in	particular	champions	the	notion	that	such	bodily	system	dysregulation	is	a	“normal	part	of	being	a	human	being”	(Stone,	2014),	and	can	be	potentially	reversed.	Alice	noted	that,	in	addition	to	back	pain,	she	experiences	lesser	(and	more	intermittent)	pain	in	her	right	arm,	dystonia	(where	limbs	curl	into	abnormal	postures),	‘drop	foot’	(where	she	cannot	move	her	foot	voluntarily	and	which	“just	kind	of	hang[s]	down”2),	weakness	from	her	hips	downward	and	in	her	right	arm	(leading	to	“clumsiness”3	such	as	knocking	things	over	or	dropping	things),	tiredness	and	fatigue	(“I	was	hit	with	this	thing	where	[…]	I	just	felt	like	I	could	sleep	all	day”4),	variable	eyesight,	jerking	and	twitching,	and	inability	to	gauge	bladder	fullness	(requiring	regular	toilet	visits).a	She	had	had	short	episodes	of	these	symptoms	earlier	in	her	life,	but	had	not	attributed	them	to	FNS	until	a	bout	of	back	pain	(that	had	persisted	for	approximately	3	months)	significantly	worsened																																									 																					
a	Alice	also	talked	about	having	sciatica	in	one	leg,	but	this	was	only	briefly	mentioned	and	seemed	insignificant	to	her	in	relation	to	the	symptoms	she	identified	as	FNS.	
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about	one	year	before	our	interviews.	At	this	point	“the	pain	symptoms	came	within	a	few	days,	getting	worse	and	worse	and	then	other	symptoms	[…]	came	in	after	that”5.	Whilst	Alice	initially	thought	she	would	recover,	as	she	did	with	earlier	episodes	(“when	this	first	started	I	thought	[…]	‘I’ll	be	back	to	work	in	a	week	or	so”6),	it	became	increasingly	apparent	that	her	condition	was	not	temporary	(“three	months	down	the	line	and	[…]	you’re	still	not	back	to	work	and	you’re	thinking	hmmmm,	you	know,	this	is,	this	is	obviously	something	bigger”7).	She	now	understood	her	past	symptoms	as	typical	progression	of	FNS:	“it’s	usually	women	[…]	in	their	40s.	They’ve	usually	had	episodes	before	and	then	they	have	a	final	big	wham	(laughing	very	slightly),	you	know,	that’s	it.	And	they	find	that	they	don’t	recover	from	that”8,	although	elsewhere	in	our	interviews	she	expressed	hope	in	recovery.		At	the	onset	of	her	latest	episode	of	symptoms	Alice	experienced	shock	at	how	her	normal	life	was	replaced	with	a	sudden	and	unstopping	deterioration:	
[…]	it’s	kind	of	more	a	[…]	shock	thing,	I	suppose,	that,	you	know,	you	were	so	well	and,	you	know,	carrying	out	fully	your	life	looking	after	a	child,	working	full-time,	you	know,	weekends	filled	with	activities,	and	then	suddenly	within,	you	know,	a	week,	a	fortnight	things	are	just	[…going]	down	and	down	and	down	and	getting	worse.	[I3:80-4]	Despite	her	symptoms	Alice	still	has	practical	responsibilities	(“you	still	have	to	do	everything”9),	and	she	has	found	it	difficult	to	fulfil	the	(often	self-imposed)	practical	demands	of	day-to-day	living:	
I’ve	got	to	do	my	washing	up	and	I’ve	got	to	stand	and	do	it.	If	I	don’t	do	it	then	it’ll	just	annoy	me.	[…]	I	don’t	like	mess	or	anything	like	that.	So	I’m	my	own	worst	enemy	because	I’ll	go	over	the	top	[…]	doing	stuff	rather	than	[…]	doing	it	in	bits	and	pacing	yourself.	[I4:711-14]	In	particular,	she	noted	juggling	caring	for	her	teenage	son	(as	a	single	mother)	with	tiredness	and	fatigue:	“I’ve	still	got	a	17-year-old	son	that	needs	taking	to	football	or	[…]	whatever.	You	don’t	[…]	get	that	recovery	time”10.	Indeed,	getting	her	son	out	to	school	on	a	morning	involves	“this	mad	‘in	one	hour	let’s	just	do	everything	what	you	can’	”11,	followed	by	a	“collapse”12	after	he	leaves	the	house	(“I	can	crash	after	[son]	has	gone”13).	These	practical	demands	are	exacerbated	by	her	choice	to	emotionally	protect	her	son	from	detailed	knowledge	of	her	illness:	
He	doesn’t	know	the	ins	and	outs	because	I	don’t	think	he	needs	to,	you	know.	He’s	got	other	things	on	his	mind,	girlfriends	and	rugby,	and	he	doesn’t	need	to	know	what’s	wrong	with	mum	because	it’s	just	too	complicated.	[I1:	478-81]	As	a	result,	she	attempted	to	make	life	as	‘normal’	as	possible	for	him:	
You’ve	got	to	get	on	with	it	when	you’ve	got	a	child	involved.	You	can’t	drag	a	child	down	with	you.	You’ve	got	to	keep	on	an	even	
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keel,	really.	You’ve	got	to	keep	going	as	much	as	you	can	and	what	I	tend	to	do	is	I	tend	to	act	normally	[…]	as	much	as	I	can	when	[son’s]	around	[…].	[I1:684-9]	However,	the	various	demands	left	her	“exhausted”14,	which	was	compounded	by	the	mental	stress	of	worrying.	She	experienced	financial	concerns	because	of	being	unable	to	work.	Help	from	welfare	benefits	is	limited	because	of	money	invested	in	the	marital	home	occupied	by	her	ex-husband,	even	though	Alice	rented	and	would	otherwise	be	eligible	for	assistance	with	this	(“they	told	me	that	because	I’ve	got	money	in	property,	[…]	I	can’t	get	any	help”15).	Moreover,	FNS	is	a	condition	with	an	uncertain	prognosis,	leading	to	anxiety	about	what	will	happen	in	the	future:	
I	think	it’s	not	knowing,	because	it’s	a	condition	where	basically	you	can	say:	how	long	is	a	piece	of	string?	So	it’s	not	like	‘oh,	right,	you’ve	had	a	hip	replacement.	Six	weeks,	you’ll	be	fine’.	There’s	just	[…]	no	end	to	it.	There’s	no	light	at	the	end	of	the	tunnel,	I	suppose.	So	you	don’t	know	if	you’re	ever	going	to	get	better.	[I3:882-6]	Alice	discussed	FNS	as	a	condition	that	is	relatively	new	and	under-researched,	and	as	such	there	was	great	uncertainty	not	only	in	prognosis,	but	also	in	terms	of	treatment	efficacy.	Besides	taking	various	medications	(including	drugs	designed	for	Parkinson’s	disease),	which	carried	side-effects	(causing	her	to	slur	her	words),	her	treatment	regimes	were	sometimes	experimental,	such	as	manipulating	her	dystonic	leg	into	a	‘normal’	position	before	undergoing	walking	exercises	in	an	attempt	to	“change	the	[neuronal]	signals	round	to	[…]	normal”16.	Whilst	Alice	expressed	great	certainty	in	her	diagnosis	of	FNS,	it	was	a	diagnosis	that	lacked	much	explanation,	and	could	only	promise	to	provide	one	some	time	in	the	future:	
[…]	like	every	disease	or	every	illness	they’re	finding	more	drugs	[…]	and	more	ways	to	treat	them,	so	[...]	I’ll	probably	be,	in	10	years	time,	thinking	different	[…]	because	they’ve	obviously	probably	researched	more	into	it	and	they	can	kind	of	come	up	with	more	answers	for	you.	[I3:304-10]	FNS	offered	a	potential	source	of	answers	for	Alice	to	some	question	concerning	the	nature	of	her	illness	experience.	Its	failure	to	adequately	provide	such	answers,	which	are	deferred	instead	to	a	promise	of	future	definition,	left	Alice	with	an	‘unreality’	of	uncertain	bodily	sensations	that	nevertheless	demanded	them,	as	the	next	section	discusses.	
(2)	LIVING	AN	UNREALITY	OF	ILLNESS	
As	discussed,	FNS	is	a	condition	lacking	identifiable	tissue	damage.	However,	conventional	medical	diagnosis	seeks	structural	bodily	change	to	account	for	symptoms,	to	be	revealed	in	diagnostic	tests,	particularly	through	visual	means	(see	Chapter	1).	Before	Alice	was	diagnosed	with	FNS	she	underwent	many	diagnostic	tests	seeking	evidence	of	this	structural	change,	but	none	was	found.	This	left	Alice	without	explanation	for	her	symptoms:	
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[…]	I	couldn’t	quite	underst[and]	because	tests	come	back	[negative],	and	you’re	not	medically	trained	yourself,	you’re	wondering	why	then,	why	then	can	you	feel	this	pain?	Why	have	you	got	this	dystonia	if	there’s	no	reason	for	it?	[I2:113-15]	The	failure	of	these	tests	to	identify	structural	changes	produced	doubts	in	the	reliability	of	Alice’s	own	senses.	She	questioned	whether	her	bodily	sensations	were	real,	even	when	her	doctor	tried	to	reassure	her	of	their	reality:	
When	[…]	you	go	with	[…]	such	a	[…]	disability	and	such	a	lot	of	pain,	you	think	that	there	must	be	something	causing	it,	some	kind	of	disease	causing	it.	But	when	[…]	all	the	tests	are	coming	back	negative,	and	the	consultant	said,	he	did	say	it	is	a	very	real	thing	that’s	happening	to	you,	but	[…]	you	do	think,	you	know,	this	is	odd.	Why	is	this	happening?	Is	it	really	happening?	[I1:118-27]	Yet	this	doubting	of	her	symptoms	because	of	an	inability	to	find	evidence	of	structural	change	pressed	against	an	undeniability	of	her	feeling	of	pain	coupled	with	the	involuntary	visual	presentation	of	her	body:	
[…]	I	knew	it	was	real	because	I	could	feel	these	pains.	I	could	feel	the	pain	and	I	could	see	the	symptoms.	I	could	see	the	drop	foot.	I	could	see	the	dystonia	as	well.	So	I	knew	them	[sic]	symptoms	were	there,	but	if	somebody,	or	a	profession,	doubt	this	sort	of	thing	then	you	start	to	doubt	it	yourself	and	think	well,	if	somebody	who	is	supposed	to	be	a	professional,	a	medical	professional,	doubts	it	then	surely	they	must	be	right.	[I2:66-73]	With	pain	as	an	againstness	that	cannot	be	personally	denied	(Scarry,	1985	–	see	Chapter	2),	and	symptoms	being	unable	to	be	visually	denied,	this	is	(for	Alice)	an	undeniable	reality	of	bodily	sensation	that	clashes	with	a	simultaneous	deferral	to	a	medical	authority	that	fails	to	confirm	the	reality	of	those	sensations.	For	Alice,	being	caught	within	this	conflict	risks	developing	“psychological	symptoms”17,	or	what	she	frequently	referred	to	as	“the	wrong	route”18.	She	described	the	‘wrong	route’	as	maladaptive	rumination	on	the	uncertainty	in	explaining	her	problematic	bodily	sensations.	It	is	“the	route	of	‘oh	why	me?	Why	me?	Why	is	it	always	me?	Why	am	I	like	this?	Why	am	I,	you	know,	in	so	much	pain?’	”19	This	involves	a	turning-in	on	oneself	away	from	the	activities	of	daily	life,	of	“living	in	your	pyjamas”20,	of	not	looking	after	oneself,	allowing	for	a	physical	deterioration	that	could	eventually	result	in	death.	The	wrong	route	(which	she	also	referred	to	as	the	“death	route”21)	constitutes	a	mental	illness	generated	by	the	misunderstanding	of	a	medical	authority	that	then	perversely	makes	real	the	mental	illness:	“you	could	just,	you	know,	get	[…]	signed-off	with	stress	and	mental	(emphasis)	illness	because	you’re	not	being	understood”22.	Indeed:	
I	think	if	I	was	doubted	by	my	GP,	if	I	was	doubted	by	the	consultant	and	[…]	the	people	around	me	then	it’ll	be	a	whole	different	story,	I	would	have	thought.	I’m	sure	there	is	[sic]	patients	that	have	got	this	that	have	just	gone	down	the-,	the	wrong	route,	you	know	[…].	[I2:549-53]	
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The	wrong	route	can	produce	desperation	in	seeking	any	medical	answer	regardless	of	its	prognosis:	
[…]	some	people	would	go	in	[…]	thinking	‘I	hope	it’s	this	because	then	it	gives	me	an	answer	[…of]	what	the	pain	is’.	And	they’re	hoping	it	is	a	[structural]	disease,	which	[…]	you	don’t	really	want	to	do	because	that’s	[…]	thinking	wrong	and	going	down	the	psychological	[route]	of	wanting	it	to	be	something	[…]	nasty	to	[…]	make	them	feel	a	bit	better	[…].	[I2:486-91]	To	prevent	herself	from	the	rumination	of	the	wrong	route	she	relied	on	regular	routines	to	maintain	“normality”23	in	her	life.	Keeping	normality	also	establishes	a	routine	of	sustained	activity	to	help	physical	rehabilitation,	something	she	identified	as	important	by	virtue	of	her	former	job	in	a	physiotherapy	department	(otherwise	“you’ll	go	down	that	slope	of	getting	weaker	and	weaker	and	weaker	and	weaker”24),	and	normality	also	protects	her	son	from	knowledge	about	her	illness	(see	last	section).	However,	avoiding	rumination	was	talked	about	as	the	primary	goal	of	keeping	normality.	It	involves	“building	up	[a]	weekly	[routine]	of	what	you’re	going	to	be	doing	to	keep	your	mind	going	and	to	[…]	stop	going	[…]	down	that	[‘wrong’]	route”25.	Regimes	of	normality	provided	distractions	from	rumination,	and	people	were	particularly	significant	to	Alice	in	this	regard:	
[People]	are	distractions	because	I	suppose	if	you	hadn’t	got	somebody	there	all	the	time,	or	you	hadn’t	got	stuff	to	sort	out,	if	you	were	just	sat	in	the	house	on	your	own	you	would	think	more	about	it.	You	would	think	‘well	how	long’s	this	going	to	go	on	for?’	Or	‘how	long	will	I	have	to	[…]	take	these	painkillers?’	And	all	the	rest	of	it.	[I4:536-9]	When	lacking	distractions	she	would	look	for	others	to	“fill	that	gap”26.	This	could	be	“any	distraction.	They’re	just	[…]	filling	the	gap”27.	“[Y]ou	try	and	distract	yourself	all	the	time”28.	The	problem	arises	when	she	is	unable	to	fill	the	gap:	
It’s	when	you	stop	thinking	about	anything	and	you’ve	got	nothing	to	think	about,	nothing	to	look	after,	nobody	around	you,	and	you’ve	just	got	this	empty	void	in	your	head.	That’s	when	you	start	to	lose	that	grip,	[…]	but	I	tend	to	[…]	always	[…]	have	another	distraction	ready.	[I4:1082-8]	Distractions	had	limited	success,	however.	Occasionally	they	would	fail	and	she	would	“have	a	real	good	cry”29	(“I	can	go	probably	6,	8	months	and	then	just	have	a	night	of	just	crying”30).	What	Alice	ultimately	needed	to	prevent	slipping	into	the	death	route	was	a	means	to	adequately	explain	her	bodily	sensations,	of	having	answers	to	the	void’s	ruminating	questions	rather	than	relying	on	distractions:	
[…]	if	I	couldn’t	get	myself	out	of	that	void	because	I	haven’t	got	answers	and	I	don’t	know	when	the	pain’s	going	to	get	better	then	that	void	will	lead	to	me	not	having	a	life	because	I	haven’t	got	answers.	[I4:1246-8]	
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As	a	fundamental	solution	to	the	unreality	of	the	void,	these	answers	need	a	medical	authority	to	legitimise	them.	However,	the	execution	of	this	authority	in	making	real	her	illness	is	contested	and	uncertain,	always	threatening	collapse	back	into	the	rumination	of	the	void,	as	the	next	section	discusses.	
(3)	MAKING	FNS	REAL	
FNS	offers	the	promise	to	provide	the	answers	Alice	is	looking	for	to	explain	her	bodily	sensations,	and	because	it	is	legitimised	by	a	medical	authority	it	is	made	real	for	her.	Thus,	Alice	discussed	when	her	consultant	neurologist	explained	his	diagnosis	of	FNS	to	her:	
[…]	he	explained	it	very,	very	easily	so	that	you	could	say	‘oh,	yes,	I	do,	I	get	what	you	mean	there’.	And	then	you	do,	you	do	think	well,	yes,	I	have	got	a	real	problem	here.	[…The]	consultant	explained	[it]	in	a	very	real	way	to	me	[…].	[I1:96-100]	Indeed,	her	neurologist’s	“passionate”31	knowledge	about	FNS	is	important	to	Alice	because	it	provides	legitimacy	to	the	bodily	sensations	she	feels:	
So	he’s	very	understanding	of	[…]	this	condition,	and	that	helps	because	he	tells	you	what	you’re	feeling	is	real,	what	I’m	seeing	is	real,	but	it’s	the	problem	with	the	signals	from	your	brain.	There’s	been	a,	you	know,	a	mix	up	in	signals,	so	that’s	what’s	causing	the	problem.	It	isn’t	[that]	you	are	making	it	up.	[I2:100-6]	The	presence	of	a	network	of	medical	professionals	who	all	‘understand’	(and	subsequently	
enact)	the	reality	of	FNS	for	Alice	was	similarly	important	to	her.	Thus,	she	talked	about	the	significance	of:	
[…]	the	more	and	more	people,	it’s	silly	to	say,	but	you	have	on	your	side,	that	understand	it.	I	have	a	very	good	GP	that	really,	really	understands	it,	and	I’ve	got	a	very	good	neurologist	who	really,	really	understands	it,	and	I’ve	got	a	very	good	physio,	who’s	a	neurophysio,	who	understands	it,	so	they	can	treat	you	better	[…]	[I2:144-9]	Having	“this	good	team	around	me”32	means	dealing	with	her	bodily	sensations	is	“not	as	much	as	a	problem	as	if	I	was	left	in	this	big	bubble	on	my	own”33.	What	is	significant	is	that	“they	actually	believe.	They	believe	that	the	condition	is	real.	And	I	think	that’s	important	as	well,	believing	that	the	condition	is	real”34.	The	authority	of	members	of	this	medical	network	to	make	FNS	real	to	her	is	increased	through	evidence	of	their	interest	and	research	into	the	condition.	Thus,	her	physiotherapist	had	“gone	to	lectures”35	on	the	topic,	and	her	GP	was	“interested	in	this	sort	of	thing”36.	Moreover,	her	neurologist	did	not	simply	rely	on	the	pre-eminence	of	Dr	Jon	Stone	for	his	understanding	of	FNS,	but	was	conducting	his	own	research:	
[…]	he	does,	you	know,	believe	a	lot	of	what	Jon	Stone	says,	but	he	does	also	have	his	own	ideas	as	well,	and	he’s	doing	his	own	little	
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bit	as	well,	and	he’s	[…]	doing	a	[…]	study	into	this	sort	of	thing.	[I4:635-41]	FNS	becomes	enacted	(is	made	real)	through	the	encounters	with	this	medical	network:	
[…]	I	suppose	if	I	had	somebody	who	didn’t	(pause)	understand	this	condition	then	I’d	probably	think	about	it,	[…]	I	would	constantly	dig	deeper	and	think	oh	what,	what	is	this?	Why,	where,	when,	you	know,	and	all	the	rest	of	it.	Where[as]	I	don’t.	I	just	think,	well	I	know	this	is	the	condition.	I	know	I’ve	got	to	deal	with	it.	I	know	I	have	to	go	to	physio.	I	know	I	have	to	go	to	see	the	consultant.	I	know	I	have	to	go	and	see	my	GP,	and	I	know	I	have	to	go-,	so	now	it’s	like	putting	down	the	framework,	the	bricks,	to	make	my	life	[…].	[I2:790-8]	In	laying	this	foundation	(the	‘framework’	or	the	‘bricks’)	of	the	reality	of	FNS	through	encounters	with	her	authoritative	medical	network,	it	offers	answers	to	the	void	of	unreality.	However,	because	of	the	inherent	uncertainty	in	the	medical	understanding	of	FNS,	Alice	encounters	doubts	about	whether	FNS	actually	provides	the	answers	explaining	her	bodily	sensations:	of	whether	FNS	is	actually	real.	That	is,	there	is	always	the	threat	of	unmakinga	FNS,	of	regressing	to	the	void	of	unreality.	This	uncertainty	comes	in	three	main	forms,	but	in	each	case	it	is	managed	in	an	attempt	to	make	FNS	real.	The	first	area	of	doubt	is	the	uncertain	prognosis	of	FNS	(as	noted	earlier).	FNS	lacks	both	an	established	treatment	and	a	clear	course	of	long-term	development.	As	the	answers	Alice	is	seeking	to	her	problematic	bodily	sensations	have	the	ultimate	aim	of	removing	or	‘curing’	them	(or,	to	use	Scarry’s,	1985,	term,	disembodying	her	from	her	pain),	the	answers	that	FNS	offers	are	notably	lacking.	FNS	cannot	even	provide	certainty	over	what	will	happen	to	her	body	in	the	future.	However,	Alice	deals	with	this	uncertainty	through	deferring	FNS	answers	to	some	future	date	(“probably	[…]	in	10	years	time”37),	having	faith	in	advances	in	medical	research	(“we’re	still	researching	it	and	we	are	further	on	than	we	were	five	years	ago”38).	Indeed,	she	is	a	willing	participant	in	experimental	treatments	in	order	to	be	a	part	of	the	fulfilment	of	this	promise	of	future	answers,	something	that	will	make	her	diagnosis	of	FNS	“more	real	because	they’re	giving	you	more	answers”39.	The	second	area	of	doubt	in	FNS	is	lack	of	medical	recognition.	Alice	noted	having	gone	to	medical	practitioners	(including	a	consultant)	in	relation	to	previous	neurological	episodes	and	felt	she	was	dismissed	(“told	to	go	away”40).	Constituting	a	medical	authority	that	is	not																																									 																					
a	‘Unmaking’	is	a	term	used	by	Scarry	(1985)	to	denote	how	pain	renders	representational	forms	meaningless	in	the	face	of	the	immediate	urgency	of	the	bodily	sensation	of	pain.	At	its	extreme	there	is	nothing	else	but	a	colossal	body	in	pain,	nothing	but	the	“mute	facts	of	sentience”	(p.	256).	See	Chapter	2.	
177	
enacting	a	reality	of	FNS	poses	doubts	about	how	real	FNS	is	for	her.	However,	Alice	presents	these	past	episodes	as	an	issue	of	medical	misinterpretation	due	to	the	newness	of	FNS	as	a	medical	condition	(“in	years	gone	by	it	has	been	very	misunderstood”41).	She	asserts	the	medical	authority	of	the	condition	(granted	by	medical	professionals	like	Jon	Stone	and	her	neurologist)	and	characterises	the	dismissals	as	a	misinterpretation	to	be	resolved	through	increasing	recognition	of	FNS	by	other	medical	authorities:	
I’ve	been	told	by	a	neurologist	that	it	is	a	condition.	A	recognised	condition,	and	[…]	it’s	getting	more	and	more	recognised	now	than	it	used	to	be.	So	hopefully	there	won’t	be	healthcare	people	in	the	healthcare	[…]	profession	that	[…]	say	it’s	a	load	of	rubbish.	[I2:223-9]	The	third	and	perhaps	most	significant	unmaking	of	FNS	lies	in	Alice’s	intuition	that	structural	change	in	her	body	must	be	the	cause	of	her	symptoms,	something	that	FNS	as	a	theory	fundamentally	denies:	
I	think	with	this	kind	of	condition	where	there	isn’t	anything	to	show	for	it	on	a	test,	there	has	to	be	some	kind	of	niggling	‘well,	why?’	[…T]here’s	nothing	on	a	scan	to	show	for	it,	and	even	though	they	tell	you	what	they	think	(emphasis)	is	happening	through	research	and	they	tell	you	‘yes,	it	is	happening’	from	your	symptoms,	you	still	have	[…this]	niggling	thing,	you	know,	because	you	think	well,	there	isn’t	anything	there,	so	how	can	it	cause	[it…]?	[I2:1048-9,1053-8]	This	intuition	is	particularly	apparent	in	the	sensation	of	pain,	with	its	againstness	(Scarry,	1985	–	see	Chapter	2)	serving	to	posit	an	object	to	be	identified	and	got	rid	of:	
I	think	it’s	[…]	hard	to	understand	[FNS]	when	there’s	so	much	pain	involved.	If	you	have	a	good	day	you	can	understand	it	more	if	[…]	your	pain	isn’t	as	bad	or	your	symptoms	aren’t	as	bad.	You	think	oh,	I	can.	Oh,	I	can	really	understand	this,	yes.	But	then	when	you	have	a	day	where	you’re	in	so	much	pain	it’s	[…]	hard	to	understand	sometimes.	[…]	I	do	understand	but	[…]	sometimes	I	think	I’ve	got	so	much	pain	in	this	leg	[…that]	you	think	[…]	it	must	be	something	in	the	leg,	[…]	but	because	[…]	there’s	nothing	there	(emphasis)	you	think	God,	how	can	that	cause	so	much	pain?	[I3:366-71,373-7,380-2]	The	medical	authorities	making	FNS	real	can	only	speculate	(‘think’)	about	answers,	an	epistemological	uncertainty	contrasted	with	the	certainty	of	a	positive	result	on	a	diagnostic	test.	Of	course,	Alice	recognises	that	theoretically	FNS	posits	that	her	symptoms	can	arise	despite	no	structural	change,	but	this	fails	to	placate	the	intuition	that	structural	change	is	the	cause.	This	intuition	intrudes	upon	her	ability	to	grasp	the	theoretical	basis	of	FNS	that	attributes	symptoms	to	dysregulation	rather	than	damage:	“it’s	so	hard	to	get	your	head	round	because	there’s	nothing	to	actually	see.	There	is	no	underlying	disease	to	cause	[…]	such	a	big	problem”42.	However,	for	Alice	the	unmaking	of	FNS	through	this	intuition	is	mitigated	through	characterising	the	intuition	as	erroneous	and	illogical,	to	be	overcome	through	logically	appreciating	the	theory	of	FNS.	Indeed,	the	continued	presence	of	this	
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intuition	is	attributed	by	Alice	to	the	complexity	of	FNS	rather	than	the	intuition	constituting	good	sense,	arising	only	because	of	the	difficulty	she	has	had	in	understanding	such	a	complicated	condition	(“it’s	took	a	long	time	to	understand	it”43),	reflecting	the	inherent	complexity	of	the	main	organ	involved	in	FNS:	the	brain	(“it’s	a	very	complex	thing	[…]	the	brain,	and	it’s	[about]	understanding	that”44).	Indeed,	“even	the	experts	don’t	understand	it	fully”45,	and	as	a	result	“how	am	I	going	to	understand	it	when	[…]	the	people	that	are	studying	it	don’t	fully	understand	it?”46	When	rationality	fails	to	overcome	the	illogical	nature	of	the	intuition,	the	unmaking	of	FNS	is	prevented	through	simply	ignoring	the	intuition’s	questioning	of	FNS.	This	means	distracting	herself	again:	“if	you	keep	yourself	busy	then	you	don’t	question	it	so	much”47.	But	distracting	herself	from	the	ruminating	questions	does	not	provide	the	answers	to	such	questions,	which	is	the	most	important	thing	that	FNS	promises	to	do	for	Alice.	As	a	source	of	answers	FNS	proves	distinctly	lacking	in	such	moments,	allowing	for	the	potential	of	these	processes	of	unmaking	to	shift	her	back	into	the	ruminating	questioning	of	the	void	of	unreality.	In	such	moments	of	the	unmaking	of	FNS	there	is	the	possibility	of	making	new	illness	realities	–	diagnoses	that	may	offer	her	better	answers	than	FNS	can.	During	our	interviews	Alice	expressed	fear	about	her	symptoms	being	regarded	as	psychological,	and	expressed	relief	when	the	authority	of	a	“neuropsychologist”48	“explained	it	wasn’t	anything	mentally	(laughing)	wrong	with	me.	I	[…didn’t	have]	any	psychiatric	problems”49.	However,	despite	her	making	a	clear	separation	between	FNS	and	any	psychological	symptoms	and	causes,a	and	distancing	herself	from	the	psychological	in	the	process,	she	nevertheless	remained	fascinated	by	the	possibility	that	there	was	a	psychological	cause	to	her	condition.	She	repeatedly	expressed	the	possibility	that	her	symptoms	emerged	from	an	emotional	conflict	related	to	her	past	(“you	don’t	know	if	it’s	something	from	way	back”50,	something	“in	the	back	of	my	mind”51	such	as	the	relationship	with	her	“horrible”52	father	or	her	difficult	marriage).	Alice	even	looked	towards	making	a	new	illness	reality	around	this	emotional	trigger	through	using	myself	as	an	apparent	authority	to	make	it	real.	Thus,	she	sought	confirmation	from	me	that	it	was	possible	that	her	“upbeat”53	nature	could	simply	be	masking	an	emotional	conflict,	and	seemed	to	consider	me	in	the	role	of	opening	up	repressed	memories:	
[…]	I’m	one	of	them	people	that	can’t	remember	back,	where[as]	some	people	can.	So	maybe	that’s	a	block,	you	know.	It	could	be.	You	know,	if	you	put	somebody	in	front	of	me	who’s	like	yourself,	
																																								 																					
a	This	is	actually	in	contrast	to	how	FNS	is	discussed	on	Jon	Stone’s	(n.d.)	website,	which	takes	a	biopsychosocial	approach	that	incorporates	psychological	symptoms	and	causes.	
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or	who	[…]	really	can	bring	out	things,	then	maybe	they’d	be	able	to.	[I3:748-53]	The	unmaking	of	FNS	through	its	inherent	uncertainty	also	allowed	another	alternative	illness	reality	to	arise.	Multiple	sclerosis	(MS)	shares	many	similar	symptoms	with	FNS,	and	as	a	result	it	is	relatively	easy	to	shift	towards	making	MS	real	over	FNS:	
[…]	there	[have]	been	diagnos[es]	where	they’ve	said	it’s	[FNS…]	and	then	[…]	so	many	years	later	it’s	turned	out	to	be	MS	when	more	symptoms	show	up	on	the	scan,	[…]	because	it	takes	so	many	years	to	show	scarring	on	[…]	the	spinal	cord	with	MS	[…].	[I2:178-84]	Whilst	she	expressed	relief	that	her	authoritative	medical	network	had	decided	to	make	FNS	real	over	MS	(“there	was	a	lot	of	relief	when	[the	neurologist]	said	‘right,	it’s	not	MS’	”54),	her	understanding	that	such	diagnoses	may	be	inaccurate	and	subject	to	change	with	time	meant	she	could	no	longer	completely	rely	on	such	statements.	Faced	with	a	potential	unmaking	of	FNS	and	the	making	real	of	MS,	she	seemed	to	again	turn	to	a	simple	ignoring	of	her	doubts	about	FNS,	this	time	based	upon	her	preference	for	an	FNS	diagnosis:	
[…]	I	would	rather	have,	in	the	end,	functional	neurological	[symptoms…]	and	a	calliper	on	my	leg	than	a	disease	[like]	motor	neurone	disease	or	MS.	That’s	how	I	think,	so	in	the	end	[…]	I	just	think	yes,	I’ve	got	[FNS].	[I2:211-19]	Yet	any	“diagnosis	is	better	than	no	diagnosis	at	all.	Even	if	it’s	one	of	these	funny	diagnoses	that	are	all	a	bit	weird	and	you	can’t	understand	them	a	lot.	It’s	better	than	none	at	all”55.	Caught	within	the	tension	between	a	void	of	unreality	of	bodily	sensation	that	demands	answers	and	the	inability	to	find	authoritative	explanations	that	can	fully	provide	these	answers,	Alice	finds	herself	between	processes	of	making	and	unmaking	of	illness	realities	that	characterise	her	experience	of	chronic	pain.	
SECOND	MOVEMENT:	MULTIPLE	MULTIPLICITIES	
Alice’s	second	movement	is	more	complex	than	those	of	the	two	participants	discussed	in	the	previous	chapters	because	rather	than	finding	one	mediator,	three	were	identified.	However,	the	difference	between	a	first	and	second	reading,	between	the	vantage	point	of	a	method	assemblage	and	the	extended	field	of	vision	of	the	pinboard,	between	an	intermediary	and	a	mediator,	can	be	very	slight,	as	the	thesis	has	sought	to	make	clear	throughout.	Indeed,	a	second	reading	can	be	more	or	less	convincing	than	a	first.	In	this	second	movement	I	contend	that	two	of	the	mediators	identified	(in	‘Part	I’	and	‘Part	III’)	can	also	be	readily	read	in	an	epistemological	sense.	By	contrast,	I	suggest	it	is	much	harder	to	read	the	other	mediator	(‘Part	II’)	epistemologically,	and	much	easier	to	read	fractionally.	
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I	suggest	these	differences	in	first-versus-second	readability	arose	because	of	the	inherent	complexity	in	the	process	of	collecting	and	analysing	interview	data	where	there	were	three	different	sets	of	objections	pertaining	to	three	different	mediators.	Objections	in	this	process	were	not	neatly	split	into	three	parts	like	this	completed	second	movement,	but	were	intertwined	throughout.	Moreover,	even	the	identification	of	the	objections	into	three	separate	types	was	only	something	fully	realised	at	the	end	of	the	analysis,	and	not	something	that	was	identified	by	myself	on	a	moment-to-moment	basis	within	an	interview	or	at	each	point	in	the	analysis.	What	this	meant	was	that	in	the	performing	of	the	interviews	there	was	not	one	direction	following	the	objections	related	to	one	particular	mediator,	but	a	wandering	amongst	the	three.	Moreover,	only	one	particular	set	of	objections	could	be	pursued	at	any	one	time,	which	resulted	in	variations	in	the	amount	of	extension	of	the	field	of	vision	that	occurred	in	relation	to	each	of	the	three.	Ultimately,	one	particular	set	of	objections	of	one	mediator	(Part	II)	became	a	focus	when	performing	Alice’s	interviews,	and	this	served	to	positively	reinforce	its	own	visibility	at	the	expense	of	the	other	mediators,	providing	one	main	‘route’	of	extended	field	of	vision.	
PART	I:	FINDING	HUMANITY	
By	our	fourth	interview	I	had	become	aware	how	much	the	enactment	of	reality	for	Alice	depended	upon	social	relationships	(“one	thing	that	really	struck	me	though	[from	our	third	interview…]	is	that	you	talked	a	lot	about	the	importance	of	other	people”56).	Prior	to	this	interview	Alice’s	social	relationships	were	understood	in	two	main	ways:	a	team	of	medical	professionals	making	FNS	real,	and	friends	and	family	establishing	regimes	of	normality	that	prevented	Alice	from	falling	into	unreality.	Both	forms	acted	as	intermediaries	enacting	the	real-unreal	narrative	of	the	first	movement.	It	was	in	exploring	social	relationships	further	that	Alice	first	expanded	on	other	people’s	role	in	establishing	these	regimes	of	normality	by	characterising	them	as	distractions	from	the	rumination	of	the	‘wrong	route’:	
L:	[…]	is	that	why	people	are	important	then	because	they	[…]	are	distractions?	[…]	A:	Yeah.	I	would	say	so,	yeah.	L:	Yeah?	A:	Yeah.	They	are	distractions	because	I	suppose	if	you	hadn’t	got	somebody	there	all	the	time	or	you	hadn’t	got	stuff	to	sort	out,	if	you	were	just	sat	in	the	house	on	your	own,	you	would	think	more	about	it	[(ruminate	more)].	[I4:532-8]	However,	I	felt	characterising	social	relationships	with	friends	and	family	as	a	distraction	from	unreality	to	be	equated	with	“a	book	or	a	TV	programme”57	(my	words),	as	a	tool	to	be	used	to	help	her,	seemed	quite	cold	and	inhuman.	Yet	on	the	other	hand	Alice	had	given	
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suggestions	of	warmth	and	humanity	in	social	relationships	where	the	reverse	was	true:	where	she	would	use	herself	to	help	others.	This	was	particularly	apparent	in	physically	and	emotionally	providing	for	her	son	despite	her	illness,	as	discussed	in	the	first	movement.	Moreover,	I	had	personally	found	Alice	to	be	very	friendly,	and	to	be	caring	for	me	rather	than	considering	how	I	could	be	used	to	better	care	for	herself.	My	intuition	was	that	social	relationships	for	Alice	stood	for	more	than	their	enactment	as	tools	creating	regimes	of	“normality”58,	as	I	suggested	in	the	fourth	interview:	
I	wonder	if	there	is	[…]	another,	[…]	more	fundamental	sense	[…]	that	people	[…]	hold	a	[…]	particular	significance	that	isn’t	necessarily	to	do	with	[where…]	they’re	just	this	kind	of	a	normal[ity]	regulator,	you	know	what	I	mean?	There’s	something	that	to	say,	to	describe	them	as	that,	is	to	do	them	an	injustice[.	…]	I	just	got	a	sense	of	that.	[I4:445-50]	Exploring	the	significance	of	social	relationships	in	the	fourth	interview	revealed	further	examples	of	Alice’s	caring	humanism,	of	the	use	of	herself	in	caring	for	others.	This	included	a	significant	(yet	non-reciprocated)	commitment	to	assisting	her	(now	ex-)	husband	in	his	daily	functioning	during	their	marriage.	She	said	“I	got	him	up	in	the	morning	with	a	cup	of	tea	and	toast	and	all	that	kind	of	old-fashioned	thing,	but	then	I	[also]	went	to	work”59,	and	that	she	“did	everything	(emphasis)	for	him”60.	By	contrast,	“in	all	the	years	that	I	was	married	to	him	he	never	once	made	a	cup	of	tea	or	washed-up.	He	was	never	there	for	me	properly”61.	When	he	informed	Alice	one	morning	that	he	had	been	having	an	affair	with	a	work	colleague	for	the	previous	11	years	(something	Alice	had	suspected),	he	asked	to	be	given	another	chance.	Alice	was	prepared	to	offer	this	(“soft	me	said	‘oh	yeah,	okay,	I’ll	give	you	another	chance’	”62),	only	for	him	to	have	changed	his	mind	and	re-established	the	relationship	with	the	other	woman	by	the	time	Alice	returned	home	from	work	that	day.	Alice	moved	out	of	their	house	immediately,	but	responded	to	her	ex-husband’s	requests	for	emotional	support	in	his	relationship	with	the	other	woman:	“then	they	split	up	again	and	he	was	forever	on	my	doorstep	wanting	to	talk.	‘Do	you	think	she’ll	come	back?	Do	you	think	she’ll	come	back?’	I	was	like	his	counsellor”63.	Following	one	separation	with	the	other	woman	Alice’s	ex-husband	again	asked	to	be	given	another	chance	for	a	relationship	with	Alice:	“I	said	‘yes,	we’ll	try	but	I	want	to	keep	[living	in	the	house	she	had	started	renting]’,	knowing	that	in	the	next	three	days	that	he’d	get	back	with	her,	which	he	did”64.	Despite	Alice’s	separation	from	her	ex-husband	and	the	means	by	which	it	occurred,	Alice	still	had	feelings	for	him	(“the	love	had	gone	but	I	cared	for	him”65),	something	that	was	ongoing	(“even	to	this	day	if	something	happened	to	him,	[…]	he’s	the	father	of	my	child,	so	I’d	be	upset”66).	Following	this	separation	she	continued	to	have	a	close	relationship	with	her	mother-in-law,	despite	the	fact	that	her	mother-in-law	was	herself	estranged	from	her	own	son	(Alice’s	ex-
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husband).	“He	has	nothing	to	do	with	her	so	[…]	in	a	way	[…]	I’m	all	she’s	got”67.	With	her	mother-in-law	also	having	had	a	daughter	who	died,	Alice	felt	that	“I’ve	taken	over	the	place	of	her	daughter”68.	Whilst	Alice’s	mother-in-law	transported	Alice	(by	car)	to	our	interviews	(which	were	held	at	the	University),	Alice	described	the	relationship	mainly	in	terms	of	Alice	providing	care	for	her	mother-in-law	(rather	than	the	reverse),	particularly	given	her	mother-in-law’s	diagnosis	of	cancer	(something	her	mother-in-law	kept	secretive	–	“she	won’t	let	anybody	go	[to	treatment]	with	her”69).	Thus,	Alice	said:	
[…]	I’ve	always,	in	a	way,	looked	after	her.	I	kind	of,	you	know,	I	bulk	cook.	You	know,	if	I	do	[…]	a	chicken	casserole	I	do	a	big	chicken	casserole,	I	do	some	for	her.	And	I	look	after	her	because	she’s	on	her	own	and,	you	know,	she’s	not	well	anyway,	you	know.	[I5:846-50]	Moreover,	in	a	similar	way	to	the	‘counselling’	offered	to	her	ex-husband,	Alice	described	being	a	sounding	board	for	her	mother-in-law’s	relationship	difficulties	with	both	her	own	son	(Alice’s	ex-husband)	(“she	always	brings	[ex-husband]	in	and	she	slags	[ex-husband]	off.	She’s	been	doing	it	on	the	way	here	[to	the	interview]”70)	and	her	grandson	(Alice’s	son)	(“she’s	just	had	a	real	good	rant	about	[Alice’s	son]”71).	Whilst	finding	her	to	often	be	too	opinionated,	unwelcomingly	dictating	to	Alice	what	she	should	do,	Alice	nevertheless	took	care	to	protect	her	feelings	in	communicating	this	diplomatically	(“And	I	try	and	make	it	a	joking	[sic]	but	I’m	trying	to	get	across	[that]	please,	just,	just	leave	it,	you	know.	I’m	going	to	[…deal]	with	it	in	my	way	[…]”72).	Indeed,	Alice	cared	significantly	for	her	mother-in-law,	commenting	that	“I	will	always	look	after	her.	I’ll	always	make	sure	she’s	okay”73.	There	were	other	examples	of	this	humanism	in	Alice’s	social	relationships,	including	those	with	her	mother	and	friends.	These	humanistic	elements	objected	to	social	relationships	being	regarded	as	a	cold,	inhuman	tool	to	prevent	dysregulation,	enacted	in	my	expression	that	positioning	them	as	tools	was	“to	do	them	an	injustice”74	(my	words)	in	light	of	the	humanism	that	I	had	picked	up,	and	which	we	subsequently	explored.	In	this	sense,	social	relationships	become	converted	from	an	intermediary	enacting	a	real-unreal	first	movement	narrative	to	a	mediator	where	they	also	enact	Alice’s	humanism,	a	humanism	nevertheless	also	juxtaposed	to	their	meaning	as	(inhuman)	tools.	Yet	this	second	(fractional)	reading	was	not	necessarily	convincing,	as	an	(epistemological)	reading	is	also	offered	where	humanism	can	be	seen	as	a	more	fundamental	meaning	of	social	relationships	than	that	developed	in	the	first	movement	narrative.	Indeed,	in	our	interviews	I	talked	of	how	other	people	were	regarded	as	“merely”75	or	“simply”76	tools,	and	that	there	seemed	to	be	a	humanism	in	Alice	“more	fundamental”77	than	the	superficiality	of	social	relationships	as	tools	(all	quotes	my	words).	This	is	akin	to	what	Law	(2002)	defines	as	an	interest	story,	which	is	a	“strategy	of	depth,	of	seeing	deeper”	(p.	84),	of	“going	beneath	the	surface	to	fundamental	and	coherent	places	that	are	said	to	be	more	real”	(pp.	84-5).	
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Here	the	inhumanities	of	Alice’s	social	relationships	as	tools	are	treated	“as	symptoms	or	superficialities”	(p.	84).	This	strategy	of	depth	may	combine	with	a	distribution	of	multiplicity	over	time,	where	present	inhumane	superficialities	are	contrasted	with	an	absence	of	humanity	that	nevertheless	should	be	there,	a	should	offering	the	promise	of	the	future	presence	of	humanity	(see	box,	below).	
TWO	READINGS	OF	(IN)HUMANITY	
I	have	suggested	that	the	objection	raised	to	Alice’s	‘inhuman’	practice	of	using	people	as	tools	arose	because	of	the	presence	of	humanism	in	her	social	relationships	that	did	not	fit	with	this	characterisation.	But	this	intuition	probably	also	derived	from	a	cultural	expectation	that,	in	situations	where	people	are	involved,	humanity	must	be	there	underneath,	or	if	it	isn’t,	it	should	be	made	to	be	(this	moral	fundamentalism	evident	when	I	described	the	characterisation	of	Alice’s	social	relationships	as	tools	as	“an	injustice”78).	This	expectation	is	coded	in	the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	(United	Nations	General	Assembly,	1948),	which	speaks	of	the	“equal	and	inalienable	rights	of	all	members	of	the	human	family”	(par.	1).	As	the	associated	United	Nations	webpage	explains,	the	document	is	a	reaction	to	the	“atrocities”	of	the	Second	World	War	(United	Nations,	n.d.,	par.	1).	It	expresses	and	enacts	a	schema	where	inhumanity	can	be	banished	to	a	wicked	past,	where	humanity	should	have	been.	And	where	inhumanity	still	exists	it	will	be	replaced	with	humanity	thanks	to	the	collective	willpower	of	humankind:	“the	international	community	vowed	never	again	to	allow	atrocities	like	those	of	that	conflict	happen	again”	(par.	1).	
A	parallel	is	found	in	academic	research.	Marzano	(2012)	notes	how	the	principle	of	
informed	consent	arose	from	the	treatment	of	inmates	at	Nazi	concentration	camps,	namely	‘the	reduction	of	their	bodies	to	“objects”	in	the	hands	of	experimenters	devoid	of	humanity’	(p.	443).	Like	the	Declaration,	informed	consent	involves	banishing	inhumanity	to	a	wicked	past.	In	addition	to	Second	World	War	atrocities,	research	ethics	training	teaches	students	about	a	by-gone	age	of	inhumanity	in	academic	research,	epitomised	by	infamous	experiments	like	the	Milgram	Experiment	and	
Stanford	Prison	Experiment.	The	possibility	of	a	return	to	inhumanity	is	actively	policed	by	extensive	research	ethics	processesa	that	did	not	exist	before,	in	the	same	way	that	the	inhumanity	associated	with	human	conflict	is	actively	policed	by	various	state	and	inter-state	organisations	like	the	United	Nations.	
																																								 																					
a	Such	as	the	NHS	research	ethics	process	this	project	had	to	pass	through.	
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Inhumanity	can	(and	does)	return,	however.	But	in	this	schema	they	are	positioned	as	abnormal	events	that	only	temporarily	replace	humanity.	This	might	include	a	rare	catastrophic	accident,	or	because	of	extreme	individuals	(who	are	also	rare	instances).	Inhumanity	is	prevented	from	being	anything	but	a	temporary	aberration	(significant	though	it	may	be)	that	can	be	separated	out	from	the	humanity	of	everyday	life.	The	inhumanity	of	an	event	or	person	is	total,	experienced	as	abject	(see	previous	chapter)	like	the	horror	of	an	accident	or	the	anger	at	the	‘evil’	or	‘crazy’	people	who	inflict	suffering	and	death	on	others.	The	boundary	between	inhumanity	and	humanity	remains	clearly	separated	and	extensively	policed.	This	is	the	first	reading	of	(in)humanity.	
A	second	reading	pays	attention	to	the	objections	that	occur	in	this	ordering.	It	identifies	mediators	that	enact	both	humanity	and	inhumanity	at	the	same	time.	The	controversy	enacted	by	such	mediators	is	more	easily	explained	away	in	some	instances	than	others	(as	I	would	suggest	is	the	case	for	Alice’s	social	relationships),	but	where	they	are	made	prominently	visible	the	observer	is	forced	to	understand	humanity	(or	inhumanity)	not	simply	as	an	either/or,	but	as	an	interference	between	the	two.	Ironically,	such	a	second	reading	can	be	readily	identified	in	one	of	the	most	prominent	exemplars	of	the	historic	past	of	inhuman	research:	Stanley	Milgram’s	obedience	experiment.	Milgram	(1963)	sought	not	simply	to	prevent	the	repeat	of	the	atrocities	of	the	Second	World	War,	where	“millions	of	innocent	persons	were	systematically	slaughtered	on	command”	(p.	371)	in	concentration	camps,	but	to	explore	an	objection	posed	to	the	idea	that	inhumanity	is	a	rare	event	that	can	be	separated	out	from	everyday	humanity.	As	Milgram	put	it,	“[t]hese	inhumane	policies	may	have	originated	in	the	mind	of	a	single	person,	but	they	could	only	be	carried	out	on	a	massive	scale	if	a	very	large	number	of	persons	obeyed	orders”	(p.	371).	From	a	first	reading	of	(in)humanity	it	is	not	possible	for	these	people	to	have	had	humanity	when	they	were	taking	part	in	such	inhuman	acts,	and	the	likes	of	Milgram’s	experiment	can	be	read	as	trying	to	understand	why	they	had	lost	their	humanity.	His	participants	willingly	inflicted	pain	on	another	but	only	because	of	‘obedience’	to	the	authority	figures	of	the	researchers,	and	‘obedience’	has	thus	been	read	as	an	inhuman	psychological	mechanism	that	robs	people	of	their	humanity.	But	this	ignores	what	Milgram	understood	‘obedience’	to	be,	for	its	constitution	is	not	simply	based	on	the	“tendency	to	obey	those	whom	we	perceive	to	be	legitimate	authorities”	(p.	378)	but	because	of	the	enactment	of	the	participants’	humanity	itself.	Thus,	Milgram	suggested	that	one	reason	the	participants	obeyed	was	because:
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Obedience	also	derives	from	a	sense	of	care	from	the	participant	to	the	researchers	since	the	participant	“has	made	a	commitment,	and	to	disrupt	the	experiment	is	a	repudiation	of	this	initial	promise	of	aid”	(p.	377).	Of	course,	this	obedience	also	means	the	inhumanity	of	believing	they	are	inflicting	(significant)	suffering	on	another.	Thus,	this	act	of	‘obedience’	means	to	act	with	both	humanity	and	inhumanity,	an	impossible	controversy	though	this	is:	“the	subject	is	forced	into	a	public	conflict	that	does	not	permit	any	completely	satisfactory	solution”	(p.	378).	Indeed,	“[o]bedience	may	be	ennobling	and	educative	and	refer	to	acts	of	charity	and	kindness	as	well	as	to	destruction”	(p.	371).	Like	the	controversy	of	(inhumanly)	using	friends	and	family	as	tools	whilst	also	deeply	(humanly)	caring	for	them,	obedience	is	here	read	as	mediator.a	
PART	II:	THE	VOID	AS	RECLUSION	
As	noted	in	the	first	movement,	Alice	discussed	having	episodes	where	she	would	have	“a	real	good	cry”79	every	6	or	8	months.	Towards	the	end	of	our	third	interview	Alice	explained	more	about	these	occasions:	
[…]	I’m	just	absolutely	[…]	exhausted	and	the	pain	and	[…]	maybe	[…]	[son’s]	on	holiday	so	I’m	on	my	own.	So	you’ve	only	got	yourself	to	talk	to,	I	suppose	[…]	and	I	don’t	want	to	bother	my	mam	or	bother	anybody	else.	[I3:870-3]	From	this	I	picked	up	on	the	possibility	of	loneliness	within	these	events	(“what	makes	you	feel	down.	What	is	it	th-,	I	mean	you	talked	a	little	bit	about	the	feeling	of	loneliness,	maybe?”80).	Of	course,	this	could	also	be	interpreted	as	expressing	a	lack	of	good	distractions	as	opposed	to	something	particular	to	being	alone.	But	as	noted	in	the	last	section,	there	was	an	intuition	that	the	lack	of	people	had	a	particular	significance	above	and	beyond	their	role	as	distractions.	Thus,	in	our	fourth	and	fifth	interviews	the	theme	of	loneliness	was	present	in	Alice’s	fears	of	losing	significant	relationships	in	her	life,	which	were	characterised	as	important	but	fragile.	In	particular,	she	feared	losing	the	close	relationship	with	her	son.	This	possibility																																									 																					
a	Law	et	al.	(2014)	describe	a	similar	‘mode’	of	fractionally	knowing	what	it	means	for	nurses	to	care	for	dying	patients.	These	nurses	face	a	contradiction	between	two	“two	different	logics”	of	care:	the	care	of	actively	attending	to	the	patient	versus	the	care	of	leaving	visiting	family	members	alone	with	the	patient	(p.	182).	The	nurses	studied	managed	the	controversy	in	a	manner	that	“strikes	balances”	between	the	two,	“but	balances	that	are	constantly	being	rebalanced”	(in	a	very	dialectically-sounding	way)	(p.	183).	
The	experiment	is,	on	the	face	of	it,	designed	to	attain	a	worthy	purpose	–	advancement	of	knowledge	about	learning	and	memory.	Obedience	occurs	not	as	an	end	in	itself,	but	as	an	instrumental	element	in	a	situation	that	the	subject	construes	as	significant,	and	meaningful.	(p.	377)		
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was	expressed	in	a	battle	with	her	ex-husband	over	her	son’s	affection.	She	said	“I’ve	got	the	upper	hand	over	his	dad	because	his	dad	is	more	strict	with	him	so	he’d	rather	come	to	me”81,	“but	then	there’s	things	that	he	can	do	with	his	dad	that	I	can’t	do	with	[son	and	his	friends]”82.	This	included	holidays	abroad	and	activities	like	snowboarding	due	to	her	ex-husband’s	greater	financial	status	(“He	was	essentially	what	I	call	‘buying	a	child’	”83,	“I	thought	well	he	can	easily	buy	him	and	I	can’t	give	him	what	his	dad	can	give	him”84).	Whilst	Alice	no	longer	felt	threatened	by	this	(“luckily	[son]	isn’t	one	of	these	children”85	who	favour	those	who	treat	them),	Alice	also	feared	that	the	relationship	with	her	son	might	degrade	because	of	her	illness,	either	because	of	a	burden	placed	on	him	to	help	her	(“I	fear	losing	him	if	I	put	that	responsibility	on	him.	Then	he’s	not	going	to	want	to	come	because	he	knows	if	he	goes	to	mum	he’ll	have	to	do	this	for	mum	and	do	that	for	mum”86),	or	because	she	might	“lose	him	because	it’s	an	embarrassment	to	go	round”87	to	her	house	with	his	friends.	For	similar	reasons	to	her	son	Alice	feared	that	the	burden	placed	on	her	friends	and	other	family	members	would	result	in	the	degrading	of	those	relationships,	with	her	reassuring	friends	that	they	should	not	feel	obliged	to	visit	and	that	her	illness	is	hopefully	only	temporary	(“I’ve	repeatedly	said	‘well	I	don’t	expect	you	to	come,	you	know,	it’s	alright.	I’ll	be	all	right’.	They’ve	drilled	it	into	me	that	they	will”88).	This	fear	of	a	lack	of	social	relationships	(of	aloneness)	was	linked	to	the	concept	of	the	void	of	unreality.	When	discussing	my	intuition	of	the	significance	of	others	as	more	than	simply	distractions	(in	our	fourth	interview),	Alice	noted	that:	
[…]	when	I	know	that	[son]	is	going	to	be	away,	because	I	speak	to	my	friends	daily	and	I	say	‘[son]’s	away	next	week’,	they’re	always	suddenly	like	‘oh,	right	we’ll	bring	a	takeaway’,	and	they	fill	that	gap	quickly.	It’s	like	they	fill	a	void.	[I4:925-7]	Rather	than	social	relationships	being	tools	to	prevent	her	from	experiencing	the	negativity	of	the	void	of	unreality	(madness	and	death),	here	the	negativity	of	the	void	is	characterised	by	the	(lack	of)	social	relationships	themselves,	as	I	suggested	to	Alice	in	our	fourth	interview:	
[…]	what	I’m	saying	though	is	something	more	fundamental	[…].	It’s	not	just	about	that	[…]	you	need	to	distract	yourself	because	otherwise	you’re	going	to	start	dwelling	on	it	and	so	forth,	[but]	that	what’s	being	avoided	is	not	necessarily	the	symptoms	and	the	pain	and	so	forth,	it’s	the	fact	that	when	you	don’t	have	these	people	that	you	are	alone.	[I4:956-66]	Indeed,	loneliness	characterised	the	void:	
L:	Yeah,	well	what’s	that	empty	void	like	then?	I	mean	what…	A:	Well	it	is-,	it	is	loneliness.	L:	Mmm.	
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A:	Because	there’s	no	one	there.	You	start	thinking	well	there’s	no-one	around,	[son]’s	on	holiday,	dog’s	not	here,	I’m	not	seeing	my	mum	until	Monday,	it’s	New	Year’s	Eve,	everybody’s	celebrating,	[…]	then	you	start	thinking	what	have	I	got	to	celebrate?	[I4:1104-9]	She	referred	to	this	as	“that	void	of	loneliness”89,	of	“your	lonely	time”90.	Whilst	Alice’s	social	relationships	were	important	in	the	first	movement	narrative	for	preventing	her	from	going	down	the	‘wrong	route’	of	the	void	of	unreality,	our	discussion	of	the	significance	of	social	relationships	suggested	that	they	played	a	role	not	just	in	the	prevention	of	Alice	entering	the	void	but	in	constituting	the	nature	of	that	void	itself.	It	is	not	difficult	to	see	aloneness	as	complimenting	the	characterisation	of	the	void	in	the	first	movement,	part	of	the	general	absence	of	things	characterising	its	unmaking.	However,	whilst	Alice’s	need	to	be	close	to	others	served	to	characterise	the	void	as	lonely,	this	picture	was	complicated	by	a	negative	side	of	being	close	to	others	that	prompted	a	need	for	distancing.	Thus,	there	was	the	possibility	of	betrayal,	something	she	had	experienced	in	her	past.	This	was	found	not	only	in	the	infidelity	of	her	ex-husband	during	their	marriage,	but	from	those	around	her	who	were	complicit	in	concealing	this	affair	from	Alice:	
[…]	these	people,	they	stand	back.	They	don’t	come	to	you	and	say	‘oh	well	actually	I	was	on	a	course	today	and’-,	they	just	stand	back	and	they	don’t	do	anything	about	it.	Where[as]	if	I	was	in	that	position	I	would	probably	say	‘come	on,	you	know,	he’s	messing	you	about,	you	know.	You’re	better	than	that,	[…]	you	deserve	better	than	that’.	But	nobody	did.	They	all	just	stood	back	and	[…]	let	it	go	on	[…].	[I5:830-4]	Alice’s	mother-in-law	was	one	of	these	people	(“even	[mother-in-law]	knew”91,	“she	didn’t	tell	me	that	he	was	having	an	affair”92)	and	even	though	Alice	remains	close	to	her,	“you’ve	got	to	have	that	in	the	back	of	your	mind”93.	“That’s	why	I’ve	got	that	stand-back	relationship	with	her”94.	Indeed,	“in	the	end	[…]	she	is	very,	very	kind-hearted,	but	you	can’t	trust	her	fully”95.	Overall,	she	said	“the	only	people	I	can	trust	is	[sic]	probably	[son]	and	my	mum	and	dad”96.	In	our	fourth	interview	I	posited	the	possibility	to	Alice	that	“there	is	something	threatening	about	engaging	with	life	that	means	you	go	into	voids”97.	Specifically	in	light	of	social	relationships	being	at	once	something	that	Alice	valued	(and	as	an	end,	not	as	a	means)	yet	also	something	that	caused	her	great	hurt,	I	suggested	a	“devil’s	advocate	argument	that	you	[…]	place	yourself,	whether	unconsciously	or	subconsciously	or	whatever,	[…]	into	the	void	as	separate	from	other	people”98.	This	reflects	an	understanding	of	pain	as	a	mechanism	permitting	regulation	of	the	degree	of	closeness	in	a	person’s	social	relationships,	(Shapiro,	2006;	Smith	&	Friedemann	1999),	as	discussed	in	Chapter	4.	I	posited	that	the	aloneness	of	the	void	might	be	beneficial	since	“although	you	want	to	be	with	other	people	and	[the	void	is…]	a	very	lonely	place,	it’s	also	a	safe	(emphasis)	place	insofar	as	nobody	can	hurt	you”99.	
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Whilst	accepting	the	idea	that	the	seclusion	of	the	void	was	(also)	positive,	Alice	did	not	suggest	this	was	as	a	means	of	protecting	against	the	hurt	of	betrayal.a	Alice	talked	instead	about	it	as	a	refuge	from	dealing	with	the	demands	of	others	who	are	close	to	her:	
[…]	sometimes	[…]	I	think	oh,	I	could	do	with	a	bit	of	peace	from	my	mum	[…]	and	from	[mother-in-law]	and	from	my	friend	that	rings	every	night	and	just	go	into	that	void	and	just	[…]	sit	there	and	think,	you	know,	just	be	alone,	if	you	know	what	I	mean.	Because	it	might	be	in	my	case,	I	suppose,	that	I’ve	got	too	many	people	round	me	who	care.	And	they’ve	all	got	different	opinions,	and	sometimes	you	just	want	to	be	on	your	own,	I	suppose.	[I5:1284-93]	Thus,	rather	than	simply	a	place	of	loneliness	where	Alice	is	without	the	social	relationships	she	so	values	(complimenting	the	negativity	of	unmaking),	the	isolation	of	the	void	is	also	a	place	where	she	is	able	to	escape	the	unwelcome	demands	placed	upon	her	by	the	very	relationships	she	values	so	much.	In	particular,	these	unwelcome	demands	take	the	form	of	attempts	to	control	her,	something	that	had	been	particularly	apparent	in	her	recent	search	to	buy	a	property:	“I’m	wanting	[family	and	friends…]	to	back	off,	you	know,	at	the	moment	with	the	house.	Just	back	off.	You’ve	given	your	opinions.	I’ve	listened	to	your	opinions.	Now	that’ll	do.	I’ve	had	enough”100.	Her	mother-in-law	was	also	identified	as	someone	giving	unwelcome	‘lectures’	about	what	Alice	should	do	her	in	life:	
[…she]	starts	wub-wub-wub-wub-wub	in	your	ear.	And	I	was	rolling	my	eyes	in	the	car	[illegible]	(sighs)	(laughs).	But	I’m	not	nasty	enough	to	say	‘shut	up’.	[…S]he’ll	give	you	a	big	lecture,	‘and	I’m	not	here	to	lecture	you	and	I’m	not	going	to	lecture	you’,	but	then	she	does	because	she	can’t	help	but	lecture	you.	[I5:1351-5]	Her	past	romantic	relationships	were	characterised	by	the	presence	of	unwelcome	controlling	behaviour	by	her	partners.	One	relationship	since	separating	from	her	husband	was	“all	fine	and	dandy”101	to	begin	with,	but	it	became	problematic	when	“he	wanted	to	start	controlling”102.	This	took	the	form	of	him	attempting	to	make	decisions	for	both	of	them,	such	as	proposing	they	buy	a	property	together	but	with	him	choosing	the	type	of	house	and	location	to	live	in,	despite	the	fact	that	Alice	opposed	it:	
[But]	I	don’t	want	to	live	in	[location]	and	I	don’t	want	to	live	in	a	bungalow.	And	it	got	to	the	stage	where	[he	said]	‘well	I	want	a	bungalow	so	you’re	going	to	live	in	it’,	and	I	was	like,	I’ve	had	this	[in	a	previous	relationship].	And	this	alarm	bells	[sic]	started	to	go	off	and	I	thought,	I’ve	had	this	[…].	[I5:1531-3]	Indeed,	she	said	“if	I’d	bought	that	house	with	him,	you	know,	and	then	he’d	start	controlling	and	then	I’d	be	in	the	same	position	that	I	was	with	[ex-husband]	for	11	years”103.	With	regard	to	controlling	behaviour	from	her	ex-husband	during	their	marriage,	Alice	noted	that																																									 																					
a	Such	a	notion	can	be	related	to	the	concept	of	betrayal	trauma	theory,	which	considers	how	someone	manages	situations	in	which	they	experience	trauma	caused	by	betrayal	by	a	person	or	institution	they	depend	upon	(Freyd,	Klest	&	Allard,	2005).	
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he	had	used	his	strength	of	will	to	overpower	her	suspicions	about	his	affair:	“I	could	never	prove	[the	affair]	because	he	was	always	the	stronger	person.	He	was	always	the	one	who	said	‘eugh	(disgusted	or	dissatisfied	sound),	I’m	not	having	an	affair.	What’re	you	talking	about?	Are	you	mad?	Are	you	making	it	up?’	”104	Alice	
couldn’t	get	proof.	I	couldn’t	follow	him	or	[…]	anything	like	that.	So	I	just	stuck	it	out	and	thought	well	one	day	it’ll	get	to	the	stage	where	he’ll	have	to	tell	me	and	he’ll	have	to	tell	me	the	truth,	[…]	and	one	day	he	did.	[I5:762-66]	And	when	her	husband	decided	not	to	pursue	the	second	chance	that	he	had	asked	from	Alice	(and	which	she	granted),	she	reflected	that	it	provided	a	feeling	of	relief	for	her	(“I	think	I	was	relieved	actually”105):	“it	was	like	I	could	go	and	he’d	admitted	to	it	and	I	could	go	with	a	clear	conscience	that	I’d	done	my	best	as	a	wife”106.	Alice	also	accepted	an	unfair	divorce	settlement	(“I’m	coming	out	alright	but	really	I	should	have	had	a	lot	more”107)	in	order	to	avoid	having	to	enter	into	dialogue	with	him	and	risk	an	engagement	with	his	controlling	behaviour:	
[…]	just	take	it	and	run,	you	know,	and	do	what	you	can	with	it,	type	of	thing.	Don’t	[argue	for	more]	because	[….]	he’s	such	a	strong	person	and	he	can	always	talk	over	you	and	talk	you	down,	you	know,	and	belittle	you	and	everything.	[…]	I	just	think	it’s	best	to	take	it	and	run.	[I5:1202-5]	In	her	subsequent	relationship,	when	Alice	identified	the	same	types	of	controlling	behaviour,	she	felt	“I’ve	gone	stronger	that	way	where	I	think:	no,	I’d	rather	be	on	my	own.	[…]	I’d	rather	be	on	my	own”108.	This	is	a	voluntary	reclusion	that	responds	to	the	negative	side	of	being	close	to	others	for	Alice	(their	tendency	to	impose	unwelcome	controlling	behaviours),	expressed	in	the	choice	of	entering	the	void	of	unreality	because	of	the	isolation	from	others.	Indeed,	the	concept	of	the	void	for	Alice	expresses	the	controversy	in	social	relationships	between	a	need	to	be	close	to	others	and	a	need	to	maintain	distance	from	them	because	of	controlling	behaviour	that	such	closeness	allows.	Not	simply	a	place	of	loneliness	associated	with	the	loss	of	closeness	with	others,	as	part	of	a	wider	unmaking	to	be	avoided	at	all	costs	(as	per	the	first	movement	narrative),	in	this	second	movement	it	is	revealed	as	also	a	welcome	refuge	from	the	controlling	behaviour	established	by	that	very	closeness,	expressed	in	the	void’s	twin	yet	contradictory	concepts	of	loneliness	and	voluntary	reclusion.	
PART	III:	ON	THE	ONTOLOGY	OF	PAIN	
The	first	movement	narrative	replicates	the	ontology	of	pain	outlined	in	Chapter	2	insofar	as	Alice’s	‘void’	of	unreality	is	at	once	an	absence	of	pain	that	cannot	be	given	representational	form,	and	present	in	undeniable	sensations	that	demand	definition.	As	discussed	in	earlier	chapters,	the	attempt	to	find	a	definition	that	might	cure	pain	is	often	entirely	feasible.	In	
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this	sense	a	representation	can	be	quite	reasonably	deferred	to	a	future	time,	allowing	pain’s	absence	and	presence	to	exist	apart	as	distinct	singularities	in	time,	separated	by	the	
promise	of	definition.	In	the	first	movement	narrative	keeping	the	presence	of	pain	to	a	promise	of	future	definition	depends	on	the	reality-making	ability	of	FNS.	But	when	this	falters	(and	where	Alice’s	distractions	are	not	sufficient	backstop)	there	is	a	risk	that	this	temporal	division	between	absence	and	presence	might	collapse	into	a	controversy	in	her	present	experience.	Certainly	the	conflict	between	the	reality	of	her	felt	sensations	and	the	unreality	of	their	lack	of	representational	form	might	be	regarded	as	such	a	controversy.	But	despite	the	apparent	collapse	of	a	temporal	division	in	a	controversy,	such	collapse	never	fully	occurs	because	the	telic	demand	for	definition	constituting	this	temporal	division	forms	part	of	the	most	basic	ontology	of	what	is	means	to	experience	of	pain.	As	Chapter	2	noted,	even	when	there	is	a	lack	of	answers	for	sensations,	the	feeling	of	pain	sensation	initiates	a	spatial	division	through	its	sheer	againstness:	‘[e]ven	though	[pain]	occurs	within	oneself,	it	is	at	once	identified	as	“not	oneself,”	“not	me,”	as	something	so	alien	that	it	must	right	now	be	gotten	rid	of’	(Scarry,	1985,	p.	52).	Pain	is	separated	as	not-self,	as	absent	to	the	self.	Yet	pain	objects	to	its	positioning	in	this	ontology	when	Alice	feels	pain	as	also	part	of	herself,	as	present	as	herself.	But	its	demand	for	presence	is	projected	away	from	the	self	into	external	(non-self)	presences.	In	this	most	naturalised,	ontological	aspect	of	pain	(its	againstness),	pain	is	maintained	as	an	absence	whose	undeniable	presence	is	bracketed	in	the	promise	of	definition	in	external	entities.	Thus,	concepts	of	the	telic	demand	(Leder,	1990),	of	Scarry’s	(1985)	intentionality	(a	take	on	Husserl),	and	pain	as	a	‘void’	of	absence	to	fill	with	words	(Biro,	2011)	constitute	the	conversion	of	the	objection	of	bodily	sensation	to	being	denied	presence	as	part	of	the	self	into	a	quest	to	seek	(substitutes	for)	that	presence	(elsewhere).a	What	is	(perhaps	somewhat	confusingly)	being	absented	into	Otherness	is	that	Alice’s	void	is	also	made	present,	not	simply	as	a	potentiality	in	a	promise	of	something	to	come,	but	as	an	actuality	right	now	alongside	its	absence.	It	is	an	entity	she	talks	about,	an	object	of	representation.	It	is	easy	to	forget	that	it	is	an	object	at	all	because	the	emphasis	is	on	a	lack	of	objects	to	define	it.	Indeed,	enacting	the	void	as	a	concept	constitutes	a	subtle	epistemological	appropriation	that	allows	pain’s	presence	to	be	acknowledged	but	then	Othered	into	absence	through	projecting	presence	into	an	external	entity	that	can	fill	what	is	(an)	empty	(object)	at	some	unspecified	future	time	(see	box,	below).		
																																								 																					
a	The	bracketing	in	this	sentence	reflects	the	bracketing	that	occurs	in	the	ontology	of	pain	being	discussed.	
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POTENTIALITY,	ACTUALITY,	AND	BEETLE	BOXES	
Chapter	6	discussed	how	reading	attention	to	practice	as	revealing	that	reality	might	
potentially	be	made	otherwise	was	a	way	in	which	multiplicity	could	be	seemingly	acknowledged	but	nevertheless	distributed	into	singularities	of	time.	The	notion	of	potentiality	deflects	from	an	attention	to	practice	that	shows	an	actuality	of	multiple	realities	being	made	present	in	a	controversy.	
This	epistemological	appropriation	occurs	when	enacting	the	ontology	of	pain	outlined	in	Chapter	2,	an	ontology	that	runs	through	Alice’s	first	movement	narrative.	That	chapter	notes	how	Biro	(2011)	used	Wittgenstein’s	beetle	box	thought	experiment	to	demonstrate	Wittgenstein’s	point	of	a	fundamental	disconnect	between	the	world	of	language	and	whatever	might	be	inside	the	box	(which	can’t	be	described	even	as	a	
something).	In	highlighting	this	disconnect,	Biro	satisfies	the	condition	of	the	ontology	of	pain	outlined	in	Chapter	2	(and	Alice’s	first	movement)	through	making	pain	entirely	absent,	with	no	possible	connection	to	presence	(in	language).	Yet	he	must	then	confront	the	problem	that	Alice	also	feels	her	pain	(the	beetle	in	the	box)	as	something	undeniably	present,	even	if	she	cannot	find	a	name	for	it.	Here	we	see	absence	and	presence	as	a	controversy:	both	impossible	to	one	another	yet	seamlessly	connected	in	her	present	experience.	Yet	Biro	adds	something	onto	the	argument	by	suggesting	the	beetle	in	the	box	is	a	something	in	the	form	of	a	void.	Pain	is	made	present	as	an	object,	but	an	empty	object	waiting	to	be	filled	with	other	objects.	It	is	impossible	to	make	the	beetle	in	the	box	as	a	something,	as	an	object	(even	an	empty	one),	but	nevertheless	entirely	necessary	because	of	the	undeniability	of	its	presence	in	felt	sensation.	Yet	in	being	an	empty	object	the	void’s	presence	as	an	object	(an	actuality	of	presence)	can	be	subtly	masked	such	that	it	can	take	the	role	of	perfectly	singular	absence,	to	be	filled	with	presence	distributed	to	a	singularity	in	some	potential	future	time.	
Here	the	actuality	of	an	absent-present	ontology	of	pain	becomes	converted	into	one	where	presence	and	absence	are	separated	into	a	(current)	absence	that	can	be	(in	the	future)	provided	with	presence	of	definition	through	conceptualising	pain	as	a	void	or	as	elusive,	two	of	the	‘compromise	words’	discussed	in	Chapter	7	that	attempt	to	acknowledge	the	empirical	undeniability	of	the	actuality	of	multiplicity	whilst	subtly	distributing	it	into	singularities	through	the	concept	of	potentiality.	
In	this	ontology	Alice’s	pain	is	enacted	as	an	entirely	absent	entity,	an	empty	object	defined	only	by	unmaking,	and	with	a	terminus	where	everything	has	been	unmade	(Scarry,	1985).	During	our	first	few	interviews	Alice	talked	about	it	being	important	to	make	things	real	to	prevent	herself	going	down	“the	wrong	route”109,	which	was	characterised	as	a	place	of	
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madness	and	(ultimately)	death.	Early	on	I	suggested	this	is	a	“contrast	between	[…]	real	versus	unreal”110.	But	this	understanding	simply	describes	the	consequences	of	unreality,	rather	than	what	that	unreality	is.	That	is,	unreality	is	enacted	as	absent	and	never	present,	seen	only	in	its	effects,	in	an	unmaking	described	in	terms	of	an	adjective	rather	than	a	noun.	Yet	in	our	fourth	interview	Alice	introduced	unreality	as	something	that	had	a	tangible	presence,	as	an	object	that	was	being	desperately	avoided	through	seeking	medical	answers,	as	my	post-interview	reflection	noted:	
The	old	structure	[(first	movement	narrative)]	of	the	need	to	avoid	the	emotional	symptoms	associated	with	unreality,	whilst	maintaining	hope	in	processes	of	making	real,	still	asserted	itself.	But	what	was	uncovered,	what	was	given	birth	to,	was	the	significance	of	the	object	of	avoidance	itself,	which	was	given	a	name	in	the	concept	of	"the	void".	The	term	arose	whilst	discussing	the	significance	of	family	and	friends	in	her	life	in	the	fourth	interview,	where	Alice	said	that	when	her	son	went	away	she	felt	friends	“fill	that	gap	quickly.	It’s	like	they	fill	a	void”111.	It	was	only	in	this	interview	after	Alice	made	reference	to	these	terms	(which	hadn’t	been	mentioned	by	either	of	us	up	until	that	point)	that	unreality	became	striking	as	an	object	that	was	being	made	present.	This	was	an	object	whose	presence	I	could	further	explore	in	my	questioning:	“what’s	that	empty	void	like	then?”112	This	exploration	was	not	to	fill	an	empty	space	of	absence	with	presence	(in	an	either/or	of	singularities	distributed	in	time),	but	to	understand	the	forms	of	presence	being	made	to	constitute	that	absence.	That	is,	not	to	provide	‘answers’	to	fill	the	void	but	to	understand	the	contours	of	the	void	itself.	This	exploration	characterised	the	void	as	loneliness,	as	the	previous	section	noted.	But	if	the	shock	at	identifying	the	void	as	an	object	that	must	necessarily	be	made	present	in	order	to	enact	its	exclusive	absence	is	an	extension	of	the	field	of	vision	identifying	an	aspect	of	Alice’s	experience	hitherto	Othered	into	absence	due	to	its	impossibility	in	the	first	movement	narrative,	then	I	contend	this	unbracketing	is	not	wholly	successful.	For	aloneness	can	be	read	as	an	empty	object	defined	by	the	absence	of	people,	with	presence	projected	to	people	filling	that	void	at	some	future	time.	Indeed,	the	concept	of	being	isolated	from	others	is	a	well-established	aspect	of	the	ontology	of	pain	outlined	in	Chapter	2,	and	compliments	this	ontology	(as	the	previous	section	noted).	If	the	
void	becomes	a	mediator	once	its	name	becomes	visible,	it	can	also	be	readily	read	as	complete	absence,	an	intermediary	serving	the	ontology	of	pain	established	in	the	first	movement	narrative.	
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CHAPTER	12:	JUDITH	
Judith	is	the	only	participant	whose	‘second	movement’	cannot	be	readily	read	as	a	pinboard	(and	so	is	not	actually	a	second	movement	as	it	was	defined	in	Chapter	8).	Since	the	intention	of	this	analysis	is	to	produce	fractional	accounts	of	the	lived	experience	of	pain	(as	an	intervention	on	epistemological	accounts	of	it),	Judith’s	analysis	as	a	purely	epistemological	account	is	not	relevant	to	this	aim.	However,	as	an	epistemological	or	fractional	reading	can	be	more	or	less	convincing	rather	than	a	digital	either/or,	this	chapter	identifies	a	fractional	reading	within	Judith’s	analysis.	More	significantly,	it	reveals	how	an	embryonic	multiplicity	becomes	distributed	into	isolated	singularities.	Whilst	not	constituting	a	convincing	intervention	on	epistemology,	it	offers	information	on	the	execution	of	the	pinboard	method	(outlined	in	Chapter	8)	that	contributes	to	improving	that	method.	As	Judith’s	analysis	in	full	is	not	directly	relevant	to	either	this	wider	aim,	nor	providing	an	intervention	on	epistemology	itself,	it	is	summarised	to	provide	brevity	whilst	offering	context	for	the	fractional	reading.	The	full	analysis	can	be	found	in	Appendix	6.	
FIRST	MOVEMENT	NARRATIVE	(SUMMARISED)	
Judith	is	in	her	late	50s	and	has	chronic	back	pain.	Her	first	movement	narrative	can	be	described	as	an	ongoing	journey	of	restitution,	with	her	experience	of	chronic	pain	closely	bound	to	depression.	This	narrative	is	split	into	four	parts.	First,	Judith	experiences	a	conflict	between	motivation	to	undertake	certain	activities	and	caution	in	such	functioning.	Motivators	include	a	practical	need	to	perform	essential	tasks	like	shopping,	a	need	to	be	social	with	others,	and	desire	to	undertake	physical	activity	with	her	active	husband.	However,	the	most	significant	motivator	is	a	need	to	enact	an	identity	as	
competitive,	motivated,	and	daring.	Yet	she	is	cautious	in	undertaking	such	activity	because	of	limits	to	the	physical	functioning	of	her	back	and	her	capacity	to	deal	with	emotional	stimulation	following	a	major	depressive	episode.	The	second	part	of	her	first	movement	narrative	outlines	an	idealised	model	of	action	that	negotiates	between	these	two	conflicting	pressures,	allowing	her	to	take	actions	enabling	progress	towards	physical	and	psychological	normality.	Her	physical	journey	of	restitution	begins	with	lowest	functionality	in	her	back	and	greatest	pain	sensation,	where	she	hands	autonomy	of	her	body	to	the	doctor	and	waits	for	it	to	heal	itself.	However,	a	point	is	reached	where	she	feels	capable	of	sufficient	physical	activity	to	make	choices	to	push	her	physical	functioning,	something	that	can	strengthen	her	back	muscles	and	permit	further	functioning	gains	in	the	future.	This	‘testing	phase’	involves	being	attuned	to	her	bodily	sensations	so	she	does	not	‘overdo’	activity	and	cause	damage	that	regresses	her	to	an	
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earlier	stage	of	recovery,	but	also	not	‘underdo’	activity	and	not	make	progress.	A	similar	psychological	‘testing	phase’	begins	when	she	feels	ready	to	take	on	emotional	stimulation	associated	with	activity.	This	involves	pushing	herself	to	accept	higher	stimulation	in	order	to	challenge	perceptions	that	she	will	be	overwhelmed	by	it.	This	relies	on	an	intuitive	awareness	of	her	emotional	capacity	to	prevent	both	over-stimulation	(which	can	result	in	a	return	of	depressive	symptoms)	and	not	encountering	enough	stimulation	to	allow	progress	towards	psychological	restitution.	Both	physical	and	psychological	aspects	of	the	model	involve	incremental	increases	in	activity,	with	the	promise	of	complete	restitution.	The	third	part	of	this	narrative	highlights	inherent	uncertainty	in	knowing	her	physical	and	psychological	limits	that	inhibit	the	efficacy	of	this	model.	Despite	relying	on	evidence	from	her	bodily	senses,	there	remains	an	unknown	quantity	regarding	these	limits.	As	such,	there	is	always	doubt	about	each	decision	over	whether	it	is	sensible,	reckless,	or	too	cautious:	of	whether	her	decision-making	voice	is	her	‘sensible	head’,	‘reckless	head’,	or	‘scaredy	cat’.	Moreover,	whilst	being	reckless	is	negative	for	restitution,	it	is	positive	insofar	as	it	enacts	her	identity	as	competitive,	motivated,	and	daring.	Likewise,	there	is	also	a	constant	preoccupation	with	weeding	out	any	‘scaredy	cat’	tendencies	that	are	the	antithesis	to	this	desired	identity,	something	that	makes	her	more	likely	to	take	reckless	actions.	The	final	part	of	Judith’s	first	movement	narrative	is	fear	that	her	desired	normality	might	be	out	of	reach,	or	will	be	soon.	Normality	is	not	an	absolute	end	point	for	Judith,	but	means	being	able	to	undertake	activities	sufficiently	enough	to	satisfy	the	demands	outlined	above,	particularly	for	her	identity.	This	can	have	tangible	targets,	such	as	completing	18	holes	of	golf.	However,	she	had	doubts	that	she	could	reach	physical	and	psychological	normality	because	of	(1)	physical	deterioration	of	her	body	with	age	and	(2)	the	ingraining	of	the	‘scaredy	cat’	as	a	potentially	irremovable	personality	trait	following	her	depressive	episode.	In	response	to	these	concerns,	Judith	had	tried	to	accept	lower	levels	of	normality,	and	that	
trying	a	particular	activity	is	enough	in	itself	(regardless	of	the	level	of	performance).	However,	this	logical	acceptance	did	not	seem	enough	to	dampen	the	emotional	need	to	undertake	activity,	and	these	two	disparate	elements	of	her	first	movement	narrative	were	partitioned	into	seemingly	irreconcilable	logical	and	emotional	impulses.	
‘SECOND	MOVEMENT’	NARRATIVE	(SUMMARISED)	
The	manner	and	frequency	with	which	Judith	talked	about	her	sociability	seemed	greater	than	its	marginal	role	in	the	first	movement	narrative	that	became	fleshed	out	over	her	first	few	interviews.	Therefore,	its	significance	was	explored	in	greater	detail	in	our	later	interviews	as	a	potential	boundary	to	the	first	movement	narrative.	This	produced	an	additional	narrative	to	the	first	movement	that	has	been	split	into	two	parts.	
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First,	Judith	experienced	loneliness	due	to	difficulty	getting	close	to	others.	When	Judith	became	depressed	she	actively	avoided	others,	which	she	described	as	being	unlike	her	usual	sociability.	This	tendency	to	isolate	herself	was	accompanied	by	an	‘aloneness’	that	was	frightening	for	her.	However,	despite	creating	an	image	of	a	highly	social	person	with	very	good	social	skills	in	the	first	movement	narrative,	Judith	went	on	to	note	that,	actually,	she	has	always	felt	lonely	–	since	childhood.	She	described	difficulty	making	friends	at	school,	and	later	in	her	life	when	she	started	work.	She	talked	about	how	her	sociability	was	a	‘persona’	that	belied	her	social	isolation	and	loneliness.	Moreover,	this	involved	a	self-imposed	tendency	to	isolate	herself,	something	she	attributed	to	some	familial	trait	(genetic	and/or	nurtured)	that	could	also	be	found	in	other	family	members,	particularly	her	father.	The	second	part	of	this	‘second	movement’	narrative	is	how	Judith	tried	to	deal	with	the	problem	of	loneliness.	The	enactment	of	a	social	persona	can	be	regarded	as	one	way	she	attempted	to	overcome	loneliness	(by	trying	to	be	social),	but	one	that	reveals	itself	as	a	superficiality	when	it	is	unable	to	successfully	Other	into	absence	inconvenient	facts	like	Judith’s	lack	of	friends.	Three	other	defences	against	loneliness	were	identified,	however.	One	involves	‘going	with’	isolation,	something	that	she	enacted	significantly	in	her	teenage	years.	However,	whilst	it	is	easy	to	accept	her	tendency	to	isolate,	it	is	less	easy	for	her	to	accept	being	alone.	A	more	widely	used	defence	for	Judith	involves	being	competitive	to	create	a	‘successful’	identity	that	others	would	want	to	be	friends	with.	The	competitive,	motivated,	and	daring	identity	identified	in	the	first	movement	as	the	primary	motivator	for	her	need	to	undertake	activity	here	becomes	reconceptualised	from	some	foundational	part	of	who	she	is	to	a	persona	performed	in	order	to	generate	a	socially	attractive	identity.	Like	the	social	persona	its	enactment	is	understood	as	a	superficiality	determined	by	a	deeper	structure	of	the	loneliness	accompanying	her	tendency	to	isolate	herself.	A	final	defence	against	loneliness	identified	by	Judith	is	being	more	open	with	others.	Something	she	noted	she	has	gradually	learned	with	time,	this	involves	being	aware	of	her	impulse	to	isolate	herself	when	it	arises,	and	to	then	choose	to	behave	in	a	social	rather	than	antisocial	manner	in	response.	Thus,	when	she	was	forced	to	enact	an	uncompetitive	(and	therefore	an	apparently	less	socially	attractive)	identity	when	she	was	promoted	to	a	more	advanced	golf	class,	rather	than	not	engaging	with	other	students	and	discretely	leaving	the	lesson	(which	she	said	she	would	usually	do	in	such	a	situation),	she	chose	to	explain	to	another	student	how	she	was	feeling.	Learning	to	be	more	open	with	others	offers	an	alternative	defence	against	loneliness	that	negates	the	need	for	her	to	enact	a	successful	identity	through	being	competitive,	and	thus	significantly	reduces	the	pressure	for	her	to	be	able	to	function	at	a	particular	level	of	activity.	As	such,	the	conflict	that	forms	the	basis	of	the	first	movement	narrative	(between	the	need	to	undertake	activity	and	the	physical	and	emotional	limits	on	such	activity)	becomes	moot,	since	the	elements	that	make	up	this	
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conflict	are	made	visible	as	superficialities	determined	by	an	underlying	conflict	that	has	a	promising	resolution	in	a	strategy	of	learning	to	be	more	open.	Thus,	Judith’s	‘second	movement’	can	be	read	as	an	interest	story	(Law,	2002)	(a	concept	discussed	in	Chapter	11),	where	the	first	movement	narrative	is	reconceptualised	as	a	superficiality	determined	(as	an	intermediary)	by	the	deeper	narrative	revealed	in	her	‘second	movement’.	That	is,	rather	than	produce	a	fractional	account	of	the	lived	experience	of	pain	where	intermediaries	become	converted	to	mediators	that	seamlessly	link	impossible	narratives	together,	instead	an	epistemological	account	is	produced	where	the	two	narratives	of	Judith’s	lived	experience	become	distributed	into	singularities	connected	(but	not	overlapping)	through	a	hierarchy	of	‘realness’	based	on	depth.	In	this	sense	her	‘second	movement’	isn’t	a	second	movement	at	all	according	to	its	definition	in	Chapter	8.	
SEARCHING	FOR	SECOND	READINGS	
This	thesis	has	argued	that	whether	a	particular	text	can	be	viewed	as	a	first	(epistemological)	or	second	(fractional)	reading	is	not	a	digital	choice.	Instead,	a	particular	reading	can	be	more	or	less	successfully	established,	and	that	the	dividing	line	between	the	establishment	of	a	first	and	second	reading	is	often	very	subtle.	Within	Judith’s	analysis	we	could	identify	several	elements	that	approach	a	second	reading.	In	this	vein	I	here	present	one	particular	section	of	Judith’s	analysis	as	a	second	reading	but	then	demonstrate	how	the	multiplicity	becomes	distributed	into	temporal	singularities.	The	first	movement	narrative	enacts	the	concept	of	the	reckless	head	as	something	that	prevents	a	return	to	her	competitive,	motivated,	and	daring	identity	because	of	the	high	risk	of	‘overdoing’	physical	or	emotional	activity	resulting	in	regression	to	a	physical	or	emotional	state	even	further	removed	from	normality.	Whilst	some	instances	of	undertaking	risky	behaviour	will	not	result	in	regression,	in	other	instances	it	will	and	has.	Yet	the	first	movement	narrative	also	enacts	the	reckless	head	as	a	necessary	component	to	the	competitive,	motivated,	and	daring	identity.	Enacting	the	reckless	head	is	something	that	is	both	necessary	and	anathema	to	the	(re)establishment	of	the	identity	at	the	same	time.	This	is	a	fractional	reading.	However,	there	was	never	an	instance	where	the	two	contradictory	meanings	were	enacted	at	the	same	time.	They	were	instead	distributed	into	separate	temporal	singularities	where	there	is	no	overlap.	The	risky	behaviour	of	the	reckless	head	was	always	understood	in	
hindsight	as	thoughtless,	even	whilst	the	motivation	for	enacting	it	in	the	moment	is	nevertheless	also	made	present.	This	temporal	division	is	evident	when	she	decided	to	try	the	risky	activity	of	unicycling,	which	was	regarded	in	hindsight	as	“a	really	stupid	thing	to	
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do”1,	a	logical	side	that	only	arose	after	the	initial	motivation	to	be	risky	to	prove	her	identity:	
L:	[…]	I’m	wondering	[…]	is	there	a	sense	that	[…]	even	though	you	know	the	reckless	head	is	bad	for	you,	you	still	need	to	go	ahead	and	be	reckless	sometimes	to	prove	to	yourself	that	you’re	still	the	old	Judith?	J:	Yeah.	L:	Yeah?	J:	Without	a	shadow	of	a	doubt,	yeah.	I	mean	although	I	did	try	[unicycling],	I	realised	after	the	third	attempt	that	it	wasn’t	going	to	work.	[…]	Then	my	logical	head	came	on	and	said,	you	know	you’ve	tried	it	three	times	and	you’ve	overbalanced	three	times	so	I’ve	done	the	reckless	head	now.	And	it	wasn’t	even	scaredy	cat	that	time	it	was	sensible	head	(laughs)	said	that	if	you	fall	the	next	time	you	might	break	your	wrist	or	something,	because	I’ve	already	broken	my	ankle	and	broken	my	wrist.	[I4:31-42]	Here	there	seems	to	be	a	negotiation	between	the	need	to	enact	risky	behaviour	yet	the	need	to	avoid	it.	Negotiation	suggests	the	presence	of	a	controversy,	and	the	need	(in	an	epistemological	system)	to	make	choices	between	multiples.	Yet	Judith	made	clear	that	such	was	the	temporal	separation	of	these	two	needs	that	there	was	no	overlap	that	even	required	making	a	decision	between	them:	
L:	[…]	you	said	there	[were…]	the	two	voices.	[…]	[Choosing	to	unicycle]	wasn’t	the	best	decision	for	one	kind	of	sensible	side	but	on	the	other	hand,	you	said	that	you	wanted	to	do	it	because…	J:	Yeah.	L:…You	wanted	to…	J:	These	weren’t	happening	at	the	same	time,	these	thoughts,	either.	L:	Yeah.	J:	It	was	go	ahead,	take	the	risk.	Do	it.	L:	Mmmmm.	J:	And	then,	as	I	was	doing	it,	I	then	thought:	mmm	maybe	this	isn’t	the	best	idea.	So	it	was	literally	two	complete	[sic]	separate	trains	of	thought	as	well.	L:	Yeah.	J:	It	wasn’t	as	if	I	have	to	make	a	decision.	L:	Right.	Okay.	J:	If	that	makes	sense.	[I4:111-125]	Indeed,	when	I	still	continued	to	insist	that	“maybe	in	a	way	there	was	a	bit	of	negotiation	going	on	there”2	between	the	two	voices,	Judith	again	stressed	that	“it	wasn’t	like	I	was	having	two	parallel	train	of	thoughts	[sic].	One	definitely	came	first	and	then	the	other”3.	
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There	is	a	sharp	division	in	time	when	she	“realised	it	was	maybe	a	foolish	thing	to	do	it”4.	Without	the	overlap	of	these	two	opposing	notions	of	risky	behaviour	there	can	be	no	pinboard:	no	mediator	emerges	that	makes	visible	the	simultaneity	of	multiplicity	within	the	singularity	of	a	mediator.	As	Julia	Kristeva	noted	of	the	abject	(see	Chapter	10),	mediators	shows	us	the	connectedness	between	two	impossible	things	just	as	“corpses	show	
me	what	I	permanently	thrust	aside	in	order	to	live”	(1982,	cited	in	Felluga,	2011a,	par.	4,	emphasis	in	original).	Unlike	the	other	mediators	of	the	previous	three	chapters	we	do	not	observe	a	thrusting	aside	(Othering	into	absence)	of	some	aspect	that	does	not	fit	with	the	first	movement	narrative.	Instead	Judith	makes	fully	present	the	contradictory	aspects	of	her	risky	behaviour	and	nullifies	the	contradiction	by	distributing	them	into	singularities	of	time.	
EVALUATING	THE	EXECUTION	OF	THE	PINBOARD	METHOD	
In	Judith’s	analysis	she	resolves	the	controversy	between	the	two	contradictory	definitions	of	recklessness	through	partitioning	them	(without	overlap)	into	separate	impulses	that	emerge	at	different	points	in	time.	But	this	prompts	further	questions	because	overlap	is	nevertheless	implied,	for	example,	in	an	implicit	assumption	that	Judith	constitutes	a	single	subject.	We	might	ask	if	Judith	sees	herself	as	‘one’	person,	and	if	so,	how	can	she	reconcile	this	with	having	two	completely	distinct	impulses.	Such	questions	were	not	explored	further	in	our	interviews,	however,	with	the	thread	of	sociability	being	explored	instead.	Not	following	through	with	particular	threads	might	be	regarded	as	a	failing	to	‘follow	the	natives’	once	the	objections	arise.	This	in	large	part	reflects,	I	suspect,	that	I	was	sometimes	preoccupied	with	the	theoretical	structures	established	during	analysis	between	interviews	(and	sometimes	within	an	interview)	at	the	expense	of	being	aware	of	the	objects	being	made	present,	as	opposed	to	using	that	theoretical	structure	to	inform	my	understanding	of	those	objects.	This	preoccupation	involves	expectations	of	what	should	happen	in	the	interview,	and	is	discussed	more	fully	in	Appendix	1.	
As	noted	in	Chapter	8,	evaluating	the	execution	of	the	pinboard	method	in	this	manner	is	an	aim	of	this	thesis	so	that	it	might	be	used	to	enhance	the	method	for	future	use.	A	key	assumption	here	is	that	the	method	should	produce	a	fractional	account,	and	indeed	all	of	the	reflection	that	occurs	on	the	performance	of	the	method	is	intended	to	be	used	to	enhance	its	ability	to	produce	fractional	accounts.	This	stems	from	global	
assumptions	that	to	know	is	the	interference	of	one	process	on	another	(a	controversy),	and	that	conventional	ways	of	knowing	tend	to	engage	in	a	misrecognition	of	the	controversy	in	favour	of	the	interpretive	omnipotence	of	singularities	(see	Part	I).	The	
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global	nature	of	these	assumptions	provides	the	grounds	with	which	the	pinboard	can	be	developed	as	a	method	that	should	realise	fractional	accounts.	That	is,	the	pinboard	method	is	a	plan	(outlined	explicitly	in	Chapter	8)	that	is	attempted	to	be	realised.	
In	this	sense,	the	method	is	based	on	assumptions	that	have	already	decided	in	advance	what	the	furniture	of	the	world	should	look	like	(to	paraphrase	Latour,	2005).	Yet	the	very	nature	of	this	pre-determination	in	method	requires	a	naiveté	that	does	not	permit	pre-determination.	The	attempt	to	realise	the	goal	of	the	method	‘paradoxically’	involves	letting	go	of	any	goals	beyond	those	provided	by	the	natives	being	observed,	including	those	found	within	pre-determined	plans	like	a	method.a	Yet	this	is	itself	a	fractional	understanding,	and	we	should	be	careful	to	understand	it	fractionally	as	both	the	realisation	of	a	plan	and	the	dismissal	of	plans	entirely	rather	than	being	forced	into	an	either/or	choice.	Indeed,	the	execution	of	the	pinboard	method	can	be	evaluated	in	a	way	that	attempts	to	identify	and	dialectically	synthesise	unanticipated	(non-relational)	elements	into	the	singularity	of	a	synthesis	(forming	newly	pre-determined	assumptions	to	realise	in	future	practice)	and	retain	a	commitment	to	a	radical	empiricism	characterised	by	naiveté	as	part	of	that	pre-determination.	Here	we	can	observe	how	the	coherence	of	the	pinboard	method	as	a	practice	is	necessarily	sustained	by	its	noncoherence.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	7,	the	practice	of	the	pinboard	itself	occurs	in	conditions	of	possibility	that	are	necessarily	fractional.	
INTERVIEW	REFERENCES																																								 																					
1	I1:545	2	I4:139	3	I4:144-6	4	I4:107	
																																								 																					
a	In	the	same	way,	for	example,	that	the	Buddhist’s	desire	to	reach	Nirvana	can	only	be	attained	when	desire	is	itself	dropped.	
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CHAPTER	13:	MARY		
FIRST	MOVEMENT:	COORDINATING	CONFIDENCE	AND	ANXIETY	
Mary	is	a	retired	woman	in	her	60s	with	rheumatoid	arthritis	(RA).	This	first	movement	narrative	differs	from	other	participants	because	it	did	not	gradually	emerge	as	a	single	narrative	with	a	set	of	coordinated	parts	but	as	two	separate	narratives.	These	barely	overlapped	but	nevertheless	emerged	side-by-side	in	a	distributed	(non-coordinated)	manner.	These	became	increasingly	coordinated	as	I	directed	the	interviews	towards	lines	of	overlap,	highlighting	a	controversy	resolved	through	a	dialectical	production	of	a	new	narrative	different	from	the	original	two	but	with	essential	elements	of	both.	The	process	of	centring	inevitably	involves	resolving	controversies	that	become	Othered	into	absence	in	favour	of	the	harmony	of	the	final	product.	In	so	here	presenting	the	two	intermediate	narratives	followed	by	the	final	coordinated	narrative,	we	can	see	the	dialectical	movement	inherent	in	the	methodological	coordination	of	the	interviews.	This	is	something	that	is	lost	in	the	analysis	of	the	other	participants’	interviews,	where	any	intermediate	stages	are	not	internally	coherent	enough	to	constitute	analytic	representation	as	a	narrative	distinct	enough	from	the	final	narrative	product.a	Making	this	visible	here	allows	a	contrast	(made	at	the	end	of	this	chapter)	between	this	epistemological	approach	to	a	controversy	and	the	fractional	approach	provided	in	the	second	movement.	The	first	intermediate	narrative	of	Mary’s	experience	of	chronic	pain	can	be	characterised	as	(1)	a	medical	salvation	from	the	extreme	suffering	of	illness,	(2)	the	experience	of	which	overturns	her	well-established	outlook	on	the	world	as	full	of	threats	to	be	feared.	Alongside	this,	a	second	intermediate	narrative	emerged	around	moral	judgement.	This	involved	(1)	distress	at	being	negatively	judged	by	others	as	faking	illness	for	personal	gain,	and	(2)	reactions	of	both	shame	and	defence	against	these	judgements.	Coordination	between	the	narratives	occurred	as	we	explored	moral	judgements	as	existing	threats	that	Mary	feared,	forcing	the	strong	and	confident	Mary	of	the	first	intermediate	narrative	to	confront	her	victimhood	and	fearfulness	in	the	second,	resulting	in	coordination	of	confidence	and	anxiety	to	form	a	final,	amalgamated	narrative.																																											 																					
a	Law	et	al.	(2014)	would	suggest	that	other	interview	narratives	would	deny	the	noncoherence	that	is	necessary	to	establish	the	coherence	of	a	final	narrative.	Denial	is	identified	by	Law	et	al.	as	one	‘mode’	or	‘style’	of	enacting	fractionality	(see	Chapter	14	for	further	discussion).	
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INTERMEDIATE	NARRATIVE	I:	SALVATION	AND	STRENGTH	(1)	ILLNESS	SUFFERING	AND	MEDICAL	SALVATION	Mary	emphasised	the	high	degree	of	suffering	with	her	RA,	with	its	pain	being	“unbearable”1.	Employing	Scarry’s	(1985)	language	of	agency	(see	Chapter	2)	this	pain	was	described	as	“electric	shocks	all	over	your	body	[,…]	a	searing	heat	[…and]	a	sharp	pain”2.	The	pain	was	something	she	feared,	and	such	was	the	unbearable	nature	of	this	“intense”3	pain	that	at	one	time	Mary	had	wanted	to	die.	She	had	asked	nurses	attending	her	“if	they	would	kill	me”4,	noting	that	“if	I	was	like	that	and	knew	I	was	going	to	be	like	that	most	of	the	time,	I	wouldn’t	want	to	be	alive”5.	Mary	felt	that	her	pain	was	so	severe	that	few	people	are	able	to	comprehend	its	intensity	of	bodily	sensation.	When	her	RA	was	at	its	most	extreme	she	was	hospitalised.	For	Mary,	even	fellow	RA	patients	in	hospital	were	taken	aback	by	the	extent	of	suffering:	
And	when	I	used	to	go	in	you	could	hear	them	all	talking	and	going	‘oh	my	god,	you	know,	look	at	the	state	of	her.	She	can’t	move.	She	can’t	do	anything’.	So	I	just	think	I	had	it	very,	very	severely.	[I1:64-5]	She	said	her	blood	pressure	would	“shoot	up”6	and	her	oxygen	levels	would	decline	such	that	there	was	doubt	about	“whether	my	body	would	cope	with	it”7.	Indeed,	“a	few	times	[…]	the	nurses	didn’t	expect	me	to	pull	through”8.	Mary	had	also	acquired	many	viral	and	bacterial	infections	because	“your	immune	system	doesn’t	work”9	in	RA:	“you	couldn’t	fight	anything	off”10,	having	experienced	bronchiectasis	(“constant	lung	infections”11)	and	pneumonia.	Her	suffering	with	RA	also	extended	to	her	medical	treatment.	In	one	example	she	described	the	pain	experienced	in	her	“really	swollen	and	inflamed”12	hands	as	a	doctor	attempted	3	times	to	find	a	vein	to	attach	a	drip.	Suffering	with	illness	also	meant	being	incapacitated	in	different	ways.	The	pain	means	that	“you	can’t	do	anything	at	all.	You	can’t	read	or	watch	the	TV	because	you	can’t	concentrate	on	anything	because	the	pain	is	so	bad”13.	Moreover,	Mary	described	experiencing	weakness.	She	noted	tiredness	in	her	legs,	as	if	they	had	been	“dipped	in	concrete”14,	and	as	a	result	she	had	difficulty	walking	and	was	prone	to	falls.	She	described	several	occasions	when	she	had	fallen	and	had	nobody	around	to	help	her.	Just	two	weeks	prior	to	the	start	of	our	interviews	she	had	fallen	in	her	garden	and	blood	was	“spurting	out	of	my	shin”15	from	a	cut	she	sustained.	Managing	to	telephone	the	emergency	services	she	was	unable	to	apply	enough	pressure	to	the	wound	to	stem	the	bleeding	(as	she	was	asked	to	do)	due	to	having	“no	strength	[…]	to	press	down”16,	and	only	resolved	the	situation	when	a	neighbour	“heard	me	shouting	and	[…]	came	and	pressed	a	towel	on	it”.17	
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For	Mary,	the	degree	of	her	suffering	with	RA	was	such	that	she	“wouldn’t	wish	it	on	my	worst	enemy.	I	really	wouldn’t.	It’s	a	horrible	illness”.18	Initially	her	RA	couldn’t	be	controlled	medically.	She	experienced	pain	for	“months	and	months	and	months	on	end,	and	[…]	everything	they	gave	me,	nothing	worked	to	get	rid	of	the	pain”19.	Indeed,	she	said	“I	couldn’t	see	an	end	to	it	because	it	was	just	going	on	for	so	long	[…]	and	even	my	rheumatologist	was	quite	concerned	that	he	couldn’t	get	me	sort	of	stable”20.	She	had	been	tried	on	many	different	drugs,	but	these	proved	ineffective,	and	in	some	cases	she	suspected	had	actually	damaged	her	(she	thought	methotrexate	had	damaged	her	lungs).	At	one	point	she	even	considered	taking	experimental	drugs,	but	was	persuaded	against	it	at	the	last	moment	because	of	concerns	from	her	family	that	she	was	taking	too	much	of	a	risk.	The	incident	served	to	highlight	the	desperation	Mary	felt	where	a	medical	solution	to	her	suffering	was	not	forthcoming.	However,	one	day	Mary	received	her	medical	“salvation”21.	On	one	occasion	in	hospital	Mary	received	a	‘pulse’	of	steroids	(administered	intravenously).	Whilst	she	had	been	“stretchered	in,	really	ill”22,	two	days	after	the	pulse	she	was	“getting	out	of	bed	and	making	other	people	a	cup	of	tea”23.	She	described	her	reaction:	“I	just	couldn’t	believe	it.	[…]	I	said	to	my	rheumatologist	‘you,	you	are	God.	To	me,	you	are	God	because	you’ve	given	me	sort	of	life	back’	”24.	Mary	began	to	receive	pulses	every	12	weeks	(the	minimum	necessary	time	between	treatments),	which	she	understood	as	serving	to	“dampen	down”25	her	inflammation.	However:	
[…]	when	I	first	started	to	get	them	done,	after	about	7	weeks	they	wore	off.	So	then	I	would	have	to	wait	5	weeks	for	the	next	lot.	So	that	was	5	weeks	of	pain	that	every	day	got	worse	and	worse	and	worse	and	more	severe.	[I1:21-3]	During	these	5	weeks	Mary	would	be	admitted	to	hospital.	Hopes	for	salvation	(“I	did	sort	of	think	that	they	would	last”26)	gave	way	to	a	realisation	that	her	relief	would	only	be	partial,	and	this	12-week	pattern	(7	weeks	of	relief	followed	by	5	weeks	of	pain)	became	established	for	10	years.	During	this	period	Mary	estimated	that	she	was	hospitalised	over	40	times.	However,	her	hopes	were	raised	when	she	had	become	aware	of	“new	wonder	drugs”27.	These	were	“new	biological	drugs,	the	new	anti-TNF	drugsa”28.	However,	Mary	found	out	that	patients	prone	to	chest	infections	are	not	given	these	drugs	because	it	significantly	increases	their	risk	of	death.	Having	experienced	pneumonia	and	bronchiectasis,	she	was	excluded	from	receiving	them.	Her	desire	for	a	solution	to	periods	of	intense	pain	instead																																									 																					
a	Anti-	tumour	necrosis	factor	(TNF)	drugs.	The	usual	(biochemical)	explanation	for	their	utility	is	that	they	block	a	substance	in	the	blood	(TNF)	causing	inflammation	(American	College	of	Rheumatology,	2019).	
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began	to	centre	on	the	hope	that	the	steroid	pulses	would	begin	to	last	longer:	“maybe	this	will	be	the	time	when	I	will	go	longer”29.	“There	was	always	that	hope”30.	In	the	10th	year	following	the	start	of	the	steroid	pulses	the	period	of	pain	relief	began	to	extend	beyond	7	weeks,	and	for	the	3	years	prior	to	our	interviews	had	been	largely	effective	(reducing,	but	not	eliminating,	her	RA	symptoms)a	for	the	full	12	weeks.	Having	reached	salvation,	Mary	was	aware	that	the	medication	might	not	last	forever.	She	noted	that	“your	body	gets	used	to	it	and	then	they	stop	working	and	so	then	they	have	to	find	another	drug”31.	How	long	the	drug	will	last	is	down	to	“luck”32,	but	she	felt	it	“very	likely”33	that	it	will	not	last	the	rest	of	her	life,	and	she	will	return	to	the	extremes	of	suffering	she	experienced	years	ago.	However,	she	felt	the	suffering	had	changed	her,	allowing	her	to	better	cope	with	what	it	brought,	and	she	was	thus	notably	stoic	about	it:	“I	used	to	think	what	if	[…the	drug]	stops	working?	And	what	if	I	go	back	to,	to	how	I	was?	What	if	that	happens?	I	used	to	think	like	that.	But	now	I	don’t.	I	just	don’t34”.	Indeed,	she	said	“if	I	don’t	stay	like	this	and	I	do	become	[extremely	ill	again,]	I	do	think	I’ll	cope	with	it	better”35.	Mary	felt	that	her	suffering	during	illness	had	a	profound	effect	on	how	she	experienced	the	world	around	her,	which	was	traditionally	one	of	anxiety	relating	to	a	plethora	of	perceived	threats.	Indeed,	for	Mary,	her	experience	of	chronic	pain	included	a	fundamental	shift	in	her	attitude	to	life,	as	the	next	section	discusses.	
	(2)	GROWTH	THROUGH	SUFFERING	Mary	described	feeling	anxious	about	many	things	when	she	was	younger,	prior	to	the	onset	of	RA.	She	said	“I	used	to	worry	about	everything”36.	She	would	worry	about	wars,	about	her	infant	son	dying,	about	her	husband	dying,	and	about	what	would	happen	if	her	husband	was	made	redundant	from	his	job,	amongst	other	things.	She	catastrophised	the	threats	she	identified,	such	as	when	a	war	(namely	Falkland	and	Gulf	wars)	started:	
There’s	going	to	be	a	war	and	they’re	going	to	come	over	here	and	they’ll	be	no	food.	My	child	will	starve	to	death.	You	know,	or	something	will	happen	to	me.	I’ll	get	killed.	Then	what’s	going	to	happen	to	my	child?	[I1:953-7]	She	said	she	“used	to	sit	and	think	about	everything	and	make	myself	more	and	more	and	more	anxious”37.	She	was	admitted	to	a	psychiatric	hospital	in	her	early	20s	for	acute	anxiety,	and	continued	to	have	symptoms	related	to	anxiety	for	decades.	However,	she	observed	in	particular	that	having	to	endure	things	that	provoked	anxiety	during	her	medical	treatment	for	RA	served	to	reduce	that	anxiety	over	time,	giving	her																																									 																					
a	Mary	told	me	(outside	of	the	recorded	interviews)	that	the	pain	was	reduced	by	90%	as	a	result	of	the	steroid	pulses.	
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confidence	“over	medical	things”38.	This	applied	both	to	medical	procedures	such	as	having	an	injection	(	“I	would	worry	all	week	about	getting	that	needle”39)	and	the	relationship	she	had	with	medical	staff.	Regarding	the	latter,	Mary	initially	felt	threatened	by	the	authority	of	doctors:	“I	would	think	‘they’re	doctors’,	you	know,	‘they’re	so	clever,	I	can’t	be	on	a	one-to-one	with	them’	”40.	She	felt	too	scared	to	communicate	with	them,	even	when	she	desperately	wanted	to.	On	one	occasion	(over	a	decade	prior	to	our	interviews)	a	doctor	made	repeated	failed	attempts	to	fit	a	cannula	(a	tube	inserted	into	a	vein	to	allow	the	delivery	of	fluids).	This	caused	her	so	much	suffering	that	she	wanted	the	doctor	to	stop,	yet	Mary	did	not	feel	confident	enough	to	voice	her	objection:	
[…the	doctor]	must	have	tried	about	15	times	to	get	the	cannula	in,	and	the	more	it	was	going	on,	it	went	on	for	about	2	hours,	and	then	the	sweat	was	pouring	off	me.	And	then	I	started	to	cry	and	I	was	stressed	out.	And	[husband]	was	there	and	he	was	pacing	the	floor.	And	I	kept	saying	(spoken	with	soft	voice)	‘I	don’t	want	you	to’.	[Doctor:]‘I’ve	got	to	do	it’,	you	know,	‘I’ve	got	to	get	this	cannula	in’.	I	don’t	know	why,	because	I	didn’t	even	need	a	cannula	in	[…].	[I1:491-6]	At	that	point	in	her	life	Mary	“wouldn’t	dare	say	anything	to	a	doctor”41.	However,	she	explained	that	if	“you	go	in	hospital	a	lot	[…]	you	get	used	to	dealing	with	medical	people”42,	and	Mary’s	frequent	hospitalisation	meant	that	she	became	more	confident	about	speaking	to	doctors.	She	said	“you	realise	they’re	just	people.	They	don’t	have	answers.	And	all	the	time	they	make	mistakes”43.	Indeed,	Mary	had	even	since	enrolled	in	a	program	where	she	is	used	as	a	source	of	patient	knowledge	directing	the	training	of	student	doctors,	inversing	the	roles	of	expert	and	non-expert.	This	confidence	can	be	seen	in	a	future	medical	encounter	when	another	doctor	was	also	having	difficulty	fitting	a	cannula:	
And	I	remember	saying	to	this	doctor	‘No.	You’ve	tried	3	times	and	that’s	it.	I’m	not	letting	you’.	And	he	was	so	shocked	and	he	went	back	to	the,	to	the	sister,	[name],	and	said	‘she	won’t	let	me	do	it,	[name]’.	She	went	‘have	you	ever	had	one	of	those	put	in?’	And	he	went	‘no’.	She	said	‘well	it’s	like	assaulting	somebody’	she	went,	‘so	if	she’s	told	you	no	and	you’ve	tried	3	times’,	she	went,	‘she	means	no.	And	leave	it	at	that’.	[I1:532-6]	Mary’s	successful	objections	to	the	actions	of	doctors	on	her	body	gave	her	a	sense	of	confidence	in	being	able	to	control	her	own	medical	treatment:	
Now	I	feel,	you	know,	that	I	can	say	to	them	‘no’,	you	know,	‘I	know	my	body,	I	know	what’s	going	to	happen,	and	you	need	to	go	away’.	Not	in	a	nasty	way.	I’m	not	nasty	to	them.	You	just	need	to	tell	them	that’s	how	it	is,	you	know.	[I1:545-9]	Whilst	Mary	identified	a	growth	in	confidence	regarding	medical	treatment,	the	same	process	of	reducing	the	anxiety	associated	with	perceived	threats	due	to	a	new-found	belief	in	her	own	ability	to	take	action	(rather	than	be	a	passive	victim)	also	applied	to	other	aspects	of	her	suffering	with	RA.	One	simple	but	powerful	action	was	endurance:	she	had	
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refuted	her	anxious	predictions	by	proving	that	she	could	endure	the	extremes	of	illness	suffering.	This	made	her	feel	“empowered”44:	
I	think	because	as	the	years	have	gone	on,	because	I’ve	been	so	ill	and	because	people	haven’t	expected	me	to	get	through	it	and	I	have,	I	think	it	sort	of	made	me	think	well,	yeah,	I	can,	you	know,	I	can	sort	of	fight	back.	I	can	do	something	about	it.	I	was	never,	ever	a	positive	person	ever	[before].	[I1:605-12]	Whilst	the	undermining	of	threats	through	belief	in	her	ability	to	act	applied	specifically	to	those	of	her	illness	and	its	treatment,	they	had	an	effect	on	her	anxious	outlook	in	general:	the	power	of	all	threats	became	challenged.	She	became	a	“much	stronger	person”45	in	general	as	she	felt	more	able	to	take	actions	that	could	mitigate	against	perceived	threats	rather	than	retreat	into	anxiety	as	a	potential	victim	to	them.	Mary	described	this	change	in	outlook	as	“like	when	people	have	a	near	death	experience	and	then	their	[…]	whole,	you	know,	outlook	changes,	you	know,	they	feel,	like,	stronger	in	that	they	want	to	live	their	life”46.	But	autonomy	(versus	passiveness)	was	not	always	an	option.	Mary	recognised	that	sometimes	she	really	was	powerless	to	take	action	against	threats.	However,	rather	than	ruminate	on	the	uncontrollable	possibilities	of	the	future,	she	had	come	to	realise	that	this	rumination	is	futile:	
[…]	I	do	get	concerned	about	the	state	of	the	world	and	about	how	things	[are]	but	again	I’m	in,	I’m	in	that	mind-frame	now	where,	where	there’s	certain	things	that	I	can’t	do	anything	about.	And	worrying	about	it	isn’t	going	to	do	anything	to	help	them	or	to	change	anything.	[I1:976-8]	In	particular,	she	no	longer	dwelled	on	the	possibility	of	future	illness.	She	became	more	comfortable	living	within	the	confines	of	uncertain	and	potentially	unfavourable	prognoses,	and	developed	an	optimism	that	she	previously	lacked.	Thus,	she	described	an	operation	she	had	in	the	weeks	prior	to	our	interviews,	where	“the	doctors	were	expecting	problems”47:	
[…they	said]	‘you	might	wake	up	in	intensive	care,	Mary,	because	your	lungs	might	collapse.	Or	you	might	get	pneumonia.	And	you	might	get	this.	And	you	might…’.	And	I	went	‘none	of	that’s	going	to	happen’.	I	went	‘I’m	going	to	have	this	operation	and	sail	through	it.	[And…]	that’s	what	happened.	[I1:854-856,858]	Through	both	a	newly	developed	confidence	in	her	ability	to	act	coupled	with	a	realisation	of	the	futility	of	worry	(when	she	cannot	act),	Mary	felt	able	to	let	go	of	worrying	in	general.	Indeed,	it	seemed	that	her	experience	with	reducing	anxiety	had	become	universalised	to	the	extent	where	she	sought	to	dismiss	worrying	altogether	without	the	need	to	interrogate	each	anxious	thought	in	terms	of	whether	it	can	be	acted	upon	or	should	be	accepted	without	rumination:	this	meant	to	“just	stop	worrying”48,	to	“just	chill”49,	to	“just	let	it	all	go”50.	
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INTERMEDIATE	NARRATIVE	II:	NEGATIVE	JUDGEMENT	FROM	OTHERS	(1)	DISBELIEF	FROM	OTHERS	During	our	first	interview,	Mary	was	discussing	how	she	was	unable	to	take	the	
new	[anti-TNF]	wonder	drugs	that	everyone	was	saying	to	me,	you	know,	‘there’s	these	marvellous	drugs	that	I’d	read	in	the	paper,	there’s	a	cure	for	rehumat-,	why	aren’t	you	on	these	drugs,	what-,	how	come	you	are	not	getting	them?’	And	that	used	to	really	anger	me	that	you	had	[to]	defend	yourself	to	people	who	had	no	understanding	of	what	you	were	going	through.	[I1:287-90]	This	discussion	of	others	brought	in	a	new	way	Mary	accounted	for	her	chronic	pain	experience:	that	of	being	disbelieved	by	others.	This	narrative	departed	from	strength	arising	from	overcoming	suffering	that	characterised	the	first	intermediate	narrative,	and	instead	concerned	ongoing	victimisation.	Mary	described	how	people	suspected	her	of	faking	or	exaggerating	illness	for	personal	gain,	and	she	feared	being	disbelieved	when	interacting	with	others.	She	identified	two	motives	others	suspected	her	of.	First,	that	she	was	“putting	it	on”51	to	gain	“sick	money”52	and	other	associated	benefits	such	as	funding	for	a	mobility	car.	She	felt	that	there	was	a	society-wide	view	of	‘looking	down’	on	people	receiving	welfare	benefits	“as	if	everybody	who	is	on	benefit	is	some	sort	of	scrounger	who’s	lazy”53.	This	expressed	itself	even	with	friends	and	family.	Thus,	she	noted	one	friend	who	
is	very	much	against	anyone	who	gets	anything.	She	doesn’t	even	know	my	car’s	a	mobility	car.	I	wouldn’t	dare	tell	her	because	straightaway	–	‘why	have	you	got	a-,	you	can	walk,	you’re	not-’,	she	will	be	straightaway	like	that	[…].	[I4:234-8]	She	also	talked	about	people	suspecting	her	of	exaggerating	her	illness	in	order	to	gain	“attention”54.	These	people	talk	about	Mary	as	a	“drama	queen”55,	something	that	she	found	“really,	really,	really	hurtful”56.	Mary	said	that	the	stress	of	being	judged	by	others	would	then	frequently	create	flare-ups	of	RA	severe	enough	to	require	hospitalisation.	Mary	felt	that	these	judgements	about	her	genuineness	stemmed	from	a	lack	of	understanding	of	her	situation.	This	was	in	part	because	of	a	societal	tendency	to	misinterpret	disability	and	suffering,	expressed	in	the	injustices	of	the	welfare	system	that	(she	felt)	did	not	attribute	welfare	according	to	real	need,	but	also	because	she	thought	her	experience	of	the	physical	sensation	of	pain	was	beyond	the	apprehension	of	others	(“even	though	[others]	might	say	they	do	[,…]	I	don’t	think	they	could	fully	understand	it	because,	you	know,	it	is	quite	unbearable	pain	when	you	get	it”57).			
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(2)	REACTIONS	TO	DISBELIEF	Mary	reacted	to	this	disbelief	in	two	ways.	First,	she	felt	“ashamed”58	and	“embarrassed”59.	This	sense	of	shame	applied	particularly	to	her	being	on	welfare	benefits:	“I	always	feel	really	ashamed	that	I’m	on	benefit.	[…T]hat	really,	really	does	bother	me”60.	Referring	to	a	sort	of	interpellation	by	a	suspicious	societal	gaze,	Mary	discussed	“how	people	perceive	unemployment	and	benefits”61	comes	to	define	her	identity:	
You	see	all	these	headlines,	don’t	you?	‘Benefit	scroungers’,	‘benefit	scum’.	And	they	just	think	everybody-,	do	you	know	what	I	mean?	And	that	really	gets	to	me.	I	think	god,	well	is	that	me?	Am	I	benefit	scum	[…]?	[I3:130-2]	Here	she	becomes	“just	one	of	the	masses	and	you,	I	think,	you	lose	your	self-respect	and	your	dignity”62.	However,	the	fact	that	Mary	explained	being	ashamed	from	the	perspective	of	a	societal	interpolation	that	fundamentally	misunderstands	her	experience	(showing	she	has	an	awareness	of	it)	suggests	a	rejection	of	this	position.	Indeed,	she	was	quick	to	identify	the	media	as	promoting	an	overly-harsh	and	distorted	view	of	people	who	receive	welfare	benefits,	and	she	criticised	a	tendency	to	misunderstand	the	situation	of	those	with	illness	or	disability.	Instead	of	(or	in	addition	to)	being	ashamed	as	a	contemptible	exploiter	of	valuable	state	resources	or	as	a	‘drama	queen’,	Mary	positioned	herself	as	being	the	wrongfully-targeted	victim	of	these	accusations.	And	in	response	to	this	victimisation	Mary	attempted	to	defend	herself	against	the	negative	judgements,	which	is	the	second	reaction	to	disbelieving	judgements	identified	in	this	intermediate	narrative.	The	predominant	form	of	defence	against	those	who	disbelieved	her	involved	protesting	with	an	alternative	account,	such	as	against	the	accusation	of	her	being	a	‘drama	queen’	(“it’s	not	a	drama.	It’s	an	illness	that	you	have	no	control	over”63).	Even	when	describing	details	of	her	illness	to	me	Mary	seemed	to	feel	a	need	to	add	qualifications,	as	if	she	were	pre-empting	disbelief:	
You	can	have	one	day	where	you’re	feeling	really	well	and	your	joints	are	good	and	you	can	move	about	quite	well,	and	then	the	next	day	yo-	you	can’t	even	get	out	of	bed.	And	that’s	just	something	that	happens	and	that,	and	I	don’t	think	people	believe	that	is	possible,	but	it	is	possible.	It	does	happen.	[I2:42-5]	Moreover,	when	discussing	how	her	legs	“start	to	stiffen	up”64	she	immediately	added:	“so	I	really	do	need	a	car”65,	the	really	do	being	a	defensive	move	against	a	threatening	manifest	absence	where	she	really	doesn’t.	Mary’s	defence	was	not	simply	about	refuting	disbelieving	attitudes	about	her	own	specific	circumstances,	but	was	grouped	as	part	of	a	defence	of	a	wider	group	of	people	receiving	welfare	benefits.	This	involved	criticising	the	suspicion	levelled	at	the	authenticity	of	benefit	receivers’	illness	or	disability.	Addressing	a	generic	accuser	she	said:	“I	think,	well,	you	don’t	
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know	the	circumstances.	[The	accused]	might	have	something	wrong	with	them	that	you	can’t	even	see	like	heart	problems	and	they	can’t	breathe”66.	This	defence	extended	to	welfare	benefit	receivers	more	generally	(not	just	those	with	illness	or	disability),	with	Mary	suggesting	that	accusers	had	overestimated	the	potential	gain	to	be	had,	being	seduced	instead	by	empty	rhetoric	(“I	don’t	understand	how	people	think	living	on	benefits	is	blissful	and	you	get	everything,	because	a	lot	of	it	is-,	it’s	just	talk,	isn’t	it?”67).	Much	of	Mary’s	interviews	involved	a	vehement	defence	of	the	victims	of	injustice,	conjuring	passionate	moral	outrage	to	defend	the	victim	and	right	the	injustice.	Whilst	the	original	injustice	we	discussed	concerned	the	disbelief	others	had	towards	those	receiving	illness	or	disability	benefits,	and	for	those	on	welfare	more	generally,	this	quickly	extended	to	a	diverse	range	of	situations.	Thus,	Mary	expressed	the	same	kind	of	outrage	in	discussing	those	in	poverty	forced	by	economic	circumstances	to	participate	in	experimental	trials	of	drugs68,	historic	medical	experimentation	on	soldiers69,	the	treatment	of	Hiroshima	atomic	bomb	survivors	as	guinea	pigs	rather	than	as	people	to	be	helped70,	the	treatment	of	Syrian	refugees	entering	Europe	(“as	if	they	were	cattle	in	a	field”71),	the	“atrocities”72	of	the	Syrian	civil	war	and	lack	of	access	to	medical	treatment	for	casualties	(“I	just	think	it’s	appalling”73),	and	the	relatively	recent	case	of	a	Royal	Marine	controversially	convicted	of	unlawfully	killing	an	enemy	combatant	in	Afghanistan74	(“I’m	incensed	at	what	they’ve	done	to	someone	who	is	fighting	for	his	country”75).	Her	moral	outrage	against	injustice	also	took	the	form	of	political	affinity,	with	her	identifying	as	a	member	of	the	working	class	fighting	against	the	economic	and	social	injustices	of	British	society,	an	identity	prompting	much	discussion	as	it	resonated	with	my	own	background.	She	said	“I	hate	to	see	injustice	of	any	kind”.76	I	argue	that	Mary’s	defence	was	enhanced	because	she	was	presented	as	a	morally	praiseworthy	victim	who	is	entitled	to	the	righting	of	injustice.a	In	particular,	the	story	she	presented	of	her	experience	of	welfare	was	strongly	contrasted	with	the	societal	suspicion	of	benefit	recipients	as	people	seeking	a	comfortable	lifestyle	but	being	too	lazy	to	work	for	it.	Thus,	in	contrast	to	a	comfortable	lifestyle	Mary	talked	about	how	her	family	had	experienced	significant	economic	hardship	(“we’ve	been	there	where	we	haven’t	had	a	penny.	Where	we’ve	put	our	hands	down	the	settee	[…to]	see	if	there’s	any	money	slipped	down,	and	I	haven’t	had	the	money	for	a	loaf	of	bread”77).	In	contrast	to	being	lazy,	Mary	talked	about	how	her	husband	had	wanted	to	work	but	was	the	victim	of	multiple	redundancies	and	had	even	took	a	difficult	job	as	a	cleaner	in	a	hospital	that	was	both	unsanitary	(“he	had	to	clean	poo	off	of	the	floor”78)	and	dangerous	to	his	health	(“after	about																																									 																					
a	I	hear	treat	Mary’s	rhetorical	practices	through	the	guise	of	perspectivalism,	where	the	truth	of	Mary’s	account	becomes	partialised	to	the	specific	moral	demands	of	the	interview	encounter.	Note	that	as	this	is	Mary’s	first	movement,	the	promise	of	(perspectival)	epistemology	remains.	
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8	years	the	chemicals	he	was	putting	in	the	machine	[…]	to	clean	the	carpets	affected	his	chest	and	lungs”79)	for	minimal	pay	(“if	he	was	a	scrounger	why	would	he	be	doing	a	job	like	that	for	a	hundred	pound	a	week?”80).	Indeed,	she	said:	
[…]	I	would	be	glad	if	I’d	never,	ever	had	to	be	on	benefits	if	I	was	healthy	enough	to	work	all	my	life	and	[husband]	could	work	all	his	life	without	being	made	redundant.	I	think	then	you’re	really	blessed	if	that	happens	to	you.	[I4:253-8]	Whilst	a	suspicious	societal	attitude	might	expect	a	potential	benefit	recipient	to	be	very	active	in	trying	to	make	welfare	claims,	Mary,	in	contrast,	is	someone	who	was	not	cognisant	about	making	such	claims,	and	only	made	them	once	medical	staff	had	prompted	her	to	do	so:	
I	wasn’t	even	claiming	what	I	was	entitled	to	until	I	went	in	hospital	and	they	were	saying	‘are	you	getting	this?	Are	you	getting	that?’	I	said	‘no’,	and	they	said	‘oh	well,	you	should-,	you	need	to	be	claiming	this,	that,	and	the	other’.	[I4:79-84]	Similarly,	it	was	“my	rheumatologist	[who]	said	‘you	really	need	to	put	in	for	[an	allowance]	for	[…]	a	[mobility]	car’	”81.		Whilst	the	‘scrounger’	would	choose	to	invent	ill	health	in	order	to	exploit	benefits,	Mary	would	(by	contrast)	much	prefer	to	give	up	benefits	if	she	could	avoid	illness:	“I	always	think	I	would	much	rather	be	healthy	and	not	in	pain	and	they	could	have	the	benefit	back	and	they	could	have	the	car	back”82.	Where	she	had	received	any	form	of	help	she	expressed	gratitude,	noting	that	she	is	“more	than	well	looked	after”83	by	the	NHS.	More	than	this,	however,	she	gratefully	‘gives	back’	through	assisting	as	a	patient-volunteer	in	the	training	of	student	doctors:	“I’m	more	than	glad	to	do	it	to	help	because	of	all	the	help	I	get”84.		Finally,	Mary’s	exposition	as	venerable	victim	is	completed	through	deflecting	societal	suspicion	onto	the	‘real’	scroungers	who	give	others	a	bad	name:	“there	is	like	that	5%,	the	ones	who	go	in	the	paper	bragging	‘why	should	I	work,	I	have	no	intention’.	That	lot	just	make	it	bad	for	everybody	else”85.	Mary	even	joins	in	with	the	castigation	of	this	5%	for	not-working-without-good-reason,	singling	out	one	neighbour	of	her	father	who	has	“never,	ever	worked.	And	he	doesn’t	want	to	work”86	and	yet	who	had	the	audacity	(from	Mary’s	perspective)	to	complain	that	an	inexpensive	and	simple	repair	job	to	his	rented	property	(fitting	a	60p	clip	to	a	drain	pipe)	had	not	been	completed	speedily	enough	by	his	landlord.	In	being	positioned	as	such	a	contrast	to	the	intended	villains	of	societal	suspicion,	Mary	simultaneously	serves	to	both	discredit	the	disbelief	about	her	as	well	as	emphasise	just	how	wronged	she	is	to	receive	such	disbelieving	attitudes.	It	emphasises	how	much	of	a	victim	of	injustice	she	is	and	justifies	the	moral	outrage	she	harnesses	in	response	to	injustice.	However,	whilst	this	moral	outrage	takes	the	form	of	a	protest	expressed	to	others	
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against	the	injustice,	it	seemed	very	limited	in	its	ability	to	right	wrongs.	Indeed,	this	moral	outrage	does	not	capture	the	same	sense	of	belief	in	her	ability	to	act	that	epitomised	the	first	intermediate	narrative.	Instead,	it	only	emphasises	how	she	(and	the	wider	world)	continues	to	be	victimised,	where	there	is	a	sense	of	anxiety	about	the	state	of	things,	where	injustices	persist	at	every	turn:	“I	think	the	world	we	live	in	is	appalling,	Leigh,	I	really	do.	I	think	it’s	getting	worse	and	worse	and	worse.	And	I	really	worry	for	the	future	of,	of	mankind”87.	This	is	the	precise	opposite	of	the	spirit	of	the	first	intermediate	narrative.	To	protest	an	alternative	account	was	not	the	only	defence	against	disbelieving	attitudes,	however.	A	second	form	of	defence	accepts	that	she	is	unable	to	change	the	opinion	of	others	(but	still	thinks	they	are	wrong),	and	seeks	to	limit	the	information	with	which	they	could	use	to	make	a	judgement	of	disbelief.	This	specifically	concerned	welfare	benefits,	with	her	noting	that:	“I	don’t	advertise	the	fact	that	I’m	on	it”88.	Even	when	explicitly	asked	by	others	about	welfare	she	said	she	simply	denies	receiving	it	if	it	is	not	important	for	them	to	know	(“I	just	say	‘no’.	I	just	think	well,	it’s	nobody’s	business”89).	A	third	form	of	defence	similarly	accepts	that	she	is	unable	to	change	others’	opinions,	but	here	she	chooses	to	simply	ignore	negative	judgements.	This	often	means	cutting	links	with	others,	reconciling	herself	to	close	family	and	friends	who	she	feels	trust	her:	
There’s	people	in	my	life	who	are	important	to	me,	who	I’m	close	to,	who	matter	to	me.	And,	I’ll	just,	you	know,	stick	with	them.	I	haven’t	got	the	energy	every	time	for	people	who	think	you’re	some	sort	of,	you	know.	[I1:327-9]	This	third	strategy	comes	closest	to	connecting	the	second	intermediate	narrative	with	the	first	because	here	we	get	a	sense	of	Mary	having	learned	to	‘let	go’	of	the	worrying	associated	with	the	negative	judgements	of	others.	Indeed,	talking	specifically	about	being	disbelieved	by	others	she	said:	
[…]	I	don’t	let	it	[bother	me].	I	don’t	dwell	on	it	much	now	because	it	doesn’t	do	you	any	good.	You	just	upset	yourself	and	make	yourself-,	so	I	just	don’t	dwell	on	it	anymore,	you	know,	now.	Or	I’m	not	aware	that	I	do.	[I2:277-9]	I	suggest	such	statements	constitute	moments	of	coordination	between	the	two	narratives.	However,	this	third	strategy	seemed	to	swim	against	the	tide	of	protestation	suggesting	she	does	dwell	on	the	injustice	of	others’	disbelief.	However,	throughout	the	interviews	my	efforts	to	understand	the	claims	made	in	both	narratives	prompted	questions	that	served	to	coordinate	them	further.	The	resulting	coordination	of	a	narrative	of	overcoming	anxiety	(she	will	act	where	she	can,	and	accept	where	she	can’t)	with	a	narrative	of	a	persistent	state	of	anxiety	(of	moral	outrage	at	injustice)	resulted	in	the	transformation	of	both	into	something	different,	as	the	next	section	discusses.	
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COORDINATING	A	NEW	NARRATIVE	
The	first	intermediate	narrative	made	a	statement	about	who	Mary	was:	that	she	had	overcome	anxiety	through	action	and	acceptance.	The	second	intermediate	narrative	made	an	opposite	statement:	that	Mary	persists	as	a	victim	to	the	world,	and	that	her	only	response	is	anxiety	about	it	accompanied	with	an	impotent	moral	outrage.	As	Mary	noted	when	this	contrast	was	put	to	hera:	“it’s	a	contradiction	isn’t	it?”90	We	explored	this	contradiction	over	the	interviews,	and	changes	to	the	nature	of	the	narratives	developed	as	we	began	to	coordinate	towards	a	single	narrative	that	merged	the	two	intermediates	together.	The	discussion	of	this	is	split	into	two	sections:	(1)	an	initial	maintenance	of	distribution	followed	by	rejection	of	each	intermediate	narrative	in	turn,	and	(2)	their	transformation	into	a	single	coordinated	narrative.	(1)	DISTRIBUTION	AND	REJECTION	One	response	Mary	had	to	the	contradiction	was	that	she	does	not	actually	have	an	‘answer’	to	explain	it.	She	argued	that	the	contradiction	isn’t	something	that	she	has	thought	about	before,	and	therefore	she	doesn’t	have	a	way	of	coordinating	between	the	two	intermediate	narratives:	
[…]	it’s	something	that	I,	I’ve	never	even	ever	thought	about	‘till	you,	‘till	you’ve	mentioned	it.	It’s	not	something	that	even	enters	my	head,	ever.	Until	you	mentioned	it.	And	I	haven’t	really	got	an	answer	because	I,	I	don’t	know	the	answer	[as	to]	why	I’m	like	that.	I	don’t	know.	(Pause)	You	know,	I	wish	I	did.	[I3:319-27]	Indeed,	Mary	suggested	that	identifying	the	contradiction	is	symptomatic	of	thinking	“about	the	deeper	things”91,	something	she	said	she	does	not	do	as	a	matter	of	course.	She	positioned	herself	as	being	only	concerned	about	‘simple	pleasures’	as	opposed	to	the	complexities	of	self-reflection:	
[…]	so	even	the	most	simplest	[sic]	pleasures	in	life	really	make	me	happy.	Going	in	the	garden	and	dead-heading	the	flowers	and,	and	my	little	dog	sitting	up	to	me,	next	to	me	for	a	cuddle,	and	my	grandchildren	coming	for	their	tea	after	school	and	chatting	to	them.	And	all	things	like	that	just	make	me	really	happy,	and	I	don’t	really	think	about	the	deeper	things.	[I3:962-9]	In	this	way	Mary	maintains	distribution	between	the	two	intermediate	narratives	through	banishing	coordinating	statements	to	a	realm	of	complexity	that	goes	against	the	way	she	lives	her	life	and	which	can	therefore	be	absented.	This	response	wasn’t	the	end	of	the	story,	however.	For	a	start,	whilst	Mary	seemed	to	consider	such	‘deeper’	thinking	as	foreign,	she																																									 																					
a	I	talked	about	how	(on	the	one	hand)	she	can	claim	to	be	able	to	not	let	things	make	her	anxious,	yet	(on	the	other	hand)	worry	so	much	about	what	other	people	thought	about	her	(see	I3:20-30).	
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also	saw	value	in	pursuing	it.	She	appeared	enthusiastic	about	my	coordinating	questioning	and	commented	in	this	regard	that	“I	just	don’t	think	about	things	enough”92.	Moreover,	an	adequate	empirical	accounting	(epistemological	or	fractional)	means	exploring	controversies	when	they	arise,	and	I	thus	persisted	with	the	coordinating	questions.	When	faced	with	this	controversy,	one	coordinating	response	from	Mary	was	to	reject	one	narrative	in	favour	of	the	other.	Thus,	she	began	to	question	whether	she	actually	had	the	confidence	the	first	intermediate	narrative	suggested	(“now	I’m	starting	to	think	that	I’m	not	confident	at	all	like	I	thought	I	was”93).	Alternately,	she	dismissed	the	anxiety	associated	with	disbelieving	judgements	through	asserting	that	she	does	not	allow	them	to	affect	her	like	she	did	in	the	past.	Indeed,	she	said	she	does	not	“dwell	on	[disbelieving	judgements]	anymore”94	(to	re-use	a	quote	from	earlier),	before	then	reasserting	how	her	discussions	with	me	had	made	her	realise	how	confident	she	actually	is	(“I	wasn’t	aware	until	then	that	yeah,	I	am	more,	more,	like,	confident,	now”95).	(2)	TRANSFORMATION	INTO	A	COORDINATED	NARRATIVE	Maintenance	of	distribution	through	rejecting	coordinating	statements	as	foreign,	or	through	rejecting	one	intermediate	narrative	in	favour	of	the	other,	gave	way	to	a	shifting	of	the	nature	of	each	narrative	so	as	to	enable	their	competing	claims	of	confidence	and	anxiety	to	be	partitioned	within	a	single	coordinated	narrative.	The	partition	enabled	the	core	claims	of	confidence	and	anxiety	to	remain,	but	pared	back	to	non-overlapping	domains	so	that	there	is	no	longer	a	contradiction.	The	partition	involves	identifying	victimisation	as	an	error	of	thinking.	In	doing	so,	Mary	drew	upon	several	stories	from	her	past	to	highlight	such	errors.	Many	of	these	involved	reappraising	the	moral	outrage	she	felt	at	higher-class	individuals	for	their	apparent	victimisation	of	the	working	class.	One	such	story	went	as	follows:	
[…]	when	I	was	younger	we	were	‘working	class’	and	anyone	who	was	rich	was	(pause)	a	‘snob’.	You	didn’t	even	know	anything	about	them,	but	‘oh	they	must	be	stuck	up.	They’re	snobs.	They’re	rich,	they’re	that’.	That	was	our	attitude.	We	were	brought	up	with	it	because	we	were,	like,	poor.	We	were	working	class.	And	it	was	only	when	[name],	my	friend,	we	went	to	London	that	time,	and	I	told	you	all	the	little	kids	[were]	in	their	uniforms	from	the	private	school	and	I	was	going	(gasping)	‘look	at	them,	the	stuck	up	little	buggers!’	And	they	were	only	little	kids,	the	poor	little	things!	And	she	went	‘Mary,	they	can’t	help	being	born	into	a	wealthy	family	or	a	rich	family	or,	you	know,	you’re	born	into	the	family	you’re	born	into.	It’s	nothing	to	do	with	them’.	And	that	always	struck	me.	It	really	struck	it	home	to	me	about,	you	know,	the	working	class	snobbery.	[I3:328-43]	In	so	identifying	the	thinking	that	establishes	victim	and	abuser	as	flawed,	the	anxiety	associated	with	victimisation	is	removed.	In	this	particular	example,	she	inverses	the	victim-
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abuser	relationship	such	that	the	working	class	snobbery	becomes	“as	strong	as,	if	not	stronger	than,	the	other”96.	Upon	my	invitation,	Mary	began	to	invert	other	victim-abuser	situations	(“sometimes	when	people	bully	it	is	because	[…]	they’re	getting	bullied”97),	including	her	victimisation	through	others’	disbelieving	judgements	(“she	was	probably	bullying	me	because	she	had	no	self-esteem”98).	In	this	way	the	universalising	confidence	of	the	first	intermediate	narrative	becomes	transformed	into	a	logically	idealised	outcome	of	the	elimination	of	flawed	thinking.	Meanwhile,	the	anxiety	of	moral	outrage	associated	with	the	many	injustices	of	the	world	(such	as	disbelief	of	her	illness)	becomes	transformed	into	an	illogical	temporary	present	that	promises	to	be	weeded	out	with	the	careful	application	of	logical	thinking.	For	the	first	intermediate	narrative	this	involved	restricting	confidence	to	the	medical	domain	only:	
It	might	be	that	I’m	confident	more,	like,	over	medical	things	with	myself.	[…]	I	don’t	worry	any	more	about	medical	things	or	going	in	hospital	or	procedures.	And	I	think,	so	I	think	I’ve	got	confident	that,	that	way.	But	I’m	maybe	not	as	confident	in	other	things.	I	might	think	I	am	but	then	when	you	look	into	it,	maybe	I’m	not.	Maybe	I’m	not.	[I3:147-56]	Indeed,	in	the	subsequent	interview	she	said	“definitely	on	the	medical	side	I’m	more	confident,	but	[not	on	being	disbelieved	by	others]	because	of	the	stigma	attached	to	being	on	benefits”99.	Cast	into	the	illogic	of	flawed	thinking	that	threatens	to	be	eliminated	entirely,	the	continued	persistence	of	the	anxiety	of	victimisation	is	explained	through	constituting	it	as	an	ingrained	habit	from	childhood.	This	habit-formation	involved	learning	to	feel	inferior,	and	applied	particularly	with	regard	to	family	wealth.	She	said	“there	were	loads	of	people	I	thought	were	posh,	and	I	did	used	to	think	they	were	better	than	me	because	it	was	just	my,	my	concept	of	things”100.	This	inferiority	was	expressed	even	in	the	places	she	later	chose	to	shop,	with	her	having	felt	that	“people	who	shop	at	Marks	&	Spencer’s	were	like	a	better	class	of	people,	so	I	should	[shop]	in	Woolworths101”.	She	was,	instead,	a	“Woolworths	person”102.	Perhaps	more	important	for	her	sense	of	inferiority,	however,	was	educational	attainment.	Having	left	school	without	any	qualifications,	she	said	“I	would	feel	inadequate”103	when	talking	with	anyone	who	had	higher	levels	of	education.	She	even	noted	being	“a	little	bit	intimidated”104	by	me	because	of	assumptions	about	my	educational	level.	For	Mary,	being	educated	means	“not	only	can	you	[…]	get	a	good	job,	but	I,	I	think	it’s	more	to	do	with	that	you	can	mix	with	people	and	not	feel	inferior	because	you,	you’re,	like,	on	the	same	level	as	them”105.	Mary	identified	several	instances	where	she	was	made	to	feel	insecure,	including	being	repeatedly	humiliated	at	school	by	a	maths	teacher.	This	involved	being	made	to	stand	at	
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the	blackboard	for	the	whole	lesson	and	him	“hitting	me	on	the	head”106	with	a	wooden	blackboard	eraser	when	she	could	not	solve	a	problem,	a	memory	that	“even	now	[…]	really	upsets	me	just	thinking	about	it”107.	Throughout	such	stories	the	familiar	moral	outrage	at	the	injustice	wrought	upon	the	pitiable	victim	is	in	the	air,	and	one	might	argue	that	through	moral	outrage	the	anxiety	of	victimisation	is	partitioned	into	an	emotional	(versus	rational)	habit.	The	attempt	to	right	the	injustice	she	experienced	in	her	maths	lessons	was	evident	in	the	approach	she	took	with	her	son:	
That’s	why	I	used	to	always	say	to	[son]	when	he	was	at	school,	you	know,	‘if	you	can’t	do	it	you	just	can’t	do	it.	Don’t	let	them	bully	you	[…]	and	if	anyone	says	anything	to	upset	you,	[or]	the	teacher	tries	to	put	you	down,	just,	you	know,	come	back	and	tell	me	what	they’ve	said’.	[I3:893-6]	Despite	school	serving	as	a	source	of	insecurity,	Mary	felt	the	relationship	with	her	mother	was	more	significant.	Mary	noted:	
[…]	I	didn’t	have	a	very	good	childhood	because	my	mother	was	one	of	these	people	who	was	always	taking	overdoses,	and	writing	her	obituaries	and	saying	you	have	to	put	this	in	the	paper	tomorrow.	All	things	like	that.	So	I	was	always	very	insecure	as	a	child.	[I3:836-40]	Mary	felt	the	kind	of	insecurity	associated	with	her	mother’s	negligent	parenting	“affects	other	parts	of	your	life”108,	including	the	anxiety	she	experienced	into	adulthood.	In	general,	when	reflecting	on	the	anxiety	she	has	experienced	she	said	“I	think	all	of	that	stems	from	the	insecurity	as	a	child	and	[…]	experiences	that	happened”109.	Thus,	it	is	suggested	that	confidence	and	anxiety	are	coordinated	into	a	single	narrative	through	being	partitioned	into	dualisms	that	position	anxiety	as	an	illogical,	emotional,	habitual	entity	that	has	dominated	her	past,	versus	a	logical,	rational,	reflexive	confidence	that	she	hopes	for	her	future.	
SECOND	MOVEMENT:	LOVE	AND	HATE	
MOTHER	AS	ABUSER	
Because	of	the	apparent	significance	of	Mary’s	relationship	with	her	mother	as	a	reason	for	the	persistence	of	the	(irrational)	victimisation	model,	the	possibility	of	better	understanding	this	model	through	understanding	this	relationship	(and	thus	of	better	fleshing-out	a	first	movement	narrative)	prompted	my	exploration	of	it.		Mary	talked	about	her	mother	as	having	engaged	in	selfish	behaviour	that	resulted	in	the	hurt	and	neglect	of	those	around	her,	which	led	Mary	to	feel	outrage:	“My	mother	was	all	about	herself.	And	for	years	I	was	very	angry	about	it	and	it	used	to	affect	me"110.	Her	
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mother’s	behaviour	involved	a	significant	moral	transgression	for	Mary.	Indeed,	Mary	noted	that	her	mother	“just	has	no	morals	and	she	doesn’t	care	who	gets	hurt	in	the	process”111.	In	particular,	Mary	described	how	her	mother	was	very	promiscuous,	having	affairs	whilst	she	was	married,	and	with	married	men.	Indeed,	“she	wanted	to	go	off	with	men	all	the	time.	She	went	off	with	her	best	friend’s	husband	and	another	friend’s	husband	and	another	friend’s	husband.	She	was	just	always	going	off	with	men”112.	Mary’s	dad	(one	of	four	husbands),	described	by	Mary	as	“a	good	husband	to	her”113,	was	positioned	as	a	victim	to	Mary’s	mother	as	she	selfishly	indulged	her	carnal	desires.	Other	victims	included	those	of	the	marriages	she	broke	up,	but	the	most	significant	victims	for	evoking	moral	outrage	for	Mary	were	the	children	her	mother	neglected	through	her	selfish	pursuit	of	men.	Thus,	Mary	described	one	incident	where	her	mother	(who	had	by	this	time	divorced	her	father)	had	met	a	man:	
She’d	invited	him	for	tea	and	she	had	all	this	food,	and	[…]	I	said	‘where’s	all	this	food	from?’	‘Oh	well,	he’s	come	for	his	tea’.	I	said	‘well,	how	come	we	can’t	live	like	this	normally?’	She	went	‘well	I	haven’t	got	any	mon-’.	I	said	‘well,	if	you	charged	them	we’d	have	loads	of	money.	We’d	be	living	like	bloody	lords	the	amount	of	men	you	have!’	[I4:1120-4]	Said	with	anger,	this	story	not	only	serves	to	position	her	mother	as	morally	contemptible	because	of	neglect	of	her	children	(that	she	only	provides	good	meals	for	men	she	had	met),	but	in	Mary’s	sarcastic	suggestion	that	her	mother	is	akin	to	a	prostitute	without	any	of	the	monetary	benefits	places	her	mother	as	more	disgraceful	than	one	of	the	most	morally	unacceptable	figures	in	Western	civilisation.a	At	least	the	prostitute	might	be	absolved	of	their	immoral	actions	because	of	the	need	to	feed	a	starving	family.b	Her	mother	is	given	no	such	excuse.	Indeed,	Mary’s	sarcastic	suggestion	that	she	accept	money	from	her	liaisons	with	men	suggests	that	being	a	prostitute	would	not	actually	be	morally	damaging	to	her	mother’s	character,	such	is	the	depth	of	depravity	already	achieved	by	her	promiscuity.	Beyond	promiscuity,	her	prioritising	of	relationships	with	men	meant	that	she	“married	this	man	who	didn’t	like	the	kids	and	was	quite	cruel”114.	Neglect	of	her	children	came	in	other	forms.	Thus,	after	one	of	Mary’s	sisters	chose	to	go	and	live	with	her	father,	her	mother	reacted	in	anger	by	“burn[ing…]	all	her	clothes	and	toys	out	of	spite”115.	Mary	also	noted	how	her	mother	would	treat	herself	but	not	her	children:	
Like	if	the	ice	cream	van	came	round:	‘I	can’t	get	any	of	you	[children	an]	ice	cream	because	there’s	too	many	of	you’.	There	was																																									 																					
a	Thus,	Benoit,	Jansson,	Smith	and	Flagg	(2018)	note	that	sex	workers	are	associated	with	“disparaging	discourses”	associated	with	“disrespect”	and	“devaluation”	that	are	“entrench[ed…]	in	public	discourse	and	knowledge”	(p.	460).	b	Benoit	et	al.	(2018)	note	accounts	that	position	sex	workers	as	“victims	of	others’	wrongdoings”	rather	than	“agents	of	their	own	fate”	(p.	458).	For	a	popular	cultural	example,	see	William	Hogarth’s	(1732/2016)	A	Harlot’s	Progress.	
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five	of	us	then,	so	we’d	all	get	a	two-penny	packet	of	nuts	and	she’d	have	a	big	Mr	Whippy	with	the	flake	in	and	two	bars	of	chocolate	to	go	with	it.	[…]	She	was	just	that	type.	Very,	very	selfish.	[I4:564-8]	Indeed,	Mary	noted	that	as	a	parent	“you	would	give	your	life	to	save	your	child.	[…]	It’s	just	what	you	would	do”116.	Yet	Mary	felt	“my	mother	wouldn’t.	She	would	save	herself”117.	Mary	also	talked	about	how	her	mother	gained	custody	of	her	children	after	her	divorce	from	Mary’s	father	for	the	sole	purpose	of	being	able	to	live	in	the	marital	house	(which	her	mother	had	moved	out	of),	a	callous	lack	of	love	contrasted	with	the	love	Mary	had	for	her	siblings:	
And	I	loved	our	[brother]	and	[little	sister]	[…].	But	she	only	took	them	because	she	wanted	the	house	back	that	my	dad	lived	in	that	was	our,	like,	[family]	house.	And	she	knew	that	if	she	got	off	on	her	own,	she	wouldn’t	get	the	house	back.	[I5:520-2]	However,	whilst	living	in	another	house	with	her	mother	in	the	interim,	Mary’s	older	brother	decided	to	move	back	with	his	father,	who	was	then	granted	the	right	to	live	there	on	the	basis	of	needing	to	provide	for	a	child.	And	“when	she	didn’t	get	the	house	she	was	so	furious	that	she	got	my	dad	the	sack	from	his	job	where	he’d	been	for	about	[…]	twenty-odd	years”118.	This	involved	giving	information	to	the	police	to	incriminate	Mary’s	father.	Not	only	was	Mary	“really	disgusted	with	her”119	for	doing	this	but	even	the	police	officers,	with	their	duty	to	report	crime,	were	reluctant	to	take	the	information	because	of	the	spitefulness	involved:	
[…]	the	police	came,	the	detectives,	and	they	said	to	her	‘do	you	know	what	you’re	doing?	This	man	will	lose	his	job.	He’ll	have	to	go	to	court	and	everything’.	He	went	‘is	that	what	you	want	to	do?’	And	she	went	‘yes,	it	is’.	And	I	wasn’t	there	at	the	time,	[but]	our	[sister]	was,	and	these	detectives	said	‘well	all	I	can	say	[is]	you’re	a-,	you’re	an	evil	woman.	You’re	very	evil’.	And	our	[sister]	said	she’s	never	forgot	what	they	said.	[I5:561-9]	Mary	also	described	how	her	mother	was	very	manipulative,	noting	that	she	“was	a	very	good	actress”120.	In	particular,	she	said	her	mother	would	seek	to	“get	sympathy”121	through	frequently	making	suicide	attempts	during	Mary’s	childhood.	Mary	felt	that	her	mother	(who	was	still	alive	at	the	time	of	our	interviews)	had	never	intended	to	kill	herself.	Even	when	her	mother	came	close	to	death	after	taking	an	overdose	of	tablets	(“they	said	she’d	got	the	last	rites	and	everything”122)	this	was	attributed	by	Mary	to	miscalculations	on	her	mother’s	part	in	executing	her	plan	to	get	sympathy.	Upset	that	Mary’s	older	sister	was	not	speaking	to	her	because	of	reporting	her	father	to	the	police,	Mary’s	mother	had	kept	“coming	down	all	day	[from	upstairs]	and	saying	‘I’m	just	going	to	take	a	few	more	tablets	and	then	I’ll	go	back	up	to	bed’	”123	in	an	apparent	bid	to	flag	a	suicide	attempt	and	gain	sympathy	from	her	daughter.	However,	both	Mary	and	her	sister	reacted	with	disdain	rather	than	sympathy	(“our	[sister]	said	‘well	go	on	then.	No-one’s	stopping	you’.	Because	she’d	had	enough	of	her	because	she’d	done	it	loads	of	times”124),	something	that	Mary	thinks	her	
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mother	did	not	anticipate.	As	a	result	“I	think	she	was	expecting	us	to	ring	an	ambulance	a	lot	earlier”125	than	they	did.	Despite	being	close	to	death,	and	in	hospital	for	a	week,	Mary	felt	that	this	“certainly	wasn’t	a	real	suicide	attempt.	It	was	all	for	attention”126.	Indeed,	apparently	reappraising	the	risk	involved	in	such	a	strategy	for	attention,	her	mother	“never,	ever	tried	to	do	it	again”127.	Mary	also	talked	about	how,	when	Mary	was	an	adult,	her	mother	sought	to	gain	sympathy	through	pretending	to	have	cancer:		
And	she	didn’t	have	cancer	at	all.	It	was	just	another	thing	she	made	up,	because	a	lot	of	[Mary’s	siblings	were	not	speaking	to	her…].	I	think	our	[brother]	had	fell	[sic]	out	with	her	as	well,	so	to	get	sympathy	again	she	started.	[I5:647-50]	Mary	noted	that	her	mother	engaged	in	similar	behaviour	whilst	Mary	was	a	child.	She	said	“once	I	saw	a	mole	on	her	stomach	and	I	asked	what	it	was	and	she	said	‘oh	its	cancer	and	when	that	grows	the	cancer	starts	to	eat	me	and	all	that’	”128,	something	Mary	felt	“you	wouldn’t	say	to	a	young	child”129.	Indeed,	Mary	said	that	her	mother’s	actions	created	a	great	deal	of	anxiety	in	her:		
I	worried	all	my	childhood	away.	I	worried	about,	you	know,	if	she	was	going	to	die,	her	and	my	dad	arguing	and,	and	her	going	off,	and	it	was	just	awful.	It’s	a	horrible,	horrible	way	to	grow	up.	[I4:948-52]	Our	discussion	positioned	Mary’s	mother	as	an	abuser	whose	selfish	immoral	behaviour	resulted	in	the	victimisation	of	those	around	her.	Mary	felt	that	for	this	she	should	be	held	morally	accountable	and	be	punished	for	her	actions.	But	this	had	not	happened:	“people	say	‘(tuts)	she’d	get	paid	back	in	the	end’,	but	[…]	she’s	just	swanned	off	and	had	the	life	of	riley”130.	This	was	an	ongoing	injustice	for	Mary.	As	an	adult	Mary	had	sought	to	hold	her	mother	to	account	for	her	neglectful	past	(“I	have	confronted	her	before.	I	used	to	say	things	all	the	time	to	her”131),	but	she	“talks	now	as	if	none	of	that’s	happened”132,	instead	describing	a	happy	and	positive	picture	of	Mary	and	her	siblings’	childhood.	Indeed,	Mary	said	“she	has	a	different	memory	to	the	rest	of	us”133	and	that	“she	has	like	that	false	memory	syndrome”134.	On	at	least	one	occasion,	however,	Mary’s	confrontation	about	her	neglectful	past	caused	her	mother	to	become	upset:	“she’d	just	start	crying	(putting	on	mock	
crying	voice)	‘oh,	I	can’t	believe	you’ve	said	that!’	”135.	Yet	Mary	felt	her	mother	had	“put	the	tears	on	and	[…]	it	was	all	an	act”136.	Indeed,	“it	was	all	an	act	with	her	always”137.	To	Mary	her	mother	could	never	be	a	victim,	with	allusions	to	it	being	a	crafty	plot	to	manipulate	others.	A	strict	division	between	victim	and	abuser	creating	anxiety	and	(impotent)	moral	outrage	that	might	be	regarded	as	persisting	as	an	emotional	pattern	into	adulthood,	this	thus	provided	an	interest	story	enhancing	our	understanding	of	the	first	movement	narrative.	
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THE	NECESSITY	OF	LOVE	
Yet	one	particular	example	of	her	mother	victimising	others	did	not	fit	this	pattern.	Mary	discussed	a	time	in	her	20s	when	her	mother,	then	divorced,	became	involved	in	a	relationship.	Her	new	partner	lived	in	Ireland,	but	was	staying	locally	(where	they	met)	for	2	years	whilst	working	on	a	maintenance	project.	The	man	was	married	with	10	children,	but	pursued	the	relationship	with	Mary’s	mother	on	the	condition	that	it	would	end	when	he	returned	to	Ireland:	
[…]	he	always	said	to	her	‘after	the	two	years	there’s	no	way	I	would	leave	my	wife.	She’s	a	Catholic	and	there’s	no	way	I	would	ever	leave	her.	And	so	we	can	have	a	relationship	but	it’s	only	going	to	be	while	I’m	here,	then	it’s	going	to	have	to	stop’.	[I4:1091-4]	Mary’s	mother	“went	along	with	that”138	condition	whilst	in	the	relationship,	but	when	“the	time	come	[sic]	for	him	to	leave,	and	he	did	leave,	she	must	have	thought	he	was	going	to	stay”139.	Her	mother	then	“wrote	to	his	wife	and	told	his	wife	all	about	them,	and	put	photos	in	of	her	and	[him]	together	and	said	‘I’ve	been	having	an	affair	with	your	husband	for	two	years’	and	all	this”140.	Mary	said	“it	was	a	horrible,	horrible	thing	to	do”141,	asking	“what	sort	of	woman	does	that?”142.	Here	her	mother’s	(ex-)partner	is	positioned	as	a	venerable	victim	(“he	was	a	lovely	man”143)	to	the	spiteful	immorality	of	her	mother,	the	abuser.	Yet	the	man	was	guilty	of	one	of	the	immoralities	Mary	was	so	outraged	at	her	mother	for	(having	affairs),	whilst	her	mother	was	actually	unmarried	at	the	time.	Moreover,	I	felt	sympathy	for	Mary’s	mother	because	it	seemed	that	“in	a	way	he	was	using	her”144	as	a	“substitute	wife”145	(both	quotes	are	my	words),	and	she	was	understandably	attached	to	him	after	two	years.	With	the	fact	that	the	man	had	established	a	clear	condition	of	temporariness	at	the	relationship	outset	seemingly	no	longer	sufficient	to	maintain	him	as	victim	and	her	mother	as	abuser,	Mary	sought	to	maintain	the	division	through	emphasising	his	probable	passivity	in	initiating	the	relationship	(“I	think	she’d	come	on	to	him.	He	never	ask[ed]	her	out.	She	made	a	play	for	him”146),	where	he	reluctantly	gave	in	to	her	pressure	(“I	think	she	pestered	him	that	much	to	be	honest”147).	Such	defensiveness	suggested	an	overcompensation	attempting	to	Other	into	absence	a	reality	where	her	mother	is	worthy	of	sympathy,	a	possible	boundary	to	the	first	movement	narrative	prompting	exploration	of	possible	realities	where	Mary’s	mother	might	be	a	victim	deserving	of	sympathy.	Such	slippages	of	sympathy	from	Mary	were	observed.	When	her	mother	attempted	to	establish	regular	contact	with	Mary’s	son	after	many	years	without	communication,	Mary	said	she	encouraged	this	because	“I	suppose	I	felt	a	bit	sorry	for	her”148.	This	was	a	sympathy	Mary	explained	away	through	appeals	to	a	generic	moral	code	caring	for	anybody	(“you	read	in	the	paper	about	people	who	say	[…]	I’m	not	allowed	to	see	my	grandchildren	any	more	and	I	just	think	it’s	an	awful	thing	to	do	to	somebody”149)	in	the	face	of	outrage	
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specifically	for	her	mother	(“you	don’t	deserve	[contact	with	grandchildren]	because	you	were	never	there	for	your	own	kids”150).	Yet	elsewhere	this	explaining-away	could	not	work	since	Mary’s	sympathy	was	very	specific	to	her	mother,	where	Mary	evoked	affection	for	the	mother	of	her	past:	
[…]	she	comes	here	and	she	sits	there	[…]	and	sometimes	I	feel	a	bit	sorry	for	her	because	she	got	run	over	[…]	a	few	years	ago	and,	like,	all	the	bounce	has	gone	out	of	her	life.	She	was	very,	very	fit	and	very	young	for	her	age.	She’s	83.	And	(coughs)	she	got	run	over	[…]	and	now	she’s	like	a	little	old	woman.	She	has	to	walk	with	a	stick.	She	has	a	mobility	scooter.	She	looks	about	90	whereas	she	always	looked	very	young,	you	know.	[I4:1063-72]	Of	course,	having	sympathy	(even	only	“a	bit”151)	risked	Mary’s	victimisation	to	her	mother’s	abusive	manipulations,	a	characterisation	of	her	mother	as	an	abuser	that	alongside	her	feelings	of	affection	provoked	indecision	about	whether	she	can	be	loved	or	must	be	hated:	
And	she	is	very	frail	but	(sighs)	(pause)	(sighs)	I	don’t	know	(whispering).	I	know	she	has	loads	of	friends	and	everyone	thinks	that	she’s	absolutely	marvellous.	But	she’s	a	good	actress,	do	you	know	what	I	mean?	[…]	It’s	like	I	don’t	quite	trust	her.	[I4:1072-4]	But	this	isn’t	a	decision	that	she	can	make.	Whilst	Mary	can’t	remove	her	mother	from	the	‘abuser’	category	and	give	her	the	sympathy	of	a	‘victim’,	she	can’t	help	but	do	it	at	the	same	
time:	
L:	So	you	want	to	feel	sorry	for	her	but	you	can’t	quite	believe,	[…	you]	can’t	quite	do	it.	M:	[…]	I	can’t	quite	do	it.	I	just	can’t	quite	get	there.	L:	But	you	want	to?	M:	I’m	not	even	s-,	I	don’t,	I	don’t…	L:	You	can’t	help	yourself	but	feel	sorry	for	her?	M:	I,	I,	it’s	like	I	can’t	help	it,	you	know.	I,	I	do	feel	some	sympathy	for	her.	[I4:1075-82]	These	are	not	simply	two	contradictory	but	separate	impulses	(such	as	emotion	versus	logic),	since	the	victimisation	causing	Mary’s	moral	outrage	depended	on	the	love	that	Mary	had	for	her	mother	as	a	child.	It	was	only	because	she	cared	so	much	for	her	mother	that	such	neglectful	behaviour	could	hurt	her:	
[…as	a	child]	a	few	weeks	before	Christmas	[…]	I	was	saying	to	[…]	my	mam,	you	know,	‘I’ve	got	you	a	lovely	present	for	Christmas’	and	she	went	‘show	me	it’.	And	I	went	‘but	it’s	for	Christmas’.	She	went	‘well,	just	unwrap	it	and	show	me	it	and	I	won’t	say	anything	to	anyone’.	I	couldn’t	wait	to	give	her	it,	I	was	so	excited	and	when	she	opened	it	she	went	‘(tutting	sound)	I	don’t	want	that.	That’s	rubbish.	Why	did	you	get	me	that?	Just	horrible,	cheap	rubbish’.	And	she	gave	me	it	back	and	I	remember	going	upstairs	and	sitting	on	that	bed	and	crying	[…].	[I5:57-63]	
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In	the	first	movement	narrative	Mary	located	the	love	for	her	mother	exclusively	to	childhood.	This	was	replaced	with	moral	outrage	when	Mary	came	to	understand	her	mother’s	neglectful	behaviour	(“I	did	love	her	when	I	was	a	kid	[…]	but	then	as	I	got	older	and	saw	the	things	she	did,	then	I	stopped”152).	But	Mary’s	defensiveness	and	her	fears	of	manipulation	suggested	she	maintained	the	affection	for	her	mother	that	were	necessary	for	the	hurt	to	occur.	Indeed,	the	temporal	break	between	love	and	hate	(distributing	them	into	temporal	singularities	without	overlap)	occurred	in	the	first	movement	narrative	when	Mary	came	to	realise	that	her	mother	‘actually’	didn’t	care	for	her.	And	yet	Mary	did	talk	about	instances	where	her	mother	expressed	care	for	her,	not	only	as	a	child,	but	also	in	the	present:	
L:	So	I’m	just	wondering	is	there	[…]	some	part	of	her	that	does	love	you	maybe?	[…]	M:	I	think	she	does.	[…]	Because	[…]	when	she	saw	me	all	them	years	ago,	I	was	ill	and	I	was	big	on	the	steroids	and	[…the]	last	time	she’d	seen	me	I	was	like	40,	fit,	you	know,	really	well,	and	then	suddenly	she	saw	me	and	I	was	like	somebody	older	than	her.	[…]	I	couldn’t	even	get	my	coat	on	and	things	like	that.	And	I	think	she	was	absolutely	shocked	when	she	saw	me.	[I4:671,675-86]	The	division	of	Mary’s	love	and	hate	into	temporal	singularities	(of	past	and	present)	begins	to	collapse	in	such	moments.	Nor	is	the	conflict	resolvable	through	partitioning	love	and	hate	into	spatial	singularities	of	emotional	versus	logical	impulses	(like	her	anxiety	and	confidence	in	the	first	movement	narrative)	Mary’s	hate	for	her	mother	is	shown	to	be	dependent	upon	the	love	she	has	for	her.	“It’s	an	emotion,	isn’t	it,	anger.	The	same	as	love.	So-,	but	I	could	never	say	to	her	that	I	love	her.	I	couldn’t	say	that”153.	Seamlessly	connected	but	impossible	to	one	another	at	the	same	time.	Hating	her	mother	isn’t	something	she	wants	for	herself	(“it’s	not	good	[…]	to	have	all	that	negativity.	[…]	You	can’t	carry	all	that	amount	of	anger	really	in	you”154).	Linking	back	to	the	first	movement	narrative,	Mary	presents	a	solution	of	‘letting	go’	of	her	anger	at	her	mother.	But	to	do	so	means	letting	go	of	both	hate	and	love,	of	breaking	the	entirety	of	the	emotional	bond	with	her	mother	that	is	the	mediator	between	love	and	hate,	of	developing	disinterest	(“if	she	gives	me	a	kiss	I	just	go	‘oh,	yeah’.	Whereas	before	I’d	have	went	‘oh!	Hay!	Don’t!’	”155).	But	Mary’s	anger	at	her	mother	was	pervasive	to	the	end	of	our	interviews,	an	anger	that	revealed	a	dependence	of	hate	on	the	presence	of	an	impossible	Other:	Mary’s	love	for	her.				
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TRANSITORY	VERSUS	OBDURATE	MEDIATORS	
Both	Mary’s	first	and	second	movement	involve	controversies	–	multiple	accounts	that	do	not	fit	together	yet	nevertheless	overlap.	In	the	first	movement	there	were	many	options	offered	to	resolve	the	controversy.	Each	option	could	quite	readily	be	regarded	as	a	possibility	for	resolution.	However,	in	the	second	movement	the	option	for	Mary	to	choose	hate	of	her	mother	over	love	was	presented	as	an	option	for	resolution	that	was	
impossible.	In	the	second	movement	Mary’s	attempt	to	choose	hate	over	love	became	unstuck	because	of	the	dependence	of	Mary’s	love	for	her	mother	in	hating	her.	Law	(2002)	termed	these	stubborn	mediators	“obdurate	interferences”	or	(alternatively)	“obdurate	incoherences”	(p.	202).	Obdurate	interferences	are	“interferences	between	
the	narratives	that	cannot	be	properly	narrated	within	those	narratives	themselves”	(p.	202,	emphasis	in	original),	as	observed	for	Mary’s	love	and	hate	of	her	mother,	but	also	in	other	chapters,	such	as	Stephanie’s	stoicism	and	emotion,	and	Eric’s	success	and	failure.	These	accounts	“are	sustained	as	much	in	narrative	incoherence	as	they	are	in	narrative	coherence”	(p.	202),	“as	much	in	interference	between	multiplicities	as	they	are	in	successful	and	singular	enactment”	(pp.	202-3).	
Other	options	for	resolution	might	be	made	present,	however.	An	obdurate	interference	is	only	obdurate	because	it	is	made	so	in	the	processes	that	have	produced	it,	and	these	processes	of	knowing	are	never	settled.	For	example,	a	persuasive	
possibility	is	that	Mary	is	able	to	choose	love	over	hate,	where	her	mother	is	regretful	and	atones	for	her	actions	(“I	think	she	[…]	must	regret	some,	you	know,	[of]	the	things	that	she’s	done”156),	and	where	Mary	distributes	love	and	hate	into	temporal	singularities	of	future	and	past	when	she	forgives	her	mother	(“I	must’ve	forgive	[sic]	her	some	or	I	wouldn’t	even	have	her	in	my	house	would	I?”157).	Objections	in	the	form	of	Mary’s	profound	distrust,	fear,	and	disgust	of	her	mother	prevent	this	from	being	realised,	however.	
Nevertheless,	the	presence	of	obdurate	interferences	have	the	effect	of	removing	the	temporal	distribution	of	multiplicity	(as	a	promise	of	resolution	in	possibility)	not	simply	by	dismissing	the	promise	of	resolution	(Mary	continues	to	sincerely	insist	she	hates	rather	than	loves	her	mother)	but	by	making	it	a	legitimate	choice	for	resolution	that	is	also	shown	to	be	impossible.	As	the	next	chapter	will	discuss,	this	is	crucial	for	the	enactment	of	a	pinboard	where	the	juxtaposition	of	multiples	in	the	controversy	is	held	still	rather	than	distributed	into	temporal	singularities,	even	whilst	other	options	for	resolution	inevitably	arise	as	the	duration	of	the	interview	continues	to	flow	and	dialectically	burn	like	a	fire.	
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CHAPTER	14:	DISCUSSION	
INTRODUCTION	
Whilst	the	previous	chapters	in	Part	II	aimed	to	make	visible	fractional	accounts	of	participants’	experience	of	chronic	pain,	demonstrating	a	basic	viability	of	the	method	(outlined	in	Chapter	8)	used	to	produce	them,	the	first	part	of	the	current	chapter	reflects	on	the	execution	of	this	method	with	relevance	to	such	viability.	Drawing	from	and	building	upon	reflections	found	in	previous	chapters,	this	chapter	aims	to	better	understand	how	the	pinboard	method	does,	or	does	not,	work	in	enacting	fractional	accounts,	such	that	this	understanding	might	be	used	to	better	enact	fractional	accounts	in	future	and	support	the	goal	of	intervening	on	epistemological	ways	of	knowing	lived	experience.	Whilst	reflection	in	Chapters	11	and	12	focussed	on	how	the	practical	skill	of	the	application	of	the	pinboard	method	may	be	enhanced	in	light	of	the	difficulty	in	producing	fractional	readings	(see	also	Appendix	1),	the	first	part	of	this	chapter	instead	focuses	on	a	more	conceptually	fundamental	issue	regarding	the	role	of	time	in	the	enactment	of	the	pinboard,	drawing	on	the	philosophy	of	Henri	Bergson.	The	second	part	of	the	chapter	examines	how	this	refined	method	of	the	pinboard	might	be	transported	from	the	narrow	confines	of	‘methodological	laboratories’	like	this	thesis	to	the	institutional	contexts	that	enact	the	epistemological	methods	that	this	thesis	wishes	to	intervene	upon.	
PINBOARDS	AND	TIME	
PINBOARDS	AND	SPACE	
Previous	chapters	noted	that	the	distribution	of	multiplicity	into	singularities	of	space	and	time,	into	what	Law	(2002)	describes	as	an	Euclidean	time/space	container,	characterises	the	methodological	strategy	of	epistemological	ways	of	knowing.	The	philosopher	Henri	Bergson	terms	this	form	of	knowing	‘analysis’	and	contrasts	it	with	‘intuition’	(Moore,	2012).	Both	are	“ways	of	knowing	a	thing”	but	analysis	“implies	going	all	around	it”	because	it	involves	representations	that	are	(only)	translations	of	the	thing,	whereas	intuition	implies	“entering	into	it”	(Bergson,	1965f,	cited	in	Moore,	2012,	p.	407).	Indeed,	intuition	“dispenses	with	representations	and	symbols”	and	“seeks	knowledge	of	things	in	their	own	terms”	(Moore,	2012,	p.	408).	Bergson	considered	that	only	intuition	“properly	deserves	to	be	called	knowledge	of	the	facts”	because	analysis	involves	“an	intermediary	veil	of	representation”	(p.	408).	The	problem,	for	Bergson,	is	that	whilst	analysis	has	practical	benefits,	it	has	erroneously	been	regarded	as	“the	way	to	make	sense	of	things”	(p.	409,	
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emphasis	in	original),	yet	conscious	experience	escapes	being	defined	by	representation	(and	can	only	be	known	by	intuition).	This	conception	describes	the	crisis	of	representation	that	is	the	concern	of	this	thesis,	and	which	has	been	described	many	times	and	in	many	different	ways.	What	is	useful	in	Bergson’s	description	for	our	purposes	is	he	conceptualises	the	crisis	in	terms	of	space,	something	that	Law	(2002,	2006)	also	does	in	conceiving	of	the	pinboard,	and	which	helps	to	clarify	how	the	enactment	of	a	pinboard	as	a	metaphorical	space	achieved	(or	did	not	achieve)	fractionality	in	the	preceding	chapters	of	Part	II.	For	Bergson,	knowledge	from	analysis	“is	knowledge	of	the	spatial”,	where	the	items	being	known	are	distinguished	“by	their	respective	positions	and	extensions	in	some	space”,	“metaphorical”	or	“physical”	(Moore,	2012,	p.	411).	Indeed,	the	items	occupy	“what	Bergson	describes	as	a	discrete	quantitative	multiplicity”	of	individual	spatial	points	(p.	412).	This	can	be	contrasted	with	“time	as	consciously	experienced”,	which	he	terms	“duration”	(p.	412,	emphasis	in	original).	Items	in	duration	“are	not	discrete	but	permeate	one	another”	–	the	“past	of	duration	does	not	terminate	with	the	present,	but	continues	into	the	present”	(p.	412).	The	insufficiency	of	analysis	emerges	when	it	is	confronted	with	overlap	between	items	in	the	conscious	experience	of	time,	something	that	is	not	permitted	in	the	distinct	coordinates	of	space.	Indeed,	in	knowing	our	being	we	should	“be	careful	not	to	consider	inner	states	as	distinct	and	separate	from	one	another,	that	is,	as	things	that	can	be	measured”	(Guerlac,	2006,	p.	96,	emphasis	in	original).	To	attempt	to	put	duration	into	space	would	be	a	“veritable	contradiction”	(Bergson,	2001,	cited	in	Geurlac,	2006,	p.	96).	The	pinboard	reveals	the	insufficiency	of	the	discrete	spatial	distribution	of	analysis	through	providing	a	surface	on	which	this	overlap	can	occur.	It	does	this	through	modifying	the	concept	of	space	in	analysis	enough	to	permit	the	concept	of	overlap,	yet	at	the	same	time	retains	its	discrete	quantitative	multiplicity.	For	when	we	place	items	on	a	literal	pinboard,	one	item	is	placed	over	the	top	of	another	item	in	order	to	overlap.	They	literally	occupy	discrete	(non-overlapping)	coordinates	in	3-dimensional	space.	But	conceptually	the	pinboard	is	only	2-dimensional:	a	surface.	Without	the	third	dimension	of	depth,	items	occupy	the	same	space	in	2	dimensions.	So	in	being	both	literal	and	conceptual,	a	pinboard	can	permit	overlap	between	entities	that	are	nevertheless	also	discrete.	
SPACE	AS	TIME	
But	where	does	time	come	into	the	pinboard?	Chapter	7	argued	that	a	pinboard	is	an	attempt	to	‘hold’	a	controversy	still	in	order	to	prevent	its	resolution	into	singularities.	Specifically,	it	constitutes	the	dissection	of	a	particular	period	of	time	during	the	naive	reader’s	attention	to	the	processes	of	a	method	assemblage,	right	when	the	Othering	practices	of	that	method	assemblage	are	made	visible.	This	involves	absenting	from	this	
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account	any	subsequent	sections	of	time	when	a	resolution	is	attempted,	and	hence	Craige	(2015)	argues	that	“a	refusal	to	practice”	the	synthesis	of	lower	level	thematic	codes	during	analysis	(in	order	to	maintain	a	juxtaposition	between	codes)	“is	definitive	of	the	pinboard	method”	(p.	152)	(see	Chapter	8).	But	the	experience	of	enacting	pinboards	in	this	thesis	suggests	that	time	cannot	be	constrained	to	such	neatly	cut	segments.	As	I	noted	in	Eric’s	chapter	(Chapter	10),	whilst	the	overlap	between	success	and	failure	as	two	entities	with	a	very	distinct	(and	policed)	boundary	was	made	present	when	his	childhood	house	was	revealed	as	both	success	and	failure,	stopping	at	this	point	felt	like	“an	arbitrary	stoppage	that	is	never	the	end	of	the	story	for	interview	practice”	(a	quote	from	Chapter	10).	Indeed,	part	of	what	was	made	visible	in	Eric’s	pinboard	of	success	and	failure	was	the	potential	for	resolution	in	the	future,	of	accepting	that	times	of	failure	punctuate	times	of	success.	Thus,	despite	carefully	dissecting	the	periods	of	time	we	want	to	make	visible,	slippages	into	periods	of	time	we	didn’t	want	to	make	visible	still	occur.	It’s	not	enough	to	‘resist’	resolution	by	cutting	up	time,	since	it	is	possible	(even	certain)	that	projection	into	other	time	periods	will	occur.	In	this	situation	the	controversy	being	held	on	the	pinboard	becomes	a	controversy	waiting	to	be	resolved,	“as	a	flaw	in	need	of	repair”	(Harrison,	2010,	p.	168,	emphasis	in	original	–	see	Chapter	6).	It	becomes	a	means-to-an-end	that	enacts	epistemological	conditions	of	possibility	with	its	mono-vision	logic	of	discrete	singularities	rather	than	expression	of	the	knowing	in	tension	constitutive	of	a	fractional	subjectivity	(Law,	2002,	2004).	So	where	did	we	go	wrong?	Bergson	would	contend	that	the	dissection	of	‘time’	that	the	pinboard	performs	is	not	really	time	at	all	in	the	sense	he	described	it	in	his	concept	of	
duration.	Rather,	the	‘time’	we	have	been	discussing	is	actually	just	space	by	another	name.	This	is	a	very	common	convention,	and	indeed	“for	nearly	all	practical	purposes,	that	is	precisely	how	[time]	is	construed”	(Moore,	2012,	p.	412).	But	this	is	“false	to	the	reality	of	time	as	consciously	experienced”	(p.	412,	emphasis	in	the	original).	Time	as	duration	cannot	“be	measured	and	cut	up	into	distinct	units	like	space”	(Guerlac,	2006,	p.	97).	The	duration	of	the	conscious	experience	of	the	naive	observer	cannot	be	cut	up	into	neat	segments	for	analysis	since	it	has	the	“indivisible	and	indestructible	continuity	of	a	melody	where	the	past	enters	into	the	present	and	forms	with	it	an	undivided	whole	which	remains	undivided	and	even	indivisible”	(Bergson,	1975,	cited	in	Moore,	2012,	p.	412,	emphasis	in	original).	The	slippages	of	time	emerging	as	promises	of	future	resolution	can	be	understood	as	the	insufficiency	of	space-as-time	in	the	pinboard	to	make	sense	of	the	duration	of	the	naive	reader’s	observations.	Yet	(and	this	is	important)	these	slippages	of	time	become	integrated	into	a	conception	of	time	that	constitutes	space	rather	than	making	visible	the	insufficiency	of	space-as-time,	with	the	slippages	given	their	own	discrete	singularities	within	that	space-
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as-time.1	The	simultaneity	of	the	literal	pinboard	(as	3	dimensions,	enacting	discreteness	of	the	parts)	and	the	conceptual	pinboard	(as	2	dimensions,	enacting	seamlessness	in	the	overlap	between	parts)	as	a	fractional	entity	is	completely	disrupted	since	the	literal	and	conceptual	pinboards	become	distributed	into	separate	spaces-in-time:	as	a	present	literal	pinboard	of	parts	(thesis	and	antithesis)	that	promises	to	be	resolved	into	a	future	conceptual	pinboard	of	seamlessness	(synthesis)	(i.e.	a	dialectic).	Overlap	never	occurs	since	the	very	instant	parts	overlap	on	the	literal	pinboard	they	cease	to	exist	as	parts,	now	existing	in	some	potential	future	conceptual	pinboard	where	their	contradiction	is	resolved.	In	short,	the	pinboard’s	appropriation	(into	space)	of	slippages	of	time	constituting	the	failure	of	that	space	to	contain	duration	means	the	pinboard	no	longer	enacts	fractionality,	but	only	the	discrete	singularities	of	epistemology.	This	is	a	crucial	point	for	the	functioning	of	the	pinboard,	and	so	I	will	clarify	it.	Bergson	considers	duration	to	have	tendencies	(virtualities)	that	become	actualised	as	time	flows.	The	“actualization	of	these	tendencies	in	turn	generates	new	tendencies”,2	and	so	duration	is	“continually	growing”	(Moore,	2012,	p.	414).	It	means	that	“the	virtual	is	never	completely	actualized”	(p.	414).	Intuition	is	capable	of	knowing	duration	“in	its	enduring	self”,	whereas	
analysis	conceives	of	duration	“as	if	it	had	eventually	come	to	an	end”,	as	if	there	was	“a	complete	actualization	of	its	previously	ever-expanding	past	of	virtual	tendencies”	(p.	414).	Analysis	focuses	on	the	actual	without	conceiving	of	how	actualisation	makes	real	new	tendencies,	which	nevertheless	inconveniently	emerge	as	the	slippages	of	time	discussed	above.	Deleuze	(1996/2006b)	discusses	this	in	terms	of	the	“plane	of	immanence”	that	includes	“both	the	virtual	and	its	actualization	simultaneously,	without	there	being	any	assignable	limit	between	the	two”	(p.	113).	On	the	plane	of	immanence	the	event	(see	Chapter	4)	in	time	is	understood	not	as	space,	which	forms	distinct	singularities	in	a	
dialectic	(see	Chapter	7),	but	time-as-duration.	Here	a	moment	“neither	takes	place	nor	follows,	but	presents	the	immensity	of	the	empty	time	where	the	event	can	be	seen	that	is	still	to	come	and	yet	has	already	passed,	in	the	absolute	of	an	immediate	consciousness”	(1995/1997,	p.	5).	Analysis	concerns	itself	with	the	actual	only,	yet	the	“actual	falls	from	the	plane	like	a	fruit,	whilst	the	actualization	relates	it	back	to	the	plane”	(1996/2006b,	p.	113).	The	pinboard	cannot	constitute	an	intervention	on	epistemology	and	enact	fractionality	if	it	enacts	slippages	of	duration	as	discrete	singularities	of	space-as-time	that	permit	a	promise																																									 																					
1	For	Bergson,	to	understand	why	this	happens	we	firstly	need	to	recognise	that	an	item	in	the	present	becomes	conventionally	but	erroneously	regarded	as	having	always	been	possible	in	the	past,	when	in	fact	that	possibility	is	enacted	with	the	production	of	the	item	in	the	present	and	not	prior	to	it.	This	‘retrograde	movement’	is	then	projected	onto	the	future	such	that	the	future	becomes	a	present-to-come	that	is	spatially	determined	by	the	possibilities	of	a	present	that	is	treated	as	a	past-to-come	(Al-Saji,	2012).	2	And	therefore	actualisation	can	be	understood	as	“coupled	to	a	ceaseless	‘virtualisation’	”	(Middleton	&	Brown,	2005,	p.	76).	
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of	resolution.	Yet	this	seems	inevitable	given	that	analysis	has	conditions	of	possibility	that	are	entirely	spatial.	But	there	were	pinboards	established	during	the	previous	5	chapters	where	a	promise	of	resolution	was	revealed	as	impossible:	in	obdurate	interferences.	
OBDURATE	INTERFERENCES	AND	THE	NEUTRALISATION	OF	SPACE-AS-TIME	
The	end	of	Mary’s	chapter	(Chapter	13)	reflected	on	the	difference	between	controversies	that	could	be	coordinated	and	those	where	it	was	impossible	to	do	so,	at	least	in	the	ways	being	attempted	(an	important	qualification,	discussed	below).	For	Mary	this	involved	choosing	hate	over	love	for	her	mother,	which	distributed	love	into	a	past	entirely	discrete	from	the	hate	of	the	present.	Yet	in	our	interviews	it	became	apparent	that	such	is	the	logical	dependence	of	that	hate	on	love	that	this	distribution	into	space-as-time	was	impossible	to	enact,	and	we	were	instead	faced	with	the	seamless	dependence	of	love	and	hate	even	
though	they	were	impossible	to	one	another.	These	occurred	in	the	same,	indivisible	‘time’.	Nearly	all	of	the	pinboards	established	in	the	other	chapters	worked	on	the	same	basis.1	Stephanie	(Chapter	9)	was	unable	to	choose	stoicism	over	emotion	because	stoicism	depended	on	emotion.	Eric	(Chapter	10)	was	unable	to	choose	success	over	failure	because	success	depended	on	failure.	Alice	(Chapter	11)	was	unable	to	enact	humanity	without	inhumanity,	or	enact	the	absence	of	her	void	without	making	it	present.	However,	as	noted	in	Mary’s	chapter	(Chapter	13),	this	impossibility	of	coordination	was	only	the	case	for	one	
particular	route	of	coordination.	In	each	case	this	involved	choosing	one	of	two	contradictory	multiples	over	the	other.	The	predominance	of	this	particular	route	of	coordination	in	the	fractional	account	emerged	from	the	first	movement,	where	it	had	previously	successfully	separated	the	two	contradictory	multiples	in	space-as-time	before	the	conversion	of	an	intermediary	to	a	mediator.	In	this	sense	the	pinboard	method	works	to	dismantle	the	separation	of	multiplicity	into	the	distinct	singularities	of	space-as-time,	making	any	promise	of	choosing	one	multiple	over	the	other	impossible	without	simply	
dismissing	that	promise.	What	is	so	‘obdurate’	about	these	interferences	is	that	the	centring	logic	of	the	particular	route	of	resolution	(choosing	one	particular	multiple	over	the	other)	is	not	only	made	impossible	by	what	is	Othered,	but	is	actually	constituted	(is	made	possible	
by)	the	presence	of	this	impossible	Other.	The	either/or	logic	fails,	is	paralysed,	and	we	are	instead	forced	to	confront	fractional	conditions	of	possibility.																																									 																					
1	The	one	exception	is	perhaps	Alice’s	mediator	of	the	void	as	both	a	place	of	welcome	reclusion	from	others	and	of	loneliness,	where	the	relationship	between	the	two	concepts	(reclusion	and	loneliness)	was	not	established	as	dependent	on	one	another	but	nevertheless	remained	seamlessly	connected	in	the	concept	of	her	void	of	unreality.	In	this	instance	the	obduracy	of	the	interference	seemed	dependent	more	upon	a	lack	of	exploring	possible	resolutions	of	the	conflict	rather	than	the	impossibility	of	particular	routes	of	resolution,	perhaps	reflecting	the	lack	of	focus	due	to	a	meandering	between	mediators	that	occurred	in	Alice’s	interviews	(see	discussion	in	Chapter	11).	
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EXPOSING	THE	VIRTUAL:	TWO	READINGS	OF	HESITATION	
Middleton	and	Brown	(2005)	contend,	following	Bergson,	that	hesitation	and	
elaboration	are	mechanisms	within	analysis	“by	which	something	of	the	virtual	remains	exposed	in	the	ongoing	spatialisation	of	experience”	(p.	198).	That	is,	whilst	analysis	is	concerned	with	the	products	(the	actual)	resulting	from	the	actualisation	of	virtualities,	the	actions	of	hesitating	or	elaborating	during	this	process	serve	to	make	visible	(in	an	intuitive	sense)	new	virtualities,	and	thus	the	continually	growing	nature	of	duration.	Indeed,	hesitation	and	elaboration	can	be	understood	as	making	visible	the	virtualisation	that	accompanies	actualisation,	in	the	same	way	that	this	thesis	seeks	to	make	visible	the	decentring	that	accompanies	centring.	Specifically,	Middleton	and	Brown	(after	Hetherington,	1997)	suggest	that	to	hesitate	requires	a	“functionally	blank”	object	(Middleton	&	Brown,	2005,	p.	215).	Such	an	object	has	“constitutional	indifference	to	existing	order,	meaning	that	it	can	take	up	multiple	sets	of	positions”	(p.	215,	my	emphasis).	A	blank	object	“gathers	up	relationships”	and	“might	be	said	to	collect	together	‘differences’	[…]	while	refusing	synthesis”	(p.	214).	That	is,	a	blank	object	is	the	site	of	a	controversy,	of	the	more	than	one	but	less	than	many	of	the	pinboard.	And	like	the	pinboard	method	discussed	in	this	thesis,	hesitation	and	elaboration	work	with	a	blank	object	because	it	“calls	into	question	the	forms	of	ordering	into	which	it	is	subsumed”	(p.	215).	Such	“juxtaposition	[…]	allows	for	an	ambiguity”	about	the	outcome	in	exactly	the	same	way	as	the	conversion	of	an	intermediary	to	a	mediator	(see	Chapter	7)	(p.	219).	And	also	like	the	pinboard,	a	blank	object	is	able	to	juxtapose	multiples,	allowing	for	“a	possible	‘elaboration’	”	or	hesitation	to	the	established	order	as	part	of	the	shock	from	the	multiplication	by	the	mediator	(p.	219).	Like	the	encounter	with	the	non-relational	it	is	“a	break	with	what	we	expect”,	producing	“a	kind	of	ambiguity”	(p.	220).	For	Bergson,	such	a	controversy	constitutes	“juxtaposition,	or	mutual	envelopment”	of	
different	durations	(Middleton	&	Brown,	2005,	p.	216),	of	“multiple,	intersecting	‘virtual’	planes	of	experience”	(p.	219).	And	crucially,	the	hesitation	at	the	ambiguity	effected	by	the	mediation	of	a	blank	object	involves	making	visible	other	(non-relational)	durations	beyond	the	vantage	point	of	a	particular	method	assemblage,	a	difference	that	throws	into	relief	the	nature	of	duration	itself	(the	virtual).	Indeed,	the	very	constitution	of	duration	as	a	‘virtual’	entity	relies	on	establishing	this	intuitive	way	of	knowing	in	hesitation	and	elaboration:	“the	living	being	[…]	has	duration	precisely	because	it	is	continuously	elaborating	what	is	new	and	because	there	is	no	elaboration	without	searching,	no	searching	without	groping.	Time	is	this	very	hesitation,	or	it	is	nothing”	(Bergson,	1992,	cited	in	Middleton	&	Brown,	2005,	p.	221).	
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But	“[w]hat	could	it	mean	to	hesitate	before	life?”	(Harrison,	2015,	p.	285).	For	Middleton	and	Brown	(2005)	it	means	“the	extent	to	which	we	are	able	to	delay	[…]	action	and	wait”	(p.	218).	The	ambiguity	of	hesitation	defers	the	affirmation	(reaching	the	spatial	coordinates	of	an	actual)	demanded	by	analysis,	of	“the	suspension	of	ready-made	categories	in	favour	of	a	direct	experience	of	change,	of	ambivalence”	(p.	219).	Yet	“[r]esisting	or	deferring	affirmation	is	not	as	straightforward	a	task	as	you	might	think”	(Harrison,	2015,	p.	286).	Indeed,	this	thesis	has	discussed	the	‘epistemological	appropriation’	of	fractional	insight	throughout.	Deferral	or	delay,	it	has	suggested,	is	one	of	these.	Even	the	“invitation	to	affirm”	raises	the	option	of	“a	potentially	infinite	number”	of	possibilities	(p.	286,	my	emphasis),	that	is,	spatial	coordinates	to	distribute	multiplicity	amongst	(space-as-)time.	Drawing	on	‘pessimist’	philosopher	Emil	Cioran,	Harrison	(2015)	contends	that	affirmation	cannot	be	deferred	because	even	the	invitation	is	affirmational.	Indeed,	‘you	have	always	already	agreed	to	play	the	game,	you	have	always	already	taken	the	bait,	and	it	is	only	on	the	credit	extended	by	this	action	that	you	can	say	“no.”	’	(pp.	293-4).	In	this	sense,	for	Cioran	hesitation	must	always	come	too	late:	“It’s	not	worth	the	bother	of	killing	yourself,	since	you	always	kill	yourself	too	late”	(Cioran,	2012,	cited	in	Harrison,	2015,	p.	294).	What	is	at	stake	in	this	kind	of	‘pessimism’	is	not	that	the	necessity	of	spatialisation	fundamentally	prevents	us	from	any	intuition	of	duration,	but	that	hesitation	must	firstly	(in	a	‘first	movement’)	fully	commit	to	the	affirmation,	to	the	actual	that	is	produced.	The	problem,	for	Harrison	and	Cioran,	is	that	this	commitment	is	accompanied	by	a	sort	of	vital	gratitude	to	the	actual,	of	a	sort	of	propensity	to	be	“grateful”	for	the	actual	at	the	expense	of	the	virtual,	as	virtualities	burn	away	in	actualisation,	ashes	that	are	blown	away	and	then	forgotten	(Harrison,	2015,	p.	294).	Yet	“[m]ortality	is	not	something	that	befalls	us	one	sad	day,	but	something	at	play	from	the	beginning”	(p.	294).	For	Harrison	the	gratitude	is	to	the	virtualities	that	have	burned	away,	visible	in	an	always	too-late	hesitation	of	ashes	(cinders).	This	is	not	a	pessimism	of	inaction,	but	an	active	one	of	unpicking	a	gratitude	to	the	actual	from	a	commitment	to	its	inevitability,	with	hesitation	emerging	as	the	(pessimistic)	recognition	that	any	life	always	already	contains	death,	even	in	the	very	movement	that	conceives	something	as	a	promise	or	
possibility.	It	is	in	this	sense	that	Cioran	might	claim	to	have	“killed	the	Possible”	(2012,	cited	in	Harrison,	2015,	p.	293).	And	it	is	in	this	impossible	possibility	that	an	obdurate	interference	offers	a	‘hesitation’,	as	a	simultaneous	commitment	to	a	possible	resolution	to	a	controversy	whilst	also	recognising	the	impossibility	of	that	resolution.	It	is	only	in	such	a	type	of	hesitation	that	the	virtual,	sacrificed	at	the	altar	of	actualisation	for	the	actual,	can	be	intuited.	
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Whilst	the	impossible	possible	route	of	coordination	within	each	obdurate	interference,	as	artefacts	from	the	first	movement,	can	be	regarded	as	the	most	predominant	propensity	towards	resolution	in	each	instance	where	a	fractional	account	emerged,	it	was	not	the	only	route.	Or	rather,	the	apparent	impossibility	of	resolution	by	one	route	of	coordination	initiated	new	possibilities	where	the	promise	was	possible,	and	therefore	where	multiplicity	could	be	distributed	into	(new)	singularities	of	space-as-time.1	Thus,	for	Mary	there	is	the	promise	of	resolving	the	love/hate	contradiction	into	a	seamless	unity	where	she	would	be	able	to	begin	to	accept	her	love	for	her	mother	and	leave	her	hate	in	the	past.2	Similar	possibilities	were	also	enacted	in	the	accounts	of	other	participants.	
HOW	TO	ENACT	OBDURATE	INTERFERENCES	
As	the	goal	of	the	thesis	is	to	enact	the	fractional	subjectivities	of	an	obdurate	interference,	we	might	then	ask:	how	might	we	perform	the	pinboard	method	in	such	a	way	so	as	to	enhance	the	possibility	of	enacting	such	obdurate	interferences?	The	simple	answer	is	to	follow	the	pinboard	method	outlined	in	Chapter	8.	Part	II	of	this	thesis	has	charted	several	obdurate	interferences,	demonstrating	how	adherence	to	that	method	is	capable	of	making	them	visible.	The	more	complex	answer	is	to	incorporate	the	reflection	on	the	importance	of	the	clamp	on	space-as-time	that	obdurate	interferences	offer.	Whilst	Chapter	7	emphasised	the	importance	of	situating	the	pinboard	within	process	–	that	of	the	practices	of	a	method	assemblage	and	the	enactment	of	a	naive	reader	that	observes	these	practices	–	the	pinboard	was	nevertheless	regarded	as	a	product	that	involves	holding	still	the	controversies	revealed	through	this	observation.	In	this	vein,	there	is	an	assumption	that	the	researcher	should	resist	the	tendency	towards	the	resolution	of	a	controversy	when	enacting	a	pinboard.	But	this	chapter	has	argued	that	such	a	careful	dissection	of	time	results	in	‘slippages’	because	duration	cannot	be	split	into	sections	of	space	without	resulting	in	slippages	that	are	appropriated	into	discrete	singularities	of	space-as-time	that	serve	as	spatial	coordinates	for	the	distribution	of	the	controversy’s	multiplicity	into	discrete	singularities,	namely	as	a	promise	of	future	resolution.	The	implied	resistance	to	the	‘flow’	of	duration	is	distinctly	un-empirical	in	its	futile	attempt	to	silence	the	objections																																									 																					
1	‘Possibilities’	should	not	be	confused	with	‘virtualities’	(Moore,	2012).	A	‘possibility’	is	an	abstract	projection	that	might	establish	metrical	chains	of	intermediaries	that	become	‘realised’	(Latour,	2005).	By	contrast,	a	‘virtuality’	becomes	‘actualised’,	involving	the	generation	of	new	virtualities	during	actualisation,	which	is	a	novel	and	uncertain	(controversial)	process	(involving	mediators).	The	actualisation	of	virtualities	apprehends	the	continually	growing	nature	of	duration,	whereas	the	realisation	of	possibilities	does	not.	See	Latour	(2005)	on	the	distinction	between	“realized	potentials”	and	“actualized	virtualities”	(p.	59).	Put	differently,	realising	a	possibility	is	akin	to	actualising	a	virtuality	but	Othering	into	absence	the	virtualisation	that	accompanies	actualisation.	2	Here	we	see	the	future	as	a	present-to-come	where	Mary	loves	her	mother,	whilst	her	present	hate	is	a	past-to-come	spatially	distinct	from	it.	Significantly,	there	is	a	hierarchy	of	importance	where	the	present	supersedes	the	past,	and	thus	such	a	distribution	into	distinct	spatial	entities	can	permit	a	coordination	where	the	present	is	chosen	above	the	past	(‘drawing	a	line’	under	it).	
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of	the	objects	we	try	to	order	in	this	way.	Instead	the	reflection	offered	in	this	chapter	emphasises	the	importance	of	naivety	in	the	pinboard	method,	of	following	the	natives	even	when	that	leads	to	the	actual	or	potential	resolution	of	controversies,	which	is	precisely	the	opposite	of	resistance.	It	just	so	happens	that	our	global	assumption	of	the	extent	of	fractionality	means	that	we	think	we	stand	a	good	chance	of	enacting	an	obdurate	interference,	and	it	is	the	charting	of	these	entities	that	permits	a	fractional	reading.	So	the	complex	answer	is	actually	a	very	simple	and	well-established	one:	“[t]he	name	of	the	game	is	to	get	back	to	empiricism”	(Latour,	2005,	p.	146).	Through	dismantling	the	distribution	of	two	contradictory	multiples	into	distinct	units	of	space-as-time,	the	obdurate	interferences	observed	in	this	study	offer	a	conceptual	clamp	on	the	process	of	distributing	multiplicity	along	these	predominant	options	for	resolution.	But	
other	options	for	resolution	nevertheless	arise.	However,	the	charting	of	an	obdurate	interference	does	not	readily	prompt	these	further	options	in	the	same	way	that	a	resolvable	controversy	prompts	possible	future	resolutions.	It	is	in	this	sense	that	obdurate	interferences	offer	a	way	of	knowing	lived	experience	fractionally	without	epistemological	appropriation,	even	if	it	is	in	a	very	modest	sense.	
FROM	METHODOLOGICAL	TO	INSTITUTIONAL	PRACTICE	
METHODOLOGICAL	LABORATORIES	
The	thesis	has	developed	a	method	for	enacting	the	pinboard	within	interview	research	as	a	fractional	means	of	knowing	the	lived	experience	of	pain,	with	the	intention	of	it	being	used	to	intervene	on	existing	epistemological	interview	research	practices	within	the	integrative	paradigm.	This	has	involved	‘testing’	this	method	through	practicing	it,	producing	the	preceding	5	chapters.	Whilst	the	practice	of	this	method	within	the	current	study	mirrored	the	method	assemblage	used	within	the	integrative	paradigm,	its	practice	was	strictly	limited	to	a	methodological	experiment	rather	than	being	embedded	within	the	practices	of	academic	research	into	lived	experience.	Law	and	Lin	(2010)	suggest	that	a	trio	of	“metaphysics,	institutions	and	subjectivities	are	mixed	together	and	mutually	supportive	of	one	another”	in	the	generation	of	‘spaces’	of	knowing	(p.	147).	Whilst	the	metaphysics	of	fractionality	has	been	significantly	theorised	in	this	thesis,	and	then	established	as	a	method	practicing	fractional	subjectivities	on	the	basis	of	this	theory,	the	institutional	arrangements	for	the	enactment	of	such	subjectivities	was	essentially	limited	to	a	methodological	exploration	that	is	distinctly	different	to	the	“spaces	of	academic	knowing”	constitutive	of	integrative	paradigm	research	(Law,	2016,	p.	21).	Yet	it	“is	such	conditions	of	institutional	possibility	that	allows	for	their	modes	of	knowing	and	makes	them	resilient”	(p.	21,	my	
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emphasis).	We	“cannot	know	differently	without	tackling	the	institutional	and	material	correlates	that	go	with	the	normative	modes	of	knowing”	(p.	21).	The	benefit	of	methodological	introspection	should	not	be	underestimated,	however,	since	it	has	permitted	the	development	of	the	pinboard	method	in	this	thesis,	tested	in	a	sort	of	methodological	laboratory,	as	an	explicit	tool	that	can	be	applied	within	the	institutional	contexts	relevant	to	the	integrative	paradigm.	It	is	only	through	departing	from	the	vantage	point	established	by	the	method	assemblages	of	the	integrative	paradigm	through	enacting	such	a	methodological	space	that	the	possibility	of	intervening	on	these	method	assemblages	is	made	possible.	Indeed,	such	spaces	are	necessary	to	provide	“alternative	ways	of	knowing	and	being”	to	the	epistemological	ways	dominating	social	science	in	‘Euro-America’	(Law	&	Lin,	2018,	p.	1).	
‘WAYS	OF	THINKING	UNUSUAL’	IN	SOCIAL	SCIENCE	One	other	fruitful	methodological	laboratory1	for	“ways	of	thinking	unusual	in	[Euro-American]	social	science”	is	the	intersection	between	Western	and	Eastern	metaphysical	traditions	(Law	&	Lin,	2018,	p.	12).	Law	and	Lin	draw	from	‘Chinese’	culture,	particularly	Taoism,	and	provide	social	science	accounts	based	on	shi	(勢),	which	they	translate	as	“propensity”	or	“propensities	of	things”	(p.	1).	A	‘shi-inflected’	account	avoids	the	attempt	to	locate	“deeper	truths”	characteristic	of	epistemology	but	instead	seeks	to	“see	how	things	move	within	the	world”	(to	be	aware	of	their	propensity)	(p.	8).	This	involves	accounting	for	things	as	a	series	of	ebbs	and	flows	that	remain	in	some	sort	of	‘balance’	if	propensities	are	encouraged,	and	imbalance	if	they	are	blocked.	In	similar	vein,	Lin	and	Law	(2017)	suggest	that	methods	of	knowing	in	Chinese	medicine	might	be	usefully	imported	as	alternatives	since	they	escape	the	epistemological	preoccupation	with	essentialising	things	into	particular	singularities	(“thingness”	or	“objects	out	there”	(p.	15)).	Instead,	Chinese	medicine	understands	specific	circumstances	as,	and	takes	action	based	on,	the	balancing	of	yin	and	yang,	which	are	entities	that	can	be	named	but	have	no	specific	form.	This	means	that	they	can	be	“mobilised	as	appropriate,	in	ways	that	are	situated”	(p.	16)	into	“a	more	or	less	indefinite	range	of	empirical	conceptualisations”	(p.	15).	Far	from	being	essentialised,	the	binary	of	yin	and	yang	can	“be	made	into	possibilities	that	will	move	from	place	to	place	without	being	fixed	into	particular	shapes”	(p.	16).	
																																								 																					
1	Or	set	of	“practical	intellectual	experiments”	(Law	&	Lin,	2017b,	p.	257).	
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Within	‘Western’	culture	itself,	a	baroque	style	of	knowing	has	been	suggested	as	offering	an	alternative	to	the	epistemological	styles	that	dominate	contemporary	methods	in	social	science	(Law	&	Ruppert,	2016).	A	term	typically	associated	with	a	particular	cultural	style	in	Europe	emerging	in	the	17th	Century,	“the	baroque	made	space	for	and	fostered	many	of	the	forms	of	otherness”	bracketed	within	epistemological	methods	(Law,	2016,	p.	23).	These	include	passion,	bodies,	material	heterogeneity,	excess,	specificity,	formlessness,	and	performativity,	which	nevertheless	manifest	themselves	in	epistemological	methods	as	an	uncomfortable	“gap	between	life	and	its	cultural	representations”,	as	“an	almost	palpable	absence	of	reliable	narrative	frames	that	might	provide	guidelines	as	to	how	to	interpret	events”	(van	de	Port,	2016,	p.	166).	However,	the	baroque	offers	“a	storehouse	of	possible	alternative	techniques”	to	try	to	address	the	nature	of	such	palpable	insufficiencies	(Law,	2016,	p.	23).	
KNOWLEDGE	SPACES	
The	incarnation	of	the	pinboard	method	as	it	has	been	developed	in	this	thesis	might	appear	significantly	less	exotic	to	conventional	Western	epistemological	practices	than	“Chinese-inflected”	(Law	&	Lin,	2017a,	p.	215)	or	baroque	forms	of	knowing.	Indeed,	in	being	more	empirical,	it	is	simply	asking	epistemological	researchers	to	be	true	to	the	empiricism	with	which	they	nominally	engage	in	research	practice.	Making	a	difference	on	existing	research	practices	in	the	integrative	paradigm	thus	appears	relatively	straight	forward	because	the	pinboard	offers	a	method	that	is	eminently	aligned	to	existing	research	methods,	and	thus	more	likely	to	be	adopted	within	it.	But	if	there	were	no	significant	differences	between	the	practices	of	the	pinboard	and	conventional	interview	research	methods	into	knowing	the	lived	experience	of	pain,	then	we	would	not	need	to	have	made	the	contrast	between	first	and	second	readings,	between	the	vantage	point	of	a	method	assemblage	and	that	of	the	pinboard,	or	between	intermediary	and	mediator.	Indeed,	if	it	were	not	for	the	differences	between	the	method	enacted	in	the	experimental	space	of	this	thesis	and	that	identified	within	conventional	integrative	paradigm	methods	then	the	work	of	this	thesis	would	not	have	been	possible.	We	can	think	of	the	pinboard	as	being	its	own	method	assemblage	that	needs	to	make	manifest	some	realities	whilst	Othering	others	into	absence,	which	of	course	recognises	the	point	made	earlier	in	the	thesis	that	any	method	is	involved	in	an	ontological	politics	(see	Chapter	7).	This	is	a	method	assemblage	with	a	difference	insofar	as	its	vantage	point	intends	to	make	its	work	of	Othering	into	absence	visible,	enacting	a	juxtaposition	between	centring	and	decentring	movements.	Importantly,	this	should	not	be	understood	as	a	self-consciousness	that	arises	spontaneously	within	conventional	epistemological	method	assemblages	(again,	if	this	happened	it	would	not	be	necessary	to	choose	to	intervene),	but	
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the	practice	of	a	completely	separate	method	assemblage	that	resembles	the	former	but	has	some	important	(if	relatively	subtle)	differences.	Perhaps	to	emphasise	the	difference	between	the	two	types	of	method	assemblage,	Law	and	Lin	have	more	recently	discussed	method	assemblages	in	terms	of	“knowledge	places”	(Law,	2011,	p.	8,	emphasis	in	original),	“knowledge	spaces”	(Law	&	Lin,	2010,	p.	147;	Lin	&	Law,	2015,	p.	117),	“knowing	spaces”	(Law	&	Lin,	2017b,	p.	262),	and	“space[s]	of	knowing”	(Law,	2016,	p.	26).1	The	concept	of	a	knowledge	space	highlights,	in	an	explicitly	spatial	way,	the	gap	between	the	methodological	knowledge	spaces	enacted	in	methodological	laboratories	and	the	knowledge	spaces	enacted	in	conventional	epistemological	research	methods.	If	we	are	to	intervene	on	the	latter,	then	in	this	spatial	analogy	we	need	to	transport	the	former	into	those	spaces.	
NEGOTIATING	BETWEEN	KNOWLEDGE	SPACES	
Law	and	Lin	(2017b)	consider	what	is	involved	in	transporting	the	Chinese	concept	shi	(勢)	(see	above)	into	conventional	Euro-American	practices	of	knowing.	Doing	so	raises	a	number	of	questions:	“What	to	try	to	carry	with	the	term?	Where	to	try	to	do	the	recrafting?	What	to	leave	behind?	And	why?”	(p.	260).	Such	transportation	would	require	decontextualizing	the	parts	they	want	to	carry	from	their	hinterlands,	whilst	leaving	others,	and	then	interfering	on	certain	Euro-American	practices.	The	result	of	this	process	“would	necessarily	be	a	crafted	hybrid”	(p.	260).	Law	and	Lin	suggest	that	this	process	involves	
negotiating	this	process	of	transportation:	“Where	do	we	want	to	bend	[conventional	Euro-American…]	terms	of	theory	on	the	one	hand	and	those	of	shi	(勢)	on	the	other?	How?	And	to	what	purpose?”	(p.	263).2	Law	(2016)	makes	a	similar	argument	with	regard	to	the	
baroque	as	a	“possible	resource	for	creating	ways	of	knowing	differently”	(p.	23,	emphasis	in	original),	asking	“what	do	we	want	to	learn	and	take	from	the	baroque	–	or	not”?	(p.	26,	emphasis	in	original).	Indeed,	there	may	well	be	elements	we	would	like	to	leave	behind,	like	the	“authoritarianism	or	conservatism”	associated	with	the	“hierarchical	world	of	the	Counter-Reformation”	that	constitutes	the	hinterland	of	what	‘baroque’	is	understood	as	(p.	42).																																									 																					
1	Law	(2011)	highlights	how	a	‘knowledge	space’	is	like	a	method	assemblage	insofar	as	it	involves	things	that	are	(1)	made	present,	(2)	made	manifestly	absent,	and	(3)	Othered	into	absence.	However,	as	noted	in	Chapter	7,	he	makes	a	further	distinction	by	splitting	Otherness	into	“the	practical”	that	“includes	institutions,	authorities,	systems	of	exchange,	and	the	materials	that	are	embedded	in	these”,	and	“metaphysics”,	which	are	“the	framing	assumptions	implied	and	re-enacted	in	the	business	of	knowing”	(p.	10,	emphasis	in	original).	2	Law	and	Lin	(2017b)	go	further	and	suggest	that	the	frame	of	analysis	where	we	conceive	of	an	object	in	a	hinterland	in	this	way	(that	of	knowledge/knowing	spaces)	constitutes	a	locating	of	an	object	of	interest	that	shi	(勢)	itself	would	reject,	and	that	the	terms	of	analysis	might	be	shifted	to	reflect	a	frame	of	analysis	that	is	more	shi-inflected.	
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What	is	meant	by	this	(in	the	way	this	transportation	has	been	described)	is	to	ask	how	we	might	negotiate	transportation	through	the	science	and	technology	studies’	(STS)	concept	of	
translation.	This	is	the	“STS-oriented	material-semiotic	translation	rather	than	linguistic	translation”	(Lin	&	Law,	2015,	p.	121),	the	latter	of	which	this	thesis	has	meant	by	use	of	the	term	‘translation’	thus	far	(see	Chapter	3).	‘Translation’	is	also	an	important	STS	concept	most	fully	explicated	by	Michel	Callon	(1986)	that	helps	to	understand	how	‘actors’	are	enticed	and	enrolled	into	particular	knowledge	spaces	rather	than	others,	a	process	involving	the	resolution	of	controversies	if	enrolment	is	attained.	For	Law	and	Lin	(2017b)	the	issue	for	intervening	on	conventional	Euro-American	ways	of	knowing	with	an	alternative	“is	how	do	we	want	to	translate?”	(p.	263).	Transporting	the	pinboard	from	the	methodological	space	of	this	thesis	to	that	of	the	institutional	contexts	of	integrative	paradigm	research	has	a	parallel	with	the	three	research	scientists	that	Callon	(1986)	describes	in	his	influential	paper.	Being	aware	of	the	problem	of	significant	scallop	depopulation	along	France’s	northern	coast	following	unsustainable	fishing,	the	researchers	had	“discovered	during	a	voyage	to	Japan	that	scallops	are	being	intensively	cultivated	there”	using	a	technique	that	“made	it	possible	to	increase	the	level	of	existing	stocks”	(p.	203).	“Their	question	was	simple:	is	this	experience	transposable	to	France”?	(p.	203).	The	three	researcher	scientists	produced	a	report,	defining	three	actors	and	their	interest	in	the	problem:	fishermen	who	need	to	protect	their	stock,	scallops	who	are	supposed	to	wish	to	“proliferate	and	survive”,	and	scientists	who	want	to	advance	knowledge	about	scallops	(p.	205).	This	report,	based	around	a	single	question	of	whether	the	Japanese	technique	works	in	France,	is	“enough	to	involve	a	whole	series	of	actors	by	establishing	their	identities	and	the	links	between	them”	(p.	205).	This	is	the	“interdefinition	of	the	actors”	(p.	204,	emphasis	in	original)	around	this	single	issue,	or	“obligatory	passage	point”	(OPP)	(p.	205,	emphasis	in	original).	In	parallel,	we	might	thus	consider	how	such	problematization,	the	first	of	Callon’s	four	“moments	of	translation”,	can	define	relevant	actors	and	their	interests	in	relation	to	the	topic	of	this	thesis,	in	addition	to	ourselves	as	methodologists	(p.	203).	Interdefinition	seems	notably	lacking	when	we	consider	why	other	relevant	actors	would	be	interested	in	the	problem	of	experience	in	the	face	of	the	pressing	telic	demand	uniting	patients	and	healthcare	professionals	around	the	obligatory	passage	point	of	‘can	this	pain	be	relieved?’	Social	scientists	working	within	the	integrative	paradigm	have	also	been	interdefined	by	this	OPP.	Thus,	Juuso	et	al.’s	(2011)	accounts	of	women	experiencing	fibromyalgia	intend	to	help	healthcare	professionals	better	understand	their	needs,	Gustafsson	et	al.’s	(2004)	accounts	of	pain	patients’	lived	experience	aim	to	assess	the	efficacy	of	a	rehabilitation	
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programme,	and	Ong	et	al.’s	(2006)	accounts	of	patient	experience	offer	an	understanding	of	how	well	standardised	medical	surveys	on	quality	of	life	and	pain	sensation	work.	The	further	moments	of	translation	identified	by	Callon	(1986)	build	upon	this	crucial	first	moment.	Interessement	involves	the	research	scientists	attempting	“to	impose	and	stabilize	the	other	actors	it	defines	through	its	problematization”	(pp.	207-8).	It	involves	interesting	actors	such	that	they	might	be	enrolled	in	the	network	of	actors	being	defined	rather	than	other	networks	with	competing	interests	(enrolment	being	the	third	moment	of	translation).	And	it	is	this	realm	of	the	“in	between	(inter-esse)”	that	offers	the	potential	to	interfere	and	make	visible	alternatives	(p.	208,	emphasis	in	original),	such	as	the	social	scientist	who	identifies	the	failure	of	grasping	participant	experience	through	conventional	narrative	accounts	(Hendry,	2007;	van	de	Port,	2016),	a	chronic	pain	patient	who	might	identify	the	problematic	conflation	of	pain’s	cause	and	experience	(Jackson,	1994),	or	the	healthcare	professional	disconcerted1	by	their	failure	to	alleviate	a	patient’s	pain	(Corrigan	et	al.,	2011;	Kristiansson	et	al.,	2011;	Lindberg	&	Engström,	2011;	Matthias	et	al.,	2010;	Patel	et	al.,	2008)	(see	Chapter	1).	
THE	STICKINESS	OF	KNOWING	
Law	(2011)	writes	of	a	“quadruple	lock”	of	inter-linkages	between	the	four	elements	of	a	knowledge	place/space	(p.	10).2	Because	of	this	he	contends	that	to	introduce	“radically	different	forms	of	knowing”	into	an	existing	knowledge	space	within	social	science	means	that	all	elements	of	this	existing	knowledge	space	“need	to	be	altered	simultaneously	if	we	are	to	achieve	certain	forms	of	radical	change”	(p.	10).	In	a	similar	argument,	Law	and	Lin	(2010)	suggest	that	the	“partial	intersection”	(p.	136,	emphasis	in	original)	between	the	trio	of	“metaphysics,	institutions	and	subjectivities”	(p.	137,	emphasis	in	original)	constituting	knowledge	spaces	“makes	it	so	difﬁcult	to	think	alternatives	well	[…]	because	any	attempt	to	rethink	knowledge	traditions	needs	to	be	able	to	treat	all	three	simultaneously”	(p.	136).	Such	changes	“require	organisational,	social,	material,	and	metaphysical	reworking	all	at	one	go”	(Law,	2011,	p.	11).	And	such	is	the	extensive	ramification	of	these	Othered	entities	that	trying	to	enact	them	all	simultaneously	in	an	alternative	practice	“is	close	to	impossible”	(p.	11).	This	is	the	“stickiness	of	knowing”	(Law	&	Lin,	2017b,	p.	257).	But	then	there	is	a	more	“optimistic”	outlook	(Law,	2011,	p.	11).	There	is	a	global	assumption	that	runs	throughout	this	thesis	that	“reality	relations	and	the	practices	in																																									 																					
1	As	noted	in	Chapter	7,	Law	and	Lin	(2010,	after	Helen	Verran)	contend	that	bodily	disconcertment	constitutes	a	controversy	where	an	intersection	of	different	ontologies	is	made	visible.	2	As	discussed,	these	are	presence,	manifest	absence,	the	‘practical’,	and	metaphysics	(Law,	2011).	
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which	they	are	implied	are	multiple”,	that	“knowledge	places	don’t	come	as	seamless	wholes,	but	instead	with	gaps	and	interstices	and	cracks”	(p.	11).1	Indeed,	within	existing	knowledge	spaces	“different	normativities,	politics	and	ethics	co-exist	and	intersect	with	one	another	too”,	and	“if	we	can	make	parts	of	these	explicit	then	they	become	debatable	and	contestable”	(p.	11).	
Callon’s	(1986)	fourth	moment	of	translation	(mobilization)	requires	understanding	that	certain	actors	come	to	speak	for	others	in	the	network	being	made.	In	his	example,	the	scallop	larvae	counted	attaching	themselves	to	collectors	in	St	Brieuc	Bay	(France)	were	judged	to	be	representative	of	the	rest	of	the	scallops	in	the	Bay,	and	these	“spokesmen”	(p.	214)	were	transformed	“into	numbers,	[and]	the	numbers	into	tables	and	curves”	that	could	be	presented	by	the	researchers	(p.	217).	The	fisherman	elected	union	members	to	represent	their	views,	who	in	turn	supported	the	work	of	the	researchers.	Finally,	the	community	of	scientists	were	persuaded	of	the	work	of	the	three	researchers,	who	came	to	speak	for	them	on	the	matter.	Thus,	“chains	of	intermediaries”	are	set	up	that	“result	in	a	sole	and	ultimate	spokesman”	(p.	216):		
A	handful	of	researchers	discuss	a	few	diagrams	and	a	few	tables	with	numbers	in	a	closed	room	[at	a	conference].	But	these	discussions	commit	uncountable	populations	of	silent	actors:	scallops,	fishermen,	and	specialists	who	are	all	represented	at	[the	conference…]	by	a	few	spokesmen.	(p.	218)		The	epitome	of	successful	translation,	these	“diverse	populations	have	been	mobilized”	(p.	218,	my	emphasis).	But	then,	as	this	thesis	has	sought	to	make	clear,	practice	does	not	stop.	There	is	the	possibility	that	“representativity	is	brought	into	question”	(p.	220).	In	the	case	of	the	scallop	problem	it	seemed	that	the	scallops	that	had	attached	themselves	to	the	collectors	were	not	representative	of	the	wider	population,	with	the	other	scallop	larvae	being	more	‘interested’	by	other	“interessement	devices”	like	the	sea	currents	that	disrupt	their	attachment	(p.	212,	emphasis	in	original).2	It	is	such	a	controversy	that	the	pinboard	wishes	to	make	visible.	But	in	our	parallel	analysis	of	how	to	translate	the	pinboard	we	are	interested	in	both	making	visible	and	stabilising	such	controversies	(on	a	surface	of	juxtaposition),	of	making	visible	obdurate	interferences.	Callon’s	description	of	translation	can	be	understood	as	both	an																																									 																					
1	On	this	global	assumption,	Law	et	al.	(2014)	contend	that	“all	practices	are	syncretic”,	that	is,	the	enactment	of	singularity	is	achieved	through	enacting	multiplicity	at	the	same	time	(p.	176,	emphasis	in	original).	2	Cultural-linguistic	‘translation’	(as	discussed	in	Chapter	3)	and	STS	‘translation’	can	be	regarded	as	the	same	concept	once	the	latter	is	understood	as	an	attempt	to	transpose	from	one	site	to	another	but	which	encounters	the	type	of	crisis	in	representivity	discussed	by	Callon	(1986).	In	this	sense,	just	as	cultural-linguistic	translation	involves	a	crisis	of	representation	where	it	necessarily	fails	to	translate	lived	experience	into	representation,	STS	“translation	is	also	a	necessary	mistranslation”	(Law	&	Lin,	2017b,	p.	263,	my	emphasis).	
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expression	of	the	functioning	of	the	pinboard	(the	action	of	both	centring	and	decentring	movements)	and	the	means	by	which	we	might	plan	to	transport	it	into	the	institutional	settings	relevant	to	the	integrative	paradigm.	In	the	latter	case,	this	can	be	understood,	like	the	network	enacted	by	Callon’s	three	researchers,	as	an	attempt	to	centre	whilst	Othering	decentring	movements	that	would	threaten	the	coherence	of	the	project.	But	the	pinboard	is	a	parcel	of	coherence	that	enacts	both	coherence	and	incoherence	at	the	same	time.	It	is	a	coherence	that	questions	coherence,	a	coherent	hesitation.	A	thoroughly	centred	argument,	to	be	sure,	but	it	“is	first	of	all	a	negative	argument”	(Latour,	2005,	p.	141,	emphasis	in	original).	Realising	the	potential	of	the	pinboard	through	translating	it	is	precisely	to	make	visible	the	dissidence	involved	in	the	controversy	of	representation	within	translation	itself,	a	hesitation	revealing	virtualisation.	The	application	of	the	STS	concept	of	translation	here	captures	the	fractional	understanding	of	the	practice	of	the	pinboard	as	a	coherence	of	method	that	depends	upon	enacting	noncoherence	(see	Chapters	7	and	12,	and	Appendix	1).	STS	translation	offers	a	framework	within	which	we	might	begin	to	translate	the	pinboard	and	other	products	of	post-epistemological	methodological	laboratories	from	methodological	knowledge	spaces	to	institutional	knowledge	spaces	like	that	of	the	integrative	paradigm	through	interdefining	relevant	actors	and	negotiating	between	our	own	methodological	interests	and	the	others	that	we	interdefine,	such	as	those	of	chronic	pain	patients	(see	box,	below).	
HELPING	PEOPLE	IN	PAIN:	TWO	READINGS	OF	THE	EXPERIENCE	OF	
CHRONIC	PAIN	One	of	the	most	common	questions	I	get	asked	when	I	describe	the	topic	of	my	thesis	to	people	is:	how	does	this	help	people	experiencing	chronic	pain?	What	they	usually	mean	by	this	is:	what	can	your	research	do	to	help	cure	someone	of	their	pain?	Their	question	is	underpinned	by	the	ontology	of	pain	outlined	in	Chapter	2,	which	seeks	to	find	a	name	for	the	pain	so	that	it	can	be	cured,	to	find	an	image	with	the	power	to	heal.	When	I	explain,	particularly	to	those	experiencing	pain	or	knowing	someone	who	does,	that	what	I	do	is	try	to	understand	how	we	come	to	know	the	experience	of	pain,	they	are	usually	disappointed.1	They	don’t	have	time	for	philosophical	ideas	when	they	have	a	pressing	telic	demand	to	go	and	find	the	source	of	their	pain	and	get	rid	of	it.	
																																								 																					
1	Some	are	also	disappointed	that	my	accounts	of	participants’	chronic	pain	experience	largely	do	not	directly	address	pain	‘itself’,	but	‘talk	around’	related	issues.	To	prelude	the	discussion	of	the	rest	of	this	box,	such	an	assertion	reflects	the	difference	between	an	approach	that	has	already	worked	out	what	pain	is	and	wishes	to	realise	a	plan,	and	an	approach	that	wishes	to	follow	the	natives	and	chart	the	process	of	actualisation.	
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But	as	Jackson	(1994)	noted	almost	25	years	ago,	the	practical	issue	of	finding	an	image	with	a	power	to	heal	and	the	experience	of	pain	are	frequently	conflated.1	Put	in	Bergsonian	terms,	this	is	the	conflation	of	the	practical	issue	of	the	realisation	of	possibilities	with	the	conscious	experience	of	the	actualisation	of	virtualities.	The	former	involves	the	attempt	to	make	real	a	plan	–	the	plan	to	be	free	of	pain.	This	requires	setting	up	chains	of	intermediaries	to	make	that	happen.	This	is	a	fine	and	worthwhile	goal	but,	as	with	any	possibility,	there	is	no	guarantee	that	it	will	be	realised.	Experience,	by	contrast,	is	that	of	duration,	where	the	process	of	actualisation	creates	new	virtuals	at	every	instance.	Attempting	to	account	for	the	experience	of	duration	limited	to	the	realisation	of	possibilities	is	a	misrecognition	of	what	it	means	to	be,	a	misattribution	of	the	ongoing	process	of	being	to	the	finite	products	that	may	or	may	not	be	realised	(see	Chapter	7).	Having	awareness	of	the	process	of	realisation	is	to	be	aware	of	the	non-relational	aspects	that	must	be	confronted	as	part	of	the	wider	process	of	actualisation,	where	the	formation	of	the	actual	results	in	a	simultaneous	virtualisation	constitutive	of	the	growing	nature	of	duration.	Like	any	second	reading	it	does	not	dismiss	the	first	–	plans	can	still	be	realised	–	but	it	instead	situates	experience	within	a	wider	context	of	the	ongoing	growth	of	duration,	where	experience	is	an	unfolding	that	is	quite	different	to	simply	realising	plans.	The	attempt	to	realise	the	possibility	for	no	pain	isn’t	a	bad	idea,	but	to	equate	one’s	state	of	being	to	such	a	metaphysics	is,	as	we	observed	with	Good’s	(1992)	participant	‘Brian’	(see	Chapters	2	and	8),	a	form	of	suffering	in	itself	when	this	isn’t	readily	realised.	The	thesis	is	therefore	interested	in	how	to	separate	the	process	of	executing	plans	from	the	wider	process	of	being	within	which	this	is	situated,	rather	than	the	successful	execution	of	a	plan	to	remove	pain.	Theorising	about	such	awareness,	i.e.	of	fractional	subjectivity,	is	the	easy	part,	however.	The	hard	part	is	to	enact	it,	particularly	given	the	tendency	towards	epistemological	appropriation	at	almost	every	instance.	Jackson	(1994)	notes	that	“mind-body	and	subject-object	dualisms	break	down	in	accounts	of	lived	painful	body	experience”	(p.	208),	even	whilst	they	are	simultaneously	enacted	in	these	accounts	because	“since	we	must	use	language	in	our	analyses,	we	necessarily	create	the	subject-object	distinction”	(p.	213).	The	dualism	is	Othered	into	absence,	or	rather,	becomes	distributed	into	space-as-time	and	pain	emerges	in	the	accounts	of	lived	experience	as	an	elusive	entity	to	be	named	at	some	future	time	(see	Chapter	2).	
																																								 																					
1	Bergson	refers	to	this	as	endosmosis,	which	can	be	understood	as	the	“commingling”	of	both	duration	and	analysis	(Middleton	&	Brown,	2005,	p.	65).	
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Planning	how	to	enact	fractional	subjectivities	for	chronic	pain	patients	is	worthy	of	another	thesis	in	itself,	and	beyond	the	scope	of	what	I	do	in	this	thesis.	Nevertheless,	a	notable	attempt	is	the	use	of	mindfulness	with	chronic	pain	patients.	Based	on	Buddhist	philosophy,	mindfulness	might	be	described	as	a	fractional	awareness	of	the	inevitable	overflow	that	occurs	when	representations	take	on	interpretive	omnipotence	(see	Chapter	4).	It	involves	learning	to	“not	concern	yourself	with	the	content	of	[…]	thoughts,	but	with	the	process	of	observing	them	coming	and	going”	(Doyle,	2014,	p.	31),	where	“no	mental	event	is	accorded	any	relative	or	absolute	value	or	importance	in	terms	of	its	content”	(Kabat-Zinn,	1982,	p.	34).	Within	Buddhist	philosophy	this	has	been	variously	called	“bare	attention”,	“choiceless	awareness”,	“shikan-taza”	(Japanese,	meaning	“just	sitting”	),	and	“just	like	this	mind”	(p.	34,	emphasis	in	original).	It	is	also	equated	with	an	attention	to	the	present	that	avoids	living	within	the	memories	of	the	past	or	the	projected	narratives	of	the	future	(Strawson,	2004;	Tolle,	1999/2016).	Notably,	many	of	the	attempts	to	introduce	mindfulness	for	chronic	pain	patients	have	involved	engaging	with	the	practical	goal	of	reducing	or	curing	pain,	this	making	fractionality	relevant	to	the	OPP	of	curing	or	reducing	pain	and	thus	interdefining	a	range	of	actors	relevant	to	chronic	pain	as	illness.	In	this	vein,	Kabat-Zinn’s	(1982)	pioneering	work	found	that	chronic	pain	patients	who	engaged	in	a	program	of	mindfulness	meditation	resulted	in	a	long-term	(7	months)	reduction	in	pain	scale	ratings	after	the	intervention.	Similarly,	Chiesa	and	Serretti’s	(2011)	systematic	review	of	ten	studies	exploring	“mindfulness-based	interventions”	on	chronic	pain	patients	showed	reductions	in	pain	were	reported	across	the	studies,	but	that	more	research	is	needed	(p.	83).	Whilst	such	a	concern	for	the	practical	goal	of	removing	pain	might	be	regarded	as	colluding	with	an	ontology	that	conflates	being	with	the	practical	issue	of	pain	reduction	(meaning,	in	this	negotiated	STS-translation,	that	fractionality	is	compromised	too	much),	it	is	the	central	tenant	of	the	mindfulness	method	being	applied	in	the	intervention	that	such	a	distinction	between	them	is	established	(which,	in	the	process,	may	reduce	pain).	These	interventions	offer	the	possibility	of	enacting	fractional	subjectivities	with	awareness	of,	and	relevance	to,	the	institutional	arrangements	within	which	fractional	practices	might	be	enacted.	
CHAPTER	CONCLUSION	
The	first	part	of	this	chapter	has	reflected	on	the	execution	of	the	pinboard	method	in	producing	the	previous	5	chapters,	considering	how	the	concept	of	time	fits	into	that	method.	Drawing	on	Henri	Bergson’s	philosophy,	it	suggested	that	a	pinboard	is	able	to	reveal	the	insufficiency	of	‘analysis’	through	enacting	both	a	3-dimensional	literal	space	of	discrete	singularity	and	a	2-dimensional	conceptual	surface	of	overlap	between	entities,	
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thus	attaining	the	simultaneity	of	discreteness	and	overlap	constitutive	of	fractionality,	of	holding	a	controversy	still.	It	suggested	that	a	pinboard	constitutes	a	particular	dissected	period	of	time	during	the	naive	observer’s	observation	of	the	processes	of	a	method	assemblage,	but	that	part	of	what	is	made	visible	in	this	pinboard	is	a	projection	into	a	potential	future	beyond	this	dissected	time	period,	where	resolution	of	the	controversy	occurs.	In	doing	so,	the	controversy	being	made	visible	on	the	pinboard	becomes	a	problem	waiting	to	be	resolved	rather	than	offering	a	meaningful	account	of	fractional	subjectivity.	This	is	posited	to	occur	because	of	the	misrecognition	of	space	as	time	in	analysis.	Fated	to	enact	spatial	coordinates	that	always	split	the	seamlessness	of	duration	into	distinct	spaces,	the	pinboard	method	can	nevertheless	produce	a	pinboard	(as	a	form	of	analysis)	that	represents	instances	where	particular	coordination	strategies	to	resolve	controversies	are	impossible	and	thus	cannot	be	projected	as	possible	futures.	Such	obdurate	interferences	do	not	overcome	the	problem	involved	in	‘cutting’	duration	and	subsequently	misrecognising	the	analytical	bits	and	pieces	for	duration	itself,	but	makes	it	visible	(a	difficult	task	given	the	tendency	towards	epistemological	appropriation).	Indeed,	it	is	this	very	contrast	that	is	posited	as	permitting	the	intuition	of	duration.	Finally,	the	reflection	in	the	first	half	of	the	chapter	argued	that	enacting	a	pinboard	should	not	involve	resistance	to	resolving	controversies,	since	this	is	in	any	case	inevitable	via	projection,	but	should	follow	the	natives	with	the	aim	of	charting	the	obdurate	interferences	that	arise.	Having	refined	the	pinboard	method	in	light	of	this	reflection,	the	second	half	of	the	chapter	considered	how	it	might	be	transported	from	a	(usefully	productive)	methodological	space	of	the	thesis	to	the	institutional	contexts	relevant	to	the	integrative	paradigm,	which	contain	the	practices	that	this	thesis	wishes	to	intervene	upon.	Using	an	explicitly	spatial	metaphor	of	knowledge	spaces	(as	a	consequence	of	it	being	a	form	of	analysis),	it	suggested	that	such	transportation	might	be	conceived	in	terms	of	the	STS	concept	of	translation.	This	requires	making	visible	the	contested	nature	of	parts	of	pre-existing	epistemological	knowledge	spaces	that	can	then	allow	for	a	process	of	negotiation	involving	the	interdefinition	of	actors	that	can	be	enticed	into	a	network	that	enacts,	within	these	academic	knowledge	spaces,	the	‘good’	elements	of	the	fractional	subjectivities	identified	in	the	methodological	knowledge	space	of	this	thesis.	This	involves	the	difficult	but	necessary	task	of	interesting	and	enrolling	relevant	actors	of	pain	experience	in	ways	that	don’t	negotiate	away	the	good	of	fractional	insight.
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CHAPTER	15:	CONCLUSION	
How	is	it	possible	to	‘get	back	into	duration’	when,	in	Bergson’s	terms	at	least,	we	are	never	outside	of	it?	(Middleton	&	Brown,	2005,	p.	81).	Middleton	and	Brown	contend	that	if	we	find	ourselves	‘out	of	duration’	then	the	“problem	lies	with	our	lack	of	conscious	awareness	of	duration,	of	change,	as	it	unfolds”	(p.	81).	The	form	of	this	awareness	is,	in	Bergsonian	terms,	a	contrast	between	two	registers	of	knowing,	that	of	analysis	and	intuition.	It	is	specifically	a	consciousness	of	the	insufficiency	of	analysis	alone	to	account	for	lived	experience:	“Bergson’s	point	would	be	that	[…the]	quantitative	rendering	of	life	does	not	exhaust	experience”	(p.	193).	The	wider	enactment	of	such	conscious	awareness	can	be	described	as	the	aim	of	this	thesis,	which	(put	differently)	has	sought	to	contribute	to	establishing	“the	difficult	subjectivities	that	are	needed	for	fractional	
knowing”	(Law,	2002,	p.	4,	emphasis	in	original),	specifically	in	knowing	pain	experience	within	social	science	in	response	to	the	representational	paradox	initiated	by	the	epistemological	methods	conventionally	employed.	As	Middleton	and	Brown	(2005)	note	in	the	quote	above,	we	are	never	outside	of	duration	if	we	ascribe	to	the	kind	of	process	philosophy	characteristic	of	fractionality,	and	this	is	borne	out	by	the	way	in	which	the	thesis	has	constantly	characterised	a	‘first’	epistemological	reading	as	erroneously	appropriating	a	‘second’	fractional	reading.	The	former	is	regarded	as	myopic,	a	Cyclops	that	is	unable	to	establish	the	kind	of	‘double	vision’	required	to	adequately	‘see’	the	whole	picture,	even	whilst	it	clumsily	bumps	into	things	it	can	‘barely’	make	out.	The	thesis	has	been	about	these	two	forms	of	conscious	awareness	and	how,	through	an	attention	to	practice,	a	route	might	be	established	to	extend	the	field	of	vision	from	former	to	latter	so	that	an	awareness	of	both	centring	and	decentring	movements	is	enacted.	The	relationship	between	these	two	vantage	points,	and	how	well	a	pinboard	can	establish	a	transition	from	one	to	the	other	based	on	the	experiment	of	this	thesis,	can	be	usefully	discussed	through	Law	et	al.’s	(2014)	consideration	of	what	it	means	to	be	syncretic.	A	term	used	mainly	in	anthropology	and	religious	studies,	syncretism	refers	to	“the	process	of	combining	practices	taken	from	different	[…]	traditions”	(p.	175).	For	Law	et	al.	syncretism	captures	the	way	in	which	the	singularity	(or	coherence)	of	a	particular	practice	depends	upon	enacting	multiplicity	(or	noncoherence).	Whilst	syncretism	can	be	taken	as	(yet	another)	synonym	for	fractionality,	it	is	also	useful	in	emphasising	the	way	in	which	fractionality	is	made	to	function.	If	all	forms	of	knowing	involve	the	interference	of	one	practice	on	another	(Mol,	2002,	see	Chapter	7),	then	we	can	contend	that	“all	practices	are	
syncretic”	(Law	et	al.,	2014,	p.	176,	emphasis	in	original).	Crucially,	these	syncretic	practices	are	not	all	the	same.	Law	et	al.	identify	six	non-exclusive,	non-exhaustive	“modes	of	
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syncretism”	(p.	172).	Perhaps	the	most	basic	of	these	is	denial,	which	“simply	refuses	the	possibility	of	noncoherence”	(p.	177).	This	is	the	defining	characteristic	of	an	epistemological	“will	to	purity”	(p.	177),	and	might	be	regarded	as	a	fundamental	move	for	epistemology.	It	can	be	found	in	the	ontology	of	pain	experience	outlined	in	Chapter	2,	as	an	
ontologically	negative	againstness	that	must	deny	that	pain	is	a	part	of	the	self	even	whilst	that	againstness	is	constituted	by	a	noncoherence	of	pain	experience	that	is	both	present	and	absent	from	the	self.	But	syncretism	is	typically	practiced	with	additional	layers	of	complexity.	It	might	work	through	domestication	(see	Chapter	6,	p.	79),	separation	(see	also	Chapter	6,	p.	79),	care	(see	Chapter	11,	p.	185)	and/or	conflict	(see	Chapters	5,	6,	and	7).1		All	five	of	these	syncretic	practices	perform	what	this	thesis	has	referred	to	as	an	‘epistemological	appropriation’	of	fractional	insight:	they	work	to	distribute	multiplicity	into	singularities	in	one	way	or	another.	Even	conflict	as	a	conventional	mode	of	syncretism	is	inflected	with	the	will	to	purity,	it	being	construed	as	“conflict	in	an	arena	where	noncoherence	is	taken	to	be	undesirable”,	where	perhaps	“domestication	is	also	at	work”	to	use	those	controversies	as	a	means-to-an-end	(Law	et	al.,	2014,	p.	184;	see	Chapter	6).	An	astute	observer	is	able	to	make	visible	these	processes	of	appropriation,	which	are	syncretic	in	nature	but	where	the	necessary	noncoherence	is	Othered	into	absence.	As	Latour	(1991/1993)	argues	more	generally:	the	purity	of	modernity	relies	on	the	enactment	of	impurity.	It	“is	both	pure	and	it	is	not	pure	at	all”	(Law	et	al.,	2014,	p.	174).	Part	I	of	this	thesis	attempted	to	make	visible	such	Othered	noncoherence	as	part	of	the	centring	of	‘pure’	coherent	entities,	thus	making	visible	their	full	syncretic	nature.	Chapters	1	and	2	highlighted	a	paradox	in	knowing	the	lived	experience	of	pain	through	narrative	accounts	where	carefully	crafted	presences	always	rely	on	absences,	and	Chapter	3	linked	this	to	a	wider	rhetorical	turn	that	demonstrated	how	the	process	of	producing	‘authentic’	translations	(in	the	cultural-linguistic	sense)	necessarily	involves	making	the	foreign	familiar	whilst	retaining	that	foreignness	at	the	same	time.	These	first	3	chapters,	like	accounts	that	make	visible	the	five	modes	of	syncretism	noted	above,	underscore	an	important	point:	“[p]urity	without	impurity	is	a	chimera”	(p.	187).	Law	et	al.	suggest	that	to	think	in	these	(fully	visible)	modes	of	syncretism	might	be	“useful	in	a	world	in	which	it	appears	that	the	will	to	purity,	and	the	conditions	of	possibility	for	purity,	are	in	decline”	(p.	177).	In	this	sense,	they	are	offered	as	alternative	ways	of	thinking,	namely	those	that	comprehend	noncoherence	as	something	other	than	incoherence.	2	The	authors	stress	that	“what	might	count	as	a	good	mode	of	syncretism”	is	context	dependent	(p.																																									 																					
1	The	sixth	type	of	syncretism	is	discussed	later	in	the	chapter.	2	Law	et	al.	(2014)	make	a	distinction	between	noncoherence	and	incoherence,	the	latter	capturing	the	sense	in	which	noncoherence	is	regarded	as	a	flaw	in	need	of	repair	(Harrison,	2010	–	see	Chapter	6).	
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188,	emphasis	in	original).	“Normativities	do	not	float	above	the	world,	but	are	embedded	instead	in	the	materially	heterogeneous	practices	ordered	by	different	modes	of	syncretism”	(p.	190).	But	then	there	is	a	more	general	position	of	syncretism	as	a	‘good’	in	relation	to	the	
will	to	purity,	one	that	is	nevertheless	thoroughly	contexualised.	This	context	is	that	the	will	to	purity	is	‘bad’	insofar	as	“nothing	can	be	said”	about	normativity	(goods	and	bads)	“if	we	insist	on	purity	and	uniformity”	whilst	also	claiming	all	practices	are	syncretic	(or	the	interference	of	one	practice	on	another)	(p.	190).	The	‘good’	identified	in	this	thesis	is	the	enactment	of	an	alternative	way	of	knowing	pain	experience	without	enacting	the	
incoherence	of	a	representational	paradox	in	epistemological	ways	of	knowing	(a	‘bad’).	It	is	in	this	vein	that	Chapter	4	began	an	exploration	of	what	this	alternative	good	way	of	knowing	lived	experience	might	look	like	through	the	concept	of	fractionality.	This	was	developed	through	Chapters	5	to	8.	It	involved	understanding	that	an	effective	fractional	intervention	should	be	practiced	rather	than	simply	theorised	about,	culminating	in	the	development	of	a	method	that	was	‘tested’	by	practicing	it	in	interview	analysis	of	five	participants,	producing	the	accounts	of	lived	experience	in	Chapters	9	to	13.	This	practice	was	reflected	upon	in	Chapter	14,	including	tentatively	exploring	how	this	alternative	way	of	knowing	could	be	transported	from	methodological	knowledge	space	to	the	institutional	knowledge	spaces	the	thesis	seeks	to	make	a	difference	in.	This	emphasis	on	transportation	is	crucial	throughout	the	thesis,	since	whilst	it	took	care	to	make	a	distinction	between	a	‘first’	epistemological	reading	and	a	‘second’	fractional	one,	its	concern	was	with	shifting	the	reading	from	former	to	latter	and	then	maintaining	it.	Indeed,	this	was	the	principle	concern	of	Chapters	4	through	7,	which	identified	the	many	epistemological	appropriations	that	could	readily	thwart	this	transportation,	and	how	they	should	be	avoided.			Yet	making	visible	any	of	the	five	modes	of	syncretism	discussed	above	does	not	permit	a	shift	from	first	to	second	reading.	Instead	they	establish	an	isolated	vantage	point	where	the	attentive	observer	remains	a	non-participant	observing	the	natives,	who,	obscured	by	a	cycloptic	mono-vision	(unlike	the	binoptic	observer),	cannot	see	the	necessary	nature	of	the	noncoherence	they	busily	work	to	Other	into	absence	in	their	will	to	purity.	The	same	method	assemblage	processes	are	observed,	but	from	two	non-overlapping	vantage	points:	
The	will	to	purity	does	not	see	[unlike	the	attentive	observer]	that	its	own	version	of	normativity	only	ever	runs	so	far	and	that	there	are	endless	places	of	normative	syncretism	that	lie	beyond	its	writ.	Indeed,	it	is	unable	to	detect	[unlike	the	attentive	observer]	that	normative	syncretism	is	the	general	case	or	(if	you	prefer)	the	general	predicament.	(p.	191)	There	is	no	porosity	between	a	first	and	second	reading	offered	by	an	observer’s	enactment	of	this	form	of	syncretism.	For	a	project	concerned	with	shifting	from	first	to	second	reading,	there	is	a	sort	of	metaphysical	apartheid	where	the	best	we	can	hope	for	is	that	the	
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fractional	vantage	point	might	be	“useful”	once	the	native’s	vantage	point	somehow	collapses,	relying	on	a	world	where	“the	will	to	purity,	and	the	conditions	of	possibility	for	purity,	are	in	decline”	(p.	177).	In	discussing	syncretism	within	organisations,	and	what	this	means	for	their	management,	Brown	and	Reavey	(2017)	highlight	a	similar	lack	of	porosity	in	how	the	“critique	of	management	typically	proceeds”	(p.	283).	Such	conventional	critique	involves,	like	the	forms	of	syncretism	discussed	above,	making	visible	how	pure	entities	depend	upon	enacting	impurity,	the	latter	of	which	is	‘illuminated’	from	the	‘darkness’	in	these	accounts.	Such	critiques	“show	how	the	two	modes	of	‘light’	and	‘dark’	depend	upon	one	another”	(p.	283),	with	their	value	being	“the	demonstration	of	how	to	invert	the	image”	(p.	284).	But	this	value	“leaves	management	pretty	much	untouched,	since	it	does	little	to	disrupt	or	destabilize	the	internal	relation	of	‘light’	and	‘dark’	to	one	another”	(p.	284).	The	natives	may	function	syncretically,	but	they	remain	unaware	of	this	syncretic	nature	because	the	relation	between	purity	and	impurity,	centring	and	decentring,	light	and	dark,	continues	to	function	on	the	basis	of	a	“gestalt	switch”	of	either/or	between	the	two	modes	that	permits	the	visibility	of	syncretism	to	be	Othered	into	absence	(p.	283).	Only	the	privileged	observer	is	able	to	see	the	gestalt	switch	in	context	sufficient	enough	to	reveal	syncretism,	and	there	is	no	mechanism	in	place	to	transmit	this	extended	field	of	vision	to	the	natives.	The	sixth	mode	of	syncretism	identified	by	Law	et	al.	(2014),	that	of	collapse,	does	not	offer	a	porosity	between	the	two	readings	directly,	but	can	nevertheless	be	a	useful	resource	within	a	wider	project	that	seeks	to	replace	a	first	reading	with	a	second.	Collapse	is	a	mode	of	syncretism	where	contradictory	logics	are	brought	together	without	“concern	with	purity	or	the	kinds	of	boundaries”	associated	with	it	(p.	186).	It	might	be	described	as	a	pragmatic	logic	of	using	whatever	works	even	if	they	clash.	However,	the	term	is	specifically	applied	to	ways	of	knowing	that	exist	in	non-Western	knowledge	spaces	like	Taiwan	that	are	made	visible	by	a	modernisation	revealing	how	people	in	these	spaces	“did	not	share	the	will	to	purity	and	[instead]	happily	and	knowingly	worked	noncoherently”	(p.	185).	Here	there	is	no	distinction	between	observer	and	native,	who	are	both	aware	of	the	coherence	and	noncoherence	necessary	in	knowing.	Such	an	intersection	was	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter	as	a	potent	methodological	laboratory	for	producing	methods	that	could	be	transported	into	epistemological	knowledge	spaces	in	an	attempt	to	shift	a	first	reading	to	a	
second,	to	merge	native	and	observer,	rather	than	maintain	two	distinct	vantage	points.		In	addition,	this	thesis	has	demonstrated	a	form	of	syncretism	that	enacts	a	shift	from	a	first	reading	to	a	second	that	is	then	maintained	without	epistemological	appropriation.	Indeed,	the	enactment	of	obdurate	interference	as	part	of	the	pinboard	method	might	be	described	as	an	attempt	to	achieve	what	Brown	and	Reavey	(2017),	following	Michel	Serres,	call	an	“endoparasitic	criticality”,	which	is	critique	that	is	“capable	of	entering	into”	the	practices	of	a	method	assemblage	being	observed	“rather	than	just	attaching	to	them	externally”	(p.	284,	
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emphasis	in	original).	Such	enactment	offers	a	syncretic	way	of	knowing	that	bridges	the	perspectives	of	both	native	and	observer	to	that	of	native-observer,	or	naive	observer.	
TWO	WAYS	OF	ENACTING	A	FLAT	ONTOLOGY	
In	Reassembling	the	Social,	Latour	(2005)	argues	that	conventional	methods	of	sociology	have	sought	to	exclusively	locate	associations	to	particular	singularities	in	the	specificities	of	local	sites	or	in	the	context	of	global	structures,	even	though	“any	given	interaction	seems	to	overflow”	those	sites	and	structures	(p.	166,	emphasis	in	original).	Indeed,	“social	scientists	have	thought	that	society	provided	a	third	dimension	in	which	all	the	interactions	should	find	a	place”	(p.	171,	emphasis	in	original).	This	describes	epistemological	methods	of	knowing.	Latour	wishes	to	enact	an	alternative	view	of	the	world,	which	he	equates	to	the	two	dimensions	of	Flatland	where	there	is	no	possibility	of	locating	associations	to	particular	(local	or	global)	sites.	To	have	a	consciousness	of	this	flat	ontology	requires	a	consciousness	of	the	3-dimensional	world	to	become	aware	that	the	dimension	of	depth	is	not	really	a	place	for	containing	things	at	all,	even	though	it	might	appear	that	way.	Latour’s	book	eloquently	explains	to	a	3-dimensional	consciousness	why	depth	isn’t	what	it	seems	to	be.	In	addition	to	revealing	how	five	types	of	occasion	where	locating	within	depth	is	a	fallacy	(and	which	ultimately	overflows),	in	the	second	part	of	the	book	he	outlines	“a	sort	of	corrective	calisthenics”	(p.	172)	that	can	be	used	to	“keep	the	social	domain	completely	flat”	(p.	171,	emphasis	in	original),	to	prevent	the	“premature	closure	of	the	social	sphere”	(p.	260,	emphasis	in	original).	Latour	gives	the	information	required	to	enact	the	consciousness	of	a	flat	ontology.	Thus,	global	entities	are	produced	in	local	sites.	A	local	site	is	itself	made	to	be	local	by	the	transported	presence	of	other	local	sites.	A	panoramic	view	doesn’t	capture	everything	even	though	it	appears	to,	because	“the	Big	Picture	is	just	that:	a	picture”	produced	by	a	local	set	of	practices	(p.	187).	
But	whilst	Latour’s	account	usefully	provides	such	sophisticated	“clamps”	(p.	174)	to	keep	the	social	flat,	this	requires	the	epistemologists,	the	‘sociologists	of	the	social’,	to	be	able	to	constantly	apply	these	clamps	in	order	to	enact	a	flat	ontology,	almost	as	if	they	must	first	enact	the	foreign	metaphysics	of	Flatland	in	their	imagination,	as	a	theoretical	possibility	that	they	must	actively	try	to	realise	in	practice.	Yet	Latour	also	suggests	the	simplicity	of	it	all:	to	be	empirical,	to	follow	the	natives.	The	method	this	thesis	has	used	to	enact	a	pinboard	requires	only	an	empiricism	characterised	by	both	naiveté	and	exploration	of	boundaries	that	is	part	and	parcel	of	what	it	means	to	be	a	good	epistemologist.	Indeed,	it	is	in	this	regard	that	Latour	can	make	the	apparently	sarcastic	remark,	“I	am,	in	the	end,	a	naïve	realist,	a	positivist”	(p.	156).	
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To	be	sure,	the	successful	enactment	of	obdurate	interferences	through	the	pinboard	method	within	this	thesis	is	distinctly	methodological,	and	their	relevance	to	the	institutional	spaces	of	the	integrative	paradigm	needs	to	be	established.	If	the	epistemological	methods	of	the	integrative	paradigm	(and	beyond)	already	enacted	the	empiricism	promoted	in	this	thesis,	then	there	would	be	no	need	for	any	intervention	at	all.	Moreover,	the	efficacy	of	obdurate	interferences	at	performing	a	viable	syncretic	visibility	given	that	they	apply	only	to	very	specific	impossible	potentialities	amongst	a	wide	range	of	possible	potentialities	being	produced	in	duration	might	also	be	questioned	and	explored.		Nevertheless,	they	offer	alternative	methodological	means	for	knowing	lived	experience	beyond	the	insufficient	epistemological	methods	which	have	dominated	(and	continue	to	dominate)	integrative	paradigm	research,	and	interview	research	into	experience	more	widely.	Indeed,	in	contributing	to	the	methodological	arguments	regarding	the	problem	of	knowing	lived	experience,	the	thesis	has	introduced,	and	added	to	the	development	of,	a	novel	practical	method	to	address	this	problem	in	the	form	of	the	pinboard,	including	the	extensive	hinterland	usually	reserved	for	analysis	of	science	and	technology.	
DEVELOPING	THE	PINBOARD	
The	thesis	has	developed	Law’s	(2002,	2006)	pinboard,	in	four	important	ways.	
Firstly,	in	Chapter	7	it	combined	the	conventional	understanding	of	a	pinboard	as	a	surface	of	juxtaposition	with	the	processes	that	produce	it,	namely	of	enacting	a	naive	reader	observing	the	practices	of	a	method	assemblage.	That	is,	it	combined	the	pinboard	with	the	process	of	empiricism.		
Second,	it	produced	an	explicit	method,	based	on	these	principles,	that	can	be	readily	replicated	(Chapter	8).	The	lack	of	an	explicit	method	is	apparent	in	previous	descriptions	of	the	pinboard.	
Third,	reflection	on	the	execution	of	the	method	(Chapter	14)	suggested	the	pinboard	is	vulnerable	to	epistemological	appropriation	because	it	is	unable	to	Other	into	absence	the	possibility	for	resolution	of	the	juxtaposition(s)	it	makes	visible.	However,	this	reflection	identified	pairs	of	juxtaposed	multiples	where	coordination	through	choosing	one	multiple	over	the	other	within	each	pair	was	impossible.	One	depended	on	the	presence	of	the	other	it	is	juxtaposed	with,	even	whilst	that	presence	of	that	other	
cannot	be	contained	within	the	first.	Such	obdurate	interferences	were	identified	by	Law	(2002),	where	accounts	are	sustained	by	incoherence	as	much	as	coherence,	but	this	thesis	has	added	to	their	understanding	through	suggesting	that	obdurate	interferences	are	crucial	to	preventing	the	epistemological	appropriation	of	the	controversy	where	it	
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becomes	an	entity-to-be-resolved	(distributing	multiplicity	into	space-as-time).	Whilst	potential	resolution	of	the	controversy	can	(and	does)	subsequently	arise	through	further	reflection	on	the	controversy,	the	presence	of	an	impossible	resolution	even	in	an	instant	is	enough	to	enact	the	elusive	goal	of	fractional	conditions	of	possibility.	
The	fourth	contribution	of	this	thesis	to	the	development	of	the	pinboard	is	the	argument	that	it	can	only	achieve	its	fractional	conditions	of	possibility	by	allowing,	if	necessary,	controversies	to	be	resolved.	This	is	part	of	a	commitment	to	empiricism,	to	following	the	natives,	as	opposed	to	trying	to	resist	the	resolution	of	controversies.	Such	resistance	has	conventionally	been	regarded	as	integral	to	what	it	means	to	practice	a	pinboard,	but	as	noted,	a	controversy	cannot	be	held	‘still’	because	projections	of	future	resolution	are	inevitably	also	made	visible.	Rather,	this	commitment	to	empiricism	permits	actors	to	resolve	the	controversies	they	create,	with	the	pinboard	method	being	based	on	an	assumption	that	the	obdurate	interferences	required	to	establish	fractional	subjectivities	will	be	produced	if	the	natives	are	followed	for	long	enough,	and	which	can	then	be	charted.	
In	addition	to	its	application	to	the	problem	of	experience	(the	concern	of	this	thesis),	the	pinboard	method	that	has	been	developed	over	the	previous	chapters	might	be	regarded	as	contributing	to	a	wider	post-epistemological	project	(when	correctly	conceived	–	see	box,	below)	intervening	on	epistemology,	a	project	that	this	thesis	has	drawn	widely	from.	
TWO	READINGS	OF	AN	INTERVENTION	ON	EPISTEMOLOGY	
Interventions	on	epistemology	have	often	been	read	epistemologically,	an	appropriation	that	by	this	point	in	the	thesis	should	not	be	seen	as	ironic.	Indeed,	“a	lot	of	people”,	Mol	and	Mesman	(1996)	assert,	“cling	to	some	variety	of	epistemology,	even	after	its	death”	(p.	424).	Over	20	years	ago	Mol	and	Mesman	wrote	that	for	decades	PhD	supervisors	had	been	advising	their	Science	Studies	students	to:	
Mol	and	Mesman	suggest	that	such	interventions	on	epistemology	ignored	the	significance	of	the	content	of	the	product	being	unravelled	because	they	aimed	at	a	separate	goal	of	contributing	to	a	wider	project	of	undermining	epistemology.	The	objects	these	interventions	so	intricately	examine	serve	as	intermediaries	for	an	
Go	and	unravel	the	construction	of	an	object.	Any	object!	It	doesn’t	matter	what.	The	laws	of	gravity,	a	nuclear	power	plant	or	the	HIV	virus	–	anything	will	do.	Just	show	that	the	thing	doesn’t	exist	by	itself,	but	depends	on	something	else.	Which	is	true.	But	why	repeat	it?	The	only	reason	for	doing	so	seems	to	be	to	undermine	epistemology.	Again.	And	again.	And	yet	again.	And	once	you’ve	shown	your	object	doesn’t	rest	on	sure	foundations	you	can	sit	back	and	relax.	(p.	423)	
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underlying	structure	of	a	project	of	anti-epistemology,	and	those	objects	carry	no	meaning	that	cannot	be	learned	from	examining	this	underlying	structure.	But,	of	course,	it	is	only	through	a	careful	“attending	to	the	normative	ordering	of	one’s	field	of	study”	(p.	424)	that	allow	objects	to	object	to	this	ordering,	a	commitment	to	naive	empiricism	that	permits	the	affirmation	of	the	non-relational	constituting	an	intervention	on	epistemology.	Indeed,	both	the	motivation	for,	and	execution	of,	the	epistemological	intervention	offered	in	this	thesis	arises	because	of	a	commitment	to	knowing	the	experience	of	chronic	pain	for	the	particular	participant	interviewed.	
This	is	a	wider	post-epistemological	project	that,	as	Chapters	2	and	7	discussed,	in	not	simply	driven	by	a	methodological	curiosity,	but	about	what	it	means	to	be.	For,	as	the	
problem	of	experience	demonstrates,	the	duration	of	one’s	being	cannot	be	adequately	contained	by	cutting	it	up	into	neat	analytical	segments.	To	think	in	such	epistemological	terms	means	not	only	to	initiate	representational	paradoxes	that	cannot	be	comprehended,	but	a	crisis	of	being	that	speaks	to	the	very	heart	of	what	it	means	to	exist.	The	epistemological	intervention	of	this	thesis	thus	speaks	more	widely	than	its	narrow	attention	to	a	representational	problem	within	the	integrative	paradigm	might	suggest:	
Method?	What	we’re	dealing	with	here	is	not,	of	course,	just	method.	It	is	not	just	a	set	of	techniques.	It	is	not	just	a	philosophy	of	method,	a	methodology.	It	is	not	even	simply	about	the	kinds	of	realities	that	we	want	to	recognise	or	the	kinds	of	worlds	we	might	hope	to	make.	It	is	also,	and	most	fundamentally,	about	a	way	of	being.	(Law,	2004,	p.	10)	
THE	FINAL	WORD:	ON	DISCONCERTMENT
In	advancing	fractional	subjectivities,	Law	and	Lin	(2010)	suggest	that	the	bodily	sensation	of	disconcertment	should	be	cultivated	because,	as	has	been	discussed,	“when	radically	different	metaphysics	intersect,	their	disjunction	is	experienced	as	
bodily	disconcertment”	(p.	141,	emphasis	in	original).	Here	disconcertment	might	be	understood	as	“hesitation	[…]	as	bodily	affect”,	where	“[t]hrough	affect	the	body	waits	before	acting”	(Al-Saji,	2014,	p.	143).	Throughout	the	production	of	this	thesis	I	experienced	this	sensation	often,	the	traces	of	which,	barely	expressed,	ebb	through	in	the	entries	of	the	Acknowledgements	section.	The	presence	of	disconcertment	is	indicative	that	the	consciousness	of	the	naive	reader	observing	and	charting	the	processes	of	a	method	assemblage	is	not	as	simple	as	it	looks.	There	are	many	more	interferences	encountered	than	those	within	the	narrative	of	the	participant.	For	a	
There	are,	and	there	will	always	be,	miserable	days	in	the	lives	of	researchers.	These	are	the	days	when	the	inevitable	realization	that	our	work	is	utterly	inadequate	at	apprehending	the	intricate	textures	of	the	lifeworld	subjects	of	our	analysis	and	description	strikes	with	its	mightiest	force.	(Vannini,	2015,	p.	1)	
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start,	the	naive	observer	charting	a	method	assemblage	must	do	so	within	word	limits,	within	deadlines,	within	certain	styles.	Then	there	are	a	number	of	interferences	between	theories,	trains	of	thought,	ideas,	that	must	be	resolved	into	(some	sort	of)	singular	narrative	if	it	is	going	to	be	regarded	as	an	acceptable	piece	of	work.	The	objects	the	observer	tries	to	fit	into	these	metrical	chains	often	object,	creating	a	controversy.	But	these	are	not	controversies	to	be	held	still,	to	be	made	visible	on	a	pinboard,	as	an	expression	of	a	fractional	subjectivity.	These	must	be	resolved,	and	then	Othered	into	absence.	And	then	there	is,	of	course,	all	of	that	which	is	Othered	into	our	‘private’	lives	but	which	in	reality	interferes	quite	readily	in	the	‘professional’.	
Moreover,	whilst	disconcertment	reveals	the	juxtaposition	of	the	controversy,	this	is	not	the	enjoyment	of	a	living	in	tension	(Moreira,	2012),	but	something	intrinsically	negative	(much	like	the	againstness	of	pain	–	see	Chapter	2).	Dictionary	example	usages	of	‘disconcertment’	are	described	in	emotionally	negative	terms	(e.g.	“disconcerted	by	their	bleakness”)	(Disconcert,	n.d.	a).	I	suggest	that,	like	pain,	this	emotional	negativity	carries	something	important	about	being.	One	notable	definition	of	‘disconcert’	is	“to	disturb	the	self-possession	of”	(Disconcert,	n.d.	b).	This	is	the	projection	of	being	into	a	representational	entity,	the	subsequent	penetration	of	which	is	experienced	as	horror	(see	discussion	of	Lacan	and	Kristeva	in	Chapter	7).	Rather	than	being	regarded	as	fractional,	disconcertment	can	be	understood	instead	as	equivalent	to	the	telic	demand	of	pain	(Chapter	2),	of	a	need	to	resolve	the	juxtaposition	that	has	been	presented.	To	be	sure,	we	can	describe	this	mode	of	syncretism	(as	I	am	doing	now),	but	its	non-porous	nature	between	first	and	second	readings	locks	the	consciousness	of	the	researcher	into	epistemological	conditions	of	possibility	rather	than	offering	a	route	out.		
If	this	crisis	of	being	is	an	important	motivator	for	a	post-epistemological	project,	we	might	ask	why	its	proponents	continue	to	readily	enact	their	consciousness	within	the	confines	of	epistemological	conditions	of	possibility	in	the	process	of	trying	to	escape	them.	To	truly	hesitate	means	to	make	visible	the	naive	observer	as	a	blank	object,	as	the	intersection	of	multiple	virtual	planes	brought	together	as	a	singularity,	effecting	a	subject	that	is	disconcerted,	torn	apart	ferociously	by	opposing	logics	(see	also	Appendix	1).	For	Law	and	Lin	(2010)	this	means	cultivating	disconcertment,	but,	in	a	world	that	affirms	life,	what	would	it	mean	to	cultivate	the	ontologically	negative?	How	might	we	approach	the	horror	of	‘learning	to	be	a	loser’	(Harrison,	2015)?	If	our	preoccupation	with,	or	rather	our	gratitude	to,	the	actual	is	the	mask	that	prevents	the	hesitation	required	to	make	visible	the	simultaneity	of	actualisation	with	virtualisation	(i.e.	fractional	conditions	of	possibility),	what	would	it	mean	to	recognise	that	the	gift	of	the	actual	“will	always	(already)	be	the	gift	of	death	as	much	as	life”	(p.	294)?
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APPENDIX	1:	REFLECTION	ON	INTERVIEW	PRACTICE	
After	each	interview	I	wrote	a	reflection	in	which	I	intended	to	record	my	thoughts	and	feelings	about	the	interview	should	I	wish	to	return	to	them	at	a	later	date.	Ranging	from	a	few	brief	notes	to	a	couple	of	pages	of	stream-of-consciousness	text,	I	re-examined	these	towards	the	end	of	my	PhD	(several	years	after	they	were	written),	with	the	intention	of	constructing	a	general	reflection	on	practice	within	the	interviews.	I	was	struck	by	the	many	different	themes	and	issues	that	the	reflections	raise	in	relation	to	the	ideas	this	thesis	has	discussed.	For	practicality,	I	here	focus	on	just	a	few	interrelated	themes	that	focus	on	a	central	issue	that	I	as	an	interviewer	found	most	challenging	in	implementing	the	method	outlined	in	Chapter	8:	managing	the	relationship	between	certainty	and	uncertainty.1	Just	after	my	final	interview	with	Stephanie2	I	expressed	a	feeling	that	for	Stephanie’s	interviews	I	had	managed	to	enact	the	intended	method.	That	is,	being	naively	led	in	the	construction	of	a	coherent	narrative	with	a	defined	boundary	over	which	I	could	gradually	glimpse	a	non-relational	element	that	constituted	something	different.	Thus,	in	my	reflection	after	Stephanie’s	fifth	interview	I	noted:	
It	was	like	childbirth.	Over	the	interviews	I	had	patiently	sat	with	Stephanie	as	we	tried	to	make	sense	of	what	was	going	on,	defining	ideas	about	her	pain,	pinning	down	the	boundaries	of	her	experience	or	what	she	thought	her	experience	was	about.	And	all	the	time	the	contradictions	within	the	narrative	threatened	to	give	birth	to	something	new,	offering	the	transformative	movement,	the	process,	that	I	had	hoped	to	encounter	in	these	sets	of	interviews.		The	naivety	is	here	expressed	in	the	‘patience’	with	which	I	had	seemingly	resisted	my	own	sense	of	self	and	made	the	pursuit	of	authentically	translating	Stephanie’s	experience	into	a	coherent	narrative	the	priority.	Or	more	precisely,	I	had	managed	to	put	into	abeyance	what	my	own	thoughts	and	ideas	about	the	way	things	should	be,	and	instead	used	these	thoughts	and	ideas	as	a	theoretical	ground	of	interpretation	in	the	attempt	to	produce	an	authentic	translation	of	Stephanie’s	experience.	Indeed,	this	theoretical	ground	of	interpretation	was	particularly	important	in	the	translational	process,	where	I	as	interviewer	acted	as	intermediary	between	a	participant’s	lived	experience	and	the	final	publically	shareable	account,	as	I	suggested	in	a	reflective	note	after	one	of	Judith’s	interviews:	it	was	as	“if	she	was	allowing	me	to	build	up	the	story	based	upon	her	experiences,	and	then	she	feeling	whether	the	story	I	have	constructed	felt	right	(and	it	did)”.	As	such,	it	was	“as	if	we	had																																									 																					
1	Whilst	this	discussion	of	the	experience	of	interview	practice	is	usefully	contrasted	with	the	formal	method	of	Chapter	8	(which	is	why	the	first	reference	to	this	appendix	is	made	there),	it	is	advisable	to	have	read	Part	II	beforehand	since	this	provides	methodological	reflections	relevant	to	this	discussion	as	well	as	a	more	detailed	understanding	of	the	narrative	accounts	being	discussed.	2	As	noted	at	the	beginning	of	Part	II,	all	names	used	are	pseudonyms.	Each	pseudonym	is	used	consistently	for	the	same	participant	throughout	the	thesis.	
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gradually	constructed	a	working	model	of	the	meaning	of	her	pain,	and	that	I	had	attempted	to	produce	the	blueprints.”	This	theoretical	ground	of	interpretation	acts	as	a	field	for	unfolding	centring	processes	to	act	upon	rather	than	dictating	the	nature	of	the	processes	that	act	upon	that	ground.	In	this	idealised	understanding	of	naiveté,	the	only	thing	that	decides	the	nature	of	the	way	things	
should	be	are	the	assumptions	that	each	participant	has	an	experience	that	can	be	authentically	translated	into	a	coherent	and	publically	shareable	account	through	establishing	‘depth’	in	the	interviews	(as	part	of	the	communicable	cartography	of	integrative	paradigm	interview	research	outlined	in	Chapter	8).	My	reflection	in	the	block	quote	above	can	be	seen	to	contain	this	idealised	understanding.		Yet	even	within	this	quote	there	is	another	‘should’:	“I	had	hoped	to	encounter”	the	“transformative	movement”	when	the	contradictions	that	gradually	emerged	within	the	developing	narrative	promised	the	possibility	of	something	else	(i.e.	a	non-relational	element).	It	is	in	this	sense	that	I	described	it	as	“like	childbirth”,	since	it	has	an	assumption	that	any	narrative	will	eventually	encounter	its	non-relational	element,	with	the	promise	that	the	narrative	will	give	birth	to	something	else.1	Indeed,	it	is	not	simply	a	“hope”	but	a	global	claim	that	guides	an	expectation	that	fractional	accounts	will	be	produced.	This	led	to	me	looking	out	for	alternative	narratives	on	the	assumption	that	they	should	be	there	rather	than	allowing	myself	to	be	naively	led	by	the	attempt	to	centre	a	coherent,	authentic	account	of	the	participant’s	experience.	This	expectation	meant	I	met	with	surprise	when	I	couldn’t	seem	to	detect	any	signs	of	an	alternative	in	Judith’s	narrative,	as	I	noted	in	my	reflection	after	her	first	interview	(which	was	also	the	first	interview	I	performed	for	this	PhD):	
Judith’s	narrative	seemed	pretty	concrete.	It	didn’t	seem	to	break	down.	It	didn’t	seem	to	falter	one	little	bit.	Yes,	there	was	a	conflict	within	the	narrative,	but	the	conflict	did	not	threaten	the	logical	construction	of	its	plot	but	instead	formed	part	of	that	plot.	[…]	Far	from	exploring	the	fluid	nature	of	pain,	I	am	exploring	the	complexity	of	something	that	is	very	fixed	for	Judith,	a	fixity	that	I	readily	consume	and	reinforce.	Where	are	the	traces	of	the	alternative	narrative,	hanging	in	the	background,	masked	by	the	certainty	of	Judith’s	‘therapeutic	journey’?”	(emphasis	in	original)																																									 																					
1	This	occurs	as	the	narrative	of	a	participant’s	lived	experience	becomes	increasingly	defined	and	more	complex	over	the	course	of	the	interviews,	developing	a	complexity	that	eventually	means	it	grows	contradictions	that	overflow	its	own	(coherent)	terms	of	possibility	(to	paraphrase	Latour,	2005	–	see	also	Chapter	6).	Building	on	the	childbirth	analogy,	as	pregnancy	advances	there	is	a	growing	complexity	of	physical	matter	(enacted	in	the	physical	symptoms	of	pregnancy	and,	most	strikingly,	in	the	frequent	MRI	scans)	that	increasingly	gives	rise	to	a	performance	of	a	new	individuality	distinct	from	the	one	that	it	has	arisen	from.	This	reaches	its	climax	in	the	pain	of	labour,	where	the	simultaneity	of	the	seamless	connection	between	two	individuals	that	are	nevertheless	also	(elusively)	distinct	express	the	crisis,	the	controversy,	of	fractionality,	with	the	promise	of	resolution	into	two	splendidly	isolated	individuals	when	the	placenta	is	finally	cut.	
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We	might	consider	this	as	a	problem	of	how	to	identify	the	boundaries	of	the	developing	narrative	–	of	whether	an	attention	to	the	potential	of	alternatives	was	necessary	to	enact	the	pinboard	or	whether	such	attention	provided	a	distraction	that	actually	undermined	the	naivety	necessary	for	the	pinboard’s	enactment:	
[…]	am	I	being	too	self-conscious	of	this	process	[of	identifying	alternatives],	worrying	too	much	about	missing	the	possibilities	that	lie	within	the	present,	or	am	I	justified	in	trying	to	pay	more	attention	to	other	subjugated	narratives	that	lie	behind?	(From	reflection	on	Judith’s	first	interview)	Thinking	about	this	early	in	the	data	collection	period,	I	concluded	that	naive	empiricism	requires	pre-established	expectations	about	alternatives	to	be	put	into	abeyance.	Instead,	the	identification	of	narrative	boundaries	and	then	“attend[ing]	to	the	textures	on	the	margins”	(Law	&	Lien,	2012,	p.	373)	was	understood	as	the	narrative	being	centred	giving	birth	to	some	form	of	resistance	to	the	logical	direction	of	the	interview	discussion	in	its	attempt	to	further	flesh	out	a	coherence	to	the	narrative.1	Indeed,	it	is	only	through	such	a	naive	empiricism	that	the	expectation	of	producing	alternatives	can	ever	be	actualised:	
Perhaps	I	should	remind	myself:	process	will	happen	by	paying	attention	to	the	present,	not	trying	to	force	it	to	happen,	or	becoming	upset	when	I	don’t	think	it	has	happened	or	happened	enough.	I	should	be	humble	rather	than	expecting	to	chart	and	predict	it.	(From	reflection	on	Eric’s	third	interview)	What	this	means	is	coming	to	terms	with	a	‘paradox’:	in	order	to	even	begin	to	be	certain	about	producing	fractional	accounts	I	needed	to	avoid	projecting	them	as	possible	alternatives	to	what	was	being	made	in	the	present	practice	of	the	interview.	To	do	so	would	be	to	already	have	two	narratives,	yet	the	pinboard	method	proposes	that	an	alternative	narrative	will	arise	from	and	as	part	of	a	first	narrative	as	it	becomes	increasingly	defined.	But	like	any	fractional	understanding	of	a	paradox,	this	does	not	involve	an	either/or:	it	does	not	mean	that	the	global	assumption	that	fractional	accounts	will	be	produced	should	be	dismissed.	Indeed,	the	thesis	aims	to	produce	fractional	accounts	of	lived	experience	in	direct	reflection	of	this	global	aim,	and	the	method	it	uses	explicitly	establishes	two	‘apriori’	themes	beforehand	(see	Chapter	8).	But	achieving	this	aim,	of	being	able	to	enact	these	two	
a	priori	themes,	meant	somehow	being	able	to	prevent	their	imposition	as	a	distraction	to	the	radical	empirical	attention	to	the	present.	What	this	required,	I	concluded,	was	faith:	“faith	in	the	process	of	the	interview,	to	let	it	go	as	and	how	the	particular	moment	decides”	(reflection	after	Judith’s	first	interview).																																									 																					
1	This	expressed	itself	as	the	participant	providing	the	resistance,	and	myself	(as	the	interviewer)	recognising	and	then	providing	the	attention	to	the	topic	of	this	resistance.	This	narrative	work	of	resistance	included	participants	repeating	improbably	vague	explanations,	strongly	defending	against	something,	and	providing	contradictions	(see	Chapters	9	to	13	for	full	discussions).	Note	that	I	did	not	regard	this	participant-interviewer	dynamic	as	provoking	distress	in	participants.	
259	
Faith	is	a	concept	that	permits	a	certainty	through	uncertainty.	In	this	sense	it	captures	the	way	in	which	the	practice	of	the	interview	is	itself	enacted	in	fractional	conditions	of	possibility	(see	also	Chapters	5	and	7).	The	Christian	New	Testament	describes	faith	as	“being	[…]	certain	of	what	we	do	not	see”	(Hebrews	11:	1,	New	International	Version).	Having	faith	in	the	centring	processes	I	was	pursuing	in	the	interview	(authentically	translating	the	participant’s	lived	experience)	meant	that	I	could	both	be	certain	of	the	global	assumption	of	fractional	conditions	of	possibility	and	the	uncertainty	that	is	required	to	enact	such	certainty.	But	this	faith	was	tested.	For	what	was	at	stake	was	not	simply	some	abstract	claim	but	the	success	of	the	project	and	my	own	sense	of	self	that	I	attached	to	such	success:	“But	where	will	this	leave	my	PhD	if	I	decide	to	trust	the	uncertainty?	What	if	I	end	up	in	a	situation	where	this	‘empirical’	data	doesn’t	show	anything	at	all?”	(Reflection	after	Judith’s	first	interview).	Centring	a	narrative	of	experience	without	an	expectation	of	it	eventually	being	accompanied	by	the	decentring	movement	central	to	this	‘success’	was	a	scary	prospect:	
[Might	Judith’s	narrative	of	lived	experience]	break	down?	It	might.	But	what	if	it	doesn’t?	If	it	does	it	will	clearly	be	something	that	shows	the	inherent	fluidity	of	ideas	about	pain.	But	if	it	doesn’t,	does	this	mean	my	work	has	failed?	Is	it	useless?	(From	reflection	on	Judith’s	second	interview)	Indeed,	much	of	the	data	collection	period	can	be	characterised	as	me	struggling	with	keeping	faith	in	the	interview	practice,	experiencing	a	constant	anxiety	that	expressed	the	doubts	that	I	had	in	this	counter-intuitive	method.	Moreover,	where	I	did	trust	in	the	uncertainty	of	the	interview	process	and	alternative	threads	did	begin	to	emerge	from	the	participants’	narratives,	the	satisfaction	with	(or	‘gratitude	to’	–	see	Chapter	14)	such	products	acted	as	a	temptation	to	already	establish	them	as	a	certainty	in	future	practice,	with	me	forgetting	that	pulling	on	the	finger	trap	in	this	way	simply	made	the	trap	worse.	This	ability	to	maintain	certainty	through	faith	in	the	uncertainty	of	‘what	is’,	which	perhaps	requires	a	sort	of	bravery,	extends	beyond	the	mechanics	of	interview	practice	to	the	whole	process	of	doing	research	(and,	of	course,	to	being	in	general).	Discussing	such	anxiety	about	uncertainty	with	my	supervisor,	Tiago	Moreira,	he	had	suggested	that	answers	do	not	follow	research	questions,	but	the	other	way	around.	In	this	sense:	
Tiago	was	right	when	he	claimed	that	I	will	not	know	my	research	question	until	after	I	have	answered	it.	Nevertheless,	the	uncertainty	of	this	process	can	be	very	disconcerting,1	and	it	is	this	uncertainty	that	will	probably	be	the	biggest	obstacle	to	truly	achieving	a	process-biased	account	of	pain.	(From	reflection	on	Mary’s	second	interview).																																									 																					
1	I	wrote	this	reflection	before	encountering	Law	and	Lin’s	(2010)	explicit	consideration	of	‘disconcertment’	and	their	encouraging	of	it.	See	Chapters	7,	14,	and	15	for	further	discussion.	
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APPENDIX	2:	PARTICIPANT	INFORMATION	SHEET	
(Starts	next	page)	Following	a	request	from	the	National	Health	Service	Research	Ethics	Committee	that	went	on	to	grant	approval	for	the	study,	the	content	of	this	document	was	informed	by	feedback	from	patients	involved	in	a	patient-public	involvement	(PPI)	programme,	who	commented	on	the	quality	of	its	communication.	
Note	1:	The	document	has	been	scaled	down	to	maintain	its	original	formatting	whilst	
respecting	the	thesis	margin	requirements.	The	original	size	of	the	document	is	A4.	A	full-sized	
version	is	available	upon	request.	
Note	2:	The	name	of	the	physiotherapist	who	facilitated	recruitment	has	been	redacted	from	
the	document	to	prevent	the	possibility	of	participant	identification	through	deduction	
(‘deductive	disclosure’).	
Note	3:	The	document	used	during	the	study	was	printed	in	black	and	white	(and	is	shown	as	
such	in	the	printed	version	of	this	thesis).	
Note	4:	The	title	of	the	study	changed	during	the	course	of	the	study	itself,	and	as	such	the	title	
listed	on	the	following	document	differs	from	the	title	of	this	thesis.
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Version: 1.5 
Dated: 12 June 2015 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
A qualitative account of pain enactment with persons in chronic pain 
We would like to invite you to take part in a research study investigating how pain is 
expressed by chronic pain patients. Before you decide whether or not to take part we 
would like you to understand why the research is being done and what it would 
involve for you. Please read through the following information carefully. If you have 
any questions please contact the researcher using the contact details at the end of 
this information sheet. Your participation is entirely voluntary – you do not have to 
take part if you do not want to. 
Name of Researcher: Leigh Rooney 
 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
The study seeks to explore what happens to ideas about pain in conversation. It 
suggests that whilst these ideas may seem very clear and definite, when we 
examine what happens to them in the flow of conversation we see that they are very 
changeable, and exist alongside other ideas about pain. For example, a patient may 
be certain that only a particular medical explanation can account for their pain, but 
examining their everyday conversation reveals lots of other ways of thinking about 
their pain. The study wants to enable us to become more aware of these other ideas 
of pain that may become ‘hidden’ in conversations about pain. It aims to do this by 
exploring what happens to ideas about pain over a series of individual (one-on-one) 
conversational interviews between the researcher and chronic pain patients. 
The term ‘enactment’ used in the study’s title is a technical term used to describe the 
process of talking about pain. Please be assured that it does not mean that a patient 
is viewed as ‘play-acting’ or ‘putting-on’ (pretending or faking) their pain. 
This study is being undertaken as part of a PhD programme. Leigh Rooney is the 
PhD student, and is being supervised by academic supervisors at Durham University. 
Why have I been invited to take part? 
You are being invited to take part because, as a person who experiences chronic 
pain, you will probably have ideas about your pain that you can talk about in an 
interview with the researcher. The researcher aims to recruit 5 participants for a 
series of individual (one-on-one) interviews between the participant and the 
researcher. 
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Do I have to take part? 
No, participation is entirely voluntary. Whether you decide to take part or not, this will 
not in any way affect the service or care you receive from your physiotherapist or any 
other healthcare worker. Only the researcher and his primary academic supervisor 
will know who has decided to take part in the study. Nobody else will know, including 
your physiotherapist. 
What will I have to do? 
You will be asked to take part in a total of 5 one-on-one interviews with the 
researcher. Each interview is expected to last about an hour (up to a maximum of 90 
minutes), with 15 minutes either side for meeting and departing. This can include 
comfort breaks as and when you want, and you can stop or rearrange the interview 
at any point during it. 
During the interviews the researcher will be interested in having a discussion about 
your chronic pain. The researcher won’t have a particular set of questions or 
particular topics to talk about, but will invite you to talk about any topics related to 
your pain that you wish. 
In order to get the discussion going in the first interview, the researcher will ask you 
to produce a short written piece (aiming for about 1 – 4 sides of paper) beforehand 
explaining aspects of your pain that you feel are not understood by others. You can 
write this up digitally (such as on a computer or tablet), or manually (using pen and 
paper). The researcher can also give you a video camera to borrow should you wish 
to do this in a video format rather than in writing. If you would like to borrow a video 
camera for this study you will not be held liable for any loss and/or damage to the 
video camera while it is in your possession. 
You can then post a hand-written or printed copy of your material back to the 
researcher using a pre-stamped envelope provided by the researcher. Alternatively, 
if you have word-processed the piece or filmed it, you can save the data to an 
encrypted memory stick provided by the researcher, and post it in the pre-stamped 
envelope. However, if you don’t feel comfortable doing this, the researcher can 
collect it from you in person. 
After obtaining your written or videoed piece, the researcher will look over it, and use 
it to start the discussion in the first interview. The second interview will be started 
using material from the first interview, and this will continue all the way through to the 
fifth interview. 
The interviews can be arranged at locations most convenient to you, such as at your 
home or at Durham University (which has sites in Stockton-on-Tees and Durham 
263	
                           
 
 
Participant Information Sheet                                                                       Page 3 of 6 
Version: 1.5 
Dated: 12 June 2015 
 
city). These cannot take place at an NHS facility, however (because the necessary 
permissions have not been sought). Note also that the interview locations will need 
to be quiet so that they can be recorded on the audio device. If you incur any travel 
costs getting to and from the interviews, these can be reimbursed to you in the form 
of high street vouchers. You would need to provide the researcher with receipts 
(such as bus tickets, taxi receipts, petrol receipts, and parking tickets) so that the 
researcher can claim the vouchers. 
What is the involvement of my physiotherapist in the study? 
The [title of physiotherapist] who informed you about the study ([--REDACTED--]) 
is not involved in the study beyond providing information to potential participants. No 
data about a participant’s involvement in the study will be fed back to him, and he will 
not know who has decided to take part or even who has contacted the researcher 
about the study. Your decision of whether or not to take part in the study will not 
affect your treatment with him or any other health care provider. 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
Yes. The only people who will know that you have taken part will be the researcher 
and his primary academic supervisor (Tiago Moreira). Neither your physiotherapist 
nor any other health worker will be aware whether or not you participate. 
The interview will be recorded onto a digital recording device and transcribed by the 
researcher. During the transcription process the researcher will remove all 
information that might be used to identify you (such as any names or locations), 
including information that might be used to identify you by deduction (such as if you 
won a rare award that was made public). Your name or personal details will not 
appear on any of the reports or publications that result from this research. Quotes 
from your interview may be used in publications and presentations, but these will 
have information that could identify you removed. It cannot be ruled out that 
somebody who is very familiar with you would be able to identify you from published 
accounts or presentations produced using your data, though this is thought to be 
very unlikely to occur. 
Your pre-interview videoed or word-processed piece will be transferred on an 
encrypted memory stick (unless you choose to print the word-processed piece as a 
hard copy and then post it). This will have a password specific to you (each 
participant will have a separate password), and known only to you and the 
researcher. This means that should the memory stick be used by anyone else, the 
data will not be accessible (it will remain encrypted). Once your data has been 
transferred to the researcher’s computer at Durham University it will be deleted from 
the memory stick. 
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The audio recording, any digital material you made for the stimulus piece (see last 
section), and a digital copy of your transcript will be stored on a secure computer 
network at Durham University. Only the researcher and his primary academic 
supervisor will be able to see it, and only the researcher will have a password to 
access them. Any paper stimulus material you produce, your contact form, your 
informed consent form, and your transcript (when not being analysed) will be stored 
in a locked filing cabinet in the researcher’s office at Durham University. Only the 
researcher will have the key to this cabinet, and only the researcher or his academic 
supervisor will be able to view its contents. Your audio recording, stimulus material, 
and contact form will be kept for a maximum of 12 months after it has been collected, 
after which it will be destroyed. Your transcript (which won’t contain your personal 
data) will be kept for up to 3 years following your final interview so that the 
researcher has time to analyse and write about it. After this, both paper and digital 
versions will be destroyed. Your informed consent form will be kept for 3 years 
following the last interview in the study, before being destroyed. 
Please be aware that if you disclose information during the study about risk of 
significant harm to yourself or others, or about a crime that requires the researcher to 
inform relevant authorities, your confidentiality may need to be broken. 
What will happen if I want to withdraw from the study? 
You are free to withdraw from the study at any time without giving a reason. You will 
be able to withdraw your data from a particular interview at any point up until 2 
months after that interview. After this period it will not be possible to withdraw your 
data because it will have been analysed by the researcher, who will have no time to 
collect more data. You are free to withdraw all or part of your data, and you may 
request a copy of your transcript from the researcher. 
You are free to stop an interview at any point, either to take a break and then 
continue, stop the current interview but with the intention of attending future 
interviews, or permanently withdraw from the study. You are also free to ask the 
researcher to change the topic of discussion if you find it too distressing. 
If you lose the capacity to give informed consent during the study, your data from a 
particular interview will be withdrawn and destroyed if the researcher becomes 
aware of this within 2 months of that interview. 
Will it cost me anything to take part? 
If you decide on an interview location outside of your home, you will incur travel 
costs. The researcher will reimburse you for these in the form of high street vouchers 
equivalent to the value of your travel costs. You will need to provide the researcher 
with receipts for travel (such as bus tickets, taxi receipts, petrol receipts, and parking 
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tickets) so that the researcher can make a claim to cover these costs. Car travel will 
be reimbursed at the rate of £0.45 per mile. 
There are no other costs anticipated. 
What are the possible risks of taking part in the study? 
It is unlikely that you will become distressed during the interview discussions, but if 
you do you should be aware that you have the right to stop an interview at any point. 
This can be to take a break, or to stop the interview entirely. You are then welcome 
to continue with future interviews, or you may wish to withdraw entirely from the 
study. You do not need to give a reason for your withdrawal. You are also free to ask 
the researcher to change the topic of discussion if you find it too distressing, and you 
can withdraw some or all of your data from a particular interview for up to 2 months 
after that interview. You can request a copy of your transcript from the researcher. 
If you experience discomfort during the interview, you are also welcome to take a 
break at any point or even stop the interview. 
There is a very small risk that people very familiar with you might be able to identify 
you from publications or presentations using your data. This is thought to be a very 
unlikely scenario, however (see the section on confidentiality, above). 
What are the possible benefits of taking part?  
There may be no direct benefits to you by taking part in the study. Nevertheless, you 
may feel better from having the opportunity to talk in depth with someone about your 
pain. This should not be regarded as a substitute for therapy, however. 
In addition, your interviews may prove valuable in influencing academic and clinical 
thinking about pain, which in turn may feed back to chronic pain patients. 
What will happen to the results of the research? 
The researcher will use the findings to write a PhD thesis. The findings may also be 
used to make presentations at academic conferences and workshops, as well as one 
or more publications in academic journals. The researcher will work to remove all 
data that could be used to identify you (see section on confidentiality, above).  
Who is organising and funding the research? 
The research has been organised by the researcher (Leigh Rooney) as part of an 
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) studentship grant for a PhD being 
undertaken through Durham University. 
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Who has reviewed the study? 
The study has been approved by the Applied Social Sciences Ethics Committee at 
Durham University, and by an NHS Research Ethics Committee. 
How will I find out about the findings of the study? 
If you chose, you can be sent a short report about the findings of the study 
approximately 12 months after the researcher starts interviewing. This can be sent 
by post or email. In addition, you are welcome to contact the researcher at any time 
to enquire about any publications or presentations produced from the findings. 
What should I do if I want to find out more, or if I am considering taking part in 
the study? 
You can fill in the contact form provided with this information sheet, and then post it 
in the stamped, addressed envelope provided. The researcher will then contact you 
to discuss the study. Alternatively, you can contact the researcher using the contact 
details at the end of this sheet. Note that filling out the contact form or contacting the 
researcher does not count as you consenting to take part in the study. 
Further information and contact details: 
If you require any further information or have any questions, please contact the 
researcher (Leigh Rooney) at: 
E-mail: leigh.rooney@durham.ac.uk 
Phone – please leave a message and contact details on [tel. number] and Leigh 
will contact you as soon as possible. 
Other contacts and complaints: 
If you wish to discuss anything with someone other than the researcher, or if you 
have a complaint, please contact: 
Dr Tiago Moreira – Reader in Sociology at Durham University and the researcher’s 
primary academic supervisor – [tel. number] or tiago.moreira@durham.ac.uk 
Dr Andrew Orton – Chair of the Applied Social Sciences Ethics Committee – on [tel. 
number] or a.j.orton@durham.ac.uk 
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APPENDIX	3A:	CONTACT	FORM	(PPI	VARIANT)	
(Starts	next	page)	This	contact	form	was	provided	to	potential	participants	on	the	patient-public	involvement	(PPI)	programme	who	were	contacted	by	post.	It	varies	slightly	to	the	one	provided	to	non-PPI	potential	participants	(see	Appendix	3B),	mainly	in	order	to	communicate	that	the	patient’s	information	held	by	the	NHS	Foundation	Trust	responsible	for	the	PPI	programme	was	outside	of	the	control	of	the	researcher,	and	that	the	patient	would	(if	necessary)	need	to	contact	the	Trust	directly	relating	to	this.	
Note	1:	The	document	has	been	scaled	down	to	maintain	its	original	formatting	whilst	
respecting	the	thesis	margin	requirements.	The	original	size	of	the	document	is	A4.	A	full-sized	
version	is	available	upon	request.	
Note	2:	The	name	of	the	NHS	Foundation	Trust	that	facilitated	recruitment	has	been	redacted	
from	the	document	to	prevent	the	possibility	of	participant	identification	through	deduction	
(‘deductive	disclosure’).	
Note	3:	The	document	used	during	the	study	was	printed	in	black	and	white	(and	is	shown	as	
such	in	the	printed	version	of	this	thesis).	
Note	4:	The	title	of	the	study	changed	during	the	course	of	the	study	itself,	and	as	such	the	title	
listed	on	the	following	document	differs	from	the	title	of	this	thesis.	
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Version:'1.1'
Dated:'22nd'February'2015'
 
Contact form: A qualitative account of pain 
enactment with persons in chronic pain 
 
Please read the information sheet.  
 
If you want to hear more about the study, or are considering participating 
in it, please complete this form and post it back to the researcher using the 
envelope provided. 
 
Please note that filling in this form in no way commits you to taking part in 
the study. It is purely designed to let you find out more about it. 
 
Please tick 
as 
appropriate 
 
YES NO I am willing for the researcher (Leigh Rooney) to contact me about the study in 
order to clarify information about it and to check my interest in participating. 
(Please complete the below if you have answered YES) 
 
My name is: …………………………………………………………………………. 
 
YES NO I would like to be contacted by telephone, my number is: 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………. 
YES NO I would like to be contacted by email, my email address is: 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
YES NO I would like to be contacted by post (address already obtained). 
 
 
Please use the envelope provided to post your form back to the researcher. 
 
Please note:  
 
Any details you provide will only be used to make contact with you about the 
study, and not for any other purpose.  
 
The information you provide will be destroyed immediately if you were to 
eventually decide not to participate, and will be destroyed within 12 months if 
you were to eventually decide to participate.  However, data you have already 
provided to [NHS FOUNDATION TRUST REDACTED] as part of the patient 
public involvement program will continue to be held by them unless you 
contact the Trust and ask for your details to be removed. 
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APPENDIX	3B:	CONTACT	FORM	(NON-PPI	VARIANT)	
(Starts	next	page)	This	contact	form	was	provided	to	potential	participants	who	were	not	on	the	patient-public	
involvement	(PPI)	programme.	It	varies	slightly	to	the	one	provided	to	PPI	potential	participants	(see	Appendix	3A),	mainly	because	the	PPI	variant	provided	communication	regarding	PPI-related	patient	information	held	by	the	responsible	NHS	Foundation	Trust,	something	that	was	not	applicable	to	non-PPI	patients.	
Note	1:	The	document	has	been	scaled	down	to	maintain	its	original	formatting	whilst	
respecting	the	thesis	margin	requirements.	The	original	size	of	the	document	is	A4.	A	full-sized	
version	is	available	upon	request.	
Note	2:	The	document	used	during	the	study	was	printed	in	black	and	white	(and	is	shown	as	
such	in	the	printed	version	of	this	thesis).	
Note	3:	The	title	of	the	study	changed	during	the	course	of	the	study	itself,	and	as	such	the	title	
listed	on	the	following	document	differs	from	the	title	of	this	thesis).	
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Version:'1.1'
Dated:'22nd'February'2015'
 
Contact form: A qualitative account of pain 
enactment with persons in chronic pain 
 
Please read the information sheet.  
 
If you want to hear more about the study, or are considering participating 
in it, please complete this form and post it back to the researcher using the 
envelope provided. 
 
Please note that filling in this form in no way commits you to taking part in 
the study. It is purely designed to let you find out more about it. 
 
Please tick 
as 
appropriate 
 
YES NO I am willing for the researcher (Leigh Rooney) to contact me about the study in 
order to clarify information about it and to check my interest in participating. 
(Please complete the below if you have answered YES) 
 
My name is: …………………………………………………………………………. 
 
YES NO I would like to be contacted by telephone, my number is: 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………. 
YES NO I would like to be contacted by email, my email address is: 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
YES NO I would like to be contacted by post, my address is: 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Please use the envelope provided to post your form back to the researcher. 
 
Please note:  
 
Any details you provide will only be used to make contact with you about the 
study, and not for any other purpose.  
 
The information you provide will be destroyed immediately if you were to 
eventually decide not to participate, and will be destroyed within 12 months if 
you were to eventually decide to participate. 
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APPENDIX	4:	RECRUITMENT	LETTER	(PPI	PATIENTS)	
(Starts	next	page)	Several	patients	on	the	patient-public	involvement	(PPI)	programme	who	had	provided	feedback	to	the	researcher	on	an	earlier	version	of	the	Participant	Information	Sheet	in	order	to	help	enhance	its	communication	expressed	a	wish	to	receive	information	about	potentially	participating	in	the	study	once	recruitment	began.	They	were	sent	a	letter	along	with	the	Participant	Information	Sheet	(Appendix	2),	contact	form	(Appendix	3a),	and	a	stamped	addressed	envelope.	Each	letter	was	bespoke	in	relation	to	specific	feedback	that	the	specific	patient	had	offered,	but	a	generic	version	can	be	found	on	the	following	page.	
Note	1:	The	document	has	been	scaled	down	to	maintain	its	original	formatting	whilst	
respecting	the	thesis	margin	requirements.	The	original	size	of	the	document	is	A4.	A	full-sized	
version	is	available	upon	request.	
Note	2:	The	name	of	the	NHS	Foundation	Trust	that	facilitated	recruitment	has	been	redacted	
from	the	document	to	prevent	the	possibility	of	participant	identification	through	deduction	
(‘deductive	disclosure’).	
Note	3:	The	document	used	during	the	study	was	printed	in	black	and	white	(and	is	shown	as	
such	in	the	printed	version	of	this	thesis).		 	
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School of Applied Social Sciences 
Durham University, 32 Old Elvet 
Durham DH1 3HN 
Email: leigh.rooney@durham.ac.uk 
29/04/2015 
 
 
 
Dear [NAME], 
 
I am writing to thank you for your recent feedback on a Participant Information Sheet for a 
chronic pain research project that I am undertaking. This document was amended in 
response to your own and others’ replies. As a result of these changes, the project has 
now been approved by an NHS Research Ethics Committee and [NHS FOUNDATION 
TRUST REDACTED] (this is in addition to approval already obtained from Durham 
University). 
 
In particular, your querying of the term “pain enactment” was particularly useful in 
ensuring that I avoid misunderstandings about the meaning of the term. I am grateful for 
your assistance. 
 
You also indicated that you would like to receive information about potentially 
participating in the study when the recruitment stage begins. I have therefore included the 
updated Participant Information Sheet with this letter for your consideration. If after 
looking at this you feel you might be interested in participating, please return the contact 
form (also included with this letter) in the pre-stamped, pre-addressed envelope provided. 
After this, I would then be in touch (preferably by telephone or email) to answer any 
questions you have about the study and to arrange an initial meeting if you are still 
interested. 
 
Please note that you do not have to respond to this letter, and your decision of whether or 
not to respond will not affect any treatment you will receive. 
 
Thank you again for your helpful feedback. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Leigh Rooney 
PhD student, School of Applied Social Sciences, Durham University 
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APPENDIX	5:	PARTICIPANT	INFORMED	CONSENT	FORM	
(Starts	next	page)	
Note	1:	The	document	has	been	scaled	down	to	maintain	its	original	formatting	whilst	
respecting	the	thesis	margin	requirements.	The	original	size	of	the	document	is	A4.	A	full-sized	
version	is	available	upon	request.	
Note	2:	The	document	used	during	the	study	was	printed	in	black	and	white	(and	is	shown	as	
such	in	the	printed	version	of	this	thesis).	
Note	3:	The	title	of	the	study	changed	during	the	course	of	the	study	itself,	and	as	such	the	title	
listed	on	the	following	document	differs	from	the	title	of	this	thesis.	
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Qualitative account of pain enactment: Consent Form 
Version 1.5, Dated: 12th June 2015                                                                                              Page 1 of 1 
 
Study Title: 
A Qualitative Account of Pain Enactment with Persons in Chronic Pain 
Consent Form 
 
 Please Tick as 
Appropriate 
Please 
initial each 
box Yes No 
I confirm that I have read and understood the Participant 
Information Sheet dated 12th June 2015, Version 1.5, for the 
above named study. I have had the opportunity to ask questions 
of the researcher and these have been answered satisfactorily. 
   
I understand that my participation in this study is entirely 
voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without 
reason. I understand that I will only be able to withdraw my data 
from a particular interview up to 2 months after that interview. 
   
I understand that if at any point in the study up until 2 months 
after an interview I lose capacity to consent, data collected 
about me during that interview will be destroyed and not used in 
the study. 
   
I understand that I am being asked to take part in a total of 5 
interviews, and to prepare some short stimulus material with 
which to initiate the first interview. 
 
   
I understand that interviews will be digitally recorded onto an 
audio device and then transcribed (written up). I agree that my 
quotes may be used in presentations and publications after 
personally identifiable information has been removed. 
   
I understand that whilst every effort will be made to remove data 
from my transcript that might identify me, it may still be possible 
for persons very familiar with me to identify me from published 
accounts. I understand this is very unlikely scenario, however. 
   
I understand that my personal data will be securely stored at 
Durham University and that it will be destroyed within 12 months 
of collection. 
 
   
I understand that if during the study I disclose information about 
risk of significant harm to myself or others, or where a crime is 
disclosed requiring the researcher to inform relevant authorities, 
that my confidentiality may be broken. 
   
I agree to take part in this research study. 
 
 
 
   
 
 
Name of Participant: ___________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Signature: ___________________________________________       Date: _____/______/ 2015 
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APPENDIX	6:	JUDITH	(FULL	ANALYSIS)	
FIRST	MOVEMENT:	A	NARRATIVE	OF	RESTITUTION	
Judith	is	a	woman	in	her	late	50s	with	chronic	back	pain.	The	narrative	she	produced	approximated	that	of	restitution	in	progress,	and	her	experience	of	chronic	pain	is	enmeshed	with	that	of	depression,	even	if	the	events	that	triggered	both	episodes	are	not	related.	Her	narrative	has	been	split	into	four	parts:	(1)	a	conflict	between	an	attitude	that	demands	that	she	function	and	one	that	demands	caution	in	functioning,	(2)	an	idealised	model	of	action	that	negotiates	between	the	two,	allowing	her	to	take	actions	that	enable	progress	towards	a	physical	and	psychological	normality	that	resolves	the	conflict	entirely	(restitution),	(3)	inherent	uncertainty	over	the	nature	of	her	physical	and	psychological	limits	that	inhibit	the	efficacy	of	this	model	of	action,	and	(4)	an	underlying	fear	that	her	desired	normality	is	actually	out	of	reach.	(1)	CONFLICT	BETWEEN	DEMANDS	TO	FUNCTION	AND	CAUTION	IN	FUNCTIONING	Judith’s	problem	with	her	back	began	about	20	years	before	our	interviews,	which	she	suspected	to	be	one	or	two	‘slipped	discs’	in	her	spine.	She	was	incapacitated	to	the	extent	that	she	spent	2	months	off	work.	This	was	only	a	temporary	episode,	and	she	recovered.	However,	2	years	before	the	interviews	she	experienced	the	same	injury	whilst	reaching	to	take	laundry	off	a	clotheshorse.	This	was	diagnosed	as	two	slipped	discs,	and	involved	one	of	the	herniated	discs	pressing	against	her	sciatic	nerve.	Since	then	she	has	experienced	persistent	pain.	The	injury	can	(at	times)	limit	her	ability	to	physically	function.	Certain	types	of	physical	activity	can	make	the	condition	and	her	pain	worse,	and	has	resulted	in	Judith	developing	an	attitude	that	is	cautious	about	undertaking	such	activity.	She	said	“I’m	really	being	careful	with	my	back”1	and	that	“when	you	do	move	you	move	so	carefully”2.	There	are	three	main	reasons	for	the	caution.	First,	there	is	fear	of	the	sensation	of	pain.	She	said	“it	hurts	so	much	you’re	absolutely	panic-stricken	about	doing	anything	that	might	cause	that	pain”3.	Second,	there	is	a	fear	that	if	she	‘overdoes’	physical	activity	(too	much,	or	done	in	the	wrong	way)	that	this	will	exacerbate	her	condition	even	further.	In	particular,	as	will	become	clearer	later,	Judith	puts	great	hope	in	the	idea	that	she	is	on	a	road	to	recovery	back	to	normality,	and	overdoing	physical	activity	can	result	in	a	backward	step	on	this	journey	of	restitution.	Thus,	she	noted	that	“if	you	do	something	badly	and	you	really	hurt	yourself	[then]	you’re	back	to	square	one”4.	She	can	be	“in	floods	of	tears”5,	not	necessarily	because	of	the	sensation	of	pain	but	“because	you	think	I’ve	just	wasted	that	last	week	by	getting	to	this	stage”6.	The	third	reason	for	her	caution	is	her	belief	that	as	she	is	
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getting	older	her	body	is	becoming	more	fragile.	In	particular,	she	believed	that	ageing	reduces	the	ability	of	her	body	to	recover	from	injury,	thus	making	it	less	capable	of	activity.	The	cautionary	attitude	to	undertaking	physical	activity	is	not	entirely	attributable	to	her	ongoing	back	problem,	however.	Intertwined	with	this	is	a	caution	deriving	from	an	episode	of	depression,	which	had	began	several	years	before	our	interviews,	after	Judith	had	experienced	a	large	amount	of	stress	at	work.	This	stress	began	after	transferring	to	a	new	role,	and	due	to	deficiencies	in	training	provision,	coupled	with	a	large	moral	responsibility	involved	with	her	job	(the	wellbeing	of	people’s	lives),	she	felt	the	pressure	on	her	“mounted	up	and	mounted	up	and	mounted	up”7.	She	“just	woke	up	one	morning	and	just	this	shutter	came	down”8.	She	said	“I	just	felt	very	calm,	and	my	head	just	said	‘can’t	do	it	anymore’.	[…]	I	couldn’t	even	get	out	of	bed”9.	Subsequently	she	experienced	significant	withdrawal	from	everyday	activities.	“I	just	wanted	to	keep	myself	to	myself”10.	She	took	sick	leave	from	work	(and	she	has	never	returned)	and	would	avoid	leaving	the	house,	spending	her	days	“just	laying	on	the	settee”11.	She	spoke	to	few	people,	and	only	her	husband	was	aware	of	what	was	happening	to	her.	She	described	this	as	an	episode	of	depression.	As	with	her	back	injury	Judith	conceived	of	a	journey	of	restitution	from	her	depressive	state,	with	her	gradually	becoming	less	withdrawn	and	more	active	in	undertaking	everyday	activities.	However,	there	was	a	great	fear	that	if	she	was	not	careful	with	the	amount	of	activity	she	was	involved	in	that	she	would	get	into	the	same	“emotionally	hyper	state”12	that	had	produced	her	episode	of	depression.	Being	withdrawn	from	everyday	activities	meant	she	could	avoid	the	production	of	too	much	emotion	within	her,	and	she	felt	“an	element	of	not	wanting	to	leave	that	emotionless	place”13.	Indeed,	her	fear	was	not	of	the	depressive	symptoms	themselves,	which	she	described	as	almost	a	relief	(“a	comfortable	feeling”14),	but	the	emotions	she	felt	prior	to	it	(which	were	“intense	and	over	the	top”15	and	where	she	was	“ready	to	burst”16).	As	a	consequence	she	said	“I	do	hold	back	on	things	just	in	case	there’s	a	risk	of	maybe	going	back	to	that	place”17,	and	that	she	has	an	attitude	of	“keeping	the	emotions	on	a	very	level	keel”18.	Any	decision	of	whether	to	undertake	a	particular	activity	is	thus	affected	by	a	cautionary	attitude	arising	from	fears	relating	to	both	her	back	condition	and	the	possibility	of	experiencing	too	much	emotion.	However,	in	opposition	to	this	cautionary	attitude	are	various	pressures	that	require	Judith	to	function.	These	include	the	practical	need	to	participate	in	essential	everyday	activities	(such	as	standing	to	answer	the	door	or	telephone,	going	outside	to	the	shops,	or	driving),	a	belief	that	her	back	muscles	require	physical	activity	in	order	to	improve	(she	took	up	golf	primarily	because	“it	could	help	if	my	muscles	get	stronger”19),	and	that	focussing	too	much	
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on	what	could	go	wrong	could	lead	to	their	realisation	(“they	can	say	it	can	be	self-fulfilling	can’t	they,	if	you	think	about	it	enough	it	will	happen”20).	Moreover,	she	also	felt	a	need	to	connect	with	others,	and	this	required	a	degree	of	activity.	Her	withdrawal	from	activity	resulted	in	isolation	and	loneliness,	and	she	missed	the	“banter	with	people”21	at	work,	noting	that	“talking	to	people	is	definitely	something	I	miss”22.	Judith	also	felt	obligated	to	undertake	activity	for	the	sake	of	others,	notably	her	husband	(with	whom	she	had	participated	in	a	lot	of	sport	and	exercise	over	the	course	of	their	marriage).	She	said	“I	feel	I’ll	disappoint	him	because	I	won’t	be	able	to	do	what	he	thinks,	what	he	wants	to	do”23.	The	last	(and	most	significant)	pressure	to	function	relates	to	a	need	to	undertake	activities	to	satisfy	important	elements	of	her	identity.	This	identity	can	be	summarised	as	‘competitive’,	‘motivated’,	and	‘daring’.	Judith	said	“I’ve	always	had	a	bit	of	a	competitive	edge	to	me”24,	and	discussed	how	she	has	felt	like	this	since	her	schooldays,	where	she	was	competitive	at	sport	(being	on	several	school	teams).	This	mind-set	involves	“setting	yourself	targets”25	and	“giving	yourself	a	focus”26,	with	the	ultimate	aim	of	success	in	the	activity	in	question.	Beyond	her	success	as	a	sportswoman,	this	translated	into	her	job,	where	she	was	a	“grade-A	performer”27.	“You	want	to	be	the	best	kind	of	person.	You	kind	of	want	to	do	the	best	job	you	can”28.	This	requires	Judith	to	be	motivated,	and	this	forms	an	important	cornerstone	of	her	identity.	Judith	does	not	like	to	“sit	and	do	nothing”29,	something	she	has	found	hard	when	she	has	withdrawn	due	to	physical	and	psychological	pressures.	She	said	it	“feels	like	you’re	wasting	time”30,	and	that	“you	feel	like	you	should	be	doing	something	all	the	time”31.	Indeed,	Judith	had	the	attitude	that	“I’ve	got	to	stretch	myself”32,	and	this	was	expressed	in	the	fact	that	she	frequently	created	objectives	to	aim	for.	Often	these	objectives	required	Judith	to	be	daring,	to	take	risks	with	a	particular	activity.	Since	her	persistent	back	pain	began	she	noted	one	particular	instance	where	she	was	given	the	opportunity	to	learn	to	ride	a	unicycle	by	an	old	friend	when	she	was	volunteering	at	a	family	festival-type	event:	
J:	And	I	said	‘there’s	no	way	I’m	trying	to	ride	a	unicycle	with	my	back’.	And	then	I	thought	‘well	why	not’,	you	know?	Well	I	tried	it	and	I	scared	myself	stupid	because	I	fell	off	three	times.	[…]	L:	How	do	you	go	from	a	situation	where	[…]	you	can’t	do	gardening	for	half	an	hour	to	[…]	trying	a	unicycle?	What	happened?		J:	[…]	I	don’t	want	to	be	that	person	who	will	say	‘I’ll	never	try	it’.	[I1:550-2;555-8]	In	this	section	I	have	argued	that	at	the	heart	of	Judith’s	narrative	is	a	conflict	between	pressures	to	undertake	activity	and	physical	and	psychological	fears	that	seek	to	limit	it.	The	following	section	will	outline	an	idealised	model	that	Judith	attempted	to	mobilise	to	negotiate,	and	ultimately	resolve,	this	conflict.	
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(2)	THE	NEGOTIATED	RETURN	TO	NORMALITY	Judith’s	great	hope	is	a	return	to	a	physical	and	psychological	normality	where	the	impediments	to	activity	have	been	resolved	and	where	there	is	thus	no	longer	any	need	for	caution	to	limit	such	activity.	She	presented	a	model	of	a	journey	of	restitution	that	involves	a	steady,	incremental	increase	in	activities	over	time	as	she	becomes	increasingly	physically	and	emotionally	capable.	Her	interviews	were	filled	with	talk	of	“when	I	start	to	feel	better”33,	of	when	“you	suddenly	realise	that	you’ve	taken	three	steps”34,	“of	moving	forward	and	upward”35.	The	model	is	able	to	provide	a	negotiated	pathway	between	the	two	attitudes	that	avoids	the	excesses	of	caution	and	over-activity.	Judith	discussed	the	journey	in	separate	physical	and	psychological	terms,	although	their	links	will	become	more	apparent	later.	The	journey	(both	elements)	is	also	less	chronological	than	it	is	systematic,	since	it	is	possible	to	regress	as	well	as	progress.	Its	starting	(and	lowest)	point	is	the	state	of	physical	and	psychological	impairment	that	she	experienced	when	she	injured	her	back	2	years	previously,	and	her	depressive	episode,	respectively.	Both	states	are	characterised	by	the	highest	degree	of	impairment	to	undertaking	activity.	Physically,	this	stage	is	dominated	by	the	experience	of	pain	sensation,	attempts	to	supress	it	using	medication,	and	waiting	for	her	body	to	repair	itself.	Unlike	in	the	later	‘testing’	phase	there	is	no	continuous	self-reflection	on	the	best	course	of	action.	This	becomes	suspended,	with	her	wellbeing	devolved	to	the	doctor,	as	she	simply	tolerates	pain	passively,	waiting	for	the	stage	to	end:	
When	the	pain	is	very	bad	I	don’t	need	control	of	it.	The	doctor’s	in	control	then.	So	if	the	doctor’s	told	me	[to]	take	[painkillers]	for	two	months,	then	I	will	take	them	for	two	months.	And	then	that’s	it.	I	don’t	even	question	it.	So	I	guess	it’s	the	control	issue	for	me	is	not	there.	You	know,	somebody	has	taken	control	then.	And	I’m	just	doing	as	I’m	told.	[I1:984-989]	Progression	beyond	this	phase	is	characterised	by	Judith’s	pain	lessening,	where	she	starts	“weaning	myself	off”36	painkillers	under	the	doctor’s	instruction,	and	where	there	is	a	handing	of	autonomy	back	to	Judith.	Movement	into	the	subsequent	‘testing’	phase	can	only	properly	begin	once	Judith	is	“given	the	control	back	by	the	doctor”37	and	she	starts	to	empirically	test	the	competing	claims	of	cautionary	and	enthusiastic	attitudes.	The	testing	phase	involves	being	closely	attuned	to	her	bodily	movement	and	(in	particular)	pain	sensation	when	undertaking	a	particular	activity	in	order	to	make	a	judgement	about	whether	that	activity	is	likely	to	be	detrimental	or	beneficial.	She	explained:	“what	you	want	to	do	is	to	be	able	to	do	the	exercises	and	have	some	small	movement,	even	the	tiniest	movement.	If	you	don’t	get	that	movement	and	it	really	hurts	then	you	can’t	do	it”38.	The	point	of	such	testing	is	to	“see	how	far	you	can	go	with	it”39.	This	can	then	be	built	upon,	
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setting	her	up	to	make	further	progress	later	(“it	means	you	can	get	a	little	bit	further	the	next	time”40).	Testing	thus	enables	incremental	progress	towards	normality.	The	various	increments	are	typically	marked	in	terms	of	the	amount	of	a	given	activity	that	can	be	performed,	such	as	the	number	of	holes	she	can	manage	in	a	round	of	golf.	Because	it	is	an	empirical	exercise,	successful	testing	requires	Judith	to	not	only	accurately	sense	her	bodily	sensation,	but	to	accurately	‘read’	it.	For	Judith	her	reading	of	her	body	exists	within	a	framework	of	significant	biomedical	knowledge	that	allows	her	to	interpret	sensation	and	make	decisions	regarding	activity	between	the	poles	of	the	cautionary	and	enthusiastic	attitudes.	Whilst	noting	that	she	has	“never	been	that	academic”41,	she	has	a	great	drive	to	assimilate	and	apply	knowledge	relating	to	her	back	condition	in	order	to	progress	towards	its	restitution:	
If	I’ve	got	a	bad	back	I	want	to	know	how	to	manage	it.	I	want	to	know	how	it	works,	why	it’s	gone	wrong,	and	what	I	can	do	about	it.	I	want	to	be	able	to	be	the	one	in	control	[…].	[I1:334-5]	She	also	has	the	capability	of	discerning	the	epistemological	quality	of	such	knowledge.	She	is	“able	to	[…]	weed	out	the	wheat	from	the	chaff”42	and	thus	be	confident	in	its	usefulness	to	her.	Judith’s	intimacy	with,	and	assurance	in	the	authority	of,	the	biomedical	knowledge	she	assimilates	is	key	to	the	confidence	she	has	in	the	method	of	incrementally	progressing	towards	restitution.	An	equivalence	can	be	drawn	with	Judith’s	psychological	restitution.	Its	starting	point	is	the	emotionless	state	following	the	hyper-emotional	one,	where	“everything	just	went	on	a	flat	line”43,	and	where	she	feared	encountering	any	emotion	again.	Although	Judith	described	this	deadening	of	emotion	as	a	“comfortable	place”44,	she	nevertheless	also	described	the	isolation	it	brought	(“you	are	so	alone”45)	as	“very	frightening”46.	Judith	waited	for	4	½	months	before	seeking	help	for	her	depression,	which	consisted	of	counselling	and	cognitive	behavioural	therapy	(CBT).	After	six	to	eight	months	since	the	depression	started	she	felt	she	was	“starting	to	get	[her]	head	sorted”47,	and	was	able	to	begin	“the	baby	steps,	and	the	testing,	and	the	‘can	I	do	this’,	‘can	I	do	that’	”48	with	regards	to	the	emotional	demands	of	particular	activities.	Similar	to	physical	testing,	Judith’s	faith	in	psychological	testing	depends	upon	her	being	attuned	to	relevant	sensations	(this	time	emotional	feelings),	and	to	accurately	interpret	these	sensations.	For	Judith	this	has	two	elements.	First,	she	has	faith	in	her	intuitive	awareness	of	whether	an	emotional	demand	is	too	great	(“I	have	a	lot	of	confidence	in	knowing,	or	feeling,	that	if	my	head	sort	of	starts	me	thinking	down	a	certain	route,	it	tends	to	be	the	right	thing”49).	Second,	she	believes	she	has	a	good	logical	reasoning	mechanism	that	can	systemically	interrogate	psychological	fears	that	arise.	Drawing	on	CBT	(and	in	
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particular	one	self-help	book	she	described	as	“my	little	bible”50)	this	is	where	you	“listen	to	your	thoughts	but	listen	to	them	sensibly”51.	Faith	in	this	mechanism	is	key	to	giving	Judith	the	hope	that	she	can	gradually	extend	her	emotional	capacity	to	reach	a	level	of	normality	whilst	avoiding	another	psychological	withdrawal	due	to	an	excessive	emotional	burden.	Progress	in	the	journey	of	restitution	is	accompanied	with	a	growing	“confidence”	(a	term	used	by	both	of	us	83	times	across	the	interviews52),	and	its	closely	related	concept:	“hope”53.	Judith	gave	many	examples	that	demonstrated	the	success	of	the	physical	and	psychological	models	of	action	described	above	in	progressing	her	towards	normality.	She	recognised	that	there	could	be	regression	to	an	earlier	stage	if	she	‘overdid’	activity,	but	this	was	understood	as	a	setback	to	be	managed	against	a	bigger	picture	of	progress.	‘Confidence’	meant	being	more	able	to	use	her	back	as	she	wanted,	and	being	able	to	take	on	greater	emotional	burden.	However,	it	also	had	a	more	fundamental	sense	that	made	it	synonymous	with	her	identity	as	competitive,	motivated,	and	daring.	It	meant	winning	novice	competitions	at	her	golf	club,	to	receive	high	compliments	from	her	coach	(“a	natural	golfer”54),	and	to	competitively	drive	a	sports	car	at	a	volunteering	event.	In	this	sense,	the	increased	ability	to	use	her	back	and	take	on	emotional	burdens	are	simply	allegories	for	being	sufficiently	competitive,	motivated,	and	daring.	And	what	this	boils	down	to	is	feeling	successful	in	what	she	does,	of	‘winning’:	
But	I	persevered	[with	driving	golf	balls]	and	I	did	every	single	ball	out	of	that	[bucket	of	balls].	And	I	thought,	yeah,	my	arms	and	my	shoulders	aren’t	aching.	And	it’s	like	a	huge	boost,	you	know.	You	feel	like	you’re	winning	again.	[I2:221-3]	(3)	‘UNKNOWN	QUANTITIES’:	EMPIRICAL	UNCERTAINTY	IN	DECISION-MAKING	I	refer	to	the	model	discussed	in	the	previous	section	as	‘idealised’	because	it	became	apparent	that	its	execution	in	practice	was	less	than	ideal.	The	reason	for	this	is	that	although	Judith	expressed	great	confidence	in	her	ability	to	read	the	sensations	required	for	empirical	testing,	there	was	actually	always	some	doubt	involved	about	whether	her	interpretation	was	accurate,	and	thus	whether	her	decision	regarding	activity	was	the	best	one.	Judith	talked	about	“the	unknown	quantity”55	involved	in	such	negotiated	decisions.	This	uncertainty	is	realised	in	the	physical	set-backs	she	has	experienced,	and	even	as	these	are	framed	as	temporary	she	talked	about	how	her	“confidence”	can	be	“shattered	quite	easily”56.	Perhaps	the	most	important	source	of	self-doubt	is	the	hyper-emotional	state	she	experienced	from	work	stress.	It	was	here	that	the	very	essence	of	her	‘confidence’	–	her	competitive,	motivated,	daring	identity	–	had	actually	been	instrumental	to	her	mental	collapse.	This	confidence	had	neglected	“some	argument	in	the	back	of	your	head	that	you	didn’t	know	about”57	which	had	protested	during	the	stress	but	had	been	supressed	by	her	confidence,	and	which	finally	revealed	itself	in	the	involuntary	“shutting	down”58	that	
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followed.	From	confidence	she	was	now	“totally	out	of	[her]	comfort	zone”59	and	“had	no	idea	what	was	happening”60.	Her	confidence	had	failed	her,	and	might	do	so	again.	Three	possible	decision	making	positions	were	discussed	in	her	interviews.	The	first,	and	most	ideal,	is	what	we	came	to	call	the	“Sensible	Head”61.	The	Sensible	Head	is	able	to	work	out	the	optimum	amount	of	activity	that	can	be	performed	at	a	given	increment	on	the	journey	of	restitution,	in	accordance	with	the	model	outlined	in	the	previous	section.	However,	the	potential	presence	of	the	unknown	quantity	means	that	the	decision	might	actually	be	an	overly-cautious	one,	and	that	she	would	miss	out	on	the	benefits	of	further	activity.	This	position	Judith	called	the	“Scaredy	Cat”62.	Finally,	there	was	a	possibility	that	Judith	is	actually	not	cautious	enough,	and	risks	an	over-doing	of	activity	that	results	in	regression.	This	I	called	the	“Reckless	Head”63.	The	unknown	quantity	meant	that	Judith	doubts	which	of	these	three	positions	is	making	the	decision.	Whilst	each	claims	to	be	the	sensible	option,	it	is	only	the	Sensible	Head	that	can	negotiate	the	path	towards	normality.	Yet	there	is	a	danger	that	she	might	be	erroneously	persuaded	that	one	of	the	two	non-ideal	positions	is	most	sensible:	
Very	occasionally	if	I’ve	done	something	wrong	and	twisted	my	back	and	I	get	an	absolute	stabbing	pain	in	my	back,	then	the	Scaredy	Cat	will	come	in	and	say	‘right,	you’re	going	to	have	to	call	it	a	day	now	because	if	you	go	to	the	next	12	[golf	holes]	you	might	even	do	even	more	damage	and	get	even	more	pain’.	But	there’s	sometimes	a	bit	of	a	fight	because	the	Sensible	Head	is,	is	right	in	a	lot	of	cases	in	that	sometimes	you	work	through	it.	[I3:784-8]	Whilst	it	was	possible	here,	with	the	benefit	of	hindsight,	to	identify	which	position	is	the	Scaredy	Cat	and	which	is	the	Sensible	Head,	that	there	is	a	“fight”	between	the	positions	suggests	this	distinction	was	certainly	not	clear	when	Judith	had	to	make	a	decision	at	the	time.	Often	even	hindsight	is	not	enough,	however,	with	Judith	discussing	her	decision	to	end	her	attempts	at	unicycling	at	a	volunteering	event	(see	above)	in	terms	of	a	sensible	decision	(the	risk	of	getting	hurt	was	greater	than	the	chance	of	her	being	able	to	“master	it”64)	before	then	framing	it	as	the	actions	of	an	ingrained	Scaredy	Cat	that	she	would	like	rid	of.	The	three	decision-making	positions	are	born	from,	and	made	elusive	through,	the	uncertainty	inherent	in	Judith’s	interpretation	of	sensations	from	her	body	and	mind.	However,	there	is	more	at	stake	than	simply	the	accuracy	of	the	assessment	of	the	capability	of	her	back	muscles	or	her	emotional	capacity.	Indeed	the	enactment	of	each	position	says,	for	Judith,	something	important	about	who	she	is.	The	Scaredy	Cat	is	not	simply	an	inefficient	route	to	normality,	but	represents	a	fundamental	contravention	of	the	‘daring’	aspect	of	Judith’s	identity,	one	that	is	key	to	her	wider	identity	of	achieving	success	through	competition	and	motivation.	Comparing	herself	to	a	woman	at	her	golf	club	she	notes:	
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J:	Before	my	depression	I	was	very	like	her,	very	outgoing,	very	confident,	very	out	there	doing	things	left,	right,	and	centre.	Trying	anything	and	everything.	And	I	said	‘now	I’m	this	little	scaredy	cat	that	I’ve	got	to	think	twice	before	I	do	anything’.	L:	And	that	bugs	you?		J:	Yeah.	That	upsets	me	actually.	[I1:494-501]	In	this	sense	Judith	is	“trying	to	get	away	from	the	Scaredy	Cat”65	because	it	says	something	about	who	she	has	become.	She	felt	that	her	emotional	trauma	had	ingrained	the	Scaredy	Cat	into	her	character,	and	she	was	desperate	to	try	and	weed	it	out.	Indeed,	she	even	seemed	to	pathologise	it	as	a	“psychological”66	problem.	As	a	consequence,	caution	is	not	simply	negotiated	through	a	combination	of	good	intuition	and	well-informed	reasoning,	but	can	be	dismissed	because	of	its	affront	to	an	idealised	version	of	who	she	sees	herself	as,	such	as	the	attitude	that	cautioned	her	against	unicycling:	“if	I’d	gone	home	and	not	tried	it,	I’d	have	thought	well,	why	didn’t	you	try,	you	scaredy	cat?”67	This	meant	that	the	Reckless	Head	was	sometimes	chosen	for	reasons	of	identity,	regardless	of	the	high	risks	of	regression.	Indeed,	Judith	felt	“without	a	shadow	of	a	doubt”68	that	there	was	a	need	to	be	reckless	to	prove	to	herself	that	she	was	the	same	competitive,	motivated,	daring	Judith	that	she	was	prior	to	her	depression.	Thus,	the	three	different	positions	express	more	than	simply	the	uncertainty	associated	with	the	assessment	of	sensations:	they	speak	of	the	acceptability	of	the	decision-making	positions	in	defining	the	type	of	person	Judith	wants	to	be.	(4)	NORMALITY	OUT	OF	REACH	Judith	understood	‘normality’	as	being	able	to	satisfy	the	demands	for	functioning	outlined	in	the	first	section,	particularly	those	related	to	her	identity	as	competitive,	motivated,	and	daring.	It	is	not	an	end	point	but	an	ongoing	maintenance	of	a	high-enough	level	of	functioning.	Sometimes	this	level	was	explicitly	defined	for	a	particular	activity,	such	as	being	able	to	play	18	holes	of	golf.	However,	Judith’s	hope	in	the	return	to	normality	oscillated	with	a	suspicion	that	the	normality	she	is	aiming	for	is	actually	out	of	reach.	Discussing	the	woman	at	the	golf	club	whom	Judith	felt	jealous	of	(see	previous	section),	Judith	noted	a	“real	sense	of	loss	that	I	know	I	used	to	be	like	that”69.	This	“sense	of	loss”	expresses	a	recognition	that	she	is	fundamentally	out	of	reach	of	the	normality	she	wants	and	that	the	idealised	model	cannot	provide	a	hopeful	ladder	up	to	it.	Indeed,	she	said	“I	know	I’ll	never,	ever	be	able	to	get	there”70.	This	doubt	centred	on	two	sources.	First,	a	feeling	that	as	she	has	aged	her	body	has	become	less	capable	physically.	She	believed	that	as	she	ages	“you	don’t	heal	as	quickly”71,	thus	
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jeopardising	the	steady	progression	of	the	repair	of	her	body	to	enable	greater	functioning.	Moreover,	she	also	believed	that	with	aging	there	is	also	a	degeneration	in	her	body	that	actually	serves	to	reduce	functioning	(rather	than	simply	slow	or	prevent	restitution):	
My	back	doesn’t	seem	to	be	getting	better.	My	back	seems	to	be	getting	worse.	The	pain	is	more	constant	now.	When	I	[hurt	my	back…]	twenty	years	ago	[…]	there	were	periods	of	time	where	I	could	just	ignore	it	completely,	and	just	not	even	think	about	it,	and	then	I’d	get	a	twinge	and	it	would	be	just	be	like	a	bit	of	a	warning.	But	now,	I	seem	to,	you	know,	there	doesn’t	seem	to	be	much	I	can	do	easily.	[I1:360-4]	She	said	“I	almost	know	for	a	fact	that	I	can’t	do	what	I	did	twenty	and	thirty	years	ago”72	and	that	this	“does	depress	me	sometimes”73.	She	seemed	to	experience	her	back	pain	in	terms	of	a	lost	past	of	physical	functioning,	noting	that	“you	want	to	be	30	years	younger	again”74.	She	said	“we	can’t	do	now	what	we	did	twenty	or	thirty	years	ago	because	we’re	not	that	[same]	fit,	active	person”75.	The	second	source	of	doubt	concerned	perceived	psychological	changes	following	her	hyper-emotional	state.	She	felt	that	after	this	the	Scaredy	Cat	became	an	established	(and	unwelcome)	part	of	her	character.	Indeed,	she	felt	that	“I	have	changed	since	my	depression”76.	Judith	noted	that	
it	is	ridiculous	how	even	things	that	[…]	you’d	taken	for	granted	and	you’d	do	so	easily	before,	somehow	become	difficult.	So	I	mean	like,	I	suppose	even	just	getting	in	the	car	and	driving	somewhere.	It’s	like	you’ve	got	to	psyche	yourself	up	to	do	it.	[I3:345-8]	The	Scaredy	Cat	not	only	jeopardises	a	restitution	of	emotional	capacity,	but	impacts	in	decisions	concerning	the	use	of	her	back.	Emphasising	its	permanence,	she	said	“I	would	like	the	Scaredy	Cat	(laughing)	not	to	be	there,	but	I	think	[…]	it	will	be	there.	I	don’t	think	I’ll	get	rid	of	the	Scaredy	Cat	now”77.	As	with	her	physical	limitation,	she	experiences	the	doubt	concerning	her	emotional	capacity	in	terms	of	a	lost	past.	This	lost	past	is	characterised	by	her	‘confidence’	as	a	competitive,	motivated,	and	daring	individual.	The	Scaredy	Cat	in	particular	impinged	on	the	lattermost	characteristic,	becoming	pronounced	in	the	contrast	between	past	and	present:	
I	didn’t	really	have	the	Scaredy	Cat	before.	The	Scaredy	Cat	definitely	has	come	in	later	rather	than	earlier.	[…S]omebody	could	dare	me	to	do	something	and	9	times	out	of	10	I	would	do	it,	before.	[I3:866-8]	This	was	a	past	where	she	and	her	husband	would	take	part	in	daring	activities	such	as	paragliding,	where	“even	though	we	were	[…]	absolutely	full	of	fear,	we	still	did	it”78.	Judith	said	that	her	recognition	that	she	has	limitations	that	prevent	her	from	reaching	the	normality	she	wants	made	her	“frightened”79.	This	fear	expressed	the	incompatibility	
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between	this	recognition	and	the	sense	of	hope	of	progress	towards	normality.	Indeed,	these	two	strands	oscillated	throughout	the	interviews,	resisting	outright	confrontation.	Nevertheless,	their	contradictory	nature	was	present	in	moments	such	as	when	she	said	that	“if	I	accept	my	limitations,	that	might	be	slightly	negative	for	me”80.	Acknowledging	these	limitations	means	“saying	this	is	how	I	am.	And	I	don’t	think	I	want	to	do	that”81.	Perhaps	unable	to	ignore	their	conflict,	it	was	apparent	that	she	had	thought	about	reconciling	the	two	strands,	and	had	two	strategies	for	this.	The	first	is	to	accept	a	lower	level	of	normality.	Thus,	she	said	“I’ve	got	to	take	my	age	into	account”82	when	considering	what	normality	is,	and	that	(for	example)	rather	than	becoming	a	“brilliant”83	golfer	she	would	be	happy	being	“a	comfortably	average	or	slightly	above	average	golfer”84.	This	strategy	means	letting	go	of	“unrealistic”85	goals,	of	avoiding	being	a	“perfectionist”86.	It	means	actively	avoiding	certain	goals	that	would	normally	appeal	to	her,	such	as	reaching	the	level	of	functioning	(or	‘confidence’)	of	the	lady	at	the	golf	club.	Thus,	she	said	“my	goals	will	be	not	to	be	like	her”87	(my	emphasis).	“I’ve	reached	the	point	where	I	know	I’ll	not	be	her.	And	I	don’t	want	to	be	her”88.	This	also	involves	having	“curbed”89	her	competitive	tendencies,	of	having	“reined”90	in	the	‘confidence’	that	characterised	her	identity:	“I	used	to	be	very	competitive	and	I’ve	curbed	that	because	I’ve	realised	that	being	very	competitive	is	part	of	the	problem	of	being	a	perfectionist	as	well”91.	Her	second	strategy	is	a	belief	that	trying	is	enough,	even	if	it	is	not	possible	to	carry	out	an	activity	and	reach	a	higher	step	towards	normality.	Thus,	regarding	unicycling	she	was	“happy	that	I	tried	it	and	failed”92.	Trying	means	“I	feel	like	I’m	doing	something.	Which	is	a	positive”93.	Nevertheless,	such	negotiation	seemed	unable	to	resolve	what	sometimes	felt	like	irreconcilable	elements	of	her	narrative.	It	felt	like	an	emotional	‘want’	of	normality	that	resists	the	logical	‘should’	of	accepting	limitations.	Thus,	when	I	asked	if	she	had	thought	about	how	she	could	exist	if	she	“can’t	be	this	successful	person	at	something”94	she	said	“no,	I	haven’t,	and	I	don’t	think	I	want	to”95.	Similarly,	when	talking	of	the	high	levels	of	stress	that	accompanied	her	competitive,	motivated,	daring	identity	in	a	high-flying	job	she	said:	“I	don’t	want	to	go	there	again.	They	were	very,	very	highly	pressured	days.	But	there’s	an	element	of	me	thinking,	you	know,	I	do	miss	that”96.	It	seemed	that	the	logical	consequences	of	her	limitations	were	never	able	to	adequately	dampen	the	emotional	wants	of	restitution	to	enable	a	successful	negotiation	between	the	two	contradictory	elements	of	her	narrative.				
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SECOND	MOVEMENT:	AN	INTEREST	STORY	ON	LONELINESS	
I	contend	that	the	controversy	presented	in	this	‘second	movement’	is	not	readily	read	as	fractional	but	epistemological.	In	this	sense,	it	is	not	a	‘second	movement’	at	all,	or	rather	it	is	only	weakly	read	as	such.	This	is	because	in	the	interferences	identified	their	multiplicity	is	readily	distributed	into	splendidly	isolated	temporal	singularities.	This	section	will	explore	how	the	controversies	that	arose	in	Judith’s	first	movement	narrative	were	relatively	successfully	established	within	epistemological	rather	than	fractional	conditions	of	possibility.	As	our	interviews	together	went	on	it	had	become	apparent	to	me	that	Judith’s	friendships	with	others	were	significant	to	her	experience	but	that	they	did	not	seem	to	play	a	particularly	significant	role	in	the	first	movement	narrative.	Indeed,	as	I	noted	in	the	fifth	interview:	“this	issue	of	friendship’s	been	raised	in	lots	of	different	sessions	but	it’s	always	kind	of	lingered	in	the	background”97.	The	identification	of	this	potential	boundary	in	the	first	movement	narrative	prompted	my	exploration	of	it	in	our	interviews,	and	the	completed	analysis	has	been	split	into	two	main	themes:	(1)	loneliness	due	to	difficulty	getting	close	to	others	and	(2)	how	Judith	has	tried	to	deal	with	the	problem	of	loneliness.	It	is	my	contention	that	rather	than	providing	an	extended	field	of	vision	that	identifies	a	mediator	connecting	the	first	movement	and	an	additional	but	impossible	narrative	that	is	Othered	into	absence,	that	this	‘second	movement’	narrative	instead	can	be	readily	read	as	an	interest	story	(Law,	2002),	a	concept	discussed	in	Chapter	11.	The	additional	narrative	offered	concerning	loneliness	can	be	understood	as	‘going	deeper’	than	the	first	movement	narrative,	many	aspects	of	which	can	be	reconceptualised	as	intermediaries	for	the	more	fundamental	narrative	of	loneliness.	However,	unlike	the	interest	story	identified	in	Alice’s	narrative,	the	superficial	and	more	fundamental	narratives	are	not	necessarily	impossible	to	one	another	despite	their	arrangement	into	singularities	based	on	depth.	Nevertheless,	the	same	effect	of	distributing	multiplicity	into	splendidly	isolated	singularities	is	achieved,	and	an	epistemological	reading	is	readily	produced.	(1)	LONELINESS	AND	BEING	A	‘LONER’	In	our	exploration	of	the	significance	of	others	Judith	noted	the	importance	of	talking	to	
people.	Thus,	having	left	work	she	noted	how	“loneliness	and	isolation”98	set	in	because	of	the	lack	of	“the	banter	with	people”99	she	encountered	in	her	work.	Indeed,	in	this	regard	she	said	“talking	to	people	is	definitely	something	I	miss”100,	and	that	the	social	side	of	her	volunteering	work	manning	a	stall	at	events	(where	“you’re	talking	to	anywhere	between	four	and	five	hundred	people	on	a	day”101)	“probably	replaces”102	this	aspect	of	work.	And	when	these	volunteering	events	become	scarce	in	winter,	“the	golf	in	a	way	would	be	a	
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substitute	for	that	because	I	could	still	continue	playing	golf,	go	to	the	golf	club	[and]	talk	to	people”103.	Similarly,	Judith	also	missed	the	socialness	of	living	in	an	urban	area	now	that	she	lived	in	a	village	(“the	one	good	thing	about	living	in	a	town	or	a	city	is	that	there’s	always	people	around	[…but]	when	you	live	in	a	village,	it	is	much	quieter.	And	sometimes	I	do	miss	it”104).	As	well	as	it	being	important	for	Judith	to	talk	to	others,	she	felt	skilled	in	being	able	to	do	so,	with	her	noting	that	“talking	to	people	has	always	been	one	of	my	strong	points	and	I’ve	always	enjoyed	that”105.	However,	when	she	became	depressed	following	her	hyper-emotional	state,	she	found	herself	avoiding	interactions	with	others:	“unusually	[…]	I	didn’t	want	to	bump	into	[anybody]”106.	This	lowest	point	in	her	journey	of	emotional	restitution	was	characterised	by	“wanting	to	be	secure	and	also	not	talking	to	people,	which	is	probably	completely	the	opposite	of	what	I’d	normally	do”107.	And	in	this	isolation	“there	was	an	awful	feeling	of	aloneness”108.	This	was	a	“frightening	aloneness	because	you	think	you’ve	got	to	deal	with	this	on	your	own”109.	Her	episode	of	depression	seemed	to	constitute	an	event	where	somehow	her	‘normal’	socialness	gave	way	to	a	tendency	to	isolate	herself,	resulting	in	a	frightening	feeling	of	aloneness.	Yet	it	became	apparent	that	this	feeling	of	aloneness	was	not	simply	confined	to	her	depressive	episode:	
J:	And	I	think	the	feeling	of	aloneness	[when	she	was	depressed]	is	really	scary.	I	didn’t	like	that	at	all,	no.	I	felt	like	I	was	just	all	on	my	own	and	couldn’t	cope	and	it	was	just	an	awful	feeling.	L:	Did	you	only	get	that	feeling	of	aloneness	[with	the]	the	depression	or	has	it	come	on	since?	J:	No,	I’ve	realised	now	I’ve	had	it	ever	since	I	was	in	my	teens.	[I4:752-5]	In	contrast	to	her	apparent	sociability	suggested	in	our	earlier	discussions,	Judith	went	on	to	talk	about	how	as	a	child	she	actually	isolated	herself	from	others:	
[…]	I	used	to	hold	back	from	school.	I	didn’t	really	have	any	friends	at	school,	you	know,	and	it	was	part	of	this	taking	it	all	inside	and	not	giving	of	myself	really.	[…]	I	talk[ed]	to	people,	but	I	wouldn’t	let	them	in	and	I	kind	of	didn’t	talk	to	them	very	much.	I	don’t	actually	know	why.	I	don’t	really	know	why	I	felt	like	that.	[I4:757-61]	Indeed,	Judith	talked	about	“how	alone	I	felt	at	school”110,	of	“this	sense	of	aloneness”111.	Lacking	friends,	she	even	“invented	this	parallel	life112”	to	compensate:	
This	is	going	to	sound	really	ridiculous	[…but]	I	had	an	exercise	book	(laughing)	with	this	[…different]	name	on	[…]	and	[she]	was	the	one	who	had	all	the	friends.	So	I	had	this	little	book	and	I	would	write	little	stories	in	it	and	things	that	had	happened,	and	it	was	all	[her]	and	her	life	(laughing).	It	sounds	ridiculous,	I	know!	But	that’s	the	kind	of	thing	that	I	think	I	wanted	but	I	didn’t	have.	[I5:45-54]	
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She	talked	about	how	this	difficulty	making	friends	extended	to	adulthood,	contrasting	with	the	first	movement	narrative	where	she	positioned	herself	as	having	good	social	skills.	This	narrative	peeled	away	as	she	noted	that,	actually,	“I	think	I’ve	always	been	a	bit	of	a	loner”113.	Even	at	work,	which	she	missed	because	of	the	‘banter’	with	others,	she	found	the	friendships	she	formed	were	superficial.	Indeed,	she	noted	that:	
[…]	I	found	it	difficult	to	make	friends	with	people	at	work.	I	could	be	friends	on	the	surface	but	where	other	girls	were	going	out	with	other	girls	for	a	drink	after	work	and	that	kind	of	thing,	I	never	got	invited,	you	know.	And	so	I	think	[…]	I’ve	recognised	that	there’s	always	been	that	element	there.	[I5:253-9]	The	sociability	expressed	by	Judith	can	thus	be	understood	as	a	superficiality,	beneath	which	lies	a	social	isolation	and	concomitant	loneliness.	More	than	this,	her	attempts	at	being	social	can	be	understood	as	her	trying	hard	to	attain	the	friends	she	desperately	wanted,	attempts	that	enact	Judith	as	a	social	person	(as	suggested	in	the	first	movement	narrative)	but	which	ultimately	are	revealed	as	an	unconvincing	papering-over	of	failed	interactions	and	aloneness	that	lie	more	meaningfully	beneath.	This	is	not	a	simultaneity	of	the	two	contradictory	concepts	of	socialness	and	anti-socialness,	but	an	anti-socialness	that	lies	underneath	the	surface	of	socialness,	as	a	singularity.	Judith	discussed	her	tendency	to	isolate	herself	from	others	in	terms	of	“not	letting	people	get	too	close”114.	She	accounted	for	this	seemingly	contradictory	behaviour	(since	it	made	her	feel	lonely)	through	appeals	to	some	fixed	personality	trait	determined	by	her	upbringing	(“it’s	your	life	with	your	family	[…]	that’s	[…]	made	you	the	person	you	are”115)	and/or	genetic	predisposition	(“if	this	is	in	my	very	DNA	and	it’s	not	going	to	change	then	it’s	always	going	to	be	there”116).	Whilst	she	said	she	never	felt	lonely	within	her	childhood	home,	and	that	her	“parents	were	two	of	the	most	lovely,	outgoing	people,	generous,	happy,	loving	parents	you’ve	ever	had”117,	she	nevertheless	identified	a	familial	trait	of	isolation	that	was	passed	down	to	both	herself	and	her	siblings	(“my	brother	wouldn’t	even	answer	the	phone	when	the	phone	rang”118).	Yet	just	as	her	isolationism	and	loneliness	were	hidden	behind	a	façade	(of	the	socialness	of	Judith),	this	was	also	the	case	in	her	childhood	home.	Thus,	Judith	talked	about	her	close	relationship	with	her	father:	“we	absolutely	loved	each	other,	you	know.	[…]	I	was	definitely	my	father’s	daughter.	There	was	definitely	a	special	bond	between	us”119.	Indeed,	she	said	“we	were	very	close”120,	and	that	“my	dad	and	I	used	to	walk	down	the	street	holding	hands	and	smiling	because	we	just	love[d]	being	with	each	other”121.	However,	later	in	her	life	Judith	learned	that	her	father	had	isolated	himself	from	his	family	as	he	experienced	significant	and	prolonged	episodes	of	depression,	for	which	he	ultimately	received	electric	shock	therapy	that	Judith	said	destroyed	his	memory	(“it’s	very	difficult	dealing	with	somebody	who	you	love	and	adore	who	doesn’t	even	know	who	you	
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are	anymore”122).	She	noted	how	her	father	did	not	let	her	or	her	siblings	know	about	the	problems	he	was	facing:	
He	might’ve	spoken	to	mam	about	it	but	he	didn’t	talk	to	his	children	about	it,	and	I	think	that	was	because	he	didn’t	want	to.	It	was	possibly	the	man	thing.	‘I’m	a	man	therefore	I	shouldn’t	have	these	problems,	therefore	if	I	don’t	talk	about	them	they	don’t	exist’.	[I5:698-703]	Through	later	conversations	with	her	mother	after	her	father	had	died	(prematurely,	in	his	early	60s	–	approximately	30	years	before	our	interviews)	she	became	aware	of	her	father’s	tendency	to	isolate	himself:		
[…]	as	I	got	older,	when	my	mam	was	still	alive,	she	said	you’re	getting	more	like	your	dad	every	year.	And	[…]	sometimes	I’d	be	talking	to	my	muma	and	you’d	have	these	in-depth	conversations	and	memories	and	all	of	this	kind	of	thing,	and	I	did	find	out	that	my	dad	did	find	it	more	difficult	to	open	up.	[I5:603-7]	Her	father’s	depression	manifested	itself	as	an	inward-turning	isolation,	something	that	Judith	later	recognised	in	her	father	when	looking	back:	
But	now	I	think	about	it,	my	dad	used	to	sit	there	for	long	periods	of	time	and	not	say	a	lot,	and	you’re	kind	of	thinking	in	hindsight,	yeah,	you	kind	of	think	yeah,	[…]	he’s	not	well.	But	I	didn’t	recognise	it	as	that	at	the	time,	you	know	[…].	[I5:800-6]	A	national	sales	manager	who	made	it	part	of	his	job	to	be	social	with	people,	but	who	had	a	crippling	tendency	towards	isolating	himself,	Judith	identified	aspects	of	both	herself	and	her	brother	in	her	father.	Indeed,	she	later	learned	from	her	mother	that,	like	Judith,	her	father	created	a	superficial	social	identity	at	work:	“my	mam	already	[…]	alluded	to	the	fact	that	he	did	the	same	as	me	in	[that]	he	put	a	persona	out,	you	know.	So	the	work	persona	is	different	to	who	you	actually	are”123.	Indeed,	she	said	
I	do	think	there	is	an	element	of	me	being	very	like	my	dad	and	my	dad	being	very	like	me	in	the	way	that	we	dealt	with	things	and	that	we	did	find	it	was	the	persona	that	spoke	to	people,	whereas,	you	know,	the	real	person	inside	just	hung	back	as	usual.	[I5:637-41]	The	‘real	person’	beneath	(the	loner)	was	Othered	into	absence	through	enacting	sociability,	but	this	was	an	enactment	that	failed	when	certain	facts	objected.	For	her	father	one	such	fact	was	his	depression,	and	whilst	a	primitive	defence	against	its	objections	is	to	simply	ignore	its	presence	(“it	just	wasn’t	spoken	about”124	in	the	family),	it	cannot	be	ignored	completely,	as	the	emotionally	painful	process	(for	the	family)	of	her	father’s	electric	shock	treatment	shows.	And	its	presence	is	read	as	revealing	a	more	fundamental	truth	regarding	isolation	and	loneliness	belied	by	a	superficiality	of	a	social	persona.																																									 																					
a	Judith	alternated	between	using	the	words	“mam”	and	“mum”	to	refer	to	her	mother.	
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(2)	DEFENDING	AGAINST	LONELINESS	In	this	interest	story,	the	social	persona	can	be	understood	as	an	ultimately	unsuccessful	attempt	to	compensate	for	the	loneliness	that	accompanies	her	isolationist	tendency.	This	is	one	type	of	defence	against	loneliness,	but	Judith	identified	three	more	defences	that	follow	the	same	interest	story	structure	of	a	fundamental	isolationism	and	loneliness	beneath	superficial	structures	of	her	identity	that	form	the	defence	in	question.	Whilst	the	social	persona	interest	story	mainly	compliments	the	first	movement	narrative	rather	than	reveals	it	as	a	superficial	structure	(since	sociability	was	not	significant	within	it),	highlighting	the	other	three	defences	serves	to	reposition	much	larger	chunks	of	the	first	movement	narrative	as	a	superficial	compensatory	mechanism	that	lies	on	top	of	the	more	fundamental	structure	of	isolationism	and	loneliness.	The	first	of	the	three	mechanisms	is	embracing	loneliness.	Judith	said	that	by	her	late	childhood	she	had	accepted	being	alone:	
When	I	was	actually	at	school,	sort	of	13,	14,	15	I	did	struggle	with	[loneliness…]	a	bit	and	I	did	wonder	why,	you	know,	why	was	I	sort	of	alone,	why	didn’t	anybody	want	to	be	my	friend.	But	by	the	time	I	got	to	6th	form	I	kind	of	realised	that	I	was	okay	with	it.	[I5:40-2]	Indeed,	she	said	she	actually	began	to	embrace	the	differences	she	felt	were	isolating	her,	particularly	activities	she	felt	made	her	different	from	girls	she	wanted	to	be	friends	with	(such	as	riding	a	motorbike):	“I	realised	I	was	actually	doing	things	that	were	slightly	different.	So	I	was	kind	of	enhancing	my	aloneness,	if	that	makes	sense”125.	The	decision	to	embrace	isolation	stemmed	from	a	feeling	that	this	was	ingrained	in	who	she	is	and	could	not	be	changed:	“I	kind	of	thought	to	myself,	you	know,	go	with	it	because	if	that’s	how	you	are,	it’s	pointless	fighting	it	and	trying	to	be	somebody	that	you’re	not”126.	This	builds	upon	the	social	persona	narrative	since	it	constitutes	an	acceptance	of	the	deeper	isolationism	found	beneath	the	façade	of	sociability	once	it	could	no	longer	Other	into	absence	inconvenient	facts	like	Judith’s	lack	of	friends.	However,	whilst	embracing	isolation	meant	“there	was	a	comfort	thing	there	as	I	realised	that’s	how	I	was”127,	she	“still	felt	alone”128,	albeit	“not	as	much”129.	Whilst	isolation	could	be	embraced,	it	was	much	more	difficult	for	Judith	to	embrace	being	lonely.	For	this	reason	other	defences	against	loneliness	continued,	including	developing	the	social	persona	that	would	come	to	play	a	major	role	in	her	working	life.	The	second	defence	mechanism	against	aloneness	is	enacting	of	the	competitive	identity	outlined	in	the	first	movement.	Judith	talked	about	the	“competitiveness	of	trying	to	be	like	other	people”130,	where	“you	want	to	be	friends	with	people	and	I	suppose	you	want	to	be	like	other	people	in	a	way”131.	The	link	between	competing,	being	like	other	people,	and	
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making	friends	was	clarified	when	Judith	talked	about	her	time	during	sixth	form	when	she	had	decided	to	pursue	the	first	defence	mechanism	of	embracing	aloneness.	She	said	“I	suppose	if	there	was	any	competitiveness	of	trying	to	be	like	other	people,	that	kind	of	[…]	went	because	there	wasn’t	any	need	for	it	to	be	there	any	more”132.	In	this	sense	competitiveness	involves	striving	to	be	like	other	people	because	it	creates	a	desirable	identity	(namely,	of	success)	that	others	would	like	to	be	friends	with.	Indeed,	she	said	“sometimes	I	think	you	do	do	things	[…]	in	a	way	[…]	that	will	make	you	look	good”133.	And	when	her	competitiveness	does	not	achieve	a	successful	identity	she	feels	socially	isolated	from	others,	such	as	when	she	was	advanced	to	a	golfing	class	where	the	standard	of	the	students	was	much	higher	than	she	was	used	to:	
The	last	time	I	felt	the	aloneness	was	a	couple	of	months	ago	when	the	normal	class	that	I	go	to	for	my	golf	couldn’t	happen	and	I	had	to	go	to	a	different	class	with	people	that	I	didn’t	know	and	I	had	huge	confidence	loss	[…]	[I5:1345-7]	From	being	highly	successful	relative	to	the	other	students	in	her	beginner’s	class	(and	therefore	socially	desirable	to	others)	she	was	now	at	the	bottom	of	the	success-ladder.	She	noted	that	“when	I	got	there	I	realised	that	the	other	[students…]	were	much	more	advanced	than	I	was	and	so	that	really	pushed	me	back	a	bit”134.	She	said	“I	felt	I	didn’t	belong	there.	[…It]	did	feel	[…]	difficult	talking	to	them.	I	realised	I	was	retreating	inside	myself	again”135.	It	is	better	to	be	a	‘big	fish	in	a	small	ocean’	than	a	‘small	fish	in	a	big	ocean’	because	of	the	social	desirability	being	a	big	fish	brings:	
I	suppose	it’s	much	easier	to	be	a	big	fish	in	a	small	ocean	[…],	isn’t	it?	When	you’re	a	little	fish	and	it’s	a	big	sea	you	get	a	bit	lost.	Whereas	[…]	if	you’re	a	big	fish	and	everybody’s	trying	to	be	you,	then	you	have	this	huge	boost,	don’t	you?	[I4:329-31]	Whilst	this	competitive	identity	in	the	first	movement	is	understood	as	some	foundational,	basic	element	of	who	she	is	that	is	not	connected	to	impressing	others	(this	is	“purely	for	me”136),	in	this	additional	narrative	it	becomes	a	superficial	structure	above	a	deeper	self	that	is	constituted	by	the	struggle	to	escape	loneliness:	
[…]	you	kind	of	develop	a	false	persona.	And	then,	you	know,	you	deal	with	things	in	a	different	way.	And	I	do	think	everybody	does	it	to	a	certain	extent:	that	you	[…]	can	sometimes	want	people	to	see	you	how	you	think	you	should	be.	[I5:222-7]	For	Judith	this	façade	took	its	most	obvious	form	in	her	competitive	identity	at	work:	“you’ve	heard	about	the	power	suits	in	the	80s.	[…]	And	to	me	that	was	like	putting	on	my-,	that	was	me.	That	was	my	work	persona.	I	took	the	suit	off	and	I	was	just	Judith”137.	If	her	competitiveness	is	reworked	as	an	intermediary	for	a	conflict	between	a	tendency	to	isolate	herself	and	the	negativity	of	loneliness	that	accompanies	this	isolation,	then	the	
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conflict	expressed	in	the	first	movement	narrative	(which	can	be	understood	as	a	need	to	return	to	the	‘normality’	of	a	competitive	identity	versus	the	physical	and	emotional	difficulties	standing	in	the	way	of	this)	instead	becomes	about	the	conflict	between	isolation	and	loneliness,	and	the	solution	to	the	first	dissolves	into	the	solution	to	the	second.	This	is	particularly	apparent	in	the	third	(and	arguably	Judith’s	most	successful)	defence	mechanism	against	loneliness	that	she	discussed:	learning	to	be	more	open	with	others.	This	involved	first	recognising	her	impulse	to	retreat	inside	herself	when	it	arises,	and	then	actively	avoiding	behaviour	induced	by	that	impulse.	Feeling	that	she	has	learned	to	do	this	over	many	years	she	said	“I	know	when	I’m	holding	back,	and	I	know	when	I’m	uncomfortable	with	somebody	and	I’m	not	being	forthcoming,	and	I	recognise	that”138.	With	regard	to	avoiding	isolationist	behaviour	when	she	has	recognised	herself	holding	back,	she	noted	how	she	had	learned	to	try	and	talk	to	her	husband	when	she	felt	herself	slipping	into	depression	(echoing	her	father’s	tendency	to	isolate	himself	from	his	family):	
[…]	I	don’t	like	to	tell	him	that	I’m	feeling	a	bit	down	but	I	have	learned	that	I	have	to	do	it.	I	do	force	myself	to	tell	him.	If	I	feel	I’m	dipping	into	it	I	do	have	to	tell	him,	but	I	don’t	like	telling	him.	[I5:817-20]	Similarly,	when	Judith	was	put	into	the	more	advanced	golfing	class	and	said	she	was	“retreating	inside	myself”139,	she	“recognised	it	immediately”140	that	she	had	“stepped	back	and	just	cut	myself	off”141	from	the	others.	In	the	past	she	said	she	would	“have	just	carried	on	and	then	when	nobody	was	looking	I’d	have	turned	round	and	scooted	home	so	I	didn’t	have	to	say	[goodbye…]	to	anybody	or	anything”142,	but	on	this	occasion	she	actively	avoided	behaving	in	an	isolationist	way	and	reached	out	to	her	fellow	students:	
[…]	by	the	end	of	the	lesson	I’d	gone	up	to	one	of	the	girls	and	I’d	said	to	her	‘I’m	really	sorry’,	I	said,	‘I’ve	just	suffered	a	minor	loss	of	confidence,	you	know,	I’m	sorry	if	I	seemed	a	bit	off-ish’.	[I5:1353-5]	Judith	felt	that	“even	though	I	know	[…the	tendency	to	isolate	herself	is]	still	there,	the	fact	that	now	I	can	actually	say	that	to	somebody	[means	that]	I’ve	come	on	leaps	and	bounds	from	before”143.	Judith	related	the	enactment	of	this	social	behaviour	(in	the	face	of	an	isolationist	impulse)	to	having	‘confidence’,	a	concept	that	figured	strongly	in	the	first	movement	narrative:	
[…]	I	do	feel	I	can	handle	it.	‘It’,	whatever	‘it’	is	(laughing).	And	I	think	[it	is]	the	confidence	of	knowing	that	that	then	gives	you	the	confidence	to	explain	about	[…her	isolationist	behaviour].	Whereas	if	I	didn’t	have	that	confidence,	[then…]	I	[would…]	still	[be]	doing	the	turning	inwards	[…].	[I5:1396-9]	Rather	than	‘confidence’	meaning	having	gained	physical	and	emotional	capacity,	and	being	able	to	enact	her	competitive,	motivated,	and	daring	identity	(as	in	the	first	movement	
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narrative),	here	it	is	understood	as	meaning	a	capacity	to	act	against	her	isolationist	tendency.	Indeed,	she	characterised	her	initial	isolationist	behaviour	in	the	advanced	golfing	class	as	a	“minor	loss	of	confidence”144	and	(elsewhere)	as	a	“huge	confidence	loss”145.	Yet	‘confidence	‘	is	also	talked	about	in	the	same	terms	as	the	first	movement	narrative	–	as	some	desirable	quality	that	she	can	gradually	acquire	with	time.	But	unlike	the	first	movement	narrative	the	acquisition	of	confidence	does	not	come	about	due	to	the	relative	ability	to	enact	her	competitive,	motivated,	daring	identity.	Now	understood	as	a	superficial	surface	feature	in	a	defence	mechanism	against	the	more	fundamental	issue	of	loneliness	that	accompanies	her	isolationist	tendencies,	the	need	to	be	competitive,	motivated,	and	daring	becomes	short-hand,	an	intermediary,	for	how	to	escape	loneliness.	And	the	third	defence	of	learning	to	be	more	open	to	others	offers	a	solution	that	questions	the	need	to	enact	the	competitive,	daring,	and	motivated	identity	at	all,	and	thus	presents	the	possibility	of	dissolving	of	the	first	movement	conflict	between	the	need	to	return	to	normality	and	physical	and	emotional	barriers	to	this	(which	is	based	on	a	need	to	enact	this	identity).	
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